KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE AUTHORITY, ALSO KNOWN AS KEMI, ALSO KNOWN AS KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. HON. GREGORY ALLEN LAY, JUDGE, LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT AND CRAIG GEORGE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND D/B/A CRAIG GEORGE TRUCKING; ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY l, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 25, 2009
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KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE
AUTHORITY, also known as KEMI, also known as
KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
V.
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APPELLA
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2009-CA-000403-OA
LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 05-CI-00725 AND 07-CI-00843
HON. GREGORY ALLEN LAY,
JUDGE, LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
CRAIG GEORGE, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND D/B/A CRAIG GEORGE
TRUCKING ; ET AL
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is taken from a decision by the Court of Appeals to deny
Appellant's motion for a writ of prohibition on the ground that a circuit court
has jurisdiction to decide a dispute between an insurance carrier, an employer,
and an insurance agent over coverage under a workers' compensation
insurance policy .
Gordon Howe, a dump truck driver, was involved in a serious traffic
accident while in the scope of his employment . He filed a workers'
compensation claim against his employer, Craig George, individually and
d/b/a Craig George Trucking, and against Ready Mix Concrete of Somerset,
Inc., a business which had contracted with Craig George Trucking .
At the workers' compensation hearing, an Administrative Law Judge
("AI_;J") found that Howe was injured and disabled in the scope of his
employment and was entitled to receive benefits . In making the ruling, the ALJ
noted that there was some confusion as to whether Craig George Trucking's
workers' compensation insurance covered the injured employee, but expressly
stated that "[t]hankfully, [the issue of insurance coverage] is not an issue to be
addressed in this opinion ." The ALJ then entered an award against Craig
George Trucking and/or the insurance carrier of Craig George Trucking, if
Howe was covered under any policy.
After the hearing, two civil actions were filed . Craig George, individually
and d/b/a Craig George Trucking, sued the workers' compensation carrier,
Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance Authority ("KEMI"), as well as the
insurance agent, Roy Martin, individually, and the insurance agency, The
Martin Agency, Inc. In the second action, the Kentucky Associated General
Contractors Self-Insurance Fund, on behalf of Ready Mix Concrete of Somerset,
Inc., sued Craig George Trucking, seeking indemnity for the amount it paid in
benefits to Howe in the workers' compensation action. The two actions were
consolidated and Martin filed a cross-claim against KEMI .
KEMI filed motions for summary judgment against Craig George
Trucking and a motion to dismiss Martin's cross-claim. In support of its
motion for summary judgment, KEMI contends that the actions are barred by
res judicata or judicial estoppel, and that the Laurel Circuit Court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims . The circuit court denied KEMI's motion
for summary judgment, and KEMI filed a petition for a writ of prohibition,
maintaining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the current
action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, stating that "the
circuit court is not adjudicating the claimant's workers' compensation
benefits." Instead, the Court of Appeals believed that the circuit court had
jurisdiction because the litigation concerned a dispute in insurance coverage,
not the validity of the claim under the workers' compensation statute .
This appeal followed . For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has broad discretion in the issuance of writs of
prohibition, and each case must be considered on its own merits . Chamblee v.
Rose, 249 S .W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1952) . Because writs interfere with the
proceedings of a trial court and the efficient dispatch of our appellate duties,
the courts of this Commonwealth have formulated a rule governing the
discretionary choice between issuing a writ and relegating a petitioner to the
right to appeal. See Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W .3d 1 (Ky. 2004) . This Court
has consistently held that a writ of prohibition is appropriate in two
circumstances: (1) when the lower court is acting without or beyond its
jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy through an application to an
intermediate court; or (2) when the lower court is acting erroneously within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and
great injustice and irreparable injury would result:-.- Id. at 10 .
KEMI argues that this case is an example of the lower court acting
beyond its jurisdiction .
KEMI points to KRS 342 .690(1), claiming that Craig George Trucking's
exclusive remedy to litigate a coverage dispute would have been during the
workers' compensation proceeding . That statute states in pertinent part:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as
required by this chapter, the liability of such employer
under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the employee, his
legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or death . For
purposes of this section, the term "employer" shall
include a "contractor" covered by subsection (2) of KRS
342 .6 10, whether or not the subcontractor has in fact,
secured the payment of compensation .
Workers' compensation is a creature of statute, and all available
remedies and procedures described are, by its own terms, exclusive . Williams
v. Eastern Coal Corp. , 952 S .W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1997) . This Court has
previously stated that an insurance carrier may be made a party to the
workers' compensation proceeding, and that the ALJ has jurisdiction to decide
questions concerning the insurer's obligation to pay workers' compensation
benefits on behalf of its insured . Custard Ins . Adjusters, Inc. v. Aldridge, 57
S .W.3d 284, 287 (Ky. 2001) . In addition, once made a party, that insurer can
question whether or not it had issued a valid policy that covered the employer
at the time of the injury . Lawrence Coal Co . v . Bo
s, 218 S .W .2d 670, 671-72 -
(Ky. 1949) .
However, the interpretation of insurance contracts and the enforcement
of the rights of the insured concern matters which are beyond the purview of
the authority vested in the ALJ. These questions are governed by the policy of
insurance and not by any provisions of KRS Chapter 342 . See Wolfe v . Fidelity
8v Cas . Ins. Co. of New York, 979 S.W .2d 118 (Ky.App. 1998) ; A . Larson, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation, ยง 92 .42 (1996) ("[W]hen the rights of the
employee in a pending claim are not at stake, many commissions disavow
jurisdiction and send the parties to the courts for relief. This may occur when
the question is purely one between two insurers, one of whom alleges that it
has been made to pay an undue share of an award to a claimant, and the
award itself is not being under attack . Or it may occur when the insured and
insurer have some dispute entirely between themselves . . . .") .
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that Howe's
rights were fully adjudicated before the ALJ and "the circuit court is not
adjudicating the claimant workers' compensation benefits." The ALJ has
already determined that Howe was injured during the course of employment
and set the amount of benefits to be awarded . The litigation currently at issue
concerns an insurance coverage dispute between Craig George Trucking, KEMI,
and an insurance agent . Accordingly, it arises under the terms of the
insurance contract rather than under Chapter 342 and, thus, does not come
within the Board's subject.: matter jurisdiction . See Wolfe , 979..,.S .W.2d at 121 .
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
J . Dale Golden
Lauren Lea Crosby
Golden 8s Walters, PLLC
Corporate Plaza
771 Corporate Drive, Suite 905
Lexington, KY 40503
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Hon . Gregory Allen Lay
Laurel Circuit Court Judge
P. O. Box 1209
London, KY 40743
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST :
Michael Allen Goforth
Crabtree 8v Goforth
120 East Fourth Street
London, KY 40741-1414
Marc Allen Lovell
Harlin Parker
519 East Tenth Street
P. O. Box 390
Bowling Green, KY 42102-0390
Roberta Kaye Kiser
Pohl, Kiser 8, Aubrey, PSC
167 West Main Street, Suite 100
Lexington, KY 40507-1323
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