MICHAEL L. TAYLOR V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : MARCH 20, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,;vupremt Courf -of
2007-SC-000476-MR
MICHAEL L . TAYLOR
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G . WEDDLE, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-000063
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Michael Taylor, was convicted by an Adair Circuit Court jury of:
(1) two counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, (2) one count
of first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and (3) possession of
marijuana, less than eight ounces and second or subsequent offense . He was
also convicted of being a subsequent offender and second-degree persistent
felony offender . For these crimes, Taylor was sentenced to sixty-seven years
incarceration . Taylor now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const.
ยง110(2)(b) . He asserts two arguments in his appeal : (1) that extremely prejudicial
evidence of prior bad acts was improperly admitted at his trial which should have
led to a mistrial and (2) irrelevant evidence was admitted unduly prejudicing the
jury. For the reasons herein, we affirm Taylor's convictions .
I. Facts and Backgrou nd Information
In June 2005, Sergeant Jason Cross of the Columbia Police Department
conducted an undercover investigation of Taylor, whom he suspected sold drugs.
Sergeant Cross met with a confidential informant who, on two different dates in
.June.2005,-purchased drugs from Taylor. Both times the substances purchased
from Taylor tested positive for cocaine base .
Based on the successful drug purchases, a search warrant was executed
on Taylor's home. During the search, the police seized packages of narcotics,
and multiple electronic devices such as DVD and VHS players, CD players, a
digital camera, and a television . Taylor was then charged with various drug
crimes and with being a second-degree persistent felony offender.
At trial, the confidential informant testified about both of the drug
purchases made at Taylor's house . During the informant's direct testimony
regarding the second drug buy, he stated that, additionally, a young girl arrived at
Taylor's house, presumably to purchase marijuana. Taylor's counsel then crossexamined the informant, asking him a series of questions regarding the young
girl . The informant indicated that while he did not see the girl purchase any
marijuana, he presumed that she was there to purchase drugs because she had
no other reason for being at Taylor's house. Taylor's counsel then asked again if
the informant was assuming that the girl was at Taylor's house to purchase
marijuana. He answered, "I've seen it before ." This answer implies that he had
witnessed this girl purchasing drugs from Taylor before. The judge then
instructed the confidential informant to be responsive and admonished the jury to
disregard the comment. Taylor's counsel immediately objected .
At the ensuing bench conference, Taylor's counsel requested a mistrial
based on the informant's testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Upon the
judge's suggestion, both parties agreed that an additional admonition to the jury
would draw unnecessary attention to the informant's comment. After the trial
resumed, the informant testified that he did not see anyone purchase marijuana
while he was at Taylor's house and that he only presumed the young girl was at
the house to purchase marijuana .
Later at trial, Sergeant Cross testified regarding his involvement in the
case . He testified as to his surveillance of Appellant's residence during the
controlled drug buys, his participation in Appellant's arrest, and the seizure of a
number of items, pursuant to the search warrant, which he believed were items
used for barter in the drug trade . He testified that sometimes drug dealers are
willing to trade drugs for items such as the electronic devices found during the
search of Taylor's house. Taylor's counsel objected to this testimony. The trial
court found that Sergeant Cross was a qualified expert to discuss the general
practices of drug dealers because of his experience dealing with drug cases.
The trial court believed that the weight of Sergeant Cross's testimony would be
determined by the jury and that it was relevant . The trial court further held that
the probative value outweighed any prejudice to Taylor.
The jury ultimately found Taylor guilty of numerous drug related offenses
and sentenced him to sixty-seven years imprisonment.
II. The trial judge properly denied Taylor's motion for a mistrial after the
confidential informant's testimony regarding. the young girl
Appellant first argues that the confidential informant's testimony, regarding
the young girl present at Taylor's house during the second controlled drug
purchase, was improperly admitted . The confidential informant implied that he
had previously witnessed the girl purchase marijuana from Taylor. As such,
Taylor argues that Kentucky Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits such evidence
from being introduced since it referred to a prior bad act and had a prejudicial
effect on the jury. Thus, Taylor believes a mistrial should have been declared .
It is important to note that the testimony Taylor objects to occurred in
response to a question asked by his counsel while cross-examining the
confidential informant . After asking the confidential informant several times
whether he was assuming that the young girl was at Taylor's house to purchase
marijuana, the informant gave the answer, "I've seen it before." While this is not
a "yes" or "no" answer to the question, it is a responsive answer. It implies that
he assumed that the girl was there to purchase marijuana because he had seen
her do it previously . Because Taylor's counsel asked the question, and received
a responsive answer to it, he has waived any objection to the answer. Mills v.
Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999); see also Estep v.
Commonwealth , 663 S .W.2d 213, 216 (Ky. 1 983) ("One who asks questions
which call for an answer has waived any objection to the answer if it is
responsive .")
Additionally, the jury was admonished to disregard the confidential
informant's testimony as soon as he said it. Combs v. Commonwealth, 198
S.W.3d 574, 581 (Ky. 2006) ("A jury is presumed to follow an admonition to
disregard evidence ; thus, the admonition cures any error.") Moreover, Appellant
agreed to forego the additional admonition offered by the court . See Hall v.
Commonwealth , 817 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Ky. 1991) (holding that failure to request
an admonition from a trial judge will be viewed as an element of trial strategy and
thus. failure to request an admonition will be treated as a waiver), overruled on
other -grounds by Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1996). Thus,
no error occurred .
111. The admittance of Sergeant Cross's testimony regarding the general
behavior of drug dealers and certain innocuous electronic equipment
seized in Appell ant's home was harmless error.
Appellant's final allegation of error is that Sergeant Cross's testimony
regarding items found during the search of Taylor's house was irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial . While Appellant contends that all testimony concerning the
items seized from his residence is irrelevant to the crimes tried and unduly
prejudicial, he takes specific issue with certain items he argues were innocuous
in nature .
During the execution of the search warrant, the following items were
removed from Appellant's residence: 1) rock crack cocaine; 2) pill bottle with
twenty-two (22) blue-shaped, oval pills ; 3) clear plastic bag containing marijuana;
4) clear plastic bag containing miscellaneous jewelry ; 5) clear plastic bag
containing loose change; 6) black leather pouch containing two (2) baggies of
marijuana and two (2) baggies of unknown pills ; 7) one potato chip canister
containing several baggies of marijuana; 8) one band-aid box containing
marijuana; 9) plastic bag containing several crack pipes; 9) yellow envelope
containing several knives; 10) pill bottle containing twenty-six (26) Darvocet ; 11)
black baggie containing marked money from controlled drug buy (located on
Appellant's person) ; 12) two wallets containing cash ; 13) milk can containing
cash ; 14) mason jar containing cash ; 15) police scanner; 16) night vision device;
17) digital camera; 18) portable "boom box" sound system; 18) cordless tool set
in case; 19) camcorder ; 20) two (2) DVDNCR players ; 21) one VCR player; 22)
two (2) DVD players ; 23) one television; 24) two (2) CD players in box; 25)
jumper box; 26) BB pistol; 27) cell phone; 28) miscellaneous lighters; 29) two (2)
two-way radios ; and 30) a bolt amp. Cross testified that electronic devices like
those found in Taylor's house are frequently received by drug dealers in
exchange for drugs. Appellant now argues that this testimony was irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial because the electronic devices seized were innocuous and
there was no evidence that these items were connected to his drug charges .
KRE 401 states that to be relevant, evidence must "hav[e] any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ."
However, evidence that is relevant may be excluded "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice ." KRE 403. "The
balancing of the probative value of such evidence against the danger of undue
prejudice is a task properly reserved for the sound discretion of the trial judge."
Commonwealth v. English , 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). "The standard of
review is whether there has been an abuse of that discretion ." Id.
Here, Appellant concedes that most of the items seized were contraband .
However, he argues that several of the electronic items were innocuous in
nature, and, thus, the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning them, as
it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial . We agree insofar that the innocuous
evidence was irrelevant, but hold such error to be harmless for reasons that the
remaining evidence was overwhelming . Thus, there is no reasonable probability
that this evidence affected the verdict in this case. See Emerson v.
Commonwealth , 230 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Ky. 2007); see also Taylor v.
Commonwealth , 995 S .W.2d 355, 361 (Ky. 1999).
As Appellant correctly points out, certain of the items seized were
innocuous on their face, and could be present in the home with legitimate reason.
While the facts in the present case do not support a compelling indication that the
electronic equipment seized from Appellant's residence was, indeed, the fruit of
drug trade, we nevertheless are cognizant of the very real implications at play
here. As Sergeant Cross alluded to, drug dealers have adopted a litany of tactics
in the purvey of their wares, including the direct bartering of merchandise in
exchange for drugs. Indeed, drug dealers have supplanted some other
traditional outlets for conveying goods and have become some of the leading
"pawn shops" in various regions of the Commonwealth . Thus, while the number
of electronics and other goods seized here do not represent a de facto
suggestion of drug dealing, under the correct facts and in the appropriate
instance such an inference would be appropriate .
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the Adair Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All sitting . Lambert, C .J .; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Scott and
Schroder, JJ., concur. Minton, J., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Danny Butler
118 N . Main St., P.O. Box 250
Greensburg, KY 42743-0250
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J . Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.