JOE WILLIE BYRD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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supreme ~nixrf of ~.
2007-SC-000373-MR
JOE WILLIE BYRD
V.
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-01446-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On September 28, 2005, a search warrant was executed at 446
Hawkins Avenue, a residence in Lexington . Appellant, Joe Willie Byrd,
Jay C. Duvall, and another individual, Jeffery Wayne Allen, were arrested
at that address and subsequently charged with first-degree trafficking in
a controlled substance, trafficking in marijuana over eight ounces,
possession of drug paraphernalia, subsequent offense, and being a firstdegree persistent felony offender. Prior to trial, charges against Duvall
and Allen were dropped . Appellant, then appearing pro se with the
assistance of stand-by counsel, was convicted by a Fayette County jury,
found guilty of all charges and sentenced to twenty-eight (28) years in
prison . This appeal followed. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
Facts
The search warrant executed on 446 Hawkins Ave. was obtained
partially on information learned from a "qualified confidential
informant."' The informant advised Sergeant Chris Schnelle, the officer
who filed an affidavit in support of the search warrant, that someone the
informant knew as "Joe" was selling marijuana from a residence at 446
Hawkins Ave. According to the informant, no one lived at the residence,
but it was being used for gambling and drug sales. Schnelle then
arranged for the informant to make a controlled drug purchase from that
residence within 48 hours of obtaining the aforementioned search
warrant, searching the informant before and after the drug purchase,
and observing the informant entering and leaving the premises . Upon
exiting the house at 446 Hawkins Ave ., the informant gave Schnelle the
contraband, saying it had been purchased from "Joe Willie ."
The informant indicated he knew the person who sold drugs as Joe
Willie, and knew that Joe Willie did not live at 446 Hawkins Ave . The
informant also said that Joe Willie lived on Ohio Street and drove an
older model pick-up truck. Based on this information, Schnelle checked
the license plate on a truck parked in front of 446 Hawkins Ave ., and
found the truck registered to Joe Willie Byrd.
Upon executing the search warrant on 446 Hawkins Ave ., Schnelle,
the first officer through the door, observed a large room with a bar,
1 A "qualified confidential informant" is an informant who had provided
reliable information to the police on at least two prior occasions. Specifically,
here, the informant made two prior controlled drug purchases for the officer
who filed an Affidavit in support of the search warrant.
2
several tables, and three men, Duvall, Allen, and Appellant, sitting at one
of the tables. On his person, Appellant had $1,500 in cash in his wallet,
and $138 in cash in his front pants pocket. A number of items were
confiscated including marijuana, cocaine, a Viagra pill, a prescription
bottle with the name Robert R. Cowen on the label containing a quantity
of cocaine folded up in a dollar bill, and a black satchel containing
plastic bags, a digital cell phone charger, and two sets of digital scales .
The officers executing the warrant also observed a Kentucky
Utilities bill addressed to "Joe W. Byrd at 460 [sic] Hawkins Ave.," two
business cards in the name of Robert Cowen at 446 Hawkins Ave.,
"numerous marijuana roaches," $173 in cash, a police scanner, multiple
cell phones, including a Nextel, and a green plate with a straw, a knife, a
razor blade, and a line of cocaine, which looked, in one of the officer's
words, "like somebody had shaped it up to get ready to snort it ."
The defense stipulated that the Nextel cell phone belonged to
Appellant and that he had the cell phone with him the night of the
search . The cell phone charger, found in the black bag with the drugs
and drug paraphernalia, fit Appellant's cell phone .
Following the search, Appellant, Duvall, and Allen were arrested.
As they were being led from the house, Appellant said "the other
suspects didn't have, anything to do with what was found," though he did
not expressly claim possession of the items found at the residence.
Subsequent investigation revealed Vivian Cowen as the owner of
446 Hawkins Ave . At trial, she testified that she and her husband,
Robert Cowen, owned the property until the time of her husband's death
in July of 2004, at which time she became the sole owner of the property.
She then rented the property to Appellant for $300 a month . Appellant
signed no lease and paid her each month in cash. Mrs. Cowen said that
she never went to the house on 446 Hawkins Ave . and did not know
what went on there.
Appellant testified that he rented out the house at 446 Hawkins
Ave. for parties about three weekends a month, and that no one lived in
the house. He testified that at least three other people had keys to the
house . Appellant also testified that he collects rent on unrelated
property owned by his adopted father, which accounted for $ 1, 000 of the
money he had on him at the time of the search . He further testified that
he was not doing drugs the right of the search, that he saw neither the
black bag, nor the green plate with a razor blade and cocaine, and that
nothing in the black bag belonged to him.
Appellant now alleges five (5) errors on appeal: 1) prosecutorial
misconduct, as exculpatory evidence was not provided as required in
discovery, 2) the trial court erred in overruling Appellant's motion to
suppress, 3) it erred by not holding a Faretta hearing, in regards to his
waiver of counsel, 4) it erred in denying Appellant's motion for mistrial,
and 5) it erred in failing to order the disclosure of the identity of the
confidential informant. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm
Appellant's convictions.
I . Alleged Prosecutorlal Misconduct
After trial, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging the
Commonwealth's Attorney withheld notice and disclosure of potentially
exculpatory evidence and, further, at trial, made improper reference to
the evidence withheld . The evidence Appellant refers to is a "Kool" brand
cigarette filter found in the black bag containing the cocaine, marijuana,
and drug paraphernalia . The cigarette filter was not listed among the
items found in the black bag in the search warrant inventory compiled
after the warrant was executed. Appellant claimed the evidence is
exculpatory because he did not smoke "Kool" cigarettes .
The trial court overruled Appellant's motion, pointing out that the
seized evidence had been readily available for defense inspection in the
police evidence room prior to trial, and that there had been no objection
to the prosecutor's comments about the cigarette filter in the
Commonwealth's closing argument .
Appellant alleges this ruling was error. He cites to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S . 83, 88 (1963), and United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S .
97 (1976), for the proposition that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment ." Brady ,
373 U.S . at 88 . He further cites to Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U .S . 419 (1995),
alleging the Commonwealth had a constitutional duty to disclose this
information to him. Ky1es, however, held that due process requires
reversal whenever the Commonwealth fails to disclose any evidence
which is material to guilt or to punishment, and which is favorable to the
accused . Id. at 432 . Evidence is considered "material" if it "could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict." Id . at 435 . Appellant's argumen t,
however, is misguided .
Brady , Agurs, and Kyles are not applicable because the "Kool"
brand cigarette filter was not exculpatory evidence. Contrary to what
Appellant argues, the record reveals that Appellant testified that he
smoked "Kool" brand cigarettes. Moreover, defense witnesses, Duvall
and Allen, testified that the "Kool" cigarettes belonged to Appellant and
that he was smoking them on the night the search warrant was
executed. Further, on cross-examination, Appellant was asked : "Do you
recall Mr. Allen testifying that you smoked the "Kool" cigarettes that
night? You were smoking a pack of `Kools?' Appellant responded:
"Yeah, I smoke Wools . '
Therefore, not only is the "Kool" cigarette filter not exculpatory, but
the Commonwealth's Attorney was allowed to reference the cigarette filter
in his closing statement because the cigarette filter goes to prove
Appellant's ownership/ possession of the black bag containing
contraband . This is a proper argument regarding a reasonable inference
for the jury to draw from record evidence . See Hunt v. Commonwealth,
466 S.W. 2d 957, 959 (Ky. 1971) . Because the black bag containing the
incriminating contraband was readily available for defense inspection
and because evidence of the "Kool" cigarette was not exculpatory, the
trial court correctly overruled Appellant's motion for a new trial .
H. Motion to Suppress
Appellant next claims that the circuit court erred in overruling his
motion to suppress the drug evidence seized during the execution of the
search warrant because the search warrant affidavit was not specific to
him. Specifically, Appellant contends, among other alleged defects, that
the statements of the confidential informant relied upon by Schnelle in
obtaining the search warrant were not verified by independent
investigation and that the physical description of "Joe Willie" was too
generalized and therefore untrustworthy . We disagree .
We begin with the standard for obtaining a search warrant. Police
must, whenever possible, obtain judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure . Katz v. United States, 389 U.S .
347 (1967) . It is well-established that a. search warrant may only be
issued upon a finding of probable cause . U .S. Const. amend. IV,
Vanhook v. Commonwealth, 247 Ky. 81, 56 S.W .2d 702 (1933), Dixon v_
Commonwealth, 890 S .W .2d 629 (Ky. App . 1994) .
In determining whether to issue the search warrant, the reviewing
magistrate is required to determine whether the supporting affidavit
contains probable cause to search the residence . Beemer v.
Commonwealth, 665 S .W .2d 912, 915 (Ky. 1984) . We have previously
held that the "issuing magistrate need only `make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' Lovett v.
Commonwealth , 103 S .W.3d 72, 77 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U .S. 213, 238 (1983)) .
The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate had
a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed . Gates,
462 U.S. at 238-239 . Moreover, when reviewing a court's decision on a
motion to suppress, findings of fact are upheld unless clearly erroneous,
while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Adcock v.
Commonwealth , 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998) ; Welch v . Commonwealth , 149
S .W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004) .
Here, the record shows the circuit judge correctly adhered to the
Lovett standard in reviewing the search warrant affidavit. At the
suppression hearing, after hearing the evidence and arguments for the
defense and prosecution, the court found that the affidavit established
probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant and that
the warrant was facially sufficient.
To successfully attack a facially sufficient search warrant,
Appellant must demonstrate that: "1) the affidavit contains intentionally
or recklessly false statements ; and 2) the affidavit, purged of its falsities,
would not be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause."
Commonwealth v . Smith, 898 S.W.2d 496, 503 (Ky. App. 1995) .
Although Appellant contends his physical description given by the
confidential informant in the affidavit serves to undermine the trial
court's finding of substantial evidence, we disagree . Appellant was not
arrested on the basis of being mentioned in the search warrant; rather,
Appellant was arrested because he was present in a residence where a
search warrant was executed and contraband was found. Although the
police had reliable information that Appellant would be present in the
residence, the confidential informant's testimony about Appellant selling
drugs out of 446 Hawkins Ave. and the presence of Appellant's truck
outside the residence, the charges brought against Appellant were not
based on any sale of drugs to the confidential informant, but rather upon
his possession of drugs, paraphernalia, and other tools of the drug trade
upon the execution of the search warrant. Consequently, the exactness
of the informant's description of Appellant was immaterial to the
sufficiency of the search warrant. Thus, there was no error.
III. Validity of Waiver of Counsel
Appellant next argues the trial court committed palpable error in
allowing Appellant to represent himself without establishing that he
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel as
required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S .806 (1975) . The primary
purpose of Faretta is to ensure a defendant is "made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open .' Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citing Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S . 269, 279 (1942)) . Because the record shows that
the Appellant insisted upon representing himself and the trial court held
two hearings to examine Appellant's decision to represent himself, and
cautioned him repeatedly about the risks associated with such .a decision,
we find no palpable error.
In each instance, Appellant insisted that he was well-aware of, and
voluntarily wished to assume such risks by representing himself with the
assistance of stand-by counsel.
As we have previously held :
In Kentucky, a trial court's Faretta duties manifest
themselves in three concrete ways. First, the trial court
must hold a hearing in which the defendant testifies on the
question of whether the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. Second, during the hearing, the trial court must
warn the defendant of the hazards arising from and the
benefits relinquished by waiving counsel. Third, the trial
court must make a finding on the record that the waiver is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A waiver of counsel is
ineffective unless all three requirements are met.
(internal citation omitted) Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 226
(Ky. 2004) (chin Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 882-883
and Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S .W.2d 412, 418 (Ky. 1994)) . Here,
the record reveals that all three requirements were met by the court in
granting Appellant's request to represent himself and the trial judge took
great pains to do so .
10
At a hearing on March 22, 2007, Appellant asked to be allowed to
represent himself with his attorney assisting him. The judge told
Appellant that he had that right, but advised Appellant to "think long
and hard about doing so since he faced a possible life sentence if
convicted." "I have, your honor," Appellant stated, "I have thought about
and taken into consideration all the circumstances . That is my wish."
The judge advised Appellant that he would not be able to pursue any RCr
11 .42 action claiming ineffective assistance of counsel if he represented
himself, and defense counsel advised that she and Appellant had
discussed this, and Appellant stated he understood. Finding that
Appellant understood the potential risks and consequences, the judge
stated that he would allow Appellant to represent himself with his
defense attorney acting as stand-by counsel.
A few days later, the court held a further hearing on the issue . The
judge stated that he had set the matter for further hearing on his own
motion to follow up on Appellant's desire to represent himself. Appellant
stated that after having considered it for several days, it was still his
desire to represent himself. Appellant indicated that he understood the
potential consequences and pitfalls of representing himself as previously
discussed. The court then reviewed each charge against Appellant to
make sure Appellant understood all the potential penalties, including a
possible maximum sentence of life in prison . The judge told Appellant
that he (the judge) would not be able to advise Appellant how to present
his case. Appellant stated that he was somewhat familiar with the law,
having no formal legal education, but having previously represented
himself in civil cases. Appellant stated that he understood the burden of
proof in a criminal case was upon the Commonwealth to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt . Appellant stated he was familiar with some
of the rules of criminal procedure and the Kentucky Revised Statutes,
but not the rules of evidence. The judge cautioned that if Appellant
represented himself, he would be expected to know and adhere to the
rules of procedure and evidence, and Appellant stated that he
understood this.
Moreover, the judge told Appellant that, by asking to represent
himself, he was effectively claiming that he could do as well as an
attorney trained in the law, and asked : "do you recognize the dangers
that you present to yourself by doing that?" Appellant stated that he
understood but felt that he could get the facts across "more adequately"
than a lawyer would. The judge asked Appellant whether - if he broke
his arm - Appellant would want to set it himself or have a doctor set it.
When Appellant stated that he would set it himself if he didn't have the
money for a doctor, the judge reminded Appellant that money was not a
factor because the court would appoint an attorney if Appellant could not
afford one. Nevertheless, Appellant insisted that he wished to represent
himself.
The judge then asked Appellant again if - being aware of the
12
potential penalties he faced and the possible consequences he faced Appellant still wanted to represent himself. Appellant answered, "Yes,
sir, I feel after studying some of my files and knowing some of the
evidence and I feel like I can, you know, attack it very adequate ." Then,
after checking with the prosecution and defense, the judge found that,
based on Appellant's responses to the court's questions and comments,
that Appellant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
right to counsel and permitted Appellant to represent himself.
Thus, having reviewed the record, we find the trial court properly
ascertained whether Appellant's waiver of counsel was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent.
IV. Motion for a Mistrial
Next, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling his
motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor's closing argument. We
also disagree.
At trial, the prosecutor asked some of the officers involved in the
search whether they heard Appellant make any statements while the
search warrant was being executed. Appellant raised no objection . Only
one of the officers, Sergeant Simmons, answered affirmatively. On crossexamination, Simmons testified that he related this statement to
Schnelle who recorded the incident in his report, from which Simmons
quoted, as follows : "As Byrd was being escorted to the wagon to be
transported to the Fayette County Detention Center he told Sergeant
13
Simmons . . . that Duvall and Allen had nothing to do with it . Byrd,
however, did not say who did have anything to do with it or that it was
his." Asked on re-direct examination what he recalled of Appellant's
statement, Simmons said, "I recall Mr. Byrd saying that the other two
gentlemen didn't have anything to do with it and that he didn't admit
that he specifically did but he admitted that they didn't have anything to
do with it."
Thereafter, in his closing argument during the guilt phase, the
prosecutor stated that while Appellant, in his statements at trial, seemed
"shocked" that there were drugs in 446 Hawkins Ave ., he made no such
expressions of shock at the time of the search . Appellant's co-counsel
immediately asked to approach the bench, objecting that the argument
was not proper. The judge agreed, asking if the defense wanted him to
admonish the jury. Defense counsel instead asked for a mistrial . When
the judge overruled the motion for a mistrial, finding that the
prosecutor's comment had been directed at the evidence and not
Appellant's Fifth Amendment right, Appellant then requested an
admonition. The admonition agreed upon, and given by the court before
the prosecutor resumed his summation, was as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, I will admonish you at this time that
you are to disregard the Commonwealth's comments in their
close [sic] regarding Mr. Byrd not making any, any
statements or comments to the police at the time of the
search . He was under no obligation to make, make any such
comments or statements.
In order for a trial court to grant a mistrial, there must be a
14
manifest necessity for one. Kirkland v. Commonwealth, 53 S .W.3d 71,
76 (Ky. 2001) . Moreover, we review claims of prosecutorial misconduct
to determine if the alleged conduct is so egregious, improper, or
prejudicial as to have undermined the overall fairness of the proceedings.
Brewer v . Commonwealth, 206 S.W .3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) ; see also
Hood v. Commonwealth, 230 S .W .3d 596 (Ky. App . 2007) . To determine
if a prosecutor's arguments commented on a criminal defendant's right
to remain silent, a reviewing court must consider whether the remarks
were "manifestly intended to reflect on the accused's silence or [were] of
such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take
[them] as such." Bowling v. Commonwealth , 873 S.W .2d 175, 178 (Ky.
1993) . The test for whether a prosecutor's comment implicated a
defendant's right to remain silent is "whether the comment is reasonably
certain to direct the jury's attention to the [Appellant's] exercise of his
right to remain silent." Sholler v. Commonwealth, 969 S .W.2d 706, 711
(Ky. 1998) (internal citation omitted) ; see also Crowe v. Commonwealth ,
38 S .W.3d 379, 385 (Ky. 2001) .
Here, there was no manifest necessity requiring a mistrial because
the prosecutor's argument was not intended to comment on Appellant's
right to remain silent, but, rather, to contrast his statements and
arguments at trial with the record evidence of what actually went on at
the time of the search. The prosecutor's comments were not calculated
to direct the jury's attention to Appellant's right to remain silent; rather,
15
they addressed the jury's attention to Appellant's statements at trial,
which were clearly at odds with the officer's testimony as to what was
said during the search. Undermining Appellant's credibility is a proper
avenue for closing argument .
Further, any possible error was cured when the trial court
admonished the jury to draw no inference from the remarks in
accordance with Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S .W.3d 569, 591 (Ky.
2006) . We note that an admonition given by the trial court is presumed
to cure the defect in the testimony for which it was requested . Combs v
Commonwealth, 198 S-W .3d 574 (Ky. 2000) . Thus, the trial court
properly denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial . There was no error.
V. Identity of the Confidential Informant
Lastly, Appellant requests palpable error review under RCr 10.26,
arguing that the circuit court ruled incorrectly in overruling his motions
to disclose the identity of the confidential informant (hereinafter,
11CJ11) .2
For the following reasons, we disagree.
KRE 508 grants a privilege to the Commonwealth to refuse to
disclose the identity of a confidential informant . "Exceptions to the
privilege occur when the disclosure is voluntary, when the informant is a
witness and when the testimony of the informant is relevant to an issue ."
Appellant's brief makes a passing reference to two witnesses, Melton
and Flannelly, during his analysis of this issue in his brief. As the Appellant
has failed to provide us with the facts of which he complains in regards to
hindering his cross-examination of the Commonwealth's witnesses, "Melton and
Flannelly" and has provided no citation to the record from which we could
reasonably ascertain the parameters of his complaint, we will not consider this
issue . See Sharp v. Sharp, 491 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Ky. 1973)
16
2
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 302, 204 (Ky. 1998) . "Our case
law provides that a defendant who requests disclosure of the identity of
an informant must first make a proper shooing that an exception
applies." Heard v . Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Ky. 2005)
Schooley v. Commonwealth, 627 S .W.2d 576 (Ky. 1982)) . Here,
Appellant made no such showing.
The authority to which Appellant cites as support, Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), is not implicated under the facts of
the instant case . In Roviaro, the charges against the defendant were
based directly upon his sale of narcotics to a C1. "This is a case where
the Government's informer was the sole participant, other than the
accused, in the transaction charged." Roviaro, 353 U .S. at 64. Here,
however, the Cl was not a witness to the charged offenses. The charges
against Appellant were based upon the evidence seized pursuant to a
validly issued search warrant, not upon a controlled drug purchase
involving the Cl . Thus, Appellant has articulated no legitimate basis for
disclosure of the Cl's identity and is therefore not entitled to such a
disclosure.
Appellant further cites to People v . Garciq, 434 P.2d 366, 370 (Cal .
1967), for the proposition that the privilege of nondisclosure of a
confidential informant must give way "when it comes into contact with
the fundamental principle that a person accused of a crime is entitled to
a full and fair opportunity to defend himself" Appellant notes the Garcia
17
court recognized that a non-participant informant can be a material
witness regardless of the fact that h& was not an eyewitness to the crime .
Under the facts of this case, however, Garcia does not require
disclosure of the confidential informant. The Garcia court began by
noting that the statute authorizing the privilege of non-disclosure of an
informant operated in such a way as to "prevent application of the
privilege in cases where disclosure `is relevant and helpful to the defense
of the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause .' Id . at
369 . The Court then goes on to note "that for these purposes a `mere
informer' was to be distinguished from one who was or could be a
material witness for the defense! A at 370 . The Garcia court explains
the difference as follows :
A mere informer has a limited role. When such a person is
truly an informant he simply points the finger of suspicion
toward a person who has violated the law. He puts the
wheels in motion which cause the defendant to be suspected
and perhaps arrested, but he plays no part in the criminal
act with which the defendant is later charged .' His identity is
ordinarily not necessary to the defendant's case, and the
privilege against disclosure properly applies . When it
appears from the evidence, however, that the informer is also
a material witness on the issue of guilt, his identity is
relevant and may be helpful to the defendant. Nondisclosure
would deprive him of a fair trial. Thus, when it appears from
the evidence that the informer is a material witness on the
issue of guilt and the accused seeks disclosure on crossexamination, the [Commonwealth] must either disclose his
identity or incur a dismissal .
Id. The difference, then, between a "mere informer" and a "material
witness" is the informer's level of involvement in the charged criminal
act. In examining the lines of precedent, the Garcia court observed that
18
"[m]ost cases in the latter category involve informants who were actual
participants in the criminal act." Id . (citin People v. Lawrence , 308 P.2d
821, 830 (Ca. App . 1957) ("(W)hen an informant participates in the
criminal act he is no longer simply an informer. He is a material witness
to the criminal act, in fact, he is similar to a feigned accomplice .")) The
Garcia court notes, however:
Disclosure is not limited to the informer who participates in
the crime alleged. The information elicited from an informer
may be `relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused or
essential to a fair determination of a cause' even though the
informer was not a participant . For example, the testimony
of an eyewitness-nonparticipant informer that would
vindicate the innocence of the accused or lessen the risk of
false testimony would obviously be relevant and helpful to
the defense of the accused and essential to a fair
determination of the cause.
Id . at 370-371 . Appellant, however, has produced no evidence that the
confidential informant in this case either 1) participated in the criminal
act for which Appellant was convicted, 2) was an eyewitnessnonparticipant informer that would vindicate Appellant's innocence, or 3)
had evidence that would lessen the risk of false testimony. Id.
Appellant argues that because the identity of Appellant was at
issue during the suppression hearing, the confidential informant should
be considered an eyewitness for the suppression hearing. Appellant
raised this same argument at the suppression hearing and the circuit
judge stated:
Under KRE 508, as far as the privilege is concerned, the
court is not satisfied from the evidence and the argument
that, that the concept of relevancy and helpfulness to the
defendant has been satisfied sufficient to overcome the
19
privilege as set forth in [KRE] 508 . The record would
indicate by the reading of the indictment both as to Mr. Byrd
and Mr. Roberts' client, Mr. Duvall, that the charges are
based not upon any, any involvement with or transaction
with the confidential informant within the 28, 24, 48-hour
time period prior to the actual ex-, obtaining and execution
of the search warrant . And that each of those defendants
are indicted, charged with trafficking under the provision of
the trafficking statute wherein possession with the intent to
distribute or sell, based upon the Commonwealth's theory of
the case, qualifies it as, to come under the trafficking portion
of the statute, that the charges nor the evidence involved,
relate to any, like I say, any of the transaction or the
occurrence between the confidential informant and that
particular property on, within the 48-hour period prior to the
execution of the search warrant. So, on that basis, I'm going
to overrule the motion to suppress, find that the confidential
informant was qualified and reliable and has provided
accurate information in the past and therefore is qualified as
a confidential informant in this particular matter and that
also that there is no basis to identify the, the specific identity
of the confidential informant at this point.
Thus, the informant's identity was as immaterial then as it is now.
Kentucky courts have held that the identity of an informant does not
have to be revealed unless the informant was a material witness to the
guilt or innocence of the accused . Thompson v. Commonwealth , 648
S.W .2d
538, 839 (Ky . App . 1983) ;
36, 38 (Ky. App . 1987)
Commonwealth v. Balsley, 743 S .W.2d
("In order for disclosure to be required . . ., the
informant must witness material parts of the offense charged.") .
Here, the Commonwealth did not rely on the facts of the
confidential informant's controlled buy to charge Appellant with drug
offenses; therefore, the informant was not a witness to any part of those
offenses. Nor was any evidence offered that the informant had any
relevant testimony regarding the facts of the charged crimes. The mere
20
fact that the informant participated in an earlier controlled buy which led
to the issuance of the search warrant does not render the facts
surrounding the controlled buy relevant to the offenses charged. Thus,
Appellant was not entitled to disclosure of the identity of the confidential
informant. Therefore, there is no error.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction of firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance, trafficking in marijuana over
eight ounces, possession of drug paraphernalia, subsequent offense, and
being a first-degree persistent felon .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Samuel J . Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of the Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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