CLIFTON EDWARD RILEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000911-MR
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CLIFTON EDWARD RILEY
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-00307
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is a matter of right appeal from a judgment in which Appellant Clifton
Edward Riley was convicted of First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance
(cocaine), Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (both second offenses), and for
being a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender . Appellant received a sentence of
twenty years, enhanced for the subsequent offenses of Use or Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia and First-Degree Trafficking, and further enhanced to thirty-five years for
being a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender. On appeal, Appellant contends that
his sentence was enhanced twice using the same prior conviction of First-Degree
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance as both a subsequent offense under KRS Chapter
218A, and under the persistent felony offender statute, KRS 532.080, constituting an
unlawful double enhancement . We reject the claimed error due to the lack of merit.
Hence, we affirm .
On June 15, 2005, Detective William Gilbert with the Paducah Police
Department, and Fred White, a confidential informant, arranged a controlled drug buy
with Appellant to purchase $100.00 worth of cocaine at America's Best Inn . When
Detective Gilbert and Mr. White were in the room, they observed Appellant cut a small
piece of cocaine from a large piece, giving the small piece to Detective Gilbert, who
subsequently left the buy money with Appellant . At this time, Appellant informed
Detective Gilbert and Mr. White that if they wanted more cocaine he would have "some
really good stuff" later that night. After Detective Gilbert and Mr. White exited the room,
Detectives John Tolliver and Matt Wentworth entered the room and arrested Appellant .
After the arrest, Detectives recovered the buy money, the large piece of cocaine, a cell
phone Appellant stated he purchased to sell cocaine, and a soda can that Appellant
stated he used to smoke cocaine . Appellant later told Detective Gilbert that they had
caught him "red-handed." An audiotape of the drug transaction was recorded and
played for the jury at Appellant's trial.
Appellant was charged with First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance
(cocaine), Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (both second offenses), and being
a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO I) .
After a jury trial on September 18, 2006, Appellant was found guilty of each
charge. During the penalty phase, the jury recommended a one-year sentence for the
Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, second offense charge . However, as the
jury was retiring to deliberate on the First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance
charge, a juror approached the trial court and stated she "just couldn't do it" because
she had just remembered that she had a brother was serving time in Illinois for the
same thing . The trial court and counsel questioned the juror, who was then dismissed,
leaving eleven jurors. The remaining jurors were then informed of the problem and
were also dismissed.
On September 21, 2006, the trial court held a hearing to determine how to
proceed . The Commonwealth requested a trial only on the remaining penalty phase
and the Appellant requested a completely new trial . The trial court determined a trial on
the remaining penalty phase was all that was needed .
On October 16, 2006, a new jury was impaneled to proceed with the remaining
penalty phase. Appellant received an enhanced sentence of twenty years for the
subsequent offense of First-Degree Trafficking to run concurrent with the one year
sentence for Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, second offense. Appellant was
also found guilty of PFO I, for which the jury recommended a total sentence of thirty-five
years. Appellant appeared in court on November 27, 2006, and was sentenced to
thirty-five years imprisonment.
DOUBLE ENHANCEMENT
Appellant argues the same prior trafficking conviction was used to enhance his
First-Degree Trafficking Conviction as a subsequent offense and also to find him guilty
of PFO I . Appellant admits that his claim of error is unpreserved for review, but states
that it can be raised for the first time on appeal . We agree . This Court in Cummings v.
Commonwealth , 226 S .W.3d 62, 66 (Ky. 2007), held that sentencing issues may be
raised for the first time on appeal. Further, this Court in Hughes v. Commonwealth , 875
S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. 1994), held that every defendant has the right to be sentenced
after due consideration of all applicable law. Therefore, this issue is properly before the
Court.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of
Appellant's prior felony convictions . In 1992, Appellant plead guilty to three counts of
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance (cocaine) . In 1993, Appellant plead guilty to First
Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, In 2001, Appellant was convicted of
three counts of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree burglary, and for
being a second-degree persistent felony offender . After presenting this evidence, the
trial court then instructed the jury to enhance Appellant's sentence for First-Degree
Trafficking if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had been
previously convicted of first-degree trafficking. The jury enhanced Appellant's sentence
to twenty years . A similar instruction was given regarding Appellant's status as PFO 1,
but this time the jury was to consider Appellant's previous convictions for first-degree
burglary, second-degree burglary, and first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance .
The jury found Appellant guilty of PFO I and recommended a thirty-five year sentence.
This Court in Morrow v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Ky. 2002)
(overruling Gray v. Commonwealth,, 979 S.W .2d 454 (Ky. 1998)), held that an offender
is eligible for a sentence enhancement under both the "second or subsequent" offender
provisions of KRS Chapter 218A, and under the persistent felony offender statute, KIRS
532.080, where there are separate prior unrelated convictions used to support each
enhancement . Appellant contends that the jury could only consider the 1993 conviction
for first-degree trafficking for the second or subsequent offense because the 1992
convictions were for "trafficking in a schedule 11 narcotic," and specifically did not include
the word "first-degree ." Appellant further contends that because that prior conviction
was already used, R could not be used again to find Appellant guilty of PFO I .
Appellant had previously been convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance
four times, but only the 1993 conviction specifically stated "first-degree trafficking."
Further, the trial court instructed the jury for the second or subsequent offense
enhancement using "first-degree trafficking ." While Appellant argues that this could only
include the 1993 conviction because the three 1992 convictions were for "trafficking in a
schedule 11 narcotic," KRS 218A.1412(l) states that "[a] person is guilty of trafficking in
a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics in: a
controlled substance, that is classified in Schedules I or 11 which is a narcotic drug
Also, Appellant's 1992 convictions were for trafficking cocaine, which is classified under
KRS 218A.070 as a Schedule 11 narcotic . Moreover, Appellant's 1992 convictions for
trafficking in a Schedule 11 narcotic were under KRS Chapter 218A, which was changed
to include "first-degree trafficking." Appellant's claim that only the 1993 conviction for
first-degree trafficking could be used is without merit.
Having concluded that any of the four previous trafficking convictions could have
been used for enhancement for the second or subsequent offense under the "firstdegree trafficking" language, Appellant's contention that any of the remaining three
convictions for trafficking could not be used for enhancement for the PFD I charge is
without merit. Using one of these prior convictions for enhancement as a second or
subsequent offender under KRS Chapter 218A would leave three separate prior
qualifying convictions for the jury to consider for enhancement under KRS 532 .080 .
The trial court properly instructed the jury to consider Appellant's previous convictions
for first-degree burglary, second-degree burglary, and first-degree trafficking for the
PFO 1 enhancement.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court is
hereby affirmed .
All sitting. All concur, except Venters, J., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Randall L. Wheeler
Assistant Public Advocate
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Bryan Darwin Morrow
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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