DARRYL D. BURRELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2006-SC-000547-MR
DARRYL D . BURRELL
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR ., JUDGE
NO. 04-CR-01362
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Darryl D . Burrell appeals as a matter of right from a June 28, 2006 Judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court convicting him of wanton murder, three counts of robbery in
the first degree, two counts of attempted murder, and tampering with physical evidence .
The Commonwealth alleged that on September 14, 2004, in the course of robbing a
Dairy Mart on East New Circle Road in Lexington, Burrell shot and killed Ashley Cason,
the store's cashier, and robbed and attempted to kill two other people . In accord with
the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Burrell to life in prison without
benefit of parole . On appeal, Burrell contends that the trial court erred (1) by refusing to
grant his motion for a mistrial after a violent outburst from the murder victim's brother ;
(2) by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of second-degree
manslaughter and reckless homicide ; and (3) by allowing Clinton Comley, one of the
robbery victims, to make an in-court identification based on an impermissibly suggestive
photographic lineup. Convinced that Burrell was not entitled to a mistrial or to lesserincluded-offense instructions and that Comley's identification testimony was proper, we
affirm .
RELEVANT FACTS
At approximately noon on September 14, 2004, an African-American man
wearing wire-rimmed glasses entered a Dairy Mart on East New Circle Road in
Lexington carrying a bolt action, sawed-off shot gun. Two employees were working that
day: twenty-two-year-old Ashley Cason and Assistant District Manager James
Wiechart. A tobacco company representative, Clinton Comley, was also present . The
robber ordered Wiechart and Comley to the floor and demanded the money from their
wallets and the store's cash register . During this exchange, the robber fired a round in
the direction of the two men . Neither of the men was hit, and the shell casing landed
somewhere between them. The robber picked up the shell casing, and once he had
collected the money from the cash register (about $180), he marched all three captives
toward the store's cooler. On the way to the cooler, he demanded that they discard
their cell phones into a sink near the cooler entrance .
Weichart testified that when they had proceeded several feet into the cooler, he
heard another shot fired followed by a scream . Weichart turned to see Cason clutching
her chest before she collapsed to the ground . As the robber loaded another shell into
the chamber of the shotgun, Weichart and Comley fled to another room behind the
cooler. As they were running, the man fired a third round that hit the door through
which they were exiting . The men hid in the back room for several more minutes .
When they emerged, they immediately checked on Cason and discovered that she was
not breathing . Comley called 911, and the police arrived moments later . Tragically,
Cason did not survive the gunshot-wound to her back and chest which pierced her left
lung and her heart. She was pronounced dead at the scene . Comley described the
robber to the police as a black man, about 6'1" in height with an athletic build ; he wore
silver wire-rimmed glasses, a black baseball cap, gray sweatshirt, dark blue jeans, and
dark work boots .
The Dairy Mart had a surveillance system that recorded both the audio and video
of the robbery . Local television stations broadcast still photos from the surveillance
video on the evening news. As a result, the police received a tip that helped them
locate and arrest Burrell on the evening of the robbery. Following this arrest, the police
conducted searches of Burrell's automobile and residence, during which they found a
loaded sawed-off shotgun (later determined to be the murder weapon), spent shotgun
shells, a black baseball hat, a gray sweatshirt, and a white plastic bag containing the
wallets of Weichart and Comley. On November 15, 2004, the Fayette County Grand
Jury indicted Burrell for the murder of Ashley Cason, three counts of robbery, two
counts of attempted murder, second-degree assault, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, tampering with physical evidence, first-degree promoting contraband,
and being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Prior to Burrell's trial, the
Commonwealth severed the possession of a firearm and first-degree promoting
contraband charges and dismissed the second-degree assault charge. The firearm and
contraband charges, as well as the PFO charge, were subsequently dismissed without
prejudice .
Burrell's trial began on May 9, 2006 . At trial, Comley testified that he "got a good
look" at the assailant and that Burrell was the man who had robbed the Dairy Mart and
shot Cason . Comley also testified regarding his pre-trial identification of Burrell from a
photographic line-up conducted the morning after the robbery. Weichart testified that
since he had been trained by Dairy Mart not to look at robbers but rather to focus on
their weapon, he did not get a good look at the robber . During Weichart's testimony,
the Commonwealth also played the Dairy Mart's surveillance video and audio for the
jury. On May 18, 2006, the jury returned with guilty verdicts of wanton murder, three
counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of attempted murder, and tampering with
physical evidence. On June 28, 2006, the Fayette Circuit Court sentenced Burrell to life
in prison without parole for the murder conviction and to a concurrent sentence of 105
years' imprisonment for his other convictions . This appeal followed .
ANALYSIS
1. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Denied The Defense's Motion For A Mistrial
After An Outburst From the Victim's Brother .
During Weichart's testimony, the Commonwealth played both the audio and
video recording of the robbery from the Dairy Mart's surveillance camera. At one point
in the audio recording, listeners hear a shotgun blast followed by Cason's screams .
When this portion was played for the jury, Cason's brother, Michael Cason, who was
sitting in the court's gallery, jumped up from his seat and moved towards the bar
separating the gallery from the parties. Before he got close to the bar, however, a
woman sitting next to him and two bailiffs restrained him and began moving him out of
the courtroom . During this commotion, Mr. Cason slapped his hand down on a wooden
bench and yelled that he was going to kill Burrell, specifically stating "I'll kill you,
motherfucker." The bailiffs quickly removed Mr. Cason from the courtroom . The entire
incident lasted approximately 10 seconds.
In response, the trial court turned off the audio recording and ordered the jury to
recess. Burrell then moved for a mistrial claiming that the outburst would certainly have
a prejudicial impact on his defense . The trial judge denied Burrell's motion. The judge
then spoke with Mr. Cason privately and barred him from any further proceedings
concerning the case. He also addressed the audience in the gallery, asking those who
could not maintain courtroom decorum during the remainder of the proceeding to
excuse themselves . Upon the jury's return, the trial judge gave them a lengthy
admonition, requesting that they "forget" about what they had seen and assuring them
that he had taken steps to prevent another such outburst . The Commonwealth then
replayed the portion of the audio that had been interrupted . Burrell now argues on
appeal that the brother's outburst tainted the proceedings and that the trial court erred
when it refused to declare a mistrial . Due to this Court's long-standing rule that a
proper admonishment can cure any prejudice arising from outbursts such as this one,
we disagree .
Trials pertaining to the death of individuals are fraught with emotion for both the
victim's and the accused's relatives and loved ones. This Court has observed that
[i]t is a frequent occurrence in homicide cases that the next
of kin or other close relatives . . . become emotionally upset,
cry, and lose their composure. These are matters that
cannot be anticipated and cannot be prevented by denying
such persons the right to be present in the courtroom during
the trial .
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 275 S .W.2d 788, 789 (Ky. 1955). When outbursts from
spectators in the court do occur, the judge must act quickly to preserve order and the
appropriate decorum .
While the behavior of bystanders may under some circumstances be grounds for
a mistrial, Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1993) (granting a mistrial
where a bystander made hand signals and gestures to a child witness), emotional
outbursts by members of the audience and by witnesses are "effectively remedied by
the court's admonition ." Belt v. Commonwealth, 2 S .W.3d. 790, 793 . (Ky. App . 1999).
This Court recently reiterated that "[w]hen there is some kind of emotional display . . .
an admonition to the jury to disregard the display is more than sufficient to cure any
possible prejudice that might occur from the situation." C ulthard
Commonwealth,
230 S-W .3d 572, 577 (Ky. 2007) .
Burrell claims that the severity of the outburst and the denial of the mistrial
resulted in manifest injustice by prejudicing the jury against him. We disagree . First,
the outburst, though unfortunate, was quickly and professionally quelled by the law
enforcement officers in the court room. Burrell does not dispute that the incident lasted
no more than a few seconds. Second, there is nothing to support Burrell's assertion
that the outburst gave the jurors cause to fear for their safety should they return a notguilty verdict . The record gives no indication that the jurors knew the identity of the
bystander or his connection to the trial . Furthermore, the trial judge's actions in ejecting
the bystander, barring him from the courtroom, and explaining as much to the jury were
sufficient precautions to guard against whatever anxiety the jury may have felt .
Finally, the admonition by the trial court was sufficient to ensure the fairness of
the proceeding. In this case, the trial court judge directed the jury to disregard the
outburst by the spectator . In particular, the trial court's lengthy admonition included the
following:
I therefore direct you to simply forget about it; do not
consider it, the outburst or any statements or anything that
you may have heard or may have thought you heard . . . .
Simply strike that from your mind and do not consider it in
any way, shape or form as anything to do with the issues to
be decided in this case. There will be no repercussions or
nothing coming back as far as you all are concerned and I
simply direct you to forget about it. It was an unfortunate
incident and it has been dealt with and should now be
forgotten by you as far as any consideration as it regards
this trial or this case in any way, shape or form .
This Court-has stated that when inadmissible evidence is mistakenly presented to a
jury, there is a presumption the jury will follow the trial judge's admonition to exclude
such evidence from their consideration. Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W .3d 860, 863
(Ky. 2002); Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Ky. 1993). This rule
translates well to this situation. The outburst, though obviously inappropriate, was
rendered harmless by the judge's detailed admonition . There was no manifest
necessity for a mistrial, therefore, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied the defense's motion for one. See Belt, 2 S .W.3d at 793.
Burrell also appeals the trial court's decision to allow the Commonwealth to
replay the audio recording of the robbery . The recording was prematurely stopped
when the outburst occurred, so it was replayed for the jury over Burrell's objection .
Burrell now asserts that replaying the tape unduly biased the jury against him and
demonstrated the trial court's bias. Prior to the replaying the tape, the trial judge
indicated to the parties that he simply wanted the jury to be able to hear the evidence in
full.. Although the jury heard a particularly emotional part of the recording twice, the
judge explained to the jury that replaying the tape did not signify a bias toward either
party but was simply done to make sure the panel had heard the evidence . We find
this conduct to be reasonable in light of the situation and conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to replay the portion of the
audiotape that had been interrupted . See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W .3d
117, 119 (Ky. 2007) .
11. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Refused To Instruct the Jury on the
Offenses Of Second-Degree Manslaughter And Reckless Homicide as Lesser
Included Offenses of Wanton Murder.
At the close of his trial, Burrell requested that the jury be instructed on seconddegree manslaughter and reckless homicide as lesser included offenses of the wanton
murder charge. The trial court denied this request and instead instructed the jury only
on intentional murder and wanton murder . Burrell now argues that the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide
entitles him to a new trial because those instructions were reasonably supported by the
evidence. Although Burrell did not testify at trial, he argues that the jury could have
believed that the discharge of his gun was accidental, that it was meant as a warning
shot, or that Cason accidentally got into the way of his gunfire. We disagree .
It is well established that a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the whole
law of a case. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S .W .3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2005). An
instruction is proper, however, only if reasonably deducible from or supported by the
evidence. /d. If the evidence does not support the instruction, the trial court is not
required to include it and does not err by refusing to do so. Crane v. Commonwealth,
833 S.W .2d 813, 818 (Ky. 1992). In Baker v. Commonwealth , this Court held that
An instruction on a lesser-included offense is required only
if, considering the totality of the evidence the jury could have
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater
8
offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he
is guilty of the lesser offense .
103 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Ky. 2003) . The Baker holding recognizes a two step analysis
before an instruction on a lesser offense is required : it must be possible for a juror to
(1) have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense and yet
(2) believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense.
The murder statute, KRS 507.020, provides that a person is guilty of murder
when:
(1)(a) with intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . or
(b) including, but not limited to, the operation of a motor
vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person and
thereby causes the death of another person .
Second-degree manslaughter differs from wanton murder by the removal of the
"extreme indifference to human life" element, what is sometimes referred to as
aggravated wantonness . KRS 507.040. Reckless homicide requires a finding that the
killing was caused not wantonly but recklessly. KRS 507.050 . Kentucky's Penal Code
defines "recklessly" by stating that a person acts recklessly "when he fails to perceive a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance
exists." KRS 501 .020(4). A person acts wantonly, on the other hand, "when he is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result
will occur or that the circumstance exists." KRS 501 .020(3). As noted, for a
defendant's wanton conduct to justify an instruction on wanton murder, in addition to
consciously disregarding a substantial risk, he must also demonstrate an extreme
indifference to human life.
Relying on comments in Cetrulo and Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries,
§ 3 .28 (5t" ed. 2006), Burrell argues that second-degree manslaughter and reckless
homicide instructions were required in this case because second-degree manslaughter
is
always a lesser included offense of wanton Murder. . . .
[And] [i]n most cases, evidence that the defendant was
acting wantonly will also afford an inference that he was
acting recklessly, requiring that the jury also be instructed on
Reckless Homicide as a lesser included offense .
Id. at 3-46 . See also id. at § 1 .05 p. 1-19 (noting that second-degree manslaughter is
"automatically a lesser included offense of wanton murder, the only distinction between
the two being that in the latter offense, the degree of wantonness is more severe.")
This is true, of course, and no doubt in most cases where wanton murder is alleged
there will be grounds for asking the jury to determine the defendant's state of mind . We
have held in the murder context, however, that lesser-included-offense instructions are
not required where
the evidence was virtually undisputed not only that the
defendant killed the victim, but also with respect to the
defendant's state of mind when he or she did so.
Commonwealth v. Wolford 4 S.W .3d 534, 538 (Ky. 1999) (citing Crane v.
Commonwealth supra) . In Crane v. Commonwealth, the defendant robbed a liquor
store, and in the process, shot and killed the store clerk. At trial, Crane testified that he
fired the fatal shot into the air rather than at the clerk directly. There was
incontrovertible forensic proof, however, that the bullet entered the clerk in a straight10
line trajectory from approximately six feet above the floor. Because the evidence in
Crane did not support the defendant's theory that he shot into the air and merely acted
recklessly, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of
wanton murder and we affirmed . We explained that
[a]s a matter of law, the shot [by Crane] had to have been
fired into the victim intentionally or, at the very least, under
circumstances indicating extreme indifference to the value of
human life. This shot was undisputedly fired during the
commission of an armed robbery of a store clerk. The
circumstances belie and preclude any inference of mere
wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the robber killer .
/d. at 817.
In this case, while robbing the Dairy Mart and the three individuals present,
Burrell shot in the direction of the two men at close range, moved the captives to the
store's cooler, shot directly at and killed Cason, reloaded his weapon, and shot directly
at Weichart and Comley as they fled, injuring Weichart with one of the shell-fragments.
Because Burrell fired at the employees on three separate occasions, the facts of this
case evince an indifference to human life on a par with that involved in Crane.
Furthermore, although Burrell argues in his brief that the jury could have believed that
his gunshots were accidental, there was simply no evidence whatsoever supporting that
theory, and indeed Burrell's collecting the spent casings and reloading the weapon belie
it. Even more so than in Crane, where the defendant testified as to his state of mind,
the evidence here was undisputed that Burrell killed and did so at least wantonly in
circumstances demonstrating an extreme indifference to human life.
Based on the evidence presented, the jury could not reasonably have doubted
Burrell's guilt of the greater offense, wanton murder while believing him guilty of either
of the lesser offenses, second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide . In other
words, the record does not indicate that any juror could rationally find that Burrell acted
merely wantonly or recklessly when he killed Ms. Cason with a gunshot wound to her
left lung and heart. For these reasons, the trial court properly instructed the court on
intentional and wanton murder and did not err by excluding instructions on the lesser
offenses of second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide.
111 . The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Determining That The Photo
Array Was Not Unduly Suggestive, And Therefore, Did Not Err When It Allowed A
Witness To Make An In-Court Identification And Give Testimony About An Out-OfCourt Identification .
As noted above, following the robbery, Comley provided a description of the
assailant to a Lexington Police Officer, noting that he was a black man, about 6'1" in
height with an athletic build and that he wore silver wire-rimmed glasses, a black
baseball cap, gray sweatshirt, dark blue jeans, and dark work boots . Later that night,
Lexington Police Detective Matthew Brotherton compiled a photo array of six pictures,
including a picture of Burrell, to show to Comley. Detective Brotherton gathered five of
the photographs by utilizing a database and computer software maintained by the
Division of Community Corrections . The photograph of Burrell used in the photo line-up
had been taken earlier that evening at his booking and was not yet in the database .
Detective Brotherton testified that he entered certain parameters into the database
software that corresponded to Comley's previous description of the robber, such as
height, race, age, hair color, and weight. Since Comley had also described the robber
as wearing glasses, Brotherton then chose five photographs where the individual was
wearing glasses . Although Detective Brotherton compiled the line-up, Detective Robert
Sarantonio of the Lexington Police Department actually presented the photo array to
12
Comley the day after the robbery.
Detective Sarantonio testified that prior to showing Comley the line-up, he
informed him that an arrest had already been made in the case. Sarantonio also stated
that he instructed Comley that the person being investigated may or may not be in the
line-up ; that the photographs were not all taken at the same time ; that he should not
consider the hair styles, facial hair, clothing, or jewelry of the suspects ; and that the
photographs may not accurately display the complexion of an individual . Detective
Sarantonio also instructed Comley to take his time, to give the number of the
photograph he identified, and to explain his level of certainty to the officer . After
viewing the photos, Comley immediately selected photograph #3, Burrell, as the man
who robbed the Dairy Mart . Comley testified at trial regarding this pre-trial identification,
noting that he was able to provide a description of the robber to the officers soon after
the incident, that he picked Burrell out of a photo array the day after the robbery, and
that he was "110% positive" that Burrell had robbed him.
Burrell made a pre-trial motion to suppress Comley's testimony about the photo
line-up identification and to prevent any in-court identification, claiming that the
identification procedure was suggestive. Following a suppression hearing, the trial
court found that the identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and
overruled Burrell's motion. Burrell now argues that the unduly suggestive photo array
resulted in an improper identification procedure, caused a likelihood of an irreparable
misidentification, and consequently denied him due process . Upon appellate review,
this Court reviews a trial court's decision on the admissibility of identification evidence
under the abuse of discretion standard . King v. Commonwealth , 142 S.W .3d 645, 649
13
(Ky. 2004). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is "[a]rbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles ." Id. After reviewing the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing, we find that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence from the
photographic line-up .
It is well settled that identification evidence will be suppressed if a "photographic
identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification ." Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S . 377, 384, 88 S . Ct. 967, 971, 19 L . Ed . 2d 1247 (1968). In this case, Burrell
contends that the photographic array shown to Comley on September 15, 2004, was
impermissibly suggestive because Comley had watched the Dairy Mart's surveillance
video the day before, the officer conducting the procedure had told him that an arrest
had been made, the officers included only six photographs in the array, and the
photographs differed in ways that tended to single out Burrell . We disagree with all of
these contentions .
First, nothing in the surveillance video can be considered suggestive since it
merely replayed what Comley had just witnessed . The police, moreover, did not ask
Comley to view the video-tape ; he merely stood over their shoulders as they viewed it.
Second, even though only six photographs were used, we have previously upheld
arrays of that size. King v. Commonwealth, s_ upra . We have reviewed the array in this
case and agree with the trial court that it contained no suggestive irregularities . All of
the men pictured in the array are African-American and are wearing glasses, several
have short hair, some are darker-complected than others, and none of the pictures
14
contains any writing on it. Burrell argues that differences among the photographs, such
as the subject's hair and complexion make the array unduly suggestive . In particular,
he complains that he had the shortest hair of anyone pictured . These differences,
however, do not constitute an unduly suggestive photographic line-up because
Detective Sarrantonio told Comley that hairstyles should not be considered and that
complexions were not always accurately depicted . Even though Burrell had the
shortest hair of anyone in the lineup, all of the men had generally short hair, and
Comley picked Burrell out immediately as the suspect . Finally, the officer's informing
Comley that an arrest had been made was not suggestive because none of the
photographs indicated that the individual pictured had been placed under arrest. There
is no indication, in sum, that the photographic line-up was unduly suggestive and
consequently created a likelihood of an irreparable misidentification .
Even if this line-up were considered unduly suggestive, moreover, Comley's
testimony regarding his pre-trial identification would still be admissible because under
the totality of the circumstances, his identification was reliable. This court has held that
a witness's "identification may still be admissible if under the totality of the
circumstances the identification was reliable even though the [identification] procedure
was suggestive ." King v. Commonwealth , 142 S.W .3d at 649 . This determination
depends upon the consideration of five factors : the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of
the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation . Savage v. Commonwealth , 920 S .W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1995) (citing Neil
15
v. Biggers , 409 U.S . 188, 199-200, 93 S . Ct. 375, 382, 34 L. Ed . 2d 401 (1972)) . In this
case, Comley stated that he got a good look at the defendant during the robbery,
described him fairly accurately on the 911 call and to the investigating officers, claimed
to be 110% positive that the man in the photograph was the robber, and picked Burrell
out of the photographic line-up only twenty-four hours after the robbery occurred . Even
if the photographic array had been found to be unduly suggestive, Comley's testimony
would still be admissible because the totality of the circumstances indicates that his
identification of Burrell was reliable . For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of the identification evidence .
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the applicable law and the facts of this case, we conclude that
Burrell's allegations of error do not entitle him to relief. Since the trial court properly
admonished the jury following Mr. Cason's outburst, it did not err by denying Burrell's
motion for a mistrial. Because the evidence did not support a second-degree
manslaughter or a reckless homicide instruction, the trial court did not err in denying
Burrell's request for such instructions . Finally, because the photo array was not unduly
suggestive and Comley's identification was reliable, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it allowed Comley to testify regarding his pre-trial identification .
Accordingly, we affirm Burrell's convictions as set forth in the June 28, 2006 Judgment
of the Fayette Circuit Court .
All concur, except Venters, J., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Jeffrey Allan Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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