CARLTON EVAN MCINTOSH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MODIFIED : OCTOBER 23, 2008
RENDERED : MAY 22, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000421-MR
CARLTON EVAN MCINTOSH
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN GRISE, JUDGE
NOS. 05-CR-00347-002 AND 05-CR-00643
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On February 4, 2005, two masked individuals, one of them armed with what
appeared to be a handgun, robbed the Fairview Branch of South Central Bank in
Bowling Green. The robbers collected about $10,000.00 from the teller drawers and
fled on foot. In April 2005, a Warren County grand jury charged Carlton McIntosh with
having participated in the bank heist, and in May 2006, following a jury trial, McIntosh
was convicted of first-degree robbery . The jury further found that McIntosh is a firstdegree persistent felon (PFO) and pursuant to that finding recommended that his
twenty-year sentence for the robbery be enhanced to life imprisonment . McIntosh
appeals as a matter of right from the Warren Circuit Court's May 31, 2006 Judgment
sentencing him in accord with the jury's recommendation . He raises several allegations
of error, but primarily contends that he was denied his constitutional right to confront
one of the witnesses against him . Because this issue was not properly preserved for
review and does not present an instance of palpable error, we affirm the trial court's
Judgment.
RELEVANT FACTS
The Commonwealth alleged that McIntosh was aided in the robbery by Delanea
Slaughter, his twenty-year-old girlfriend, and Richard Banks, his second cousin .
McIntosh and Slaughter both resided in Indiana, but according to Slaughter they
frequently visited Bowling Green, where several members of McIntosh's extended
family lived . Slaughter testified that they had driven to Bowling Green in December
2004, ostensibly to retrieve a vehicle McIntosh had left there, and had stayed on
through January 2005, living sporadically with friends, McIntosh's family members, and
at motels . During their stay Slaughter obtained employment at a nursing home . She
testified that McIntosh had mentioned the possibility of a bank robbery, had shown her
a mask, and that a couple of days before the robbery they had purchased a revolverlike BB-gun from Wal Mart, but not until the morning of the robbery itself had he told her
which bank they were to rob and how they were to do it. On the morning of February 4,
Banks borrowed his girlfriend's car and led Slaughter and McIntosh to a parking lot not
far from the bank where they left their car. Banks then drove the other two to the
entrance of the bank and after checking inside, presumably for police officers, signaled
them to proceed . He then went into a neighboring store, Nation's Medicines, while
Slaughter and McIntosh entered the bank.
According to Slaughter and the bank surveillance photos, she and McIntosh both
wore hoods, masks, and gloves . McIntosh stood outside the tellers' counter, displayed
the BB-gun, and apparently had the tellers open their drawers. Slaughter then went
behind the counter and loaded the money into a plastic grocery bag. According to
Slaughter they were in the bank no longer than a minute . They then ran from the bank
to their car, stripping their disguises on the way, and drove to the house of one of
McIntosh's relatives . There they rendezvoused with Banks, who drove them to his
girlfriend's house . The plan, apparently, was for Banks's girlfriend to drive McIntosh
and Slaughter to Indianapolis, but the girlfriend backed out. The pair wound up waiting
a day and then simply drove themselves to Indianapolis in their own car.
As it happened, the Nation's Medicines security cameras caught Banks behaving
suspiciously at just the time of the robbery, which led Bowling Green detectives to
question him . He named Slaughter and McIntosh . McIntosh was known to reside in
Indianapolis, where after further investigation, including the discovery that Slaughter
and an African-American male companion had just paid cash for a used car, led to the
pair's arrest. McIntosh was arrested at the couple's motel room, and a subsequent
search of the room produced a black, revolver-like BB-gun, a bag of marijuana, clothes,
and receipts from recent clothing purchases and car repairs.
At trial the Commonwealth introduced testimony by a number of bank
employees, customers, and McIntosh's relatives, including testimony tending to show
both that the robbers had taken a large number of two-dollar bills and that that evening
McIntosh and Slaughter had given a large number of such bills to one of McIntosh's
relatives . Primarily, however, the case rested upon the testimony of Slaughter and
Banks. As noted above, Slaughter's testimony was particularly damning . Not only did
she detail McIntosh's perpetration of the crime, but her own involvement added the
appearance, at least, that a very young woman (Slaughter was-about twenty at the
time) had been used and manipulated by a much older man (McIntosh was about forty).
Banks's testimony was hardly less damaging, and it is his testimony that brings
us to McIntosh's principal claim of error. Banks had pled guilty by the time of
McIntosh's trial and apparently had begun to serve his sentence. He acknowledged his
family relationship with McIntosh, but when asked to describe the events of February 4,
2005 he denied having any recollection of the bank robbery whatsoever . The
Commonwealth then began laying the foundation for the introduction of Banks's prior
statements to the police by asking him if he had not told them a series of details about
the robbery. Banks asserted that his recollection of the police interviews was no better
than his recollection of the robbery, and not far into the Commonwealth's series of
questions he announced that he was "pleading the Fifth" and would give no more
answers . When the court told him that he had waived his Fifth Amendment right by
pleading guilty and ordered him to respond, Banks reverted to his lack of recollection,
although he did at one point deny having ever told anyone that he served as a lookout
for the robbers .
Having laid a foundation, the Commonwealth moved to play for the jury two
video recordings of Banks being interrogated by the police, on the ground that Banks's
prior police statements were inconsistent, for the purposes of KRE 801 A(a)(1), with his
non-responsive testimony. McIntosh's counsel objected . He explained, "Your honor,
my position is that, unless he denies it, and she [the Commonwealth's Attorney] uses it
to impeach, those videos are not admissible ." The court overruled counsel's objection
and permitted the introduction of Banks's prior statements . In them he ultimately
provided a description of the robbery in substantial accord with the description
Slaughter provided . Banks was no more responsive during cross-examination than he
had been during direct. He claimed no recollection of having ever met Slaughter and
otherwise again denied any recollection of the robbery.
On appeal, McIntosh contends that Banks's unresponsiveness rendered him
essentially unavailable for cross-examination and that his hearsay statements to the
police were thus introduced in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as recently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v.
Washington , 541 U.S . 36,124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). We disagree .
ANALYSIS
I. The Admission of Banks's Statements to the Police Did Not Violate the
Confrontation Clause.
We begin by noting that this issue was not preserved by appropriate objection at
trial . As quoted above, counsel's objection asserted only that until Banks denied having
made his statements to police, as opposed to not remembering them, the prior
statements should not be deemed "inconsistent" with his testimony for the purposes of
KRE 801A(a)(1), the rule which permits the introduction at trial of a testifying witness's
prior inconsistent statement. The objection included no reference to the constitution, to
the right of confrontation, or to cross-examination, nothing, in other words, to alert the
trial court to a ground for objection beyond the evidence rule. Generally, of course,
"[w]hen a party states grounds for an objection at trial, that party cannot assert a
different basis for the objection on appeal ." Fairrow v. Commonwealth , 175 S .W .3d
601, 607 (Ky. 2005). Accordingly, McIntosh's Sixth Amendment claim is subject only to
palpable error review .
There can be no palpable error, of course, without an error, and we agree with
the Commonwealth that the admission of Banks's statements to the police did not run
afoul of the rule laid down in Crawford . In Crawford , as McIntosh notes, the Supreme
Court held that if the declarant does not testify at trial, his "testimonial" hearsay
statements are not admissible, regardless of the hearsay rules, unless he is unavailable
to testify and his hearsay statements were previously subject to cross-examination. Id.
at 54. The Supreme Court has yet to provide a thorough definition of "testimonial," but
in Crawford it noted that under any definition of that term a witness's accusatory
statements elicited during police interrogation would be included . Id. at 68 . There is no
question then that Banks's statements to the investigating officers tending to inculpate
McIntosh were "testimonial" under Crawford .
As the Crawford Court explained, however,
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the
use of his prior testimonial statements. . . . The Clause does
not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is
present at trial to defend or explain it.
Id. at 59 (citation omitted) . McIntosh contends that although Banks was present at trial
he did not truly "appear for cross-examination" because his evasiveness rendered
meaningful cross-examination impossible . Absent meaningful cross-examination,
McIntosh maintains, Banks's testimonial statements to the police should have been
excluded regardless of the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements . In
Estes v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 421 (Ky . 1987), we held that a witness's
privileged refusal to testify did indeed render him unavailable for cross-examination for
constitutional purposes and that such a refusal could not serve as the basis for invoking
KRE 801 A(a)(1).
Absent a testimonial privilege, however, and there is no claim in this case that
Banks was privileged not to testify, the Supreme Court has indicated that a witness's
inability or refusal to recall the events recorded in a prior statement or the events
surrounding the making of the statement does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
In United States v. Owens, 484 U .S . 554, 108 S . Ct. 838, 98 L . Ed . 2d 951 (1988), a
case in which the victim of an assault had given a statement to police accusing the
defendant, but at trial testified that he had no recollection of why he made the
accusation, the Court held that the victim's memory loss did not deprive the defendant
of a constitutionally adequate opportunity for cross-examination:
The Confrontation Clause guarantees only "an opportunity
for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish ."
Id. at 559 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted ; quoting Delaware v.
Fensterer , 474 U .S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L . Ed . 2d 15 (1985)) . The witness, the Court
observed, had been placed under oath, had answered questions, and had been subject
to the jury's observation .
Although Crawford did not discuss what it means for a witness to "appear for
cross-examination," Crawford did not overrule Owens , and several courts have held that
under Owens a witness "appears for cross-examination" if he willingly takes the stand,
answers questions in whatever manner, and exposes his demeanor to the jury, thus
giving the defense an opportunity to address the witness's prior testimonial statements .
United States v. Ghilarducci , 480 F .3d 542 (7th Cir. 2007); State v. Pierre , 890 A.2d 474
(Conn . 2006) (collecting cases); State v. Real, 150 P.3d 805 (Ariz . App. 2007). But see
State v. Nyhammer , 932 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. 2007) (confrontation right denied when
alleged infant sex-abuse victim became completely unable to testify about her prior
statements) . We agree with these Courts that Owens remains controlling, and under
Owens, McIntosh was afforded a constitutionally adequate opportunity to crossexamine Banks . Banks willingly took the stand ; answered defense counsel's questions,
though not as McIntosh might have wished ; and gave the jury an opportunity to
compare his demeanor at trial with his demeanor during his interrogations . His
testimony enabled McIntosh to argue that Banks's prior allegations were solely the
result of Banks's desire to deflect blame from himself and to curry favor with the police.
Crawford and Owens do not require more .
Hoping to avoid this result, McIntosh notes that under KRE 804(a)(3) a declarant
is "unavailable" as a witness if he "[t]estifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of
the declarant's statement ." He argues that Banks's lack of memory rendered him
"unavailable" under this rule, and that he thus should also be deemed "unavailable"
under Crawford . The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Owens, where it
was urged that the federal counterpart to KRE 804(a) likewise required a finding that
the forgetful witness was "unavailable" and so precluded finding him "subject to cross
examination" for the purposes of Fed . R. Evid . 801(d). That rule permits the
introduction of out-of-court identifications provided that the identifications are "subject to
cross examination" at trial . The defendant argued that it was inconsistent to say on the
one hand that a forgetful witness was "unavailable," but on the other hand to say that
he was "subject to cross-examination." Noting the different purposes of the two rules,
however, the Supreme Court explained that the inconsistency was apparent rather than
real:
[This] situation . . . presents the verbal curiosity that the
witness is "subject to cross-examination" under Rule 801
while at the same time "unavailable" under Rule 804(a)(3) .
Quite obviously, the two characterizations are made for two
entirely different purposes and there is no requirement or
expectation that they should coincide ."
484 U .S . 563-64 .
Similarly here, Crawford's provision that the Confrontation Clause does not bar
testimonial hearsay statements if the declarant "appears for cross-examination," has a
different purpose from that of KRE 804, which provides that certain hearsay statements
may be admitted if the declarant is "unavailable ." Despite the seeming verbal kinship,
the two standards are distinct, and there is no inconsistency in saying that Banks may
have been "unavailable" for the purposes of KRE 804, but that he "appeared for crossexamination" for the purposes of Crawford and Owens. The trial court, in sum, did not
err by admitting the video reproductions of Banks's statements to the police.
II . The Magistrate Validly Issued the Motel-Room Search Warrant.
As noted above, McIntosh was arrested outside an Indianapolis motel, and after
the arrest the officers obtained a search warrant for his motel room, where they found
and seized the black BB-gun, a small bag of marijuana, receipts, and clothing. Prior to
trial McIntosh moved to suppress the motel-room evidence on the ground that the
warrant was obtained on the basis of stale information . The trial court denied the
motion, and the motel-room evidence was discussed and some of it introduced at
McIntosh's trial. On appeal, McIntosh renews his contention that the search warrant
was invalid because it was based on information too stale to supply probable cause.
We disagree .
A search warrant may be issued, of course, if there is probable cause to believe
that the search will uncover evidence of a crime . The United States Supreme Court
has explained that the probable cause determination is to be based on the totality of the
circumstances and that the issuing magistrate need only make
a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place .
Illinois v. Gates , 462 U .S . 213, 238, 103 S . Ct. 2317, 76 L . Ed. 2d 527 (1983). The
magistrate's determination is entitled to great deference and
should be upheld so long as the magistrate had a
"substantial basis for concluding that a search would
uncover evidence of wrongdoing ."
Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 583 (Ky. 2006) (quoting from Gates).
As McIntosh correctly notes, probable cause diminishes with the passage of time
so that the age of the information presented to the magistrate is one of the
circumstances he or she must consider . In reviewing the issue of staleness, however,
"it is important to look at the nature of the offense and the length of criminal activity, not
simply the number of days that have elapsed ." Id. at 583. Instead of measuring
staleness solely by counting the days on a calendar,
courts must also concern themselves with the following
variables : the character of the crime (chance encounter in
the night or regenerating conspiracy?), the criminal (nomadic
or entrenched?), the thing to be seized (perishable and
easily transferable or of enduring utility to its holder?), the
place to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience
or secure operational base?), etc. . . . As these variables
demonstrate, even if a significant period has elapsed since a
defendant's last reported criminal activity, it is still possible
that, depending upon the nature of the crime, a magistrate
may properly infer that evidence of wrongdoing is still to be
found on the premises. . . . Furthermore, where recent
10
information corroborates otherwise stale information,
probable cause may be found.
Id. at 584 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) .
In this case, the officer's warrant application was presented to the magistrate on
March 4, 2005 . Its accompanying affidavit noted the February 4, 2005 bank robbery,
the arrest warrants that had been issued for Slaughter and McIntosh, Slaughter's
February 15 $2,650 .00 cash purchase of a used van, her cash payments of $38.25 per
night for the motel room from February 12 until March 3, Slaughter's African-American
companion during the van transaction, and McIntosh's presence at the motel . The
application sought authority to search the motel room for evidence "used in the robbery
or taken during the robbery . . . [s]pecifically, any U .S . currency, a handgun or replica
[there]of, any ammunition associated with a handgun and black face masks used in the
robbery ."
Although, as McIntosh contends, gun, money, and masks could have been
disposed of during the intervening month, the continuing utility of the gun and the
money, Slaughter's recent cash transactions, and the possible future utility of the
masks, made it fairly probable that the gun, the masks, and some of the money would
have been retained after the crime and would be found in the motel room. The warrant
was valid, therefore, and the trial court did not err when it denied McIntosh's motion to
suppress the motel-room evidence .
III. The Admission of Evidence that McIntosh Purchased Drugs Was Harmless
Error.
Prior to trial McIntosh also moved to suppress any evidence that he and
Slaughter used or purchased drugs. The Commonwealth countered with a motion
pursuant to KRE 404(b) to introduce Slaughter's testimony that the pair had spent some
of the stolen cash on marijuana and cocaine . Granting the Commonwealth's motion,
the trial court opined that Slaughter's proposed testimony was admissible either
because it was "inextricably intertwined" with other evidence essential to the
Commonwealth's case (KRE 404(b)(2)) or because, by showing that the pair had been
able to afford costly pursuits in the weeks immediately following the robbery, it tended
to show that they were in fact the perpetrators (KRE 404(b)(1)) . When asked to
account for the stolen proceeds at trial, Slaughter testified that in addition to the van,
the month worth of motel rooms, and some clothing, she and McIntosh had purchased
marijuana and cocaine . McIntosh contends that this evidence was not properly
admitted under KRE 404(b) because its prejudicial effect was grossly disproportionate
to any probative value. We agree .
Evidence of a defendant's "other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts" is not admissible
as proof of the defendant's character or of his propensity to break the law. KRE 404(b),
however, permits the introduction of such evidence
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident ; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential
to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering
party .
This rule is to be applied cautiously, we have explained, in accord with its
fundamental purpose of "prohibit[ing] unfair inferences against a defendant ." Anderson
v. Commonwealth , 231 S .W.3d 117, 120 (Ky. 2007). To be admissible under the rule,
the evidence of other criminal or wrongful acts must be (1) relevant for some purpose
12
other than to prove criminal predisposition, (2) sufficiently probative to warrant
introduction, and (3) sufficiently probative so that its probative value outweighs its
potential for prejudice to the accused . Id.; Bell v. Commonwealth , 875 S .W .2d 882 (Ky.
1994). We agree with McIntosh that with respect to Slaughter's drug testimony this
standard was not met.
The Commonwealth's main concern was to counter an inference that because
Slaughter and McIntosh were not caught with a significant amount of cash only a month
after allegedly stealing $10,000 .00, they likely were not the thieves . Drug purchases
are clearly relevant to an attempt to account for the missing cash, and significant drug
purchases soon after a theft by individuals with no income would be probative that they
had perpetrated the theft. The probative value of the drug evidence here, however,
was diminished by the fact that no evidence indicated that the alleged drug purchases
exceeded Slaughter's and McIntosh's ordinary means . Slaughter testified only that the
pair had purchased marijuana and cocaine . She did not say in what quantities or how
much money was spent . Absent those additional facts the drug evidence contributed
only marginally to the purported accounting . On the other hand, as McIntosh notes, the
drug evidence was apt to be significantly prejudicial as it added to the impression that
McIntosh was an unsavory older man taking advantage of a young woman-precisely
the sort of character evidence KRE 404(b) is meant to exclude absent a compelling
need for it. As there was no compelling need for the marginally probative drug
evidence here, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it.
That is not the end of the matter, however, for as we noted in Anderson, supra ,
RCr 9 .24 requires that evidentiary errors be deemed harmless "if there is no reasonable
13
possibility that [the erroneously admitted evidence] contributed to the conviction ." 231
S.W .3d at 122. The error here was harmless. The case against McIntosh may fairly be
characterized as overwhelming . Slaughter's testimony and Banks's statements were
significantly corroborated by the two-dollar-bill evidence, by McIntosh's participation in
the van purchase, and by the presence of the BB-gun in the pair's motel room. There is
no reasonable probability that absent the drug evidence either the guilty verdict or the
sentence would have been any different .
Finally, McIntosh contends that having admitted the drug evidence the trial court
erred by failing to admonish the jury to consider it only as part of the Commonwealth's
attempt to account for the stolen money . Generally, however, the right to an
admonition is waived unless the admonition is requested. Coulthard v. Commonwealth ,
230 S .W .3d 572 (Ky. 2007). Here there was no request. Prior to trial, it appears, the
possibility of an admonition was discussed, but during trial, when the evidence was
introduced, McIntosh's counsel did not renew the issue. The trial court did not err by
not giving an unrequested admonition .
IV. McIntosh's Trial Was Not Marred by Palpable Error .
McIntosh also alleges two errors which he concedes were not preserved by
appropriate objection at trial but which, he contends, so plainly undermined the fairness
of the proceedings as to amount to palpable error. Under RCr 10.26, a palpable error is
an error which is apparent from the record, which affects the substantial rights of a
party, and which has resulted in a manifest injustice . Relief may be granted for
palpable error only upon a showing of "probability of a different result or error so
fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law." Martin v.
14
Commonwealth, 207 S.W .3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006). McIntosh's allegations fail to meet this
standard .
A. The Jury Instructions Provided a Recognized Definition of "Deadly
Weapon ."
First, McIntosh contends that the jury instructions incorporated an invalid and
overly broad definition of "deadly weapon" and consequently permitted his conviction of
first-degree robbery when at most his crime was second-degree . Jury Instruction No . 1,
First Degree Robbery, provided as follows :
You will find the defendant guilty of First-Degree Robbery
under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following :
A. That in this county on or about February 4, 2005, and
before the finding of the indictment herein, Carlton McIntosh
stole money from South Central Bank;
B . That in the course of so doing and with the intent to
accomplish the theft, he used or threatened the immediate
use of physical force upon any person not a participant in
the crime ; AND
C. That when he did so, he was armed with a deadly
weapon .
"Deadly weapon" was then defined in instruction no . 3 as
any object intended by its user to convince a victim that it is
a deadly weapon and the victim is in fact so convinced .'
As McIntosh notes, the trial court's definition of "deadly weapon" is circular, in
that it uses the term to be defined in the body of the definition. McIntosh's complaint,
however, is not that the trial court's definition was unclear or unartful, but that it does
not comport with the statutory definition, which, in pertinent part, provides that a "deadly
weapon" is
[a]ny weapon from which a shot, readily capable of
' See Wright v. Commonwealth , 239 S.W .3d 63 (Ky. 2007), for a more recent
specimen first-degree robbery instruction .
15
producing death or other serious physical injury, may be
discharged .
KRS 500 .080(4)(b) . He contends that a BB-gun is not such a weapon . Had the trial
court employed the statutory definition, as McIntosh contends it was obliged to do, he
claims he could not have been convicted of first-degree robbery .
As the Commonwealth correctly points out, however, in Merritt v.
Commonwealth , 386 S .W .2d 727 (Ky. 1965), a case, in which it was alleged that the
robber may have used a toy pistol rather than a real one, the former Court of Appeals
held that within the context of the pre-Penal Code robbery statute,
any object that is intended by its user to convince the victim
that it is a pistol or other deadly weapon and does so
convince him is one .
Id. at 729 . This is the definition the trial court employed. The Penal Code was adopted
in 1974 and included in the section that became KRS 500 .080(4)(b) the statutory
definition of "deadly weapon" quoted above. Nevertheless, in Kennedv v.
Commonwealth , 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1976), this Court, relying on commentary to the
Penal Code's then new robbery provisions, held that in the robbery context the Merritt
definition of "deadly weapon" remained "as viable now as it was prior to the adoption of
the code." 544 S .W.2d at 221 . That viability was recently extended in Thacker v.
Commonwealth , 194 S .W .3d 287 (Ky. 2006) and Shegg v. Commonwealth , 142
S .W .3d 101 (Ky. 2004). In light of this precedent, it cannot be said that the trial court
committed a palpable error when it employed the Merritt definition of "deadly weapon" in
this case. We recognize, however, that our continuing reliance upon Merritt has drawn
scholarly criticism, see Robert G . Lawson & William H . Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law
ยง 13-7(c)(3) (1998), and in a case where the issue is properly preserved would warrant
16
further consideration .
B. Competent Evidence Supported the Jury's PFO Finding .
McIntosh's second claim of palpable error concerns his sentence. He contends
that his PFO status was determined on the basis of incompetent evidence . He correctly
notes that one of the elements of that status is that he committed his current offense
while on release or within five years of discharge from a prior felony sentence . KRS
532 .080 . He argues that the Commonwealth relied upon inadmissible hearsay to prove
his last discharge date and thus that it failed to prove the required temporal connection
between this current offense and a prior one .
Through a detective on the case, the Commonwealth introduced exemplified
copies of four prior felony convictions . The most recent was an Indiana Judgment
entered December 11, 1997, which sentenced McIntosh to two years (730 days) for
residential entry and battery . McIntosh was given sentence credit of 178 days for time
spent in confinement before sentencing. That left him with a bit more than a year-anda-half to serve . The earliest he could have been discharged, therefore, was about June
1999 . When asked when McIntosh had been discharged from that sentence, the
detective referred to his file and testified, without objection, that "his effective date of
discharge from the Indiana Department of Corrections was January 21, 2001 ." The
basis for this testimony does not appear in the record, and McIntosh correctly notes that
it appears to be hearsay subject to objection . The absence of an objection, however,
very likely reflects that fact that the judgment itself adequately established the temporal
element of McIntosh's PFO status and/or that the detective's information was accurate .
Cf. Commonwealth v. Mixon , 827 S .W.2d 689 (Ky. 1992) (upholding, in the absence of
17
objection, oral proof of PFO elements read from documents which were not introduced) .
In any event, because McIntosh has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
detective's hearsay, its admission cannot be deemed a palpable error.
CONCLUSION
In sum, notwithstanding Banks's evasiveness when he testified at McIntosh's
trial, he nevertheless "appeared for cross-examination," and thus the introduction into
evidence of his testimonial hearsay statements to police investigators did not deprive
McIntosh of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Nor were
McIntosh's rights violated when the police searched his motel room pursuant to a validly
obtained warrant. Neither the jury instruction defining "deadly weapon," nor the
admission of oral proof of McIntosh's discharge date from a prior sentence amounted to
palpable error. Finally, although the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
insufficiently probative evidence of McIntosh's alleged drug purchases, the error, in light
of the overwhelming evidence of McIntosh's guilt, was clearly harmless . Accordingly,
we affirm the May 31, 2006 Judgment of the Warren Circuit Court .
All sitting . Lambert, C.J., Abramson, Cunningham, Minton, Noble, and Scott,
J .J ., concur. Schroder, J ., concurs in result only by separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Carlton Evan McIntosh
Northpoint Training Center
P .O . Box 479
Burgin, KY 40310
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Perry Thomas Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
RENDERED : MAY 22, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000421-MR
CARLTON EVAN MCINTOSH
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
NOS . 05-CR-00347-002 AND 05-CR-00643
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE SCHRODER
CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY
The dilemma in the present case is that Banks was forced to testify after
attempting to invoke the Fifth Amendment . In United States v. Owens , 484 U.S . 554,
561, 108 S. Ct. 838, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1988), the Court stated that "[o]rdinarily, a
witness is regarded as `subject to cross-examination' when he is placed on the stand,
under oath, and responds willingly to questions ." A witness who has to testify after
being denied the Fifth is hardly a willing witness! However, Owens also generally
indicates that the Clause is satisfied so long as the witness answers the questions
posed to him on cross-examination, albeit evasively or with a faulty memory . Id . at 554.
Therefore, I concur in result.
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2006-SC-000421-MR
CARLTON EVAN MCINTOSH
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN GRISE, JUDGE
NOS . 05-CR-00347-002 AND 05-CR-00643
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
MODIFYING OPINION ON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant, Carlton Evan McIntosh, is
DENIED. The Memorandum Opinion of the Court, rendered on May 22, 2008, is
MODIFIED on its face by substitution of the attached opinion in lieu of the original
opinion . Said modifications do not affect the holding.
All sitting . All concur.
ENTERED: October 23, 2008.
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