MICHELLE DUNN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 26, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBPS E'D
SUFrrMr C~Vurf of
2006-SC-000412-DG
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MICHELLE DUNN
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2005-CA-000816-MR
KNOX CIRCUIT COURT NO . 02-CR-00094
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING, VACATING AND REMANDING
The primary issue presented is whether a youthful offender who
has committed a violent felony must be considered for probation upon
reaching age eighteen and being returned to the sentencing court pursuant
to KRS 640 .030(2) . The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that
Michelle Dunn was not eligible for such consideration because KRS
439.3401, the Violent Offender Statute, prohibits probation for her offense
until 85% of the sentence has been served . Having recently decided in
Commonwealth v. Merriman and Commonwealth v. Hickman,
S .W.3d
(Ky. 2008) (2006-SC-000330-DG and 2006-SC-000690-DG, rendered
September 18, 2008; modified October 2, 2008), that the Violent Offender
Statute does not apply to youthful offenders, we reverse the decision below
and remand to the trial court for consideration of probation and the other
alternatives available under KRS 640 .030(2) .
GV.
In October of 2002, having been transferred to circuit court for
trial as a youthful offender, Dunn accepted a plea agreement and entered
guilty pleas to charges of first-degree robbery, first-degree assault, and
receiving stolen property - offenses committed when she was fifteen years of
age . She received concurrent sentences totaling ten years . On turning
eighteen, Dunn was returned to the sentencing court in August of 2004,
pursuant to the mandate of KRS 640 .030(2), according to which the court
"shall" determine whether the individual will be placed on probation or
conditional discharge, temporarily returned to the Department of Juvenile
Justice to complete a treatment program, or incarcerated in an institution
operated by the Department of Corrections .
Appearing in the sentencing court with counsel, Dunn proposed
to offer evidence of rehabilitation in support of her request for probation.
The court declined to hear any such testimony, being of the opinion that
Dunn was a violent offender and ineligible for probation, as she had not
served 85% of her ten-year sentence . Our decision in Merriman/ Hickman,,
supra, makes clear that probation is an available course in these
circumstances and must be considered by the sentencing court. It is a
natural corollary, we believe, that Dunn must be permitted to present
relevant evidence on the issue.
As a secondary issue, the Commonwealth argues that Dunn is
estopped from claiming that the Violent Offender Statute does not apply to
her. In an unsuccessful motion for relief pursuant to RCr 11 .42, filed in
2003, Dunn argued that her trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to
advise her that she was a violent offender and therefore would be required
to serve 855% of her sentence before being considered for probation or
parole. The Commonwealth's point is that, in a prior judicial proceeding,
Dunn has admitted, even asserted, that she is a violent offender, and that
she should not now be permitted to claim otherwise.
The apparent conflict between KRS 640 .030 and KRS 439 .3401
was an unsettled issue prior to our decision in Merriman I Hickman, but it
was not a contested issue in the RCr 11 .42 proceeding . In that proceeding,
the Court of Appeals ultimately determined that trial counsel had in fact
advised Dunn that she could be classified as a violent offender. Given the
circumstances, we are not persuaded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel
precludes Dunn's assertion of KRS 640 .030 in the present case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, the judgment
of the Knox Circuit Court entered herein on August 11, 2004, is vacated,
and the matter is remanded to the Knox Circuit Court for consistent
proceedings under KRS 640 .030(2) .
Minton, C.J. ; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Scott, and
Venters, JJ., sitting. AH concur. Schroder, J., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Londa Jeanine Adkins
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR. APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D . Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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