RICHARD EARL THOMAS, II V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 26, 2008
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RICHARD EARL THOMAS, II
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
NOS . 04-CR-00273 AND 05-CR-00103
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Richard Earl Thomas, II, was convicted by a Bullitt County
jury of murder, theft by unlawful taking over $300 .00, and third-degree
burglary. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, he was sentenced to
twenty (20) years for murder, five (5) years for theft, and five (5) years for
burglary, to run concurrently for a total of twenty (20) years in prison . He
appeals to this Court as a matter of right under Ky. Const . ยง 110(2) (b) and
argues the circuit court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress selfincriminating statements; (2) denying his motion for a directed verdict; (3)
admitting hearsay evidence ; and (4) denying his motion for a new trial. We
affirm.
Appellant stands convicted for the murder of his father, Richard
Thomas . At the time of the murder, Appellant had been living with his father
and stepmother, Malissa Thomas, under what was referred to as "lockdown ."
This arrangement was put in place after Appellant was denied in-patient
treatment for his OxyContin addiction . He was not allowed to leave the
residence unless he was with a family member or his girlfriend, Amy Coble .
On Friday, September 3, 2004, Malissa Thomas left for Michigan with
several family members. Appellant and his father were at home when Malissa
departed . Despite repeated attempts to contact Richard, the last time Malissa
spoke to her husband was at 2:00 a.m . on Saturday, when she called to tell
him she had safely arrived in Michigan . Malissa became worried and asked her
brother to check on Richard . However, her brother was unable to gain entry
into the residence . On Monday, September 6th, Appellant called Malissa twice
from Richard's cell phone to ask if she had made it home . Malissa arrived at
the residence at approximately 3 :00 p.m . and found Richard dead . Richard
was lying on the couch with a gunshot wound to his head . The bullet causing
his death had been fired from a 9mm handgun. While a shell casing was found
near the body, Richard's 9mm handgun was missing from the residence. In
addition, there was no evidence of forced entry into the home and the alarm
system had not been activated . Malissa also found that the thermostat had
been turned down to its lowest setting.
Everything in the kitchen was exactly as it had been when Malissa
departed on Friday. Specifically, Malissa found a pot on the stove, in which
Richard had prepared soup, and a bowl of leftover food on the kitchen table .
She also found garbage bags on the table where she had left them. Finally,
Malissa noted that their Dodge truck was parked in an unusual fashion in the
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garage, which was not customary for Richard. Subsequently, Malissa
discovered that tools were missing from the garage, and that Richard's wallet
and Masonic ring were also missing from a bedroom drawer .
According to Appellant, he accompanied his father to a flea market on
Saturday morning. There, Richard met a friend named Cindy. Appellant
further claimed that his father gave him his cell phone and credit card before
leaving the flea market . Allegedly, this was the last time Appellant saw his
father alive . On Saturday evening, Appellant took his girlfriend, Amy Coble, to
a Louisville restaurant . Afterwards, he spent the night at the home of his
brother, Paul Thomas. Around 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, he and Amy departed
for Indiana. Using Richard's credit card, Appellant rented a hotel room for the
evening. He and Amy returned to the Louisville area the next day.
Contrary to Appellant's assertion that he visited a flea market with his
father on Saturday, evidence showed that he was in Louisville that day between
the hours of 11 :30 a.m. and 4:41 p .m., pawning items at various locations. On
Monday, Appellant bought OxyContin from Joshua McKinney and spent that
night in a hotel room with a friend named Michael Schron. Finally, evidence
showed Appellant gave inconsistent stories to others regarding his whereabouts
throughout the weekend .
Investigators, believing Appellant was the last person to have seen
Richard alive, wanted to interview him. When Appellant could not be found,
investigators released his photograph to the news media. Upon seeing his
picture on television, Appellant called his brother, Jeremy Thomas. Jeremy
picked him up in Louisville and, at Appellant's request, took him to the police
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station in Bullitt County. As a result of incriminating statements he made to
police, Appellant was arrested and subsequently indicted on theft and burglary
charges, as well as for the murder of his father.
Self-Incriminating Statements
Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
certain incriminating statements he made to police . Appellant's argument has
three main parts. First, citing to Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W .3d 403
(Ky. 2006), he claims he was subjected to custodial interrogation from the
moment questioning began, based on the presumptively coercive nature of a
police station . Second, Appellant claims there was not substantial evidence to
support the trial court's ruling that he received and waived his Miranda rights.
Third, he claims officers employed a question-first tactic during interrogation,
as prohibited by Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S . 600 (2004) .
.
On appeal of a trial court's order denying suppression, factual findings
are reviewed for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S .W.3d 300, 305 (Ky. 2006) . In reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress, findings of fact are considered conclusive if they
are supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9 .78; Adcock v . Commonwealth,
967 S .W .2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) . When factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the next question is whether the law was properly applied
to the established facts. Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky.
2004) .
Appellant claims he was under custodial interrogation from the moment
he arrived at the police station. "Custodial interrogation has been defined as
4
questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way."
Lucas, 195 S .W.3d at 405 . Both custody and interrogation are required to
trigger the constitutional right against self-incrimination . The threshold
question in any case involving a possible violation of Miranda rights is whether
the defendant was subject to custodial interrogation . Jackson , 187 S .W .3d at
305 .
"Interrogation has been defined to include `any words or actions on the
part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect[ .]' Wells v. Commonwealth, 892 S .W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. 1995) .
Appellant was indeed under interrogation once the questioning began because
the officers should have known their words or actions were reasonably likely to
elicit incriminating responses . However, our inquiry does not end there. We
must now consider whether Appellant was in custody during the interrogation .
The initial determination of whether a person is in custody depends on
the objective circumstances of the interrogation, rather than the subjective
views of the parties involved . Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318 (1994) .
The inquiry into custody must consider whether the person was under formal
arrest, whether there was a restraint upon his or her freedom, and whether
there was a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree normally
associated with formal arrest. Lucas, 195 S .W.3d at 405. Custody
determinations are fact specific and must always be made considering the
totality of the circumstances . Jackson, 187 S.W.3d at 310 . An interview of a
5
suspect by a police officer necessarily has coercive aspects to it; however, it
does not create the type of risk that warrants a per se requirement for the issue
of Miranda warnings for all station-house interrogations. Id. Rather, the
pivotal requirement that triggers Miranda warnings turns on whether the
environment has become so coercive as to induce a reasonable person to
believe that he or she is not free to leave, or that their freedom is otherwise
restrained . Id . ; Lucas, 195 S .W.3d at 405 . Some factors to consider in this
analysis are whether there was the "threatening presence of several officers,
physical touching of the person, or use of a tone or language that might compel
compliance with the request of the police ." Id. at 405-06 .
Appellant came to the police station on his own accord and arrived at
around 1 :00 a.m. on Wednesday, September 8th. He voluntarily accompanied
officers to an interview room to answer questions. At that time, Appellant was
neither under arrest, nor was his freedom of movement restrained. Further,
Appellant never requested that he be allowed to leave. It is true that Appellant
was escorted to the bathroom . However, this was in accordance with a policy
that prohibits individuals from roaming about the facility unaccompanied. As
such, Appellant was not in custody before he was read his Miranda rights.
Appellant further claims there was not substantial evidence to support
the trial court's finding that he received and waived his Miranda rights.
Specifically, he claims the officers' testimony was inconsistent and
contradictory with regard to the timing of the events that transpired at the
police station. Initially, Appellant was asked where he had been over the
weekend . During his account, Appellant admitted to stealing items from his
6
father's home . Officers Patchin and Dawson testified that this occurred at
approximately 2 :00 or 2 :30 in the morning. Prior to Appellant's admission, he
was not in custody. Subsequent to that admission, the officers testified that
Appellant was verbally given his Miranda rights, and that he waived them .
There is some dispute as to the time this occurred; however, the waiver form
listed the time as 4:22 a.m. While both Officers Patchin and Dawson testified
with certainty as to the sequence of events, and that Appellant was read his
Miranda rights directly after implicating himself in the burglary, neither could
verify the exact times each of these events took place . Contrary to the officers'
testimony, Appellant claimed he never received, much less waived, his rights.
However, Appellant does recall signing various papers at the station. Under
these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when
it found the Commonwealth had presented substantial evidence that Appellant
had waived his right against self-incrimination.
Appellant next argues that officers employed an impermissible "questionfirst" tactic as prohibited by Seibert, 542 U .S. at 602 . We agree with the
Commonwealth that this issue was not preserved for appellate review, as it was
not presented to the trial court for consideration. Further, Appellant has not
requested palpable error review on this basis . See Dant v. Commonwealth , 258
S .W.3d 12, 21 (Ky. 2008) (holding that an appellate court will not review for
palpable error unless requested and briefed by the appellant) .
Directed Verdict
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
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third-degree burglary and murder. Upon review of the record, we conclude that
sufficient evidence was presented to cause a reasonable jury to find Appellant
guilty of burglary and murder.
In considering a motion for a directed verdict,
[T]he trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . If the
evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a
directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling
on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions
as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony .
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) . "On appellate
review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict o f acquittal." Benham , 816 S .W.2d at 187,
citin Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S .W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983) .
We turn first to the burglary conviction. The evidence established, and
Appellant essentially concedes, that he took items from his father's detached
garage and pawned them. He argues, however, that no proof was offered that
he entered or remained unlawfully in the detached garage so as to establish
burglary . In fact, Appellant claims that he was authorized to enter the garage
because he had been living at his father's house, albeit on "lockdown," and was
therefore a resident.
A person is guilty of third degree burglary when, "with the intent to
commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building."
KRS 511 .040(l) . The official commentary to the burglary statute explains that
the requirement that one enter or remain unlawfully in a building or dwelling
includes any person who enters under privilege, but who "remains on that
property beyond the termination of his privilege ." Official Commentary to KRS
511 .020 . Thus, a person who enters the victim's home as an invited guest is
guilty of burglary where he kills the victim, then remains in the house to steal
items. See Tribbett v. Commonwealth , 561 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Ky. 1978) ("Upon
the death of the licensor, the license ceased and the privilege to be upon the
premises lapsed . Therefore, when [the licensees] failed to leave, they remained
unlawfully upon the premises within the meaning of the burglary statute .") .
Likewise, an employee authorized to enter a business after hours nonetheless
exceeds the scope of that license by re-entering the business for the purpose of
stealing valuable coins. See Commonwealth v . Partee, 122 S .W.3d 572, 576
(Ky. 2003) ("It is doubtful that Appellee, despite having a key and the security
code, was entitled to be on the premises . His license to be there was
sufficiently circumscribed to entitle the jury to believe that his third visit there
on the weekend in question was without any license.") .
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
find it is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to find Appellant guilty of
burglary in the third-degree . The Commonwealth argued that Appellant
entered the detached garage with the intent of taking items to pawn after he
had killed his father. The last reported contact with Richard was at 2 :00 a.m .
on Saturday, September 4th. The medical examiner placed the time of death
somewhere between Saturday and Sunday, but acknowledged that
environmental variables, such as the low temperature in the home, could affect
9
this estimation . Appellant pawned his father's tools on Saturday afternoon.
Based on these circumstances, a reasonable juror could conclude that
Appellant killed his father sometime on Saturday morning.
The Commonwealth argues that Appellant's license and authorization to
be on the property was terminated upon his father's death. See Fu ate.
Commonwealth, 993 S .W .2d 931, 940 (Ky. 1999) ("[T]he privilege granted to
one doing business ceases when the licensee commits acts, such as crimes,
inconsistent with the business. This rationale applies to the personal dwelling
as well .") . Alternatively, the Commonwealth points to evidence that Appellant
was not authorized to enter the detached garage, regardless of his permission
to be in the residence itself. The nature of Appellant's "residency" at Richard's
home is certainly a factor. Appellant was under strict rules regarding his stay
there. He was not permitted to leave without an escort, and he did not have
express permission to enter the detached garage. Moreover, Appellant himself
told police that he had to use a credit card to pick the garage's lock, indicating
his knowledge that he was unauthorized to enter that building. Considering
these circumstances in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a
reasonable juror could believe that Appellant killed his father before entering
the detached garage, and that he had no authority to enter the building.
Appellant also claims that a directed verdict should have been granted on
the charge of murder . The thrust of his claim is that the conviction was based
solely on circumstantial evidence. Upon review of the record, we believe
Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict.
10
Appellant had a drug addiction so severe that he often stole items from
family members and pawned them for drug money. In an effort to combat his
addiction, Appellant was staying with his father and stepmother in a
"lockdown" situation . Testimony showed that Appellant told inconsistent
stories regarding his whereabouts on the weekend in question. Further,
Appellant fled from Bullitt County in the days following the murder. It is
undisputed that Appellant was in possession of his father's credit card and cell
phone . Appellant's stepmother testified at trial that Richard would not have
given Appellant his cell phone while she was out of town, and that Richard
would have attempted to contact Appellant on Amy Coble's cell phone . Malissa
further testified that Richard would not have given Appellant his credit card,
considering Appellant's drug addiction and the family's overall financial
problems . Finally, there was no evidence of forced entry and there was
testimony that Appellant had been driving the family's Dodge truck during his
pawning spree in Louisville that Saturday .
When viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and drawing all fair and reasonable inferences from that
evidence, a reasonable juror could have inferred that Appellant murdered his
father. KRS 507 .020(1)(a) . Although the evidence presented with regard to the
murder charge in this case was circumstantial, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is
sufficient to support a criminal conviction as long as the evidence taken as a
whole shows that it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt."
Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S .W.2d 111, 114 (Ky. 1994). As the evidence
was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Appellant guilty of murder beyond
11
a reasonable doubt, a directed verdict with regard to murder was not
warranted.
Hearsay Evidence
Next, Appellant asserts that the trial court committed error by allowing
the Commonwealth to introduce hearsay evidence, in violation of KRE 802,
through the testimony of Amy Coble and Malissa Thomas . Alternatively,
Appellant argues that even if the testimony was non-hearsay, it was irrelevant
and inadmissible under KRE 401 and KRE 402 . Finally, Appellant argues that
even if relevant, the undue prejudice of the testimony substantially outweighed
its probative value under KRE 403 . We disagree. Appellant acknowledges that
no contemporaneous objection was made and therefore, the issue is not
preserved for appellate review . He requests palpable error review pursuant to
RCr 10.26.
The first instance of alleged error occurred during the Commonwealth's
direct examination of Appellant's girlfriend, Amy Coble:
Q: Did Ricky make at least some contact with you after he turned
himself in to the police? Did he write you some letters?
A : Yes, and I believe you have copies of them .
Q: And you got those letters?
A : Yes . And at this time I had hired Lori Rakes and his lawyer
was trying to contact me, and I was very scared and nervous
because Lori had told me that his lawyer was going to try to get me
to change my story which I didn't need t[o] do because mine is the
truth. And so I hired Lori Rakes and I immediately gave them to
her and she turned them over to the detectives .
Later in the trial, the Commonwealth recalled Malissa Thomas and asked
her what she remembered about a confrontation Richard had with Appellant
the week prior to his death . The following dialogue transpired :
A : Richard caught Ricky snorting in the bathroom and he was just
tired of the road Ricky was going down, and they - - he was
arguing over that . He - - it was yelling and . . .
Q: (INTERRUPTING) Was it a little more heated than normal?
A: Yes. Because Ricky's drug use was really starting to become a
problem . And Richard even made a comment to him out of anger
that he didn't want to have to worry about what his son was
turning into. And said that he wanted to know that he wouldn't
have to worry about going to sleep and his son killing him for
drugs and I got up and walked away. I went to the back bedroom
and I told Richard later that he was wrong to have said that.
Turning first to Coble's testimony, we conclude that the statement is not
hearsay. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted ." KRE 801 (c) . Coble's statement was not offered to prove that
Appellant's lawyer had, in fact, attempted to persuade Coble to change her
testimony. Rather, it was a non-responsive comment made while the
Commonwealth was attempting to elicit testimony concerning Coble's contact
with Appellant, both before and after his arrest. Moreover, any supposed
prejudice resulting from Coble's statement was cured on cross-examination.
Defense counsel established that Appellant had retained new representation
prior to trial, that it was not trial counsel who had attempted to change. Coble's
testimony, and that Coble felt in no way threatened or coerced to alter her
testimony at trial. No manifest injustice resulted from Coble's testimony and,
for that reason, palpable error review is not appropriate. RCr 10 .26.
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We next turn to Malissa Thomas's testimony. From our review of the
record, we are unable to conclusively identify the purpose of the
Commonwealth's question that elicited the alleged statement made by Richard
to Appellant. Nonetheless, without expressly determining that the statement
was hearsay, we conclude that any supposed error was undoubtedly harmless .
"An error is reversible if the erroneously admitted evidence has a
reasonable possibility of contributing to the conviction; it is harmless if there is
no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction ." Anderson v.
Commonwealth, 231 S .W.3d 117, 122 (Ky. 2007) . We acknowledge that this
statement carries some prejudicial value because it precisely mirrors the
Commonwealth's theory of the case; that is, that Appellant killed his father for
drug money while he slept. However, upon review of the trial record, we believe
the statement is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence . Considerable
evidence was presented detailing Richard's disapproval of Appellant's drug
problem, and his fear that Appellant would either hurt himself or others if he
continued using drugs. Both Thomas and Coble gave testimony about the
strict terms of Appellant's "lockdown," the purpose of which was to control
Appellant's behavior. The testimony established Richard's worries about
Appellant's health, his attempts to stop Appellant from stealing from the family
home, and his fear of Appellant's erratic behavior. Having been well-informed
of Richard's concern for his son, we cannot conclude that this statement
unduly influenced the jury. Errors in the admission of evidence that are
cumulative of properly admitted evidence are harmless . Collins v .
14
Commonwealth, 951 S .W .2d 569, 576 (Ky. 1997) . Reversal is not required .
RCr 9 .24.
New Trial
Finally, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for
a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence ofjuror misconduct.
Specifically, he asserts the trial court erred when it refused to hear testimony
pertaining to events that occurred within the jury room. We find the trial court
took evidence at the hearing on external influences on the jury, and that it
properly refused to hear evidence concerning what occurred within the actual
jury room . Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion .
The trial court held a hearing on Appellant's motion for a new trial,
during which evidence of external influences on the jury was received . At the
hearing, Ronnie Thomas (Richard's brother), Charlotte Mills (Appellant's
cousin), and Steven Nallet (a witness at trial) testified in support of the motion .
All of these individuals were present at Appellant's trial and claimed the
foreperson was giving the thumbs up signal to Malissa Thomas, winking and
nodding at her, patting her on the shoulder, inquiring how she was doing, and
telling her not to worry because everything would be okay. Malissa Thomas
and Shirley Madden (the jury foreperson) also testified at the hearing and
denied the allegations .
The trial court heard evidence of external influences on the jury, but
refused to allow evidence of any internal influence on the jury . Specifically, the
trial court did not allow testimony from juror Anna Gilpin concerning her
15
regrets in returning a guilty verdict, nor did it allow a bailiff to testify to
statements he heard the foreperson make to the jury during deliberation .
In Kentucky, it is well settled that "[a] juror cannot be examined to
establish a ground for a new trial, except to establish that the verdict was made
by lot ." RCr 10 .04 . This Court has recognized "the wisdom of the longstanding rule in this Commonwealth that a jury verdict cannot be impeached
through the testimony of jurors as to what occurred in the jury room, except to
show that the verdict was made by lot." Hicks v. Commonwealth, 670 S .W.2d
837, 839 (Ky. 1984) . Testimony from a juror regarding anything that occurred
in the jury room is incompetent evidence to impeach the jury's verdict. Ruggles
v. Commonwealth , 335 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ky. 1960) . Juror Gilpin's change of
heart does not show the verdict was made by lot. Therefore, the trial court did
not err in excluding such testimony. We further find that the same rule
precluding juror testimony as to what occurred in the jury room would also
preclude the bailiff from testifying as to jurors' conversations he overheard
while standing outside the jury room.
In an attempt to introduce evidence of what occurred in the jury room,
Appellant cites Taylor v. Commonwealth , 175 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Ky. 2005), for the
premise that this Court has "not interpreted this rule as the clear-cut
exclusionary rule that its text appears to suggest . . . . [T]he rule must give way
to various constitutional requirements, such as due process of law." However,
Appellant has failed to show why the case before us warrants deviation from
the rule disallowing juror testimony to impeach the verdict.
16
Likewise, Appellant's reliance on Doan v. Brigano , 237 F.3d 722 (6th Cir.
2001), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Maples v. Stegall, 340 F .3d
433 (6th Cir. 2003), is misplaced . In Doan, the Sixth Circuit declared an Ohio
rule similar to our RCr 10.04 unconstitutional . Id. at 731 . However, in that
case the jury misconduct at issue concerned an experiment conducted by a
juror in her home, the findings of which she reported to the jury in the same
way an expert witness would present findings. Id. at 733 . The court in Doan
went on to say,
A review of this misconduct stands in stark contrast to an examination
of internal factors affecting the jury . Whether the jury understood the
evidence presented at trial or the judge's instructions following the
presentation of the evidence, whether a juror was pressured into arriving
at a particular conclusion, and even whether jurors were intoxicated
during deliberations, are all internal matters for which juror testimony
may not be used to challenge a final verdict. Id. at 733.
Thus, we conclude the trial court's application of the principle that "[a] juror
cannot be examined to establish a ground for a new trial, except to establish
the verdict was made by lot," does not offend due process under these
circumstances . RCr 10 .04.
Finally, Appellant cites to Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S . 140 (1892),
for the proposition that courts should consider juror testimony when it
pertains to overt acts through which extraneous information is presented to the
jury. In Mattox, a bailiff read a newspaper article to the jury, the content of
which pertained to a case before them. 146 U.S. at 142-43 . As the testimony
excluded from the hearing on Appellant's motion did not pertain to an overt act
like that in Mattox, we find that case distinguishable on its facts.
17
We are left then to decide whether the denial of Appellant's motion for a
new trial was error based on the conflicting evidence of external influences on
the jury. In Kentucky, the decision of whether to grant a new trial is a matter
of judicial discretion. Jillson v. Commonwealth, 461 S .W.2d 542, 545 (Ky .
1970) . Unless there has been an abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse .
Id. The trial court properly considered conflicting evidence of external
influence on the jury. Having resolved the conflicting evidence against
Appellant, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a
new trial.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Bullitt Circuit Court is
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Randall L. Wheeler
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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