COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. DEANNA GAYLE WOOTEN
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2006-SC-000125-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2004-CA-002334-MR
BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 03-CR-00001-002
DEANNA GAYLE WOOTEN
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE SCHRODER
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from orders of the Bracken
Circuit Court relative to the court's determination that Deanna Wooten was
incompetent to stand trial on two counts of first-degree criminal abuse. We
reject the Commonwealth's arguments that the trial court erred in allowing
funding for an independent defense expert for evaluation of Deanna's
competency, in allowing that expert to testify at the competency hearing, and in
denying a motion for a more specific report by that expert. In light of the
evidence that Deanna could not participate rationally in her own defense, we
also adjudge that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Deanna
incompetent to stand trial. Hence, we affirm.
On January 24, 2003, Appellant, Deanna Wooten was indicted on two
counts of first-degree criminal abuse for allowing her like-in boyfriend, Anthony
Winkle, to abuse her two children. Wooten pled not guilty at her arraignment
in January 2003, and on March 31, 2003, the trial court entered an order for
reciprocal discovery. At a status hearing on July 10, 2003, Deanna's counsel
requested that Deanna be evaluated by Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center (KCPC), but made clear that she was concerned about the limited
testing the appointed evaluator would employ. The court granted the motion
and directed Deanna's counsel to draft an order for the evaluation . No such
order appears in the record .
At some point thereafter, Deanna made an ex parte motion for state
funding for a mental health expert . Specifically, the motion stated that Deanna
sought to retain the services of Dr. Peggy Pack "for mental evaluations for
purposes of possible guilt and innocence defenses and mitigation." On
September 20, 2003, the court entered a scaled order ordering defense counsel
to provide authority for holding an ex pane hearing on the motion. Deanna's
attorney thereafter filed a response citing KRS 31 .185(2) as authority for the
motion. On March 11, 2004, apparently without holding a hearing on the
motion, the court entered an ex parte order authorizing the funding for an
expert witness and set the matter for trial on November 3, 2004.
During a status conference on June 10, 2004, Deanna's counsel revealed
that a sealed order in the record authorized funds for a private expert . The
Commonwealth stated that an indigent defendant is first required to use state
facilities before getting funds for a private expert, and that the proper
procedure had not been followed. However, the Commonwealth made no
formal objection, nor asked for any relief.
On July 22, 2004, Deanna's counsel provided a copy of Dr. Pack's report
to the Commonwealth and gave notice of their intent to introduce evidence of
Deanna's mental retardation at the time of the offense. Dr. Pack's report solely
addressed the competency issue, but did not state a definitive opinion as to
whether or not Deanna was competent to stand trial. Eight days later, the
Commonwealth
made aa motion that Deanna be required to submit to a mental
health examination at KCPC and that Dr. Pack be required to provide a more
specific report. On September 2, 2004, the court granted the request for the
KCPC examination, but denied the motion far a more specific report.
A competency hearing was held on October 18, 2004. The court heard
testimony from Dr. PegTj Pack and Dr. Barbara Jefferson, who evaluated
Deanna for 1QCPC.
Dr. Pack testified that Deanna's verbal IQ was 66, her performance IQ
was 74, and her overall IQ was 66. Based on these scores, Dr. Pack diagnosed
Deanna as being mentally retarded . Dr. Pack testified that Deanna's problems
processing new information would make it difficult for her to assist her
attorney in legal
proceedings . Initially Dr. Pack ?d not want to state an
opinion as to Deanna's competency during the hearing, but eventually, when
pressed, she testified that Deannawas "at the marginal line of competency."
Dr. Pack qualified her response, stating that for Deanna to be competent to
stand trial, she would need a great deal of support during the proceedings.
Dr. Jefferson agreed with Dr. Pack that Deanna was mildly retarded.
While Dr. Jefferson testified that Deanna was competent to stand trial, she
noted that Deanna has a limited ability to understand new information. Dr.
Jefferson stated for Deanna to go to trial, trial language would have to be
simplified, the trial would have to move at a slower pace, attorneys would have
to be patient, and the pressure placed on Deanna should be limited .
In an order entered on October 19, 2004, the court determined that
Deanna was incompetent to stand trial. The court reasoned as follows :
While the defendant has the capacity to understand
the nature and consequences of the proceedings if the
proceedings are carefully explained in the simplest
terms, she, by virtue of limited ability to process new
information, does not have the ability to assist her
counsel at trial in her own defense. Defense counsel
may have the luxury of explaining in detail the
preliminary steps and procedures leading up to trial,
but in the trial itself, if the defendant cannot mentally
process and respond to the testimony and other trial
events, it is clear that she cannot effectively or
rationally assist her counsel during the most
important phase of the prosecution. For these reasons,
the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
The Commonwealth appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order
granting Deanna's ex parte motion for expert funding, the order denying the
Commonwealth's motion to require Dr. Pack to give a more specific report, and
the court's order determining that Deanna was incompetent to stand trial. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the Commonwealth that KRS 31 .185 does not
authorize funds for a defense expert on the issue of competence to stand trial,
and that under the applicable statute, KRS 504. 100, neither the defense nor
the prosecution is entitled to an independent evaluation on competency to
stand trial. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Commonwealth that the
trial court abused its discretion in granting the ex parte motion for expert
funding because the defense failed to demonstrate that the use of state
facilities would be impractical or that a private expert was reasonably
necessary, a precondition to funding under KRS 31 .185. However, the Court of
Appeals adjudged the resulting error to be harmless, reasoning that KRS
504.100 did not prohibit consideration of the expert testimony once it was
available, even though it was erroneously obtained. As to the failure to require
Dr. Pack to provide a more specific report, the Court of Appeals ruled there was
no error because the statutes do not require the expert to give a specific
opinion. The Court of Appeals also noted that even if it was error to not give a
specific opinion in the report, any variance between Dr. Pack's report and her
testimony leaned in the Commonwealth's favor when she testified at the
hearing that Deanna was marginally competent . Finally, in light of the
evidence of Deanna's substantial intellectual limitations and special needs, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
finding Deanna to be incompetent to stand trial.
This Court accepted review to address the issues regarding funding for
mental health experts and the court's ruling that Deanna was not competent to
stand trial.
FUNDING FOR DR. PACK
The Commonwealth argues that it was error for the trial court to grant
the ex parte order authorizing funding for Dr. Pack and that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding such error was harmless in this case. The
Commonwealth relies heavily on this Court's decision in Bishop v. Caudill, 118
S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003), wherein we held that the Commonwealth is not
entitled to an independent evaluation of the defendant's competency to stand
trial under KRS 504 . 100. The Court of Appeals in the instant case extended
that holding to the defense, stating "[n]othing in the statute authorizes
independent evaluations by either the Commonwealth or the defendant." We
do not believe the holding in Bishop is to be extended to the defense and that
the Court ofAppeals erred in so ruling.
The Bishop Court distinguished between the functions of mental health
experts for determinations relative to the defense of mental illness or insanity
(KRS 504.070) and for determinations of competency (KRS 504. 100). Id. at
161-63 . KRS 504.100(1) provides:
If upon arraignment, or during any stage of the
proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to
believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the
court shall appoint at least one (1) psychologist or
psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the
defendant's mental condition.
While the Bishop Court recognized that a competency examiner
appointed under KRS 504. 100(l) "is working for the court, not necessarily the
defense or the Commonwealth," the Court was not faced with the issue of
funding for an independent competency evaluation for the defense, only the
Commonwealth . Id. at 163 (internal citation omitted). And indeed the Court's
entire policy rationale in Bishop for not allowing the Commonwealth an
independent competency evaluation - the risk of disclosure of other evidence,
conduct or defense strategy not otherwise accessible to the prosecution - would
not be applicable in the case of an independent competency evaluation for the
defense . Id. at 163-64. "A competency determination has significant
consequences for both the defendant and the Commonwealth ." Id. at 166
(concurring opinion, Justice Keller) . As observed in Justice Keller's concurring
opinion in Bishop:
Although . . . the psychologist or psychiatrist who
performed a neutral competency evaluation pursuant
to a KRS 504. 100(l) order is subject to crossexamination at this evidentiary hearing, the appointed
examiner's report is only part of the evidence the factfinder must consider. Parties are entitled to - and, in
practice, do - introduce additional evidence for the
court's consideration. In fact, KRS Chapter 504
explicitly recognizes that "[a] psychologist or
psychiatrist retained by the defendant shall be
permitted to participate in any examination under this
chapter." [KRS 504 .080(5)] . Of course, it goes without
saying that a defendant with the financial means to do
so can develop additional expert testimony by
submitting to an independent competency evaluation
by an expert of his or her choice . But, we have held
that, in cases where the defendant is indigent: (1) the
assistance of a psychological expert is constitutionally
and statutorily required ; and (2) the funds necessary
to retain such an expert are a reasonable and
necessary expense authorized under KRS Chapter 31 .
Id. at 165-166 (internal citations and quotations omitted) .
In Crawford v. Commonwealth, 824 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1992), the
defendant sought funds for a second independent competency examination.
This Court held that while the defendant is entitled to an independent expert to
evaluate his mental state and his competency to stand trial, he is not entitled
to an additional state-provided examination or funds to hire additional experts
simply because the initial evaluation was contrary to his defense. Id. at 850
(citing Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985)) .
Although we adjudge it was not per se error for the lower court to
authorize funding for an independent competency examination for Deanna in
the instant case, there is still the issue of whether it was error to authorize the
funding if there was no determination of whether the use of a private expert
was reasonably necessary pursuant to KRS 31 .110, or that state facilities were
unavailable or would be impractical pursuant to KRS 31 .185(1). Additionally,
there is the question of whether it was error to authorize the funding for a
competency expert when Deanna's counsel represented it was to be for mental
evaluations for guilt and innocence defenses and mitigation.
In order to hire a state-funded private psychologist, the defendant must
make the requisite showing that the state facilities were unavailable or that the
use of state facilities would be impractical. Commonwealth v. Paisley , 201
S.W. 3d 34, 36 (Ky. 2006); Binion v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W. 2d 383, 385 (Ky.
1995) ; KRS 31 .185(1). The defendant must also demonstrate that the desired
expert assistance is "reasonably necessary." Crawford , 824 S.W.2d at 850
(citing Young v. Commonwealth, 585 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1979)) . Because the
order for funding was obtained ex pane in this case, the record is not clear
whether a hearing was held on the reasonable necessity of a private expert or
the impracticality or unavailability of state facilities . The record does not
reflect that such a hearing was held. However, the ex parte order authorizing
the employment of Dr. Peggy Pack states :
A reasonable necessity has been shown for the
defendant herein to employ the services of DR. PEGGY
PACK as a forensic psychologist .
There are no state facilities nor personnel
available whom defense counsel could utilize to obtain
this assistance, which is necessary to provide the
defendant with a fair trial under both state and federal
constitutional law.
Given the court's findings above, we must presume that Deanna made a
sufficient showing of unavailability of state services and of reasonable necessity
for the hiring of Dr. Pack to support the trial court's order. See Hamblin v.
Johnson , 254 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Ky. 1952).
We next turn to the Commonwealth's assertion that because the initial
representation in Deanna's ex parte motion was that it was for a mental
evaluation for guilt and innocence defenses and mitigation, when, in fact, it
was for a competency evaluation, the order authorizing the funding was
entered in error. As we have ruled above that an indigent defendant is entitled
to an independent expert for purposes of determining competency under a
proper showing of necessity and unavailability/impracticality of state services,
we deem any error to be harmless . RCr 9.24.
FAILURE TO FILE A MORE SPECIFIC REPORT
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred when it denied its
motion to require Dr. Pack to file a more specific report stating a definitive
conclusion about Deanna's competency to stand trial. The motion alternatively
asked for exclusion of any testimony or opinion by Dr. Pack at the competency
hearing if she failed to give a specific opinion about Deanna's competency in
her report. The Commonwealth claims that it was prejudiced at trial by Dr.
Pack's conclusion that Deanna was "marginally competent" when such
conclusion was not previously disclosed in her report.
The trial court makes the ultimate determination of whether a defendant
is competent to stand trial. To aid the court in making this determination, KRS
504. 100(l) requires the court to appoint at least one psychologist or
psychiatrist to examine and report on the defendant's mental condition. KRS
504.100(2) provides :
(2) The report of the psychologist or psychiatrist shall
state whether or not he finds the defendant
incompetent to stand trial. If he finds the defendant is
incompetent, the report shall state:
(a) Whether there is a substantial probability of his
attaining competency in the foreseeable future ; and
(b) What type treatment and what type treatment
facility the examiner recommends.
We would agree that the language of subsection (2) requires a specific
finding of competency. However, in reading the statute as a whole, we believe
the requirements of specificity in subsection (2) apply only to the report of the
court-appointed neutral expert, and not to the defendant's independent expert.
The language of subsection (2) is clearly in reference to the court-appointed
psychologist or psychiatrist in subsection (1), and applies to the report from
that examiner, who is working for the court and not the defense or the
10
prosecution. Bishop, 118 S.W. 3d at 163. Hence, the lower court did not err in
denying the motion for a more specific report by Dr. Pack.
As to the Commonwealth's claim of unfair surprise at trial by Dr. Pack's
conclusion, it must be noted that the Commonwealth did not object to Dr.
Pack's testimony at the competency hearing. RCr 9.22. Further, the
Commonwealth had an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Pack at the
competency hearing. In reviewing the twelve-page report of Dr. Pack, while it
did not reach a definitive conclusion about Deanna's competency, it was replete
with statements about her cognitive impairments and repeatedly questioned
her intellectual abilities and competency to stand trial. From our reading of
Dr. Pack's report, we do not see how the Commonwealth could claim surprise
at Dr. Pack's testimony that Deanna was marginally competent.
COMPETENCY RULING
The Commonwealth's final argument is that the trial court erred in
finding that Deanna was not competent to stand trial when both mental health
experts opined that she was competent. "'Incompetency to stand trial' means,
as a result of mental condition, lack of capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against one or to participate rationally in
one's own defense." KRS 504.060(4).
[A] defendant is competent if he can "consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding" and has "a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." . . . [A]
competent defendant can make a "reasoned choice"
among the alternatives available to him when
confronted with such crucial questions as whether he
should testify, waive a jury trial, cross-examine
witnesses, put on a defense, etc.
Bishop, 118 S.W.3d at 162-63 (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 39698, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2685-86, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993)) . The nature of the
inquiry in a competency proceeding is:
(1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to
provide his counsel with information necessary or
relevant to constructing a defense;
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance
of the trial and his relation to it. The defendant must
have an ability to confer intelligently, to testify
coherently, and to follow the evidence presented. It is
necessary that the defendant have a rational as well as
a factual understanding of the proceedings .
Bishop, 118 S.W. 3d at 163 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kentucky
Criminal Law, ยง 5-4(b) p. 210 (Lexis 1998)) . "The trial court has a broad
discretion in determining whether a defendant has the ability to participate
rationally in his defense." Hopewell v. Commonwealth , 641 S.W .2d 744, 748
(Ky. 1982) .
Although both Dr. Jefferson and Dr. Pack opined that Deanna was
competent to stand trial, both experts agreed that Deanna was mildly mentally
retarded and noted Deanna's severe mental limitations. Dr. Pack testified that
Deanna was "marginally competent," and that as a result of her cognitive
impairments, Deanna would need a lot support during the trial proceedings. In
particular, Dr. Pack noted that Deanna's problems processing information
would make it difficult for her to assist her attorney, as she would not know
what questions to ask and could not recognize a lie. Dr. Pack questioned
12
Deanna's ability to keep up and understand what was going on during the trial.
Dr. Pack also stated that the use of unfamiliar vocabulary would require a
great deal of explanation during legal proceedings and that is was "very likely"
that Deanna did not understand what happening at the competency hearing.
In her written report, Dr. Pack made the following conclusions regarding
Deanna's competency :
Her cognitive deficits interfere with her ability to
realistically consider the nature and defenses available
to her and the potential outcomes of a trial. She has
no concept of legal defense strategies or pleadings and
is unable to intelligently evaluate any options that
might be presented by her attorney. . . . Deanna has a
limited factual knowledge of the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against her. Her
intellectual and language disabilities limit her ability to
achieve a rational understanding of the proceedings.
She may not efficiently or accurately follow trial
events . She lacks the cognitive ability to quickly
reason and make judgments regarding how and when
to respond. Furthermore, Deanna is functionally
illiterate (unable to read and write at a fourth grade
level) . As a consequence, she is unable to read and
review any written evidence presented.
Even Dr. Jefferson acknowledged that Deanna has a limited ability to
understand new information and would have special needs during legal
proceedings . Dr. Jefferson stated that in order for Deanna to go to trial, trial
language would have to be simplified, the trial would have to move at a slower
pace, attorneys would have to be patient, and the pressure placed on Deanna
should be limited.
"Competency determinations are made based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard." Thompson v. Commonwealth , 147 S .W. 3d 22, 32 (Ky.
13
2004) . In light of all the evidence of Deanna's mental impairments and
limitations, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding
Deanna incompetent to stand trial. See Edmonds v. Commonwealth , 586
S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Wellman v.
Commonwealth , 694 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1985) . Notwithstanding the experts'
conclusions that Deanna was competent or marginally competent to stand
trial, there was substantial evidence presented of Deanna's inability to
participate rationally in her own defense. See Thompson v. Commonwealth ,
147 S.W.3d at 33.
For the reasons stated above, the orders of the Bracken Circuit Court are
affirmed .
All sitting. Minton, C.J. ; Cunningham, Noble, and Venters, JJ., concur.
Scott, J., concurs by separate opinion in which Abramson, J., joins .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Matthew Robert Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Damon Loyd Preston
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Ste . 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 26, 2008
TO BE PUBLISHED
Z
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,;Vuyrmur x~.ourf of ftrufurhV
2006-SC-000125-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2004-CA-002334-MR
BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 03-CR-00001-002
DEANNA GAYLE WOOTEN
APPELLEE
CONCU RRING OPINION BY JUSTICE SCOTT
I concur fully with the majority's determination that indigent
defendants are entitled to an independent expert for a competency
examination upon a showing of necessity and
unavailability/ impracticality of alternate state services. Here, for want of
a record from which to make these determinations, we have accepted the
findings of the court's order that a reasonable necessity has been shown
and that no available or practicable facilities existed . However, in most
instances this will not be the case as state facilities will be available, or
will have already been used. Despite the absence of record from the ex
parte hearing in this instance, it is clear that the trial court had
significant reservations about Deanna's competency. Thus, the court
appropriately exercised its discretion and permitted an additional
independent examination .
I write separately for reasons that I believe, for the benefit of the
Commonwealth's trial courts, some parameters should be established 1)
concerning the extent of a trial judge's discretion in allowing indigent
criminal defendants access to public funds in acquiring non-state expert
witness competency evaluations ; and 2) to define what constitutes a
reasonable showing of necessity. It is those circumstances I wish to
address further.
As this Court has oft noted, while a criminal defendant is not
entitled to state funds merely to conduct meritless fishing expeditions,
see, e .g. , Bowling v. Commonwealth , 964 S .W.2d 803, 804 (Ky . 1998), we
should, likewise, not be so tight-fisted in our funding as to permit
injustice where it is preventable. Trial courts are empowered by virtue of
KRS 504.100(1) to order, at any stage of a trial's proceedings, a
competency examination if "the court has reasonable grounds to believe
that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial." (emphasis added) . This
is not to say, however, that a trial judge's discretion should be
unfettered . Indeed, trial courts are the gatekeepers of evidence and must
exercise caution in the determination as to whether an additional or
independent evaluation should occur.
In addition to the procedural preconditions of
unavailability/ impracticality of state facilities, which we have previously
noted, the defendant must, upon his request, demonstrate that obtaining
an independent expert is reasonably necessary, Crawford v.
Commonwealth , 824 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Ky. 1992) (citing Youngv
.
2
Commonwealth , 585 S .W.2d 378 (Ky. 1979)) . However, I would extend
this reasonably necessary requirement further in an attempt to clarify
these admittedly murky waters . I believe that in order for a trial judge to
invoke his or her authority under KRS 504 .100(1) and order an
additional or independent competency examination, the defendant's
competency must still be legitimately in question, I see Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S . 68, 74 (1985), and it appears reasonably likely that only an
additional or independent evaluation will lead the court to a firm
conclusion as to the defendant's fitness to stand trial. KRS 504 .060(4) ;
see Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S .W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003) .
In sum, a trial court may allow or order an additional state or
independent evaluation for purposes of determining competency if it still
has reasonable concerns about a criminal defendant's competency. KRS
504 . 100 . However, for these reasonable concerns to be justifiable and
for a defendant to obtain an independent competency evaluation, he
must demonstrate reasonable grounds by showing that state facilities are
unavailable or impractical, KRS 31 .185(1), and that an independent
evaluation is reasonably necessary, KRS 31 .110 . In order to be
reasonably necessary, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the
defendant's competency is still legitimately in question following the
state's report and a reasonable likelihood that the additional independent
evaluation would assist the court in reaching a firm conclusion as to the
defendant's competency .
1 As was the circumstance here, where the defendant was, at best,
marginally competent.
3
With this framework in place, I believe trial judges would have a
more reasonable analytical path upon which to exercise their discretion .
Abramson, J ., joins this opinion .
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