COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. AMANDA R. GADDIE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 21, 2007
TO BE PUBLISHED
,;VUFrrMr (~Vurf
of
~i
2006-SC-000575-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NUMBER 2006-CA-001074
HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 06-CI-00189
V.
AMANDA R . GADDIE
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE MINTON
AFFIRMIN G
This case presents the question of whether, more than ten days after imposition
of sentence, the district court may, with the defendant's consent, increase the
defendant's underlying term of imprisonment in conjunction with a referral to drug court .
The question arises in the context of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
Amanda Ray Gaddie . The circuit court denied the petition. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the circuit court, concluding that a referral to drug court is not a
reason of extraordinary nature justifying relief of the type envisioned under Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02(f) . The Court of Appeals remanded the matter to
the circuit court for entry of an order granting Gaddie's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Louis Lawson, Jailer, Hardin
County Detention Center, to release Gaddie immediately from her current unlawful
detention . We agree with the Court of Appeals that (1) under CR 59.05, the district
court was without power to amend the final judgment over eight months after its entry to
increase Gaddie's term of imprisonment from 180 days to twelve months, and (2)
referral to drug court was not a reason of extraordinary nature under CR 60 .02(f) that
would allow the district court to amend the final judgment. So we affirm .
I. ORIGINAL GUILTY PLEA AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Gaddie entered a guilty plea in the district court to the charges of prescription
drugs not in original container and possession of marijuana, for which she received a
term of imprisonment of 180 days in jail, probated for two years. One of the conditions
of her probation was submission to drug screens to ensure that she did not use illicit
drugs. Two months after she entered her guilty plea, she had a positive drug screen for
marijuana.
Based on the positive drug screen, the Commonwealth moved the district court
to revoke Gaddie's probation . In lieu of revocation, Gaddie agreed to an increase in her
term of imprisonment from 180 days in jail to twelve months in jail, probated for two
years on condition of successful completion of drug court. The district court issued an
amended judgment reflecting the agreement . After Gaddie failed to appear for drug
court on the day following the agreement, the district court issued a bench warrant for
her arrest. Law enforcement officers did not arrest Gaddie on the outstanding bench
warrant until over one year after it was issued . In the interim, the district court issued an
order terminating Gaddie from the drug court program and requiring her to serve the
twelve-month term of imprisonment upon her arrest.
After serving six months in the county detention center, Gaddie filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 419.020 in the circuit
court. The circuit court concluded that being allowed to participate in the drug court
program was an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under CR 60.02(f),
especially when Gaddie requested and agreed to the relief . And the circuit court
reasoned that although constitutional rights were at issue, such rights could be waived,
as Gaddie had done when she agreed to an amendment of the original judgment to
provide for a longer jail term if she did not complete the drug court program .
II . RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE.
The facts in this case are not in dispute . We review de novo the circuit court's
legal conclusions in denying Gaddie's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Under KRS 419 .020, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall be issued upon petition on
behalf of anyone showing by affidavit probable cause that he is being detained without
lawful authority or is being imprisoned when by law he is entitled to bail ." The right to a
writ of habeas corpus is a fundamental right guaranteed by Section 16 of our Kentucky
Constitution .'
Here, Gaddie made the requisite showing that she was being detained without
lawful authority because the district court's attempt to amend its judgment was beyond
its power . The attempt was beyond its power because a trial court loses jurisdiction to
Commonwealth v. Marcum , 873 S.W.2d 207,210 (Ky. 1994).
Id. at 211 (held that trial court's attempt to amend final judgment over one month after entry
of judgment was a nullity because trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after ten days
under CR 59.05) .
amend a judgment in a criminal case ten days after its entry.3 And the district court
entered its amended judgment in this case eight months--from September 12, 2003, to
May 17, 2004-after entry of the original judgment. The amended judgment was void .
We must uphold the traditional principles stated in the preceding paragraph even
when the challenge comes from a referral to the nontraditional, yet valuable, drug court
program . "[W]hen one is tried for an offense, upon a finding of guilt, he is entitled to
have his sentence fixed with certainty and finality . Constitutional restraints prevent
subsequent enhancement. ,5
In deciding the issue of the amended judgment in Gaddie's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the circuit court relied on CR 60 .02(f) in upholding the district court's
increase in the term of imprisonment, even though the district court did not rely on that
provision in amending the final judgment. Preservation notwithstanding, on this point,
we agree with the Court of Appeals that participation in the drug court program is not a
reason of extraordinary nature justifying relief under CR 60.02(f) . Returning to the
principle of finality of judgments, our predecessor court has cautioned that the
CR 59.05; Commonwealth v. Gross , 936 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1996) (judgment could not be
amended nearly two years later to probate the sentence) ; Marcum, 873 S.W.2d at 211
(judgment could not be amended almost two months later to increase the sentence from
five years to ten years); Silverburg g v. Commonwealth , 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky. 1979)
(judgment could not be amended 38 days later to reduce the sentence from one year to ten
months); Hord v. Commonwealth , 450 S.W .2d 530, 532 (Ky. 1970) (based on double
jeopardy and due process restraints, judgment could not be amended in probation
revocation proceedings to impose a greater punishment in order revoking probation than
was fixed in the original judgment of conviction); Howard v. In-gram., 452 S.W .2d 410, 411
(Ky. 1970) (following Hord and holding that circuit court had no authority to sentence
Ingram to confinement for two years in face of his previous sentence for only one) .
Silverburq, 587 S.W .2d at 244.
Galusha v. Commonwealth , 834 S .W.2d 696, 698 (Ky.App . 1992) (relying in part on Hord.
450 S.W.2d at 531, and concluding that circuit court lacked power in releasing Galusha on
shock probation to increase term of imprisonment in original sentence from eight years to
twenty years).
extraordinary nature clause "must be invoked only with extreme caution, and only under
most unusual circumstances ."' Considering the very prevalent social problem that the
drug court program was- implemented to address--nonviolent, repeat drug-related
offenses--it cannot be contended that referral to the program is a reason of
extraordinary nature.
The Commonwealth does not view the issue as the district court's attempt to
amend the final judgment. Instead, the Commonwealth contends that the issue is
whether the district court had the authority to grant Gaddie's request to amend her
sentence in the form of amended terms and conditions of probation . And the
Commonwealth argues that under KRS 533.020(1) and KRS 533 .050(2), it did. We
reject this contention, however, because a term of imprisonment shall be fixed;' and a
term of imprisonment is not a term or condition of a sentence of probation subject to
modification .$
We now turn to the fact that Gaddie requested referral to the drug court program,
which, the Commonwealth argues, necessarily required an increase in the term of
imprisonment from 180 days to twelve months because 180 days is simply not enough
punishment to act as an incentive for the completion of the drug court program . As
discussed above, however, at the point when Gaddie agreed to referral to the drug court
program, the district court no longer had the power to amend her final judgment to
6
Cawood v. Cawood, 329 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ky. 1959) .
KRS 532.030 .
Commonwealth v. Tiryung, 709 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. 1986) (quoting with approval
McCulley v. State, 486 S.W.2d 419,423 (Mo . 1972)) .
increase the term of imprisonment. Gaddie could not, by consent, give the court the
power to revisit the original sentence .9
In holding that the Court of Appeals properly reversed the circuit court and
remanded the matter for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, we have relied, in part,
on two cases, as did the Court of Appeals, that address finality of the term of
imprisonment in the context of shock probation : Galusha v. Commonwealth and
Stallworth v. Commonwealth . The Commonwealth argues that these cases are
distinguishable for four reasons : (1) shock probation is a unique statutory creation
governed entirely by KRS 439.265; (2) in this case, Gaddie did not seek to amend the
court's final judgment as a means to be released from jail, as is the case in a shock
probation situation ; (3) the district court had the authority under KRS 533.020 to modify
the terms of Gaddie's probation (which argument we rejected above) ; and (4) the
administrative procedures governing Kentucky drug courts state that a referral to drug
court may be made during probation, including a referral in lieu of revocation. But the
Galusha and Stallworth decisions rest on the finality of judgments and the constitutional
restraints of due process and double jeopardy, as does our decision in this case . And
we conclude that the Commonwealth's attempt to distinguish this case misses the mark.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals .
Lambert, C.J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Schroder, and Scott, JJ., concur . Noble,
J ., not sitting .
Stallworth v. Commonwealth, 102 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Ky. 2003) (relying on Galusha ,
834 S.W.2d 696, and holding that trial court had no power to amend the final judgment to
increase term of imprisonment from ten years to twenty years in order that Stallworth may
receive shock probation) .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Jennifer B. Pitts
Assistant Hardin County Attorney
#14 Public Square
P. O. Box 884
Elizabethtown, KY 42702-0884
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Shane Alan Young
Lewis & Preston
102 West Dixie Avenue
Elizabethtown, KY 42701-1498
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.