JOHN RONNIE OSBORNE V. EAGLE COAL CO. # 10, ET AL.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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RENDERED : January 25, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-0187-WC
JOHN RONNIE OSBORNE
V
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-001844-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 98-73105
EAGLE COAL CO. #10,
DR. BALLARD WRIGHT,
HONORABLE JOHN W. THACKER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, AND KENTUCKY
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The claimant injured his back at work in 1998 and was later found to be partially
disabled -by a 15% impairment, half of which was due to the injury . Several years later,
after the employer filed various medical fee disputes, the claimant alleged a worsening
of condition and moved to reopen . He argued that he had become totally disabled .
In a decision that was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board (Board)
and the Court of Appeals, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the claimant's
motion to reopen and also determined that medical expenses he incurred after July 1,
2004, were not compensable. Appealing, the claimant maintains that the law of the
case doctrine barred the ALJ from relying on any opinion from a university evaluator or
other physician who stated that the injury caused no permanent impairment at
reopening . He also asserts that the ALJ misapplied KRS 342.125 when finding that his
condition had not worsened at reopening . We affirm in both respects .
The claimant testified in the initial proceeding that he had been injured in a 1988
automobile accident and missed three months' work; that he had injured his back and
neck in the early 1990's; that he had injured his back again in a non-work-related motor
vehicle accident on May 6, 1998, but missed only one day of work. Medical evidence
indicated that he complained of severe low back pain after the accident ; that he
requested additional Lortabs ; and that he was referred to Dr. Bean, a neurosurgeon .
The work-related lumbar injury that is the subject of this appeal occurred on July
13, 1998, when the claimant was pulling on a miner cable . Dr. Bean, his treating
neurosurgeon, diagnosed a lumbar sprain . He released the claimant to return to work
on October 13, 1998, and was of the opinion that the injury caused no permanent
impairment . However, the claimant failed to return to work and began pain
management treatment with Dr . Wright. Among other things, records from Dr. Wright
indicated that the claimant admitted taking more than the prescribed amount of
medication and that he tested positive on at least two occasions for drugs that were not
prescribed for him.
The claimant's application for benefits alleged that lumbar, cervical, and
psychiatric conditions resulted from the injury and that the injury was totally disabling .
He testified that he began receiving social security disability benefits in 1999.
On August 4, 2000, an ALJ determined that the claimant was partially disabled,
that the work-related lumbar injury caused half of his 15% impairment, and that his
cervical and psychiatric conditions were not work-related . Finding that the claimant
lacked the physical capacity to return to coal mining, the ALJ enhanced his income
benefit by 50% . The award of medical benefits noted specifically that the employer was
liable only for treatment of the lumbar condition . The Board affirmed the decision,
rejecting the claimant's arguments that his injury was totally disabling and that his entire
impairment was work-related .
Dr. Wright continued to treat the claimant after the award . On November 30,
2001, he noted that the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and that
conservative treatment had failed. He continued to prescribe various medications,
epidural blocks, facet injections, and other therapies that provided the claimant with
periods of relief from pain but not complete relief.
Dr. Travis evaluated the claimant for the employer in July, 2003. He noted that
the claimant had a normal neurological exam with no objective findings and that he
exhibited significant symptom magnification (5/5 Waddell's findings). MRI from July,
1998, and October, 2001, revealed no pathological changes, no indication of nerve root
compression that would account for low back or radicular pain, and only mild
dessication at L5-S1 . Dr. Travis thought that there was no neurological reason why the
claimant could not return to work. He recommended no further treatment and indicated
that the claimant was not a candidate for a morphine pump or any pain procedure.
Noting the prior history of narcotic abuse, Dr. Travis also recommended that the
claimant undergo a psychological evaluation and be weaned from narcotics . He
assigned a 0% impairment under DRE lumbar category 1 .
In November, 2003, the employer filed a motion to reopen in order to contest
certain treatments that Dr. Wright prescribed, asserting that they were unrelated to the
lumbar injury, unreasonable, and unnecessary . It also contested any similar future
medical expenses. The motion was granted, and the matter was assigned to an ALJ
-3-
for the presentation of evidence.
In March, 2004, Dr. Primm evaluated the claimant for the employer and noted
multiple somatic complaints with no objective findings . He reported evidence of
symptom magnification and probable drug-seeking behavior or chronic drug addiction .
In his opinion, the work-related injury was the cause of the claimant's complaints by
history, but there were no objective findings that it was the cause of his present
complaints. Moreover, Dr . Primm was not convinced that there was an organic cause
for the lower back and leg pain . He assigned a 0% impairment under DIRE lumbar
category 1 . He thought that the claimant had received more than an adequate trial of
injections for pain and had experienced no real improvement; therefore, a morphine
pump was not likely to improve his condition significantly . Dr. Primm did not
recommend any invasive procedures .
Faced with conflicting evidence from the parties' experts, the ALJ ordered a
university evaluation under KRS 342 .315. The order directed the evaluator to address
the reasonableness and necessity of the proposed pain management therapies and of
a referral to a drug treatment facility for detoxification and/or treatment for a workrelated condition .
Dr. Goldman performed the evaluation on July 1, 2004, and completed a Form
107 report. It indicates that he took a history and conducted an extensive physical
examination, noting specific findings and observations . He also summarized the course
of treatment and various post-award diagnostic test results. Dr. Goldman diagnosed
chronic pain syndrome and mild degenerative disc disease but also noted specific
evidence of symptom magnification as well as 5/5 Waddell's signs. Asked whether the
claimant's injury was the cause of his complaints, Dr. Goldman responded as follows :
Though [the work-related injury] may have been the cause of
some low back discomfort for 6-10 weeks following the initial
episode, his persistent complaints of pain some six years
later, in the absence of any significant anatomical findings,
and in the presence of evidence of symptom magnification,
lead to my opinion that the injury was not the cause of his
current complaints .
Dr. Goldman assigned a 0% impairment rating under DIRE lumbar category 1 and
stated that the claimant required no work restrictions due to the injury. However, he
also thought that the claimant lacked the physical capacity to return to coal mining
because he had not worked in six years and had become deconditioned . In his opinion,
the proposed morphine intrathecal pump, sacroiliac joint injections, and radio frequency
thermal coagulation were not reasonable or necessary treatments for the effects of the
work-related injury . Also in his opinion, the need for medications to protect the
claimant's gastroesophageal system from the effects of medications for chronic pain
syndrome and the need for a referral to a drug treatment or detoxification program was
not attributable to the work-related injury.
Several weeks later, the claimant filed a motion to reopen, alleging that his
condition had worsened and that his disability had increased since the award. He later
testified that medical treatment had provided some relief from his symptoms but that his
pain was more severe. He acknowledged that he had not worked since the injury but
testified that he was less able to work presently than he had been in 2000. He spent
90% of his time at home, playing the guitar and watching television.
A March, 2005, statement from Dr. Wright indicated that the requested medical
treatment was reasonable and medically necessary for the treatment of the claimant's
chronic pain and, to the best of his knowledge, related to the claimant's injury at work.
After considering the evidence, the AU determined that the claimant had been
found to have a 7'/2 % impairment due to the work-related injury in the initial proceeding
but that there was no objective medical evidence of a worsening of condition .
Moreover, his testimony regarding the severity of his condition was essentially the same
as in the initial proceeding . Convinced that he failed to sustain his burden of proving a
change of disability, the ALJ dismissed the request for increased income benefits.
Turning to the question of medical benefits, the ALJ relied on the claimant's testimony
that Dr. Wright's treatment had helped to ease his pain and determined that medical
treatment performed before July 1, 2004, was compensable . Noting, however, that the
claimant failed to rebut Dr. Goldman's clinical findings and opinions, the ALJ relied on
his testimony that the work-related injury did not cause the claimant's present
complaints of pain and dismissed all claims for medical treatment after July 1, 2004.
Appealing, the claimant raises two arguments . First, he asserts that the finding
in the initial proceeding that his injury caused a 7'l2% impairment was binding at
reopening under the law of the case doctrine . On that basis, he argues Dr. Goldman's
report was entitled to no weight at reopening because his opinions were inconsistent
with the finding . He reasons that because Dr. Goldman stated that the injury presently
caused no permanent impairment, he based his opinions regarding future medical
treatment on the mistaken impression that the injury was only temporary . Therefore,
his opinions (like those of Drs. Travis and Primm, which "contain the same error") could
not constitute substantial evidence. Second, he asserts that the AU misapplied KRS
242 .125 by failing to consider whether his increased pain, by itself, warranted a finding
of total disability at reopening .
Although KRS 342.305 permits a final workers' compensation award to be
enforced in circuit court as a judgment, KRS 342 .125 affords some relief from the
principles of the finality of judgments . It permits an othenrvise final award to be
reopened upon specified conditions and to be amended prospectively . Under R. J.
Corman Railroad Construction v. Haddix, 864 S .W .2d 915 (Ky. 1993), and National
Pizza Co. v. Curry, 802 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. App . 1991), it also permits an employer to
contest the compensability of post-award medical expenses.
KRS 342 .285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers' compensation
proceedings . Consistent with the statute, Special Fund v. Francis , 708 S .W.2d 641,
643 (Ky. 198F), explains that a finding that favors the party with the burden of proof
must be affirmed if it is reasonable under the evidence. 1f the party with the burden of
proof fails to convince the ALJ, that party's burden on appeal is to show that the
favorable evidence was so overwhelming as to compel a favorable finding, in other
words, that the finding was unreasonable under the evidence . As the movant
contesting post-award medical treatment, it was the employer's burden under R. J.
Corman Railroad Construction v. Haddix, supra , and National Pizza Co. v. Curry , su ra,
to prove that any contested medical treatment was unreasonable or unnecessary for
the effects of the work-related injury . As the movant seeking additional income
benefits, it was the claimant's burden under KRS 342 .125(1)(d) to prove a post-award
change of disability as shown by objective medical evidence of a worsening of
impairment.
Contrary to the claimant's argument, the law of the case doctrine would not
preclude reliance on the opinions of Drs. Goldman, Travis, and Primm simply because
they reported that his permanent impairment rating presently was 0°l0 . It was
undisputed that the claimant's permanent impairment rating due to the injury had been
7'/2°l°
at the time of the initial award and that he was entitled to reasonable and
_7_
necessary medical treatment for the effects of the lumbar condition. At issue in the
reopening were whether the disputed post-award medical treatment was for the effects
of the injury, whether his condition had worsened, and whether his present disability
from the injury was greater than it had been in 2000.
Opinions found in the reports from Drs. Goldman, Travis, and Primm were not
based on a mistake regarding the nature of the claimant's injury or contrary to his award
because they addressed his medical status at subsequent points in time . They were
competent evidence of his present condition and of the reasonableness and necessity
of the disputed medical treatment for the effects of the lumbar injury. Faced with
competent medical evidence that the lumbar injury was not the cause of the complaints
for which the treatment was prescribed and with no overwhelming evidence from Dr.
Wright to the contrary, the AL concluded reasonably that the treatment was not
compensable.
We are not convinced that the AL misapplied KRS 342 .125 when dismissing
the claimant's request for additional benefits on the grounds that "no objective medical
evidence of worsening of condition has been shown and the testimony of the plaintiff as
to his assessment of the severity of his condition is essentially the same ." Nothing
indicates that the AL based the decision on the claimant's failure to offer evidence of a
greater AMA impairment rating at reopening. The
AL simply was not convinced that
Dr. Wright's testimony contained sufficient objective medical evidence to rebut the
evidence found in Dr. Goldman's report. Like the reports from Drs. Travis and Primm,
Dr. Goldman's report indicated that the claimant's present complaints of pain were not
due to the effects of the lumbar injury and that the injury did not prevent him from
performing all types of work. Although the claimant testified that his pain was worse
and more disabling at reopening, the ALJ simply was not convinced that the disability
caused by the lumbar injury was any greater than it had been at the time of the initial
award . Under the circumstances, a remand for further consideration is unwarranted .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All Concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
JOHN RONNIE OSBORNE:
Leonard Stayton
Attorney At Law
P.O. Box 1386
Inez, KY 41224
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
EAGLE COAL COMPANY #10:
Denise Kirk Ash
Attorney At Law
P.O . Box 34125
Lexington, KY 40508-4125
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