HENRY GILBERT RODGERS, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2005-SC-000379-MR
HENRY GILBERT RODGERS, JR.
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HON . SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 2003-CR-01455
COMMOWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Appellant, Henry Rodgers, was charged and convicted by the Fayette
Circuit Court on April 21, 2005 for 1) receiving stolen property ; 2) two (2) counts
of criminal trespass in the second degree ; and 3) being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree . He was sentenced to twenty (20) years. He now
appeals his conviction to this Court pursuant to Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) asking this
Court to reverse his conviction and afford him a new trial .
FACTS
On July 31, 2003, Lexington Police Sergeant Scott May (Sgt. May) was on
routine patrol when he saw the Appellant, Henry Rodgers, walk from behind the
Coach House Restaurant carrying what appeared to be a couple of cases. As
Sgt. May pulled up along the side of the building, the Appellant dropped the
cases and began to run . Sgt. May radioed for backup and began chasing the
Appellant. The Appellant ran through a gate in a fence and into a horse barn,
eluding Sgt. May. Officer Cornett had heard the radio dispatch and saw the
Appellant run across the Red Mile race track and into a field on the Tattersal
property . He caught up with the Appellant and told him to stop . The Appellant
stopped and lay down in the field .
The officers then went back to the Coach House and retrieved the three
cases left there by the Appellant . Inside they found various tools and office
equipment and a business card with the names Ron Knight and C&C Contracting
on it. Upon further investigation, the officers learned that someone had broken
into a nearby construction trailer, and with that, the officers asked Mr. Knight to
accompany them to the construction trailer .
Mr. Knight was the superintendent for Cromwell Development and was
employed at the site to build the Spring House Suites Hotel. The trailer was his
office and storage facility . He identified the property as his and gave the officers
the purchase price of each of the items found in the cases. The items found in
the cases included : a laptop computer ($800.00), computer case ($55.00), a
home label maker ($19 .00), three "talk around" radios ($30 .00), a calculator
($10 .00), a tape measure ($10.00), an electric staple gun ($25 .00), a Palm Pilot
and charger ($399.00, about a month old), AAA batteries, a pocket dimension
master ($35 .00), two screwdrivers ($10 .00), a USB portable floppy, a cordless
drill ($249.99, one year old), nail clippers, five compact discs, gloves, staples, file
folders, several pens, and a socket set ($45.00).' Subsequently, the officers
read the Appellant his Miranda rights and then interviewed him.
' The prices were what he paid for them when he bought the items. The
computer and drill were purchased about a year before the theft; however, the
palm pilot was purchased approximately one month before .
During the interview, the Appellant denied ever entering the trailer and
claimed that he picked up the three cases behind a Waffle House restaurant as a
favor for a friend named Patrick "Trick" Ingram (Trick) . Specifically, the Appellant
stated that he had met with Trick at Winn Dixie that evening, and that Trick had
asked Appellant if he could hold some property for him . The Appellant claimed
that he met with Trick behind the Waffle House where Trick gave him the cases
in exchange for $21 .00 and a pill . Although the Appellant stated that he had a
feeling that the cases were stolen, he claimed that he did not know where or how
Trick obtained the cases. During the trial, Trick appeared and corroborated the
Appellant's testimony. However, he stated that the items were stolen by a man
named Alan Morales (Morales) .
On November 25, 2003, the grand jury of the Fayette Circuit Court
indicted the Appellant, charging him with 1) burglary in the third degree, 2)
receiving stolen property over $300, 3) criminal trespass in the second degree, 4)
criminal trespass in the second degree, and 5) being a persistent felony offender
in the first degree .
The Appellant was tried before a jury and the jury found him guilty of
counts 2-5. On April 21, 2005 the Fayette Circuit Court entered a judgment
against the Appellant sentencing him to imprisonment for a total of twenty (20)
years. From these convictions the Appellant now appeals.
ARGUMENT
I . Prosecutor's conduct did not vreiudice the Appellant
A. Comment on "thrift value"
At trial, the Commonwealth allowed Mr. Knight to testify regarding the
purchase price of the stolen items. The amount of the items totaled $1660.00.
During the Commonwealth's closing argument, the Commonwealth's attorney
told the jury that the "thrift value" of the stolen property was one-third of the retail
value. At a bench conference, the Commonwealth explained that she merely
intended to argue that even by depreciating the total value of the property, the
items would still be valued above $300 .00. The Appellant objected and
requested an admonition to be given to the jury. As requested, the trial judge
admonished the jury not to consider the Commonwealth's statement that the thrift
value was one-third of the purchase price. The Appellant did not ask for any
additional relief.
The Appellant now asks the trial be reversed for this otherwise irrelevant
comment. He concedes that this issue was not preserved for appeal, but argues
that it is palpable error . We disagree .
"[R]elief may be granted for palpable errors only upon a determination that
a manifest injustice has resulted from the error." Partin v. Commonwealth , 918
S .W.2d 219, 224 (Ky.1996) . And when counsel requests no further relief, he
could not later complain on appeal. See Campbell v. Commonwealth 788
S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1990) and Lynem v. Commonwealth 565 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.
1978) . This is because an admonition by a trial judge will generally cure the
erroneous admission of testimony or any other trial irregularity . See Hardy v.
Commonwealth 719 S .W.2d 727 (Ky. 1986).
Here, Mr. Knight testified the total of all items was, in fact, more than
$1600.00. Thus, even if the "thrift value" comment by the Commonwealth was
erroneous, the trial judge gave the requested admonition to cure it. The
comment did not affect the substantial rights of the Appellant .
b. Closing argument comm ents on Trick
During trial, Trick testified that he received the property from another man,
whom he identified as Morales . After receiving the property, he asked the
Appellant to keep it for him. In closing, the Commonwealth's attorney
commented :
Trick was trying to trick us. He was trying to confuse us. The fact
of the matter is that he's trying to help his friend out, but he doesn't
want to take too much of the guilt. He just wants to say that a third
party had him do this so he didn't really possess the property
himself because he doesn't want to get any more charges on
himself, and he was trying to also help out his friend. This Morales
story he came up with is very convenient: a third party takes the
blame . We've never heard of him before this day, and this
happened July 31, 2003. It's been two years, almost two years,
and we haven't heard of Morales.
After this, the Appellant's attorney asked to approach the bench . He
argued that the comments were improper because they shifted the burden of
reasonable doubt to the Appellant. The court gave an admonition to disregard
the last statements and stated further that it was the Commonwealth's burden to
prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
A prosecutor or defendant may suggest to the jury that a certain witness is
not believable. Medlev v. Commonwealth , 704 S .W.2d 190 (Ky. 1985). See also
Adkins v. Commonwealth 647 S.W .2d 502, 506 (Ky. App . 1982) .
Prosecutors
enjoy considerable latitude in presenting arguments to a jury, and it is permissive
to draw inference from the facts in evidence . Williams v. Commonwealth, 644
S.W.2d 335, 338 (Ky. 1982).
The comment made here by the Commonwealth's attorney was merely a
suggestion that Trick was not a believable witness. There was no error.
c . Mischaracterization of evidence
Next, the Appellant argues that the Commonwealth mischaracterized the
evidence in its closing argument. At trial, the Commonwealth's attorney stated,
"[G]uilty people run. He doesn't work." The Appellant objected, but the trial court
overruled the objection noting the Commonwealth's statement was supported by
the evidence .
The Appellant, of his own accord, stated that he did not work anywhere
and that his last job was about a week prior to the interview (at which time he
worked for the Hyatt hotel) . He further stated that the Hyatt had called him and
told him they would call if they needed him, and he had not worked since.
Although Trick testified that he had known the Appellant for about two and a half
months and that he and the Appellant worked together at Command Staffing (a
temporary employment service), there was no testimony that the Appellant was
working during the time of this incident. Furthermore, the police citation indicates
that the Appellant gave no place of employment at the time of his arrest. "It is the
duty of the prosecuting attorney to confine himself to the facts in evidence and
fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom ." Williams , 644 S.W.2d at 338 .
Again, a "wide latitude is allowed the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the
jury." Id. Therefore, this argument is without merit.
II. Permitting Cumulative evidence
The Appellant also argues that the trial judge erred by allowing needless
presentation of cumulative evidence at trial. During the direct examination of Sgt.
May, the Commonwealth used an easel with various photos taped to it to depict
the area where Sgt. May first observed the Appellant . Sgt. May pointed out on
the photos the path that the Appellant took and where he sat the cases down
before he ran. In the middle of this soliloquy, the Appellant objected, stating the
witness had "gone a long time without a question ." The trial court overruled the
objection .
Next, the Commonwealth handed Sgt. May photos of the stolen property,
which were shown to the jury. The Commonwealth then asked Sgt. May to draw
on a flip chart where the officer found the items. A list of all the stolen items was
then read to the jury. The Appellant objected claiming it was cumulative . Again,
the trial court overruled the objection .
Trial judges have substantial discretion in performing KRE 403 balancing
test for admission of evidence. In effect, the trial judge weighs the probative
value of the evidence against the consideration of needless presentation of
cumulative evidence . KRE 403. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that, in
Kentucky, the law of evidence tilts heavily toward admission over exclusion .
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2 .05(11) p 53 (3rd ed . 1993) .
The photos and descriptions given in the testimony of Sgt. May did not
confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or inflict undue prejudice upon the
Appellant . It was necessary for the Commonwealth to establish the path that the
Appellant took for the criminal trespassing charges. Moreover, it was necessary
for the Commonwealth to detail the stolen items so the jury could get an idea as
to what the items were and what condition they were in so that they could
determine if the items together were valued over $300.00. This argument is
without merit, and the trial court's rulings are affirmed .
III . Batson Challenge
The Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth violated Batson v.
Kentucky , 476 U .S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d (1986), in selecting the jury.
During voir dire, the Commonwealth approached the bench and stated for
the record that it had struck every prospective juror that had been accused of a
crime . Concomitantly, four African-American jurors were striken. The
Appellant's counsel argued to the trial court that being accused of a crime was
not a racially-neutral explanation because African-American people are accused
of crimes in a disproportionate number as compared to Caucasians. The trial
judge ruled that it was a race-neutral reason for exclusion and struck the jurors.
Assuredly, it is true that an attorney cannot use its peremptory challenges
to exclude members of the venire from the jury solely on the basis of their race .
See Washington v. Commonwealth 34 S.W.3d 376 (Ky. 2000) . In Batson , supra ,
the Supreme Court set up a three-step process for determining if race-based
exclusion has occurred ; 1) the defendant must establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, 2) the Commonwealth must state a racially neutral
explanation for having made the peremptory strikes, and 3) the defendant must
show that the government engaged in purposeful discrimination .
In addition, "although a prosecutor theoretically could fabricate a
demeanor-based pretext for a racially-motivated peremptory strike, the third step
in Batson alleviates this concern by permitting the court to determine whether it
believes the prosecutor's reasons." Thomas v. Commonwealth , 153 S.W.3d 772,
778 (Ky. 2004) (citing Yarborough v. State, 947 S.W.2d 892, 896
(Tex.Crim .App.1997) (en banc) ("[S]ubjective evaluations of venire members
could be used to disguise violations of the Equal Protection Clause . But this does
not mean that such evaluations must always be held to have no weight. Trial
judges are not without ability to detect pretexts .")) . "Given the trial court's unique
ability to evaluate the demeanor of both the jurors and the prosecutor, its ruling
stands unless clearly erroneous ." Id. (citing Washington v. Commonwealth , 34
S.W.3d 376, 379-80 (Ky. 2000); Stanford v . Commonwealth , 793 S.W.2d 112,
114 (Ky. 1990)) .
After examining this process, the Appellant's argument must fail. The first
step of the Batson analysis examines an issue of law and fact. "Because the
prosecutor stated his reasons for striking the four jurors in question, there is no
need to determine if a prima facie showing was made; thus, we proceed to the
second step ." Thomas, 153 S.W.3d at 777 (citing Commonwealth v. Snodgrass ,
831 S.W.2d 176,179 (Ky. 1992) (internal citations omitted)) .
As for step two, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that they
struck everyone that had been accused with a crime . The Appellant argued that
because African-Americans are arrested more than Caucasians, the
Commonwealth's decision to strike them was not a race-neutral reason . The
reason does not need to be "persuasive, or even plausible, so long as it is
neutral ." McCurdv v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir.2001)).
The decision here was reasonable, and further, did not deny prospective jurors
equal protection . Upon consideration of step three, the Appellant must be able to
show that the Commonwealth engaged in purposeful discrimination. Based on
the record, there is no evidence of purposeful discrimination ; therefore, this
argument must fail, and the trial court's ruling is affirmed .
IV. Directed verdict (receiving stolen property over $300)
The Appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for
directed verdict of acquittal as to his conviction for receiving stolen property over
$300 . He argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the property had a
value of more than $300.00.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the Appellant
moved for directed verdict as to count two (2), arguing that the Commonwealth
failed to establish that the value of the property exceeded $300.00. The trial
judge overruled the motion and stated that the evidence sufficiently proved that
the value of the property was greater than $300.00. The Appellant again moved
for a direct verdict at the close of all the evidence, and the motion was overruled .
"If under the evidence as a whole, it would not be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find the defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal." Trowel v. Commonwealth 550 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ky. 1977) . KRS
514.110 provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty of receiving stolen
property when he receives the property, knowing, or with reason to know, that it
has been stolen, and if the property is valued at over $300.00 dollars, it is a
Class D felony . Further, the statute states that it is prima facie evidence of
knowledge when the person possesses any recently stolen movable property,
such as the three cases possessed by the Appellant. Id .
In this instance, the Commonwealth had more than enough evidence for a
reasonable jury to find the Appellant guilty. The Appellant had the cases with
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him . Once he had seen the police, the Appellant dropped them and ran from the
police . Inside of the cases was stolen property that amounted to a value
exceeding $300 .00 . Specifically, the amount that was determined was
approximately $1660.00 . Even if we devalued the property that was stolen by
three-fourths (making the total $415.00), the $300 .00 amount necessary for the
charge would still stand . The trial court's ruling is affirmed .
V. Habit evidence
The Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth improperly introduced
habit evidence in violation of Kentucky law. He asserts that the trial judge
permitted Mr. Knight to testify that he habitually locked the door to his trailer
although he had no specific memory of having locked the door. However, the
Appellant did not preserve this issue for appellate review and, therefore, the
issue must be reviewed under a palpable error standard .
If admittance of the evidence that Mr. Knight had a habit to lock the door
was in error, it was harmless as the admission of the testimony did not affect the
outcome of the trial . The testimony was used to establish an element of the
burglary charge, i .e . that the Appellant broke into the locked building . Since the
jury acquitted the Appellant of the burglary, the admission of the habit evidence
could not have altered the outcome of the case .
VI . Directed verdict (criminal trespass in second degree)
The Appellant last argues that the trial judge erred by failing to grant his
motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to count three (3) criminal trespass in
the second degree, as to the Tattersal property . Specifically, the Appellant
argues that he could not have trespassed when he entered the property because
he entered through a "man-gate," and therefore, he argues, it is not reasonable
for the jury to convict him of second degree criminal trespass . At the conclusion
of the case-in-chief, the Appellant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal stating
that the "man-gate" precluded him from being charged with criminal trespass .
In response to the objection, the Commonwealth argued that the photos
were enough proof that a reasonable juror could conclude that the opening was
not intended to give the public ingress and egress to the Tattersall property. The
trial court overruled the motion and told the Appellant he could argue that point to
the jury. At the close of all evidence, the Appellant again moved for a directed
verdict, which was also overruled .
KRS 511 .070 states that "a person is guilty of criminal trespass in the
second degree when he knowingly enters . . . upon a premise as to which notice
against trespass is given by fencing or other enclosure." (Emphasis added) .
"Adequate warnings of land or premises use restriction can be communicated
constructively through the use of physical barriers such as . . . fences . . . which
actually limit or bar access ." 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass §178 (2006) .
When the Appellant ran from the police, he went through a gate onto the
Tattersal property . Indeed, although he entered through a gate, he knew that he
did not have a right to enter the property because it was fenced, which gave
notice that the land was not to be entered upon . This argument is without merit .
CONCLUSION
The trial court's rulings and the Appellant's convictions are affirmed .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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