ROSCOE KEVIN TRUITT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED ".NOT TO BE
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IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL ATOT BE
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RENDERED : MARCH 23, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-0302-MR
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ROSCOE KEVIN TRUITT
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
2004-CR-1002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Roscoe Kevin Truitt, was convicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court of
first-degree assault, first-degree sodomy, attempted first-degree rape, first-degree
unlawful imprisonment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender . He was
sentenced to life imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Finding
no error, we affirm .
The evidence at trial established that Appellant, who was a handyman, had been
staying in a house that he had been hired to remodel . The home was in disrepair,
having no furniture and being filled with construction equipment . The victim, S .L ., was a
transient who had also been staying at the house with Appellant for a few days prior to
the offenses . On the morning of March 20, 2004, S .L . returned to the house to find
Appellant upset from an argument he had with another female. S .L . testified that
Appellant was high from having smoked crack cocaine that morning and began ranting
about women in general. When S .L . tried to leave, Appellant grabbed her and a
physical fight ensued . Appellant dragged S .L . to the second floor where he tore off her
clothing and proceeded to sodomize her. S.L . stated that Appellant attempted to rape
her, but was unable to maintain an erection .
At some point, Appellant left the room and S.L. tried to escape . She made it as
far as the front door when Appellant grabbed her by the hair. During the continuing
struggle, Appellant cut S.L . several times on her back with a drywall knife, struck her on
the top of the head with a claw hammer, and then struck her across the face with a
piece of metal pipe. Thereafter, Appellant bound S .L .'s wrists and ankles with duct tape
and attempted to push her through a hole in the floor into the basement . When S.L.
struggled free, Appellant re-taped her, as well as stuffed a sock in her mouth and
wrapped her face in duct tape . He then dropped her into the basement.
S .L. stated that after Appellant tossed her belongings into the basement, he
came down holding a hammer and several garbage bags. S.L. told police that she
pretended to be unconscious with the hopes that Appellant would leave her alone .
However, while trying to place her feet and legs into one of the bags, Appellant realized
that S .L . was still awake. He then removed the tape from her mouth and forced her to
perform oral sex on him . He again unsuccessfully attempted to rape her. Eventually,
Appellant resorted to masturbation, after which S .L . stated that his entire demeanor
changed . S.L. claimed that Appellant became calm, removed the duct tape from her
wrists and ankles, and helped her out of the basement. S .L . convinced Appellant to go
buy them some more "dope." Once Appellant was gone, S .L . dressed and ran to a
nearby florist shop for help.
S .L. was treated at University of Louisville Hospital . Her injuries included a
swollen right ear, a scratch on her right abdomen, a right eyelid that was swollen shut
and required multiple stitches, a laceration to the top of the head that required multiple
staples, two vaginal lacerations, and extensive cuts and bruising on her arms, legs and
back.
Based upon S.L.'s report, police were dispatched to the house . While surveying
the property, which authorities believed to be empty, an upstairs light came on in the
house . As police approached the rear of the house, Appellant was observed crawling
on his stomach through the grass . He was thereafter arrested . A search of the house
revealed a claw hammer and metal pipe covered in blood, a bloody sock, and duct tape
matted with S.L.'s hair. Her belongings were also retrieved from the basement, in
addition to garbage bags and a roll of duct tape . Finally, blood found on Appellant's
pants was linked by DNA to S .L .
Appellant was subsequently indicted by a Jefferson County grand jury for two
counts of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree assault, first-degree
unlawful imprisonment, and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender .
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a request to issue an arrest warrant for an
indispensable party pursuant to RCr 7.06 . The accompanying affidavit stated that the
Commonwealth was having difficulty securing S .L.'s attendance at trial. S .L . had failed
to show for multiple appointments with the prosecuting attorney and had never attended
a pretrial conference . Apparently, S .L. was no longer living at the address she had
given the Commonwealth . A warrant for S .L.'s arrest was thereafter issued on January
18, 2005.
On January 26, 2005, a hearing was held during which S .L. was appointed an
attorney . Based on the information presented, the trial court ruled that it was necessary
to keep S.L. in custody until trial . At some point, she was placed in a home
incarceration program, which was subsequently terminated when she moved her
location and violated the terms of the agreement . On January 31, 2005, a second
arrest warrant was issued.
On the morning of the February 8, 2005 trial date, the prosecutor informed the
trial court that S .L . had notified him the previous evening that she did not intend to
testify. The prosecutor stated that he was nonetheless going to call her and, if she
failed to appear and/or testify, he would move to hold her in contempt of court.
Ultimately, S .L . did testify against Appellant and corroborated her prior statement to
police .
Appellant took the stand in his own defense and admitted that he was addicted
to crack cocaine . Although he conceded that he and S .L . had engaged in a physical
altercation on the morning in question, he denied ever hitting her with a weapon or
sexually abusing her. Appellant noted that he taped S .L.'s wrists and ankles for both of
their safety because she was extremely aggressive. On cross-examination, however,
Appellant was unable to explain either the duct tape matted with S .L.'s hair or the
bloody sock .
In addition to the Commonwealth's physical evidence and S .L .'s testimony,
Kenneth McNalley testified that on the morning in question, S.L. ran up to the side of
his pick-up truck and began banging on the door for help. McNalley stated that S .L .
had blood all over her face, but ran off before he could help her. Further, Lisa
Worthington, the employee at Mathis Florist who assisted S .L., testified that when S .L.
came into the store, she was barefoot, her head and face were bleeding, and she had a
wad of bloody duct tape still in her hair.
At the close of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of the instant charges and
recommended life imprisonment . Judgment was entered accordingly and this appeal
ensued . Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
The sole issue presented on appeal concerns the trial court's refusal to allow
defense counsel to ask S .L. about the fact that she was on conditional discharge from a
misdemeanor offense at the time of her testimony in this case . Appellant claims that
his inability to impeach S.L.'s credibility to demonstrate that she had a motive to testify
against him violated his constitutional rights .
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked S .L ., "You're on probation
right now, aren't you, out of district court?" S .L. responded, "No ." The Commonwealth
objected, and during the bench conference that followed it was noted that S.L . was
actually on conditional discharge from an unrelated misdemeanor offense in district
court.' Defense counsel argued that the information was relevant to show S.L .'s
motivation to cooperate with the prosecution . The trial judge noted that it was obvious
S.L.'s cooperation was non-existent, and ruled that the conditional discharge was not
relevant .
A criminal defendant has a constitutionally-protected right to cross-examine
witnesses for any potential bias or motivation in testifying . Davis v. Alaska , 415 U .S .
308, 316, 94 S . Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L . Ed . 2d 347, 354 (1974).
' By an avowal the following day, the defense introduced a certified copy of a judgment
wherein S .L . entered a guilty plea to one count of misdemeanor theft and was
sentenced to 365 days incarceration, conditionally discharged for a period of two years.
However, it is well-established that such right is not unlimited, and that trial courts
"retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose
reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant ." Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475
U .S . 673, 679, 106 S . Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L . Ed . 2d 674, 683 (1986). See also
Commonwealth v. Maddox , 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997) ("[t]rial courts retain broad
discretion to regulate cross-examination"). "[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish ." Van Arsdall, 475 U .S .
at 679, 106 S . Ct. at 1435, 89 L. Ed . 2d at 683 (emphasis in original) . This Court has
noted, "[s]o long as a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and
motivation is developed, the judge enjoys power and discretion to set appropriate
boundaries ." Turner v. Commonwealth , 153 S.W .3d 823, 831 (Ky. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Boylan , 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir. 1990) .
"In defining reasonable limitations on cross-examination, this Court has
cautioned : 'a connection must be established between the cross-examination proposed
to be undertaken and the facts in evidence ."' Davenport v. Commonwealth , 177
S .W.3d 763, 768 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Maddox , 955 S .W .2d at 721) . The trial court does
not err in limiting evidence of potential bias when there is a lack of credible evidence
supporting the inference . Bowling v. Commonwealth , 80 S.W.3d 405, 411 (Ky. 2002).
Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth , 569 S.W .2d 139 (Ky. 1978) (evidence supporting the
inference of bias was strong : the key witness refused to testify at the defendant's first
trial unless he was released from jail; he was in fact thereafter released, the conviction
was later vacated, and he admittedly refused to incriminate the defendant until after he
had spoken with a government agent) .
This Court has recently addressed this issue in Davenport v. Commonwealth ,
177 S .W .3d 763 (Ky. 2005), wherein the appellant challenged the trial court's refusal to
permit defense counsel to cross-examine a witness about his probationary status in an
adjacent county as well as his pending misdemeanor charges in the venue county. The
appellant maintained that the proposed cross-examination was necessary to impeach
the witness's credibility, by establishing the possibility that he may have cooperated with
the police in anticipation of leniency regarding his probation and, more importantly, to
establish that an even greater potential for bias existed given the two misdemeanor
charges that were pending at the time of the trial . As does Appellant herein, the
appellant in Davenport claimed that the exclusion of that testimony violated his Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses.
Upholding the trial court's decision, this Court noted :
[A] limitation placed on the cross-examination of an adverse
witness does not automatically require reversal : the "denial of the
opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness does not fit within
the limited category of constitutional errors that are deemed
prejudicial in every case." Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. at 682, 106 S . Ct.
at 1437 . Rather, a reviewing court must first determine if the
Confrontation Clause has been violated . The [United States
Supreme] Court explained :
While some constitutional claims by their nature
require a showing of prejudice with respect to the trial
as a whole, the focus of the Confrontation Clause is
on individual witnesses . Accordingly, the focus of the
prejudice inquiry in determining whether the
confrontation right has been violated must be on the
particular witness, not on the outcome of the entire
trial . I We think that a criminal defendant states a
.
violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that
he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness,
and thereby "to expose to the jury the facts from
which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences
relating to the reliability of the witness ." Respondent
has met that burden here : A reasonable jury might
have received a significantly different impression of
[the witness'] credibility had respondent's counsel
been permitted to pursue his proposed line of crossexamination .
Davenport, 177 S.W .3d at 768 (quoting Van Arsdall , 475 U .S . at 680, 106
S . Ct. at 1435-36 (internal citations omitted)).
We are of the opinion that Appellant herein presented a "reasonably complete"
picture of S .L .'s veracity, bias, and motivation . And, as in Davenport, the jury would not
have received a "significantly different impression" of S.L.'s credibility had defense
counsel been permitted to cross-examine her about the conditional discharge . The jury
was clearly aware that S .L. did not want to cooperate with the authorities . In fact,
defense counsel was permitted to bring out the relevant information concerning S .L.'s
arrest to secure her appearance at trial, and that she had been in jail approximately two
weeks prior to trial and had been rearrested after having violated the terms of her home
incarceration . Defense counsel again emphasized the issue during closing argument:
And lastly, and perhaps most importantly, ladies and gentlemen,
Sondra had to be arrested to get her here to testify . She would not
cooperate with the prosecutor or the police . They couldn't locate
her at all. But they had to arrest her to insure her appearance here
before you yesterday. And she spent almost two weeks in jail.
That's not how a rape victim acts ladies and gentlemen . But the
Commonwealth is gonna try and tell you that she was scared, and
she was scared to meet with the prosecutor . That doesn't make
sense . If she was scared of Roscoe, she'd want to be here to
testify, to make sure that he went to jail, to prison for a long time.
They wouldn't have had to lock her up to make her testify . She had
every reason to come in here and lie to you, because she was in
jail . By arresting her, they showed her . . . they showed her the
consequences of her not doing what they wanted her to do.
The only information the jury did not hear was that S.L. was on conditional
discharge from an unrelated misdemeanor conviction . However, the Van Arsdall Court
noted that any Confrontation Clause inquiry must be fact specific: "that on the facts of
that case, the error might well have contributed to the guilty verdict." 475 U.S . at 683,
106 S . Ct. at 1437. As we held in Davenport:
While a witness's pending charges or probationary status alone
may, in some cases, be a satisfactory basis upon which to infer
bias, the facts in evidence here were simply insufficient to
support the inference of Davenport's bias . Other than the plain
fact of Davenport's probationary status, defense counsel offered
no evidence whatsoever to support the claim that he was
motivated to testify in order to curry favor with authorities . Nor
was there any evidence that prosecutors had offered Davenport
a "deal" for his testimony .
177 S .W.3d at 771 . See also Bowling , 80 S .W .3d at 411 . Similarly, other than the
factual information of the conditional discharge, defense counsel offered absolutely no
evidence during the avowal to support a claim that S .L .'s testimony was motivated by or
related in any manner to her discharge status . Quite simply, the claim was purely
speculative .
"The burden espoused in Van Arsdall is whether a 'reasonable jury might have
received a significantly different impression of [S.L.'s] credibility had [defense] counsel
been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination ."' Davenport, 177
S .W.3d at 770 (emphasis in original) (quoting Van Arsdall , 475 U .S . at 680, 106 S . Ct.
at 1436). We are of the opinion that Appellant has failed to meet that burden .
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination
of S .L. Nunn v. Commonwealth , 896 S .W .2d 911, 914 (Ky. 1995). Moore v.
Commonwealth , 771 S.W .2d 34,38 (Ky. 1988) .
The judgment and sentence of the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed .
Lambert, C.J . ; Graves, Johnstone, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
Cooper and Roach, JJ., concur in result only .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
J . David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew Robert Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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