WILLIAM EUGENE THOMPSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$1murme (gaurf of 'A
2005-SC-0268-MR
WILLIAM EUGENE THOMPSON
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
72-CR-2007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirming
In 1974, a jury of the Pike Circuit Court convicted Appellant, William Eugene
Thompson, of the willful murder-for-hire of Gladys Deskins. For this crime, Appellant
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant's conviction was appealed to and
affirmed by this Court, although the resolution was considerably delayed due to the
complete loss of his trial record . Appellant also filed an unsuccessful RCr 11 .42
motion. In 1986, Appellant murdered a prison guard during a successful escape. He
was subsequently apprehended, charged, and convicted of the prison guard's willful
murder. For this crime, Appellant's conviction for the murder of Gladys Deskins was
A narrative statement prepared by the Commonwealth pursuant to CR 75.13 is the
only record of Appellant's 1974 trial.
used as a statutory, aggravator, and Appellant was sentenced to death. He is currently
awaiting his sentence on death row.
In December 2002, the Commonwealth notified Appellant, some twenty-eight
(28) years after his initial conviction, that one of the witnesses at his trial for the murder
of Gladys Deskins was given a plea agreement for his testimony . On December 17,
2003, within one year of learning of the plea agreement, Appellant filed a CR 60.02
motion asking that his conviction be overturned . The trial court denied Appellant's
motion, and he now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court's rulings .
The 1971 murder of Gladys Deskins was both brutal and notorious . She was
undergoing a contested divorce with her husband of some forty years, Boone Deskins .
Mr. Deskins became impatient with the wrangling concerning property disposition, so he
paid Willard "Woody" Christian seven thousand dollars ($7,000) to murder his wife .
Apparently too squeamish to commit the murder himself, he subcontracted the job to
Appellant and another man, Robert Sykes. According to Christian, on July 12, 1971,
Sykes drove Christian and Appellant to a point near the Deskins' home . Christian and
Appellant got out of the vehicle and walked some distance to the home's perimeter.
Christian then waited outside while Appellant went inside the home. Christian reported
that he heard a shot gun blast and that Appellant rejoined him shortly thereafter with the
shotgun in hand. Appellant and Christian then met with Sykes, and the trio buried the
shotgun and threw away Appellant's shoes . When Gladys was found, she had several
stab wounds and most of her head was blown away by a shot gun blast. The evening
after the murder, Christian reported receiving the agreed amount of money from Boone
Deskins and sharing the proceeds with Sykes and Appellant .
Deskins, Christian, Sykes, and Appellant were indicted for Gladys' murder almost
a year later after an intensive investigation . The husband was tried first, Appellant was
tried next, and finally, Robert Sykes was tried . All three were convicted of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment . Although a pivotal player in the murder plot, Christian
was never tried but did serve as a key witness against his three co-defendants .
The indictment against Christian lay dormant for approximately twenty-seven (27)
years. In November 1998, Judge Eddy Coleman, sua sponte, assigned the case for a
status conference . Christian's attorney filed a motion to dismiss, claiming a violation of
Christian's constitutional right to a speedy trial . The motion was overruled and the case
was set for trial. In September 1999, Christian claimed for the first time that he could
not be prosecuted due to a plea agreement he entered into with John Paul Runyon, the
Commonwealth's Attorney, in 1971 . Initially, the trial court rejected Christian's claims,
but on appeal, this Court remanded the matter back to the trial court for further
consideration . 2000-SC-0547-MR .
Upon further consideration, the trial court ultimately determined that only one
explanation could account for the fact that Christian was never tried for his role in
Gladys' murder - Christian must have been given an immunity deal in exchange for his
testimony against Appellant and others . The trial court further determined that Christian
was directed by the Commonwealth's Attorney to deny the existence of the agreement if
asked about it at trial . The trial court's determination was appealed to and affirmed by
this Court, and our opinion on the matter became final on January 9, 2003. 2001-SC0659-M R.
On December 17, 2003, almost one year after being notified by the
Commonwealth of the adverse ruling in the above matter, Appellant filed a CR 60.02
motion in the Pike Circuit Court asking that he be relieved of the judgment entered
against him for the willful murder of Gladys Deskins. In his motion, Appellant alleged
violations of Brad v. Maryland, 373 U .S. 83, 83 S .Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed .2d 215 (1963)
(prosecution may not withhold materially exculpatory evidence) and Napue v. Illinois ,
360 U.S . 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L .Ed .2d 1217 (1959) (prosecution may not elicit or
condone perjury) . The trial court denied Appellant's claims, finding that Appellant "failed
to prove that the use of this information to impeach Christian would have resulted in a
different outcome in his trial ." Appellant now appeals the denial of his CR 60.02 claims
to this Court.
In his appeal, Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to subsections
(b) and (f) of CR 60.02 . Subsection (b) allows relief based on "newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59.02." Id . Subsection (f) allows relief for "any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief." Id .
As contended by the Commonwealth, relief pursuant to CR 60 .02(b) is not
available in this case. Appellant filed his CR 60 .02 motion many years after a judgment
against him for the murder of Gladys Deskins was entered and became final. See CR
60 .02 ("The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b),
and (c) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken."). Accordingly, Appellant has missed the deadline to claim relief under this
section.2
2 Relief under RCr 10.06 would have been the proper vehicle for Appellant in this case.
RCr 10.06 permits motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence after
one year upon a showing of good cause . _Id.
4
However, we do believe that Appellant's claims are appropriate for consideration
under subsection (f) of CR 60.02. See Bishir v. Bishir, 698 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Ky. 1985)
("Relief under CR 60 .02(f) is available where a clear showing of extraordinary and
compelling equities is made ."). The extraordinary and compelling equities in this case
consist of impeaching, and possibly perjured, evidence that was intentionally withheld
from Appellant by the prosecution for nearly thirty years . The fact that such evidence
was not disclosed or reasonably discovered for such an extended period of time
enhances the extraordinary nature of Appellant's claims and warrants a closer look
under this rule. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U .S . 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31
L.Ed .2d 104 (1975) ("deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of
known false evidence is incompatible with `rudimentary demands of justice"') ;
Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 991 S .W.2d 651, 655 (Ky. 1999)(" if the introduction of
perjured testimony at Spaulding's second trial amounted to a denial of due process of
law, then his motion is properly brought under CR 60.02(f)") .
Appellant claims relief under two alternate theories . First, he argues that
sufficient evidence exists to infer that the prosecution elicited, condoned, or did not
correct the occurrence of actual perjury at Appellant's trial in violation of Napue , supra .
In the event there is not sufficient evidence to infer that perjury actually occurred at
Appellant's trial, he contends he is still entitled to relief based on the withholding of
materially exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady, supra .
The trial court found as fact that Appellant failed to demonstrate that any perjury
was actually committed at his trial. The trial court based its ruling on the following
findings : (1) no transcript of Appellant's trial exists and the narrative statement is silent
as to this issue; (2) when Christian testified at Boone Deskin's trial, the first of the co-
defendants to be tried, he was never asked about any possible plea deals or incentives
for testifying; and (3) neither Appellant nor his attorney have any memory of whether
Christian was asked about any possible plea deals or incentives at Appellant's trial .
Appellant counters that (1) Christian was asked about and denied the existence of any
deals at Robert Syke's trial, the third and final co-defendant to be tried, and (2) his
attorney acknowledged that while he does not remember whether he specifically asked
about a plea deal at Appellant's trial, he believes it was his habit at that time to ask such
questions . We believe this is a close question, and thus, on balance, cannot say that
the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. CR 52 .01 . Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's holding that insufficient evidence exists to infer that any perjury actually occurred
at Appellant's trial.
We next determine whether the prosecution nonetheless withheld materially
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady, supra . Evidence is "material" under the
Brads doctrine "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different ."
Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S . 263, 280,119 S .Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed .2d 286 (1999). We
review de novo whether particular evidence is material under Brads. United States v.
Corrado , 227 F .3d 528, 538 (6th Cir. 2000).
In arguing that the plea agreement is material, Appellant claims that the
circumstances in this case are akin to the circumstances in Gi lio, supra . In Gi lio,
supra, a new trial was ordered where the key witness against the defendant was
promised immunity by one of the prosecutors, but this information was withheld and not
3 As of July 1, 2006, habit evidence is now admissible in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky to prove that the conduct of a person on a particular occasion was in
conformity with his or her stated habit or routine practice . KRE 406.
6
discovered by the defendant until after his trial . Id. at 154-55 . In granting a new trial,
the U.S . Supreme Court found it significant that "the Government's case depended
almost entirely on [the key witness'] testimony; without it there could have been no
indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the jury." Id . at 154.
This case is distinguishable from Giglio , supra , however, because the
prosecution's case at Appellant's trial did not depend almost entirely on Christian's
testimony. Compelling physical evidence which corroborated Christian's testimony was
also submitted at trial . This physical evidence included the existence of two sets of
footprints from John's Creek to the Deskins' home, the existence of shoes and a
shotgun buried at a place near the Deskins' home where Christian said they were
buried, and testimony by a firearms examiner stating that at least one of the shells
found at the scene of Gladys' murder had been fired from the buried shotgun .
Moreover, several independent witnesses testified that (1) Christian and Appellant were
together on the night of Gladys' murder; and (2) Appellant was in possession of a large
amount of money immediately following Gladys' murder. Finally, two men incarcerated
with Appellant testified, stating that Appellant had confessed to stabbing and shooting
Gladys .
Appellant counters that he submitted evidence of his own at trial, including (1)
testimony from himself denying any involvement with the crime ;4 (2) testimony from
Appellant's wife and mother, which was subsequently impeached on rebuttal, providing
alibis for Appellant on the night of the murder; and (3) testimony from another inmate
4 At Robert Sykes' subsequent trial, Appellant testified once again . But, this time,
Appellant admitted being in Gladys' home armed with a sawed-off shotgun. He
disavowed any intent to murder Gladys, but claimed that the gun accidentally
discharged into Gladys' head while he was holding it.
7
stating that the two inmates testifying for the Commonwealth were lying about
Appellant's alleged confessions .
When these circumstances are considered and weighed in their totality, we agree
with the trial court that even if Christian's immunity deal had been disclosed to the jury,
there is no reasonable probability that the result of Appellant's trial would have been
different . Ample independent evidence existed at the time of Appellant's trial which
placed Appellant at the scene of the crime and corroborated Christian's story. Thus, our
confidence in the jury's ultimate verdict is in no way undermined by the limited effect this
impeachment evidence would have had at trial. See Strickler , supra, at 293-94
(although evidence impeaching key witness was significant, in light of other evidence
presented before the jury, it was not significant enough to be material); Foley v.
Commowealth , 55 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Ky. 2000) ("newly discovered evidence that merely
impeaches the credibility of a witness or is cumulative is generally disfavored as
grounds for granting a new trial") .
In his final assignment of error, Appellant appeals from a ruling of the trial court
denying Appellant's Motion for Supplemental Discovery of the Commonwealth
Attorney's notes . Appellant claims that those notes could reveal, once and for all,
whether Christian was ever asked at Appellant's trial about his immunity deal . As a rule,
post-conviction discovery is simply not available . Haight v. Commonwealth , 41 S.W.3d
436, 445 (Ky. 2001) . Moreover, a prosecutor's trial notes are work product and thus,
are generally not discoverable . See Hillard v. Commonwealth , 158 S .W.3d 758, 766
(Ky. 2005). However, it is also axiomatic that "suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution ." Strickler , supra , at 280 (quoting Brady, supra, at 87).
Here, Appellant merely speculates that additional exculpatory evidence could be
discovered in the Commonwealth Attorney's notes . "Mere speculation that some
exculpatory material may have been withheld is unlikely to establish good cause for a
discovery request on collateral review." Id . at 286. Accordingly, we find no reversible
error in the trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion for Supplemental Discovery of the
Commonwealth Attorney's notes .
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the orders entered by the Pike Circuit
Court.
Lambert, C.J., Graves, Minton, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J .J., concur. Roach,
J., concurs in result only . McAnulty, J ., dissents without opinion .
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
David Hare Harshaw III
Dennis James Burke
Assistant Public Advocates
Department of Pubic Advocacy
207 Parker Drive, Suite 1
LaGrange, KY 40031
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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