JAMES R. BEARD, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT 1VOTICE
OPINION
NO T'TO BE PUBLISHED
THIS OPINION ISDESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyx=r Qlaurf of
2004-SC-1108-MR
JAMES R. BEARD, JR.
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
03-CR-00030
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Charles Richard Beard, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin Circuit Court
jury of first-degree sodomy, incest, and first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) .
The jury recommended a twenty year sentence, and the trial court entered judgment
accordingly . Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110
(2)(b) . For the reasons stated herein, we affirm .
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In January 2001, Appellant's biological daughter, V.B ., told her guidance
counselor she was being sexually abused by her father. V.B. wrote a statement
recounting the details of January 17, 2001, specifically stating that Appellant had forced
V.B . to perform oral sex on him . At trial, V.B. testified that Appellant began molesting
her after her thirteenth birthday in May 2000 . V .B . explained that when she was in
trouble, Appellant would decrease her punishment if she performed sexual favors .
Appellant testified on his own behalf, claiming V.B . made these allegations as retaliation
for being grounded after she misbehaved .
Appellant raises three issues on appeal : 1) trial court error in denying Appellant's
motion to dismiss the indictment; 2) sufficiency of the evidence on the sodomy charge;
and 3) prosecutorial misconduct.
I.
Appellant first argues the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss
the superseding indictment issued by the Commonwealth . The first indictment listed the
date of offense as January 17, 2001 ; however, the superseding indictment amended the
date to reflect May 2000 - January 2001 as the date of offense . Other than the change
in date, no other information was added or deleted to the indictment . Appellant claims
the superseding indictment was duplicative because it alleged a continuing course of
conduct, and it denied Appellant the right to a unanimous jury verdict. We find these
contentions without merit .
An indictment is duplicative when two separate charges are made in one single
count. Benge v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 609, 201 S .W .2d 892, 894 (1947). In the
case at bar, Appellant was charged with one count of incest, one count of first-degree
sodomy, and one count of first-degree PFO. Revising the indictment to read. "May 2000
- January 2001" does not result in multiple charges under a single count . This situation
is similar to cases where an indictment is amended to reflect a different date of offense .
See, e.g . , Anderson v. Commonwealth , 63 S .W .3d 135,140-41 (Ky. 2001). RCr 6.16
allows amendment of an indictment "if no additional or different offense is charged and if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced ." Although in this case the
prosecutor formally dismissed the indictment and issued a superseding indictment, only
the dates were changed . Appellant was not prejudiced by the superseding indictment,
nor was the indictment duplicative .
Appellant also claims he was denied the right to a unanimous verdict. In closing,
the prosecutor recounted the testimony of V.B . describing earlier incidents of abuse .
Appellant opines the jury was confused and convicted Appellant for these earlier events,
which did not meet the statutory threshold of sodomy .
We find this argument unpreserved for our review and without merit. RCr 9.22
requires a party to inform the trial court of a perceived error and the remedy desired .
Appellant did not object to the prosecutor's comments, nor did he object to the jury
instructions .
II.
Appellant's second claim is trial court error in denying his motion for a directed
verdict . Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to prove the statutory elements of
sodomy, therefore entitling Appellant to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge .
We disagree .
First, we find that this issue is not properly preserved for our review. Appellant
moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case ; however, he
failed to renew the motion at the close of all evidence . Appellant claims the issue is.
preserved because he moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the end of the
trial.
Alternatively, Appellant requests review as palpable error. RCr 10.26.
It is well settled in Kentucky that "[a] motion for a directed verdict made at the
close of the plaintiff's [here the Commonwealth's] case is not sufficient to preserve error
unless renewed at the close of all the evidence . . . ." Kimbrough v. Commonwealth , 550
S .W.2d 525, 529 (Ky. 1977) ; see also, Baker v. Commonwealth , 973 S.W .2d 54, 55 (Ky.
1998) .
Even if the issue were preserved, Appellant does not have a viable claim. "On
appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled
to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W.2d 186, 187
(Ky. 1991) . In this case, the Commonwealth introduced ample testimony and evidence
for the jury to convict the Appellant of first-degree sodomy . Consequently, the trial court
properly denied Appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal, and we find palpable
error review unnecessary.
II1.
Appellant's final claim is prosecutorial misconduct . Appellant alleges the
Commonwealth misstated the law during its closing argument and confused the jury as
to the definitions of "sexual abuse" and "sodomy." Appellant concedes this issue is not
preserved for our review, but urges palpable error review under RCr 10.26 .
Relief may be granted for palpable error under RCr 10.26 only if "manifest
injustice" results from an error affecting the "substantial rights" of a party. Since the
error claimed by Appellant is not structural, the reviewing court must consider the case
as a whole, and "conclude that a substantial possibility exists that the result would have
been different in order to grant relief." Partin v. Commonwealth , 918 S.W.2d 219, 224
(Ky. 1996).
We find Appellant's argument without merit. In this instance it cannot be said the
prosecutor's statements "baffled" the jury and created an error of manifest injustice . It is
also relevant that the jury instructions stated the correct definitions of the offenses under
consideration, and Appellant did not object to the instructions submitted to the jury.
Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments do not constitute reversible error.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment and sentence of the Hardin Circuit
Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Astrida Liana Lemkins
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fairs Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Michael Harned
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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