JIMMY YOKELY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
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CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : APRIL 20, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-000751-MR
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--
JIMMY YOKELY
V.
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
02-C R-00338
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Jimmy Yokely, was convicted of first degree burglary and of
being a persistent felony offender in the first degree . He received a ten (10) year
sentence, enhanced to twenty (20) years . Appellant now appeals that conviction to this
Court as a matter of right .'
Robert Loomis lived alone in a home at the end of a private drive,
approximately one-eighth of a mile long. The house was adjacent to some railroad
tracks . The only other person living on the drive was Mr. Napier, who lived in a mobile
home about halfway up the drive. Mr. Napier stated that he did not notice anything
unusual on the day of the Loomis burglary . Mr. Loomis' house was impossible to see
from the main road because of leaves .
' Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
The house was equipped with an alarm system . It was controlled by a
key-box located in the garage, and if the key was turned on, it was activated . The keybox was eighteen inches to the right of the door into the living quarters, and when he
activated it, Mr. Loomis normally hid the key under a box. The alarm was not hooked
up to a phone line, and did not notify anyone when it sounded, but rather made a very
loud audible alert. The alarm was not connected to the windows in the garage, nor was
it connected to the door leading from the garage into the living quarters . The alarm only
sounded when someone was in the living quarters and activated a motion detector.
On August 18, 1999, Mr. Loomis left his house around 7:00 a.m . to have
breakfast and go to work. Mr. Loomis had opened the windows in the garage slightly
that morning, because it was supposed to be a hot day. He returned home about four
hours later . As he approached his house, he noticed that one of the windows on the
side of the garage was open more than how he had left it. Mr. Loomis recalled that the
window was damaged, and from inside his garage it was evident that someone had
"tinkered" with it. The windows were operated by a cranking mechanism, and when
they were opened, the top of the window slid down toward the middle of the window
frame . The bottom of the windows was approximately six feet from the ground, and the
windows approximately one foot in height and two feet in width. The outer garage door
was also open . Inside the garage was a door that led from the garage to the living
quarters, and it was also open. The interior door was not usually locked by Mr. Loomis
when he went out, and he could not remember if he activated the alarm on the day of
the burglary.
Mr. Loomis examined his residence and discovered that a total of six
firearms were missing, as well as ammunition, a camera, and a television . Mr. Loomis
stated that the firearms were all capable of being fired. Mr. Loomis did not know
Appellant, and did not give him or anyone else permission to go in his home and
remove these items . None of the stolen property was ever recovered .
Mr. Loomis called the Independence Police Department, and Sgt. John
Lonaker responded to the residence . Sgt. Lonaker could find no evidence of forced
entry except the garage window. He believed that the front-most garage window
appeared to have been pulled up, and based on his personal experience, it was the
point of entry for the burglar. He noted that the screen that went over the front-most
window had been pushed out, but that the screen was intact on the other garage
window. Furthermore, an item had been pushed underneath the window on the
outside, so that someone could stand on it and access the window. Sgt. Lonaker could
clearly see fingerprints that indicated someone had lifted the window up to gain entry to
the garage, because the fingerprints were located on the inside of the window. Mr.
Loomis told Sgt. Lonaker that the fingerprints were not his, and that there was no
legitimate reason for them to be there . The prints were subsequently lifted as evidence .
Following the initial report of the burglary prepared by Sgt. Lonaker, the
case was transferred to Independence Police Detective Danny Bridges. On September
3, 1999, Bridges sent the fingerprints from the window to the Kentucky State Police
Crime Laboratory for analysis . He received a positive identification on one of the
fingerprints from the lab in August, 2001 . Howard Jones, a fingerprint analyst with the
Kentucky State Police, analyzed the fingerprints submitted by Detective Bridges . He
determined that there was only one print of comparison value taken at the scene of the
crime . The print was identified as the right middle finger of Appellant . The time lapse
between the date the prints were sent to the crime lab, and the date of identification
was apparently due to the lab being understaffed . Cases were also prioritized, with
burglaries given a lower priority than rapes, murders, and drug cases.
During trial, the Commonwealth called four witnesses, and Appellant
requested a directed verdict. The directed verdict was denied, and Appellant called no
witnesses. Appellant requested that a lesser included offense instruction be given on
criminal trespass . That request was overruled, and Appellant then objected to the
instructions as a whole . Appellant also made a motion to dismiss the indictment due to
the pre and post-trial delay in bringing the case to trial. That motion was also denied.
Appellant filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which was overruled after a hearing.
Final judgment was entered on August 25, 2004 .
Appellant first argues that he was denied due process under both the
United States and Kentucky Constitutions, because there was insufficient evidence to
prove his guilt of every essential element of first degree burglary . The Commonwealth
argues that the insufficiency of the evidence claim is unpreserved because Appellant
only moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case, and not at
the close of all the evidence . If the alleged error is deemed unpreserved, then
Appellant's claim is evaluated using the palpable error standard .
As previously mentioned, the Commonwealth rested after calling four
witnesses, at which time Appellant's motion for a directed verdict was overruled .
Appellant elected not to put on evidence . The Commonwealth contends that for the
alleged directed verdict error to be preserved, Appellant would have had to make yet
another motion for directed verdict . This of course would have been immediately after
informing the court that he would not be calling witnesses, and within moments of his
original motion for a directed verdict.
"It is black-letter law that, in order to preserve an insufficiency-of-theevidence allegation for appellate review, `[a] defendant must renew his motion for a
directed verdict, thus allowing the trial court the opportunity to pass on the issue in light
of all the evidence .m3 The purpose of this preservation rule is to allow a judge the
opportunity to evaluate all of the evidence, once at the close of the Commonwealth's
case, and once at the close of all the evidence. However the interpretation of the rule
that the Commonwealth urges is an overzealous application of black-letter law.
Requiring a defendant to move for a directed verdict subsequent to one made a few
minutes before, and without any further evidence having been heard, serves no
purpose . The language of Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth 4 supports this proposition :
In other words, a motion for directed verdict made after the
close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, but not renewed
at the close of all evidence-- i .e., after the defense presents
its evidence (if it does so) or after the Commonwealth's
rebuttal evidence-- is insufficient to preserve an error based
upon insufficiency of the evidence . 5
The above quotation illustrates the two instances when a motion for
directed verdict would have to be renewed to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence
claim . Although the defendant in Schoenbachler did present evidence, unlike Appellant
herein, we found it necessary to give guidance in cases similar to the one at bar . While
our rules regarding error preservation are indispensable, a technical application of
3 Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth , 95 S .W.3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Baker v .
Commonwealth, 973 S .W .2d 54, 55 (Ky. 1998)).
` Id .
5 Id . at 836 (emphasis added) .
those rules is unnecessary when no purpose is served . The alleged error is this case
was preserved, and we now review it as such.
Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the
charge of burglary in the first degree . Specifically, he argues that absent other
evidence linking him to the crime, a single fingerprint is insufficient to convict . Burglary
in the first degree is defined as follows :
(1)
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when,
with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or
remains unlawfully in a building, and when in effecting entry
or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom,
he or another participant in the crime :
(a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon ; or
(b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime ; or
(c) Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous
instrument against any person who is not a
participant in the crime .
(2) Burglary in the first degree is a Class B felony .'
Appellant contends that, taken as a whole, the evidence in this case is
such that no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed the burglary . He concedes that there was no contest about whether a
burglary occurred and that firearms, capable of firing a shot,8 were stolen . However, he
asserts that there was no other evidence, save the single fingerprint, that connects him
to the crime . The proper standard for determining whether a directed verdict is
warranted was articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham,9 which stated as follows :
6 In Scruggs v. Commonwealth , 566 S .W.2d 405, 412 (Ky. 1978), we stated the
proposition as follows : "On the other hand, if the (directed verdict) motion is denied,
then, and in that event, the defendant must either stand on his motion and refuse to put
on any proof or he may present his evidence to support his defense."
KRS 511 .020 .
8 Mr. Loomis stated that the firearms were all capable of being fired, thereby making
them deadly weapons pursuant to KRS 500 .080(4)(a) .
9 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) .
6
On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given . For the purposes of ruling on the motion, the trial
court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth
is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility
and weight to be given to such testimony
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal .' °
In the case at bar, Mr. Loomis stated that the fingerprint found at the
scene had no legitimate reason for being there, and that it appeared that someone had
"tinkered" with the window. Sgt. Lonaker testified that he could clearly see fingerprints
that indicated someone had lifted the window to gain entry to the garage . He also
noted that a screen was missing from the window, and that the screen on the other
window was intact . Furthermore, it appeared to him that someone had pushed
something under the window in order to gain entry, and during his investigation he
found no other point of entry for the house. The stolen property was never recovered,
and Appellant was not seen in the area of the crime .
Appellant cites to other jurisdictions that have held that a single
fingerprint, standing alone, is insufficient to convict of a crime ." While that position is
debatable, the circumstantial evidence in this case is sufficient to support the
conviction . "Circumstantial evidence may form the basis for a conviction so long as the
'° _Id. at 187 (emphasis added) .
" See Ruffin v. State , 556 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. Ct . App. 2001) ; State v. Gilmore , 542
S.E .2d 694 (N .C. Ct. App. 2001) ; Shores v. State , 756 So .2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) ; McCleskey v. State , 924 S.W.2d 427 (Tex . Crim. App. 1996) .
7
evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable jury of guilt."' 2 The only evidence
directly linking Appellant to the crime is the single fingerprint . However, its placement
on the inside of the window, combined with the other evidence of burglary, is sufficient
to allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt . Most of the foreign cases dealing
with a single fingerprint fact pattern, also include some explanation from the defendant
as to an alternate theory of how the fingerprint came to be on the object in question .
Absent such an explanation, we hold that the circumstantial evidence in this case was
indeed enough to convict Appellant of the crime of burglary .
Appellant next argues that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial
due to both the pre-indictment and post-indictment delay . He claims that this was a
violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as
well as Section 1, 2, and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution . This error was properly
preserved by Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment.
A review of the timeframe of this case is helpful. The offense was
committed on August 18, 1999 . Appellant was indicted on May 21, 2002, and on that
day a warrant for Appellant's arrest was issued. Appellant appears to have been
incarcerated on other charges, for on April 15, 2004, a detainer was lodged against
Appellant at the Kentucky State Reformatory . Appellant was arraigned on May 10,
2004, and this was only after he made a pro se motion to be tried under KRS 500.110 .
An indictment alleging that Appellant was a Persistent Felony Offender was handed
down on July 9, 2004. The jury trial was held on August 5, 2004, and a verdict of guilty
was returned on both the burglary charge and the PFO.
'2
Davis v. Commonwealth , 147 S .W.3d 709, 729 (Ky. 2004) (citing Bussell v.
Commonwealth , 882 S .W.2d 111, 114 (Ky. 1994)) .
8
When a hearing was held on Appellant's motion, it was noted that the only
explanation for the delay in the fingerprint analysis by the Commonwealth was that the
Kentucky State Police was short-handed and placed a higher priority on other cases.
Additionally, Detective Bridges testified that he got Appellant's name in August, 2001,
but did not go to see him until January, 2002, while Appellant was at the Kentucky State
Reformatory . Bridges himself did not testify before the grand jury until June, 2002 . The
trial court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss because of a lack of prejudice, other
than the fact that Appellant had a right to have the case decided speedily.
An individual is not entitled to the speedy trial protections of the Sixth
Amendment until formal proceedings are instituted .
13
Pre-charging delay can however
constitute a due process violation, provided that the Appellant can show "substantial
prejudice" and "intentional delay to gain tactical advantage" on behalf of the
Commonwealth .
14
Furthermore, the delay must be intentional and mere negligence by
the police is insufficient .
15
Kentucky law provides no statute of limitations for the
prosecution of a felony offense. Reed v. Commonwealth '' explains the rationale
behind this reasoning:
A legislative determination has been made that felony
charges may be brought at any time ; that the interest of the
Commonwealth in the prosecution of crime outweighs the
benefits normally associated with statutes of limitation ; and
that there is no right to be free of felony prosecution by the
18
mere passage of time .
13 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S . 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971).
14 Reed v. Commonwealth , 738 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky. 1987) .
15 _Id
.
1s
KRS 500 .050.
17
738 S .W.2d 818 (Ky. 1987) .
18 Id. At 820.
Appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the passage of time, because
it impacted his ability to remember his whereabouts on the date of the burglary .
Furthermore, he contends that the delay made it difficult for him to seek out alibi
witnesses that could corroborate his story. He further asserts that the delay during the
pre-indictment phase of his trial was intentional, because the Kentucky State Police
Crime Laboratory intentionally did not examine the fingerprints for two years . However,
the delay in the processing of the fingerprints, while unfortunate, was not "intentional"
as that word is used in the relevant caselaw.
Obviously, the delay in the case at bar was intentional, because the Crime
Lab intentionally put certain crimes in a hierarchy of importance, with burglary being
near the bottom . However, "intentional", as it is used in Reed, means purposefully not
investigating or prosecuting a crime in order for the Commonwealth to make the
outcome of the case more favorable . There is no evidence in this case to show that the
reason for the delay had anything to do with ulterior motives . The Kentucky State
Police Crime Laboratory is constrained by budget concerns, and they felt it necessary
to investigate certain types of evidence more quickly. This is to be expected, given the
more injurious effects of crimes such as rape, murder, and drug offenses . Additionally,
during the seven month delay after the fingerprints were identified, the investigation
continued, including an interview with Appellant . "[I]nvestigative delay is fundamentally
unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely `to gain tactical advantages over the
accused ."'19 For this reason, we hold that there was no violation of due process
because of the pre-indictment delay .
19
United States v. Lovasco , 431 U .S. 783, 795, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed .2d 752 (1977).
10
Now we turn to the post-indictment delay. Under both the Federal and
Kentucky Constitutions, we analyze a defendant's right to a speedy trial using the fourfactor Barker v. Wingo20 test. "That test involves an examination of: (1) the length of
delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) the
prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. ,2' "The factors are balanced and `[n]o
single one of these factors is determinative by itself ." ,22
We must first determine if the delay was presumptively prejudicial to the
defendant, because if it was not then no rights were violated and this inquiry ends.
"Determining whether a delay was presumptively prejudicial requires examining two
elements: the charges and the length of the delay." 24 A "delay that can be tolerated for
an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy
charge ." 25 In this case, Appellant was charged with burglary in the first degree and
being a PFO. We view these charges to be serious, but of slight complexity .
The second element, length of delay, is the period between the earlier of
arrest or indictment, and the time the trial began .26 Appellant was indicted on May 21,
2002, and his trial began on August 5, 2004 . Therefore, the period between indictment
and trial was approximately 26 months, although we note that approximately two
months of this delay was due to Appellant's motion for a continuance. Although the
charges are only slightly complex, we view this amount of time to be presumptively
prejudicial.
20
407 U .S. 514, 92 S .Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed .2d 101 (1972) .
Dunaway v. Commonwealth , 60 S.W .3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001).
. (citing Gabow v. Commonwealth , 34 S.W .3d 63, 70 (Ky. 2000)) .
23 Id
Id.
24 I
d
25
Barker, 407 U.S . at 531 .
26
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U .S . 64, 96 S .Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed .2d 205 (1975) .
11
2'
Having found Appellant's delay was presumptively prejudicial, we now
turn to the other factors of the Barker test, starting with the reason for the delay . The
Barker Court set forth three general areas of delay : (1) intentional delay meant to
hamper the defense ; (2) neutral delay such as negligence or overcrowding of the
courts ; and (3) valid delay such as a missing witness. As we have already stated, we
do not feel that any delay was caused in an attempt to gain an upper hand on the
defendant, however we do feel that the delay in this case can be attributed to
negligence on the part of the Commonwealth . The only indication in the record of why
Appellant was not brought to trial was the fact that he was incarcerated on other
offenses during the delay. Even though negligence is considered a neutral reason, "the
primary burden [is] on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought
to trial ."28 Although the reason for delay in this case cannot be considered deliberate,
we deem it highly undesirable .
The third Barker factor is the responsibility of the defendant to assert his
right to a speedy trial . The record indicates that Appellant filed a pro se motion for
disposition on April 26, 2004, pursuant to KRS 500.110 . Although he did not
specifically use the language "right to a speedy trial" in the motion, we view the filing of
the motion sufficient to be an assertion of that right . However, Appellant's motion to
dismiss dealt solely with the pre-indictment due process argument, not the right to a
speedy trial. Regardless of this, Appellant adequately asserted his speedy trial rights .
We therefore turn to the final factor in the Barker test.
27
28
Barker, 407 U .S. at 531 .
Id. at 529.
12
Barker calls for an examination of the prejudice to the Appellant caused
by the delay. That Court articulated three distinct areas of concern : (1) to prevent
oppressive pre-trial detention ; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern for the accused ; (3)
and to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired . 29 In this case, the pre-trial
detention interest weighs heavily against Appellant, as he was already incarcerated
during the period of delay. Secondly, while Appellant undoubtedly felt anxiety at the
prospect of a twenty (20) year sentence, there is nothing in these facts to indicate that
his concern would have grown as a result of the delay . In fact, Appellant could have felt
relieved because of the inactivity of his case, and the possibility that he would never
have to stand trial for his crime . Finally, as already stated, the delay did not impair the
defense of Appellant . Once Appellant was indicted, a trial or guilty plea was inevitable,
and Appellant should have begun to prepare his defense for the crime charged . The
delay did nothing to hamper this, and if anything, gave him two years of additional time
to reflect on the events of the crime and to seek favorable witnesses .
.
Upon a weighing of the Barker factors, we conclude that although there
was slight prejudice to Appellant, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation .
Though Appellant asserted his rights, the delay was presumptively prejudicial, and the
reason for the delay was pure negligence, the facts of this case do not show that any of
this caused great harm to Appellant, and more importantly did nothing to affect the
outcome of his trial. We hold that the delays in this case did not violate either the
United States or Kentucky Constitutions .
Appellant's final argument is that the trial court should have instructed the
jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the first degree . "A person is
29
Id . at 532 .
13
guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when he knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a dwelling ." 3°
"[A]
lesser included offense is one which `is established by
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged .,,'31 The interplay between burglary and criminal trespass is explained
as follows :
KRS Chapter 511 describes three degrees of burglary and
three degrees of criminal trespass, all of which proscribe
intrusions by the defendant on the property of the victim . All
contain one multifaceted element, viz. that the defendant
"knowingly enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully" in or upon the
victim's property . The three degrees of burglary contain an
additional common element that the defendant did so "with
the intent to commit a crime," the element which
distinguishes the felony or burglary from the misdemeanor of
criminal trespass . 32
In this case, the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included
offense of criminal trespass . The jury could have believed that Appellant committed
burglary when he entered the home . However, based on the modest amount of
evidence, and the lack of any evidence connecting Appellant to the stolen firearms, the
jury could have also believed that he did not steal the firearms . Without stealing the
firearms, he would have only committed the offense of criminal trespass . Furthermore,
the jury could have believed that he did not have the requisite intent to commit a crime,
as mandated by the burglary statute .
For the reasons herein stated we reverse the judgment and remand for a
new trial .
KRS 511 .060.
Colwell v. Commonwealth, 37 S .W .3d 721, 726 (Ky. 2000) (citing KRS
505.020(2)(a)) .
32
Id. at 725.
14
30
31
Lambert, C .J., and Cooper, Johnstone, and Roach, JJ., concur. Scott, J.,
dissents by separate opinion in which Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Kathleen K. Schmidt
148 East Second Street
P . O. Box 218
Shepherdsville, KY 40165-0218
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : APRIL 20, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
~ixprEms mart of 'ffEntuskg
2004-SC-000751-MR
JIMMY YOKELY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M . STEPHENS, JUDGE
02-CR-00338
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE SCOTT
Respectfully, I dissent as the evidence in this case does not require or
support the giving of a lesser-included instruction for criminal trespass .
Mr. Loomis lived alone in a home an eighth of a mile up a private drive .
On August 18, 1999, he left home around 7:00 a.m . for work. When he returned,
he noticed one of the windows in the garage was opened wider than he had left
it. He noticed it was damaged, and looking at it from inside, it was evident that
someone had "tinkered" with it.
Inside the garage, the door that led from the garage to the living quarters
was open . Upon looking around, he discovered that six firearms were missing,
including ammunition, a camera and a television. The firearms were all capable
of firing. No one had permission to go into his home and remove these items .
After receiving notice of the alleged burglary, Sergeant Lonaker of the
Independence Police Department checked the scene. In his opinion, the frontmost garage window appeared to have been pulled up and was the point of entry
for the burglary . He noticed fingerprints on the window and lifted these as
evidence .
The fingerprints were subsequently sent to the Kentucky State Police
crime lab, where a positive identification was made on one of the prints . It was
identified as the right middle finger of the Appellant .
At trial, the Commonwealth put on four witnesses and closed . The
Appellant moved for directed verdict, which was denied, then rested without
calling any witnesses. During the preparation of the instructions, the Appellant
requested the inclusion of a lesser-included offense of criminal trespass . The
request was denied . Appellant was convicted of burglary in the first degree and
of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree and sentenced to twenty
years .
Upon the foregoing facts, the majority reverses the Appellant's conviction
for burglary postulating that upon "the modest amount of evidence, and the lack
of any evidence connecting Appellant to the stolen firearms, the jury could have .
. . believed that he did not steal the firearms . Without stealing the firearms, he
would have only committed the offense of criminal trespass . Furthermore, the
jury could have believed that he did not have the requisite intent to commit a
crime, as mandated by the burglary statute ."
It is settled in our jurisprudence that the trial court must instruct the jury on
all the lesser included offenses which are justified by the evidence . Cannon v.
Commonwealth, 777 S .W .2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1989) . However, "[a] defendant is not
entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense unless the evidence is
`such as to create a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of the
higher or lower degree ."' Rowe v. Commonwealth , 50 S.W.3d 216, 218-19 (Ky.
App. 2001)(citing Jones v. Commonwealth , 737 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky . App.
1987)) .
To sustain a charge of Burglary in the First Degree, the jury must have
believed the Appellant entered the home of Mr. Loomis unlawfully with the intent
to commit a crime therein and while in the home, or the flight therefrom, he, or an
accomplice, was armed with a deadly weapon . KRS 511 .020 . Criminal trespass,
on the other hand, would only require that a jury believe that the Appellant
entered Mr. Loomis's home unlawfully. KRS 511 .060 .
The Appellant argues that the jury "could, [have] reasonably believed that
the Appellant was present at the house but did not remove the guns." Such an
argument ignores the fact that the guns were taken . And there was no evidence
that any other person entered the home except Appellant . Thus, from the
evidence adduced, under all applications of logic - Appellant took the guns, as
the jury unanimously held .
The giving of a lesser included instruction should be based upon evidence
which supports it, not on the absence of evidence to exclude it with mathematical
certainty . Here all logic leads to one conclusion . If there was any evidence to
support any other person being involved in the burglary or committing the
burglary, then it should have been put forward. It wasn't.
I believe it is time we return to plain, simple instructions, which fit the
evidence introduced at trial - not evidence, which was not.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent from the majority's opinion in this case.
Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., joins this dissent .
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