TIMOTHY MARTEVES TAYLOR V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : JANUARY 19, 2006
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TIMOTHY MARTEVES TAYLOR
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-2363
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 02-CR-778
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals which affirmed a
judgment based on a conditional guilty plea entered by Taylor to one count of trafficking
in a controlled substance and one count of possession of marijuana . He was
sentenced to five years for the trafficking charge and twelve months for the possession
offense, the sentences to run concurrently for a total of five years in prison .
The question presented is whether the circuit judge erred by denying the motion
by Taylor to suppress his statements to the police and the evidence found on his
person.
Police received information from a confidential source that Taylor was in
possession of crack cocaine . The informant, who had proven reliable on prior
occasions, gave the police a detailed description of Taylor's physical appearance,
clothing and whereabouts. The officers went to the location in search of the person
who had cocaine . They saw Taylor and observed that he matched the physical
description of the suspect. As the officers approached him, Taylor moved in the
opposite direction, occasionally making furtive glances at the officers. Eventually, the
officers confronted Taylor next to a wall and handcuffed him.
The officers were in an area known for drug trafficking activity and they were
cognizant of the fact from prior experiences that there were multiple escape routes .
One of the police officers testified that Taylor was restrained because they feared he
was a flight risk. After handcuffing Taylor, the officers advised him that he was not
under arrest and that they had been told he possessed drugs . At that point, Taylor
voluntarily admitted to the officers that he had cocaine and marijuana in his pockets.
From the time he was handcuffed until the time he made the statement, approximately
ten to fifteen seconds elapsed . The police then arrested Taylor, searched him and
found the drugs on his person . He was read his Miranda rights after being formally
arrested and he refused to answer any questions .
The grand jury indicted Taylor on one count of trafficking in a controlled
substance and one count of possession of marijuana. Taylor moved to suppress his
statements and the evidence . The circuit judge conducted a suppression hearing and
overruled the motion . He found that the police had sufficient basis for initiating the
contact with Taylor and securing him for his protection as well as their own, and that the
officers were not interrogating Taylor. Following the denial of his suppression motion,
Taylor entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges and was sentenced to a total of
five years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and this Court accepted
discretionary review .
Taylor argues that the circuit judge erred by overruling his motion to suppress his
statements made to police and the evidence found on him following his custodial
statement made without Miranda warnings . He asserts that he was not free to leave
and the police did not have the right to make accusations in order to get an
incriminating statement from him. Taylor admits that no specific questions were asked
of him, but he argues that the statements made by the police were designed to elicit an
incriminating response . He contends that although the officers did not frame their
inquiry in the form of a question, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only
to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that
they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode
Island v. Innis , 446 U.S . 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) . We disagree with
Taylor's argument.
The circuit judge acted correctly in denying the motion to suppress the
incriminating statements and the physical evidence that was found as a result of that
statement. Taylor was handcuffed to allow officers to conduct an investigative stop in
an area which they knew had multiple escape routes . The handcuffs were used only as
a means of reducing the mobility of Taylor . The circumstances of the furtive glances
given by Taylor as he walked away from the officers, as well as the escape route
possibilities, caused them to consider him a serious flight risk. He was not placed in
custody as that phrase has been generally used in the context of Miranda cases. As
the officer began to tell Taylor why he was being stopped, Taylor spontaneously
interrupted him stating that he had crack cocaine and marijuana in his pockets .
Innis, supra, certainly does not support Taylor's position. Innis was arrested
following the robbery of a taxicab driver . He was advised of his Miranda rights and
placed in a vehicle with three other police officers . While en route to the station, one of
the officers initiated a conversation with a second officer. He indicated to him that he
frequents this area on patrol and that because a school for handicapped children is
nearby, it would be tragic if one of them found a loaded weapon . The second officer
shared the concerns of the first officer. Innis interrupted the conversation and told the
officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located. The
police returned to the scene of the arrest where a search for the shotgun was in
progress . Innis was given his Miranda warnings again and stated that he understood
those rights, but that he wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the children in
the area . He then led police to the weapon. The court held that Innis was not
subjected to express questioning, nor its functional equivalent.
The evidence indicates that the statements made by Taylor were not in response
to any police statement reasonably calculated to elicit an incriminating response .
Miranda requires an individual who is stopped to be apprised of his/her rights only in the
context of a custodial interrogation . Here, there was no custodial interrogation . See
Commonwealth v. Vanover, 689 S.W .2d 11 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 953, 106
S.Ct. 322, 88 L.Ed .2d 305 (1985) . Cf . Denny v. Commonwealth , 670 S.W .2d 847 (Ky.
1984), overruled on other grounds Commonwealth v. Burge , 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky.
1996) .
The findings of fact made by the circuit judge are supported by substantial
evidence and are conclusive pursuant to RCr 9.78 . Taylor has not demonstrated that
the findings of fact are otherwise. Taylor was not in custody for Miranda purposes
simply because he was handcuffed and detained in order to prevent his flight until the
investigation was completed . See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U .S . 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed .2d
889 (1968), holding that brief investigatory stops by police are permitted when there is
reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See also United States v.
Foster , 376 F .3d 577 (6th Cir. 2004), which held that the use of handcuffs does not
exceed the bounds of a Terry stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that
precaution . Telling an individual of the reason he is being stopped by police is not an
interrogation . To consider such actions or statements by police to be an interrogation
would force the police to work in silence, detaining people without even informing them
of what is going on . The statement made by police informing Taylor as to why he was
being detained was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response .
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
V. Gene Lewter
Fayette County Legal Aid Inc.
111 Church Street
Lexington, KY 40507
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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