IMPOR 'ANT NOTICE NOT TD BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CI VIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
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IMPOR 'ANT NOTICE
NOT TD BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : June 16, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyreme Courf of ~L~~'
2004-SC-0648-WC
CLARK REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-2652-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 99-75897
RITA OSBORNE ; HON. BONNIE C .
KITTINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) reversed an Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ's) finding that the claimant had become permanently and totally disabled
from her work-related injury at reopening, concluding that there was no substantial
evidence of increased impairment from the injury as required by KRS 342 .125(1)(d).
Convinced that the Board misapplied the law and that the award was supported by
substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals reinstated it. Dingo Coal Co . v. Tolliver, 129
S .W .3d 367, 370-71 (Ky. 2004) . We affirm .
The claimant was born in 1945, has an eleventh-grade education, and is certified
as a patient care technician. She began working for the defendant-employer in 1977.
She testified that she provided general care for patients at her employer's facility and
that the job required her to lift, push, pull, bend, squat. Her application for benefits
alleged that she sustained work-related back injuries while lifting patients on October
28, 1998, and June 1, 1999. When the claims were heard, she had not returned to work
and alleged that she was totally disabled . She complained of sharp, burning pain in her
low back that ran into her right leg and for which she took Ultram and Flexeril daily. She
performed only limited household chores such as making a bed, washing dishes, or
cooking and could not run a vacuum cleaner or drive.
The employer submitted reports from Drs. Wood and Sheridan, who were of the
opinion that the claimant sustained only soft tissue injuries that had resolved . Dr.
Sheridan assigned a 0% impairment, stating that he had consulted the DRE model and
the 4th edition of the AMA's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
( Guides ). Dr. Wood evaluated the claimant and testified that the claimant's symptoms
were due to degenerative osteoarthritis in her thoracic and lumbar spine, which existed
before the work-related injury . He noted that her treating physician returned her to work
within a week of the second injury, albeit with a ten-pound lifting limit .
The claimant introduced testimony from Dr. Vaughan . His report of July 26,
1999, indicated that MRI of the thoracic and lumbar spine revealed disc
protrusions/bulges at T11-12, T12-L1, L1-2, and L2-3 but no frank herniations . He
attributed her axial thoracic and lower back pain to degenerative spondylosis of the
thoracic and lumbar spine . In a December 23, 1999, report Dr. Vaughan indicated that
he had seen the claimant twice and had diagnosed thoracolumbar spondylosis . He
assigned a "5% [impairment] to the body as a whole" and restricted her from lifting more
than 15 pounds and from repetitive twisting and bending of the back .
On October 19, 2000, the claimant was awarded temporary total disability
benefits from July 1, 1999, until October 21, 1999. Although the ALJ noted that whether
the claimant was permanently and totally disabled was "a close question," he
determined that her permanent disability was only partial and that she retained the
ability to perform sedentary work. She received income benefits under KRS
342 .730(1)(b) and (c) based on findings that her impairment was 5% and that she did
not retain the physical capacity to return to her previous work.
On October 17, 2001, the employer filed a motion to reopen in order to contest
the payment of medical expenses for various conditions that it alleged were unrelated to
the back injury . In a separate motion, it also moved to join medical providers that had
an interest in the medical fee dispute . On October 22, 2001, the claimant moved to
reopen her partial disability award under KRS 342 .125(1)(d), alleging a worsening of
condition and increased disability due to the initial back injuries and complaining that the
employer refused to provide medical coverage . Attached to the motion was a letter
from her primary care physician, stating that she had developed severe deep vein
thrombosis and massive pulmonary embolus . It attributed the conditions to the
immobility caused by pain from her back condition. The parties' motions were granted,
without objection, and they proceeded to take further proof. After considering the
evidence regarding the deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolus, the ALJ
determined that the conditions were not due to the claimant's back injury. The present
appeal concerns only the back condition.
The claimant introduced a medical report from Dr. Kriss, a neurosurgeon, who
evaluated her on July 17, 2001, at the request of Dr. Gupta, her pain management
specialist. He noted that Dr. Gupta had treated her with medication and injections for
low back pain and radicular nerve pain that ran down her right leg. She rated her back
pain at 9 out of 10 and her leg pain at 4 out of 10 . After taking a history and conducting
a physical examination, Dr. Kriss noted that the claimant had been diagnosed with
spondylolisthesis, which could very well account for the radicular pain . A July 24, 2001,
report indicates that the claimant brought MRI scans from August, 2000, which showed
"some ruptured discs in the proximal lumbar spine, but in the lower lumbar spine at the
L3/ L4/ L5 and S1 levels there is no evidence of slippage or spondylolisthesis ." He
reported that the claimant had convincing nerve pain in the leg but that he found no
evidence of a pinched nerve or slippage to provide a structural explanation . For that
reason, he did not recommend surgery but did recommend continued pain management
therapy because it had helped to alleviate the symptoms from the injury .
A September 23, 2001, report indicated that Dr. Gupta treated the claimant for
right L3 radicular pain that was secondary to a disc bulge causing subarticular stenosis
and degenerative disc disease . Dr. Gupta stated that the claimant received methadone
and that intermittent transforaminal injections helped her significantly. In Dr. Gupta's
opinion, she needed aggressive pain control so that she could perform regular exercise,
which was the only effective way to prevent further pulmonary emboli . She would not
be able to exercise without pain control .
The ALJ to whom the claim was assigned determined that a university medical
evaluation of the claimant's conditions would be helpful and directed the claimant to
undergo such an evaluation. KRS 342 .315(3) . Dr. Prince performed the university
evaluation on April 15, 2002. His Form 107 report began with a note that the purpose of
his evaluation was to address a worsening of the claimant's condition, specifically her
back pain . He took a history of the work-related incidents and the course of her
treatment and symptoms . His report noted that Dr. Vaughan had conducted a surgical
evaluation and found multi-level degenerative changes but did not find any lesions that
would be amenable to surgical treatment . The claimant had also undergone a course of
physical therapy and attempted to continue the exercises but found it difficult due to her
pain and other medical problems. She eventually began pain management treatment
with Dr. Gupta, which was complicated by the pulmonary embolus . Despite various
medications, she complained that she continued to have "constant" low back pain, with
pain radiating into her posterior right leg . The pain had increased in recent months.
After conducting a physical examination and reviewing June, 1999, MRIs of the
lumbar and thoracic spine, Dr. Prince diagnosed chronic low back pain with extensive
degenerative changes in the lumbosacral spine. He attributed the claimant's complaints
to her injury, stating that there was no history of a prior back injury and that both the
findings and clinical course were consistent with the history of a work-related injury and
the noted pathology . Dr. Prince assigned a 7% impairment to the lumbosacral spine,
none of which was active before the injury, indicating that he used Chapter 15, table 157, of the Guides in arriving at the percentage . He indicated that the claimant had
described her work as a patient care technician as involving occasional to frequent
lifting and carrying while assisting patients and recommended various restrictions due to
the injury or its residuals. They included : no frequent or forceful twisting or bending of
the trunk; limit lifting or carrying to 20 pounds maximum, 10 pounds regularly; and no
lifting below knee level . He did not think that the claimant retained the physical capacity
to return to the type of work she performed at the time of injury.
It is undisputed that the employer introduced two reports from Dr. Sheridan, the
1999 report from the initial claim and a May 21, 2002 report. For whatever reason, only
the 1999 report is part of the record on appeal . As summarized by the ALJ, the 2002
report indicated that the claimant complained of intermittent thorcolumbar pain and
lumbosacral pain that was exacerbated by bending and of intermittent pain that radiated
from her right buttock to her right ankle . He reviewed an April 30, 2002, MRI and
indicated that, in addition to the disc bulges at L1-2 and L2-3 that were present in 1999,
the 2002 MRI showed bulges at L3-4 and L4-5 and a herniation . He continued to
diagnose an acute thoracolumbar strain that had resolved and stated that he was
unable to determine if the claimant had radicular pain. In his opinion, the claimant's
condition was no different than it had been in 1999 . Using the 5th edition of the Guides ,
he assigned 0% thoracic and lumbar impairments . He thought that the claimant did not
need any work restrictions .
Dr. Sheridan also offered an explanation for the reason that there was a
difference between the 7% impairment Dr. Prince assigned at reopening and the 5%
impairment Dr. Vaughan had assigned in the initial proceeding . According to Dr.
Sheridan, Dr. Prince used the 5th edition, Range of Motion model; whereas, Dr.
Vaughan had used the 4th edition, DRE model . In his opinion, if both physicians had
used the same edition and model, the impairments they assigned would also have been
the same .
The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Shultz had released the claimant to return to
work one week after the 1999 injury with a ten-pound lifting restriction but pointed out
that the record was silent as to whether he had changed the restriction before the initial
award . The ALJ noted that Dr. Sheridan's opinion regarding impairment had been
rejected in the initial proceeding and rejected his opinions at reopening . Instead, the
ALJ relied upon Dr. Prince, noting that he knew both the basis for Dr. Vaughan's 5%
impairment and the purpose of the university evaluation. Although acknowledging that
he used the 5th edition of the Guides , which had not been available to Dr. Vaughan, and
that he used the Range of Motion model, the ALJ concluded that his report was
evidence of a greater impairment at reopening and entitled to presumptive weight.
Convinced that the claimant was no longer capable of even light work, the ALJ
determined that the back condition, by itself, rendered her totally disabled at reopening .
Dissatisfied with the analysis, the Board remanded the matter for the ALJ to establish
that there was sufficient evidence of a change of impairment as shown by objective
medical findings . KRS 342.125(1)(d).
Again reviewing the evidence, the AU noted that the claimant did not use a
wheelchair during the initial proceeding but did use one at the hearing in the reopening .
When questioned, she explained was that it was not prescribed by a physician and that
she used it for traveling longer distances because of difficulty breathing and because
her back "gives out." She stated that Dr. Gupta recommended the use of a cane
sometime after October, 2000, and that she now used one almost all the time . Her
present medications included Lortab, Midrin, and Neurontin for back pain and
Phenergan for stomach upset due to the pain medication . She testified that her pain
was significantly worse than in 2000, explaining that Dr. Gupta had increased the
dosage of Lortab from 5 milligrams, which she took in 2000, to 7.5 milligrams and then
to 10 milligrams . Presently, Dr. Gupta alternated the dose between the 7 .5 and 10
milligram strength . Also, she now required injections in her back every four months but
did not require them in 2000 .
Remaining convinced of a post-award worsening of the claimant's physical
condition, the AU noted that Dr. Sheridan reported additional disc bulges and a
herniation that were not present in 1999 . Although he concluded that her condition was
no different, the objective findings in his report indicated otherwise . Although Dr.
Sheridan could not determine if the claimant had radicular pain, Dr. Gupta characterized
her pain as being radicular. Likewise, Dr. Kriss reported radicular pain . In 1999, Dr.
Vaughan restricted the claimant from lifting more than 15 pounds and from repetitive
twisting and bending of the back but, at reopening, Dr. Prince restricted her from
frequent or forceful twisting or bending of the trunk; from lifting or carrying more than 20
pounds and more than 10 pounds regularly; and from lifting below knee level.
Remaining convinced the claimant had become totally disabled since the initial
award, the ALJ found the claimant's testimony regarding the worsening of her back pain
to be credible evidence that she had much more back pain than in October, 2000, and
that the present pain was throbbing, sharp, and constant . Dr. Gupta had recommended
a cane, which she used almost all the time, and she now felt the need to use a
wheelchair for traversing longer distances . Furthermore, her ability to perform
household duties was now more restricted than it had been.
Again concluding that Dr. Prince's testimony was entitled to presumptive weight,
the ALJ determined that Dr. Sheridan's report did not sufficiently explain why there was
no actual change of impairment . The ALJ noted that this was not a case where the
difference in impairment ratings resulted solely from the use of different editions of the
Guides . Although a cross-examination of Dr. Prince could have revealed his rationale
for using the Range of Motion model and his opinion of whether there was an actual
difference in the claimant's impairment, none was conducted. Furthermore, Section
15.2 of the Guides appeared to support his use of the Range of Motion model .
Under the misapprehension that KRS 342.125(1)(d) required the claimant to
prove a post-award increase in her impairment rating due to the effects of her injury and
convinced that she failed to do so, the Board again reversed the ALJ's decision . This
occurred before our decision in Dingo Coal Co . v. Tolliver , supra , which explained that
KRS 342.125(1)(d) governed only the prima facie showing necessary to warrant further
proof-taking . Reversing the Board's decision, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the
claimant's motion to reopen was granted without objection ; therefore, KRS
342 .125(1)(d) was no longer applicable . At issue was whether substantial evidence
supported a finding that the claimant became totally disabled due to a post-award
worsening of her injury. Convinced that there was, the court reinstated the total
disability award . This appeal by the employer followed .
The employer asserts that there was no substantial evidence that a change of
condition due to the claimant's back injury caused her to become more disabled during
the interval between the initial award and reopening. It emphasizes that she never
returned to work after the 1999 accident and acknowledged in the initial proceeding that
she had applied for Social Security Disability benefits. Furthermore, her testimony
indicated that she thought she was unable to perform even sedentary work at that time .
Focusing on Dr. Sheridan's testimony that there was no change in the claimant's
condition at reopening, the employer points to his "uncontradicted" opinion that the
impairment Dr. Vaughan assigned in the initial proceeding and the impairment Dr.
Prince assigned at reopening would have been the same had they used the same
standards . The employer also notes that Dr. Kriss found no evidence of a pinched
nerve or slippage that would account for the claimant's symptoms at reopening .
Although he noted some evidence of a ruptured disc, his report did not specify at what
level it was located . Having noted that the claimant acknowledged she had been
referred to Dr. Gupta before the initial award, the employer asserts that there was
nothing in the physician's report to indicate that a change or worsening of her physical
condition caused her to be more disabled at reopening than she had been in October,
2000 .
The amount of disability that the claimant's condition caused was fully litigated in
the initial proceeding . As a final determination of the matter, the October, 2000, finding
that she was only partially disabled was binding at reopening . As we explained in Dingo
Coal Co. v. Tolliver, supra at 370-71, the standard set forth in KRS 342.125(1)(d)
governs only the prima facie showing necessary to obtain an order to reopen proof in a
claim that has become final. It is inapplicable to the merits of a worker's right to receive
additional income benefits in a reopening proceeding . The claimant's motion to reopen
was granted without objection . The present dispute concerns whether there was error
in the decision on the merits . It is governed by the versions of KRS 342.730 and KRS
342.0011 that were effective on the date of injury . Id.
This is not a reopening in which the injured worker was found to have a greater
partial disability, which would have been required to be supported by substantial
evidence of increased impairment under KRS 342 .730(1)(b) . Roberts Brothers Coal
Co. v. Robinson , 113 S .W .3d 181, 182-83 (Ky. 2003). In a reopening in which the
injured worker is found to have become totally disabled, KRS 342 .0011(11)(c) and KRS
342 .730(1)(a) require substantial evidence that a worsening of condition due to the
injury has caused the worker's present "disability" to be total . Id . The terms
"impairment" and "disability" are not synonymous under the 1996 Act. Id .
The initial partial disability award established that the claimant had an AMA
impairment at that time, and even Dr. Sheridan did not assert that her impairment had
improved ; therefore, it is undisputed that the claimant had a disability rating at
reopening . KRS 342 .0011(35) and (36). In order to receive a total disability award at
10
reopening, her burden on the merits was to show that a worsening of her condition due
to the injury rendered her completely and permanently unable to provide services to
another in return for remuneration on a regular and sustained basis in a competitive
economy . KRS 342 .0011(11)(c) and (34). Even under the 1996 Act, a finding of total
disability involves a weighing of the lay and medical evidence and a consideration of
some of the Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968), factors. Ira A. Watson
Dept. Store v. Hamilton , 34 S .W .3d 48, 51 (Ky. 2000). Evidence of greater impairment
is but one type of evidence of a worsening of condition and but one type of evidence
that the worker's disability due to the injury has increased and become total .
KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers' compensation
claims, giving the ALJ the sole discretion to determine the weight, credibility, quality,
character, and substance of the evidence and to determine what inferences to draw
from it . Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt , 695 S .W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985). That
discretion extends to the medical evidence as well . Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers , 547 S .W.2d
123, 124 (Ky. 1977) . If an ALJ's finding in favor of the party with the burden of proof is
supported by substantial evidence in the record, it is reasonable and may not be
disturbed on appeal. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W .2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986) .
Substantial evidence has been defined as some evidence of substance and relevant
consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people .
Smyzer v. B . F . Goodrich Chemical Co . , Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367 (1971). The substantiality
of evidence must take into account whatever fairly detracts from its weight . Pierce v.
Kentucky Galvanizing , Ky.App ., 606 S .W.2d 165 (1980).
Dr . Vaughan's report in the initial claim indicated only that he assigned a 5%
whole-body impairment . Dr. Sheridan speculated at reopening that it was assigned
under the DRE model of the 4th edition of the Guides . The Form 107 report that Dr.
Prince completed specifically required the use of the DRE model for a spinal injury
unless another method was authorized in the Guides . Dr. Prince assigned a 7%
impairment, using the table for the Range of Motion model . He was not deposed ;
therefore, he was not examined regarding his reasons for using that model or asked to
compare the impairment he assigned with the impairment Dr. Vaughan assigned in the
initial proceeding .
The proper interpretation of the Guides with regard to orthopedic injuries is a
complex matter that requires medical expertise . This is particularly true when the
experts assign impairments using different models . See Thomas v. United Parcel
Service , 58 S .W .3d 455 (Ky. 2001). Nonetheless, an ALJ may consult the Guides when
necessary in order to weigh the conflicting opinions, to draw reasonable inferences from
the available evidence, and to decide which evidence is most reliable. Paramount
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt , supra ; Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers , supra ; Pierce v. Kentucky
Galvanizing , supra .
Testifying on the employer's behalf, Dr . Sheridan reported that the claimant's
condition was no different at reopening than it had been in 1999 . He indicated that he
thought the DRE model to be appropriate at both points in time and indicated that he
thought Drs . Vaughan and Prince would have assigned the same impairment had they
used the same guidelines . As the ALJ noted, his objective findings were not entirely
consistent with his conclusion that the claimant's condition had not changed . His report
did not explain the basis for the opinions he expressed or indicate that Dr. Prince's use
of the Range of Motion model was erroneous under the Guides . Furthermore, when
rejecting Dr. Sheridan's opinions and deciding to give Dr. Prince's presumptive weight,
12
the ALJ noted that the Guides appeared to authorize the use of the Range of Motion
model where there was multi-level involvement such as Dr. Prince found. Despite the
employer's assertions, Dr. Sheridan's opinions were not uncontradicted evidence such
as would compel the ALJ to disregard Dr. Prince's opinions and to conclude that the
claimant's impairment and physical condition were unchanged .
The medical testimony submitted by the claimant and Dr. Prince's report
established that the claimant experienced a change of condition after October, 2000,
due to a worsening of the back condition her injury caused . Furthermore, despite his
conclusions, Dr. Sheridan noted that a 2002 MRI revealed bulging discs at two levels
that were previously unaffected . Dr. Prince imposed physical restrictions at reopening
that exceeded the ones Dr. Vaughan imposed in the initial proceeding . Finally, the
claimant's own testimony provided competent evidence of a decline in her physical
condition due to the back injury and in her ability to perform daily activities . Hush v
Abrams , 584 S .W.2d 48 (Ky. 1979) . Under the circumstances, there was substantial
evidence that a worsening of the work-related back condition, by itself, caused the
claimant to be totally disabled at reopening . The Court of Appeals determined correctly
that the Board misconstrued the controlling statutes and erred by reversing the award .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J., and Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ .
sitting .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Charles Ernest Lowther
Boehl, Stopher & Graves
444 West Second Street
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Theresa Gilbert
Rachel Wagner Kennedy
Denney, Morgan, Rather & Gilbert
156 Market Street
Lexington, KY 40507
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