KELVIN QUARLES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
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IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
upumo (gourf of
L.
2004-SC-0439-MR
KELVIN QUARLES
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R . JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
2003-CR-00389
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Quarles of
first-degree robbery and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. He was
sentenced to a total of twenty-five years in prison .
The only question presented is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in
denying a motion to remove a juror for cause.
At approximately 1 :45 a .m., an individual brandishing a gun robbed a Five Star
Food Mart located in a Shell gas station . A police officer responded to the robbery
within minutes and observed a person near the food mart . He could see money in the
one hand of this person and something dark in his other. The suspect, later identified
as Quarles, fled when the police officer approached, but was soon apprehended .
After police recovered the gun and money that Quarles tried to discard during the
pursuit, they took him back to the food mart for a witness identification . The two
employees working at the time of the robbery immediately recognized Quarles as the
robber. A store surveillance camera recorded the crime .
Quarles was indicted for first-degree robbery, first-degree fleeing or evading
police, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and being a first-degree persistent
felony offender . Before trial, the fleeing or evading police charge was dismissed and
the firearm charge was severed . Accordingly, Quarles was only tried on the two
remaining counts -- first-degree robbery and being a first-degree persistent felony
offender . The jury convicted him of both charges .
At the penalty phase, the defendant admitted his guilt, but indicated that he did
not plead guilty because he wanted to be sentenced by a jury instead of a judge. The
jury sentenced Quarles to twenty years on the robbery charge, which was enhanced to
twenty-five years for being a first-degree persistent felony offender. This appeal
followed .
Quarles argues that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to
excuse Juror #21 for cause because he allegedly could not consider the full range of
penalties for first-degree robbery. We disagree .
During voir dire, defense counsel informed the panel that Quarles was charged
with first-degree robbery, which carried a penalty of ten to twenty years . She then
asked the panel, if they found him guilty, would anyone "have a problem giving him as
little as ten years?" Juror #21 indicated that he would have a problem with that if it was
armed robbery. The following exchange then took place :
Defense : You'd have a problem with that? So for
armed robbery, you feel like the penalty
shouldn't be as low as ten?
Juror #21 : I mean in some instances, I haven't
heard the case yet . In case of poverty
2
or something like that I might feel
compassion in that direction, but for
armed robbery for the sake of robbery,
ten years is not enough .
Defense : Is twenty years something you could consider?
Juror #21 : (Affirmative nod)
Defense : Twenty is enough, but ten is not? Does
anybody else feel the same way? Anybody else
feel that there's no robbery that's worth as little as
ten years? [Juror #21] do you realize that in order to
sit on the jury you have to be able to consider all
ranges of penalty, as low as ten as high as twenty?
Juror #21 : (Affirmative nod)
Defense : Do you think, you said you haven't heard anything
about it, so it might depend on the case?
Juror #21 : (Affirmative nod)
Defense : Would it depend on the case or you said if it was
poverty?
Juror #21 : If they're in dire financial straights or had a family
they're trying to support and weren't able to support
them, I'd probably take that into consideration.
Defense : Okay. But just a straight robbery case you'd want
to know more personal things about the person and
as to why they did it?
Juror #21 : When they're using a gun they're threatening
someone's life.
Defense : Your honor.
Judge :
I think he's qualified . He said under certain
circumstances he'd consider the minimum so I
think he's within range .
Defense : Okay, you [referring to Juror #21] have said
depending on other information that you may have .
Quarles exercised all of his peremptory challenges, but did not strike Juror #21 .
The juror sat on the petit jury.
The trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to excuse a juror for
cause . Mills v. Commonwealth, 95 S .W.3d 838 (Ky. 2003). That determination will not
be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion . Id .
Here, Juror #21 clearly indicated that he could consider the full range of
penalties. He expressed misgivings about the minimum penalty only when there were
no mitigating circumstances . That did not require the trial judge to excuse him for
cause . See Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668 (Ky. 1994) . Contrary to the
claim by Quarles, Juror #21 did not limit the circumstances he would consider in
mitigation . The trial judge did not abuse his discretion or commit any error in denying
the motion to excuse this juror for cause .
Quarles received a fundamentally fair trial . He was not denied any of his due
process rights under the state or federal constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D . Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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