JAMES ROY TUCKER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED _OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMULGA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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JAMES ROY TUCKER
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APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
03-CR-1079
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Tucker of
three counts of first-degree sodomy, one count of second-degree sodomy, one count of
third-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse . He was sentenced
to a total of sixty-one years in prison .
The questions presented are whether the testimony of the examining physician
exceeded the scope of KRE 803(4) ; whether the defendant was denied the opportunity
to cross-examine the physician ; whether Tucker was denied the right to refute hearsay
testimony ; whether investigative hearsay was improperly introduced into evidence ;
whether unqualified expert testimony was erroneously admitted ; whether evidence of a
prior consistent statement should have been excluded ; whether improper rebuttal
evidence was allowed; whether the trial judge exhibited bias toward the
Commonwealth ; whether the defendant was denied his right to present a defense ; and,
whether there was cumulative error.
Tucker was indicted for five counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of
first-degree sexual abuse against three victims. Two of the victims were brothers and
the third victim was their friend . For purposes of this opinion we will refer to the older
brother as the first victim, the younger brother as the second victim and the friend as
the third victim .
Tucker was married to the step-sister of the mother of the first and second
victims. Both of these victims visited the Tucker home frequently and often stayed
overnight. On one of those overnight visits, the third victim accompanied them .
The victims recounted several acts of sexual misconduct perpetrated by Tucker,
including anal and oral sodomy as well as sexual abuse. In each instance, the victims
were isolated and had something placed over their heads or had their vision otherwise
restricted. These improper acts occurred on different dates over several years when
they were between the ages of thirteen and sixteen . The victims were seventeen,
thirteen and sixteen, respectively, at trial .
Tucker testified in his own defense and completely denied the charges . The jury
convicted him of three counts of first-degree sodomy (fifteen years each), seconddegree sodomy (ten years), third-degree sodomy (two years), and two counts of first
degree sexual abuse (two years each) . The sentences were run consecutively for a
total of sixty-one years in prison . This appeal followed.
I . KRE 803(4) Testimony
Tucker argues that the trial judge erred when she allowed an examining
physician to give hearsay testimony far broader than permitted as statements for the
purpose of treatment or diagnosis . A pediatrician who specializes in sexual abuse
evaluations testified about the examination she conducted on the first and second
victims . When she was asked to recall the history she took from the first victim,
defense counsel objected on grounds that 1) this was not medical treatment, but
therapy; and 2) the information was privileged. The objection was overruled . The
doctor then read the history she took from the first victim which included the allegations
of sexual misconduct by Tucker.
Defense counsel made a second objection when the doctor testified that the first
victim had informed her that he had told a friend about the abuse. The objection was
that the testimony was duplicative and bolstering. It too was overruled . The doctor
then continued with her testimony about the history she took, which included the first
victim telling his friend ; the pornography he was shown and that was possessed by
Tucker; and how the allegations finally came to light. After the narrative, she
proceeded to inform the jury about her physical findings for the first victim . Those
findings were consistent with the history taken, but showed no abnormalities .
Next, the doctor was asked to give a history of the second victim . Defense
counsel responded "same objection your honor." That objection was overruled by the
trial judge. The doctor then read the history she took from the second victim which
included the allegations of sexual misconduct by Tucker. After reading this history, she
repeated her physical findings of the second victim . The doctor concluded that those
findings were consistent with the history taken, but showed no abnormalities .
Portions of the doctor's testimony were not admissible under KRE 803(4)
because they were not made for the purpose of medical treatment . Particularly, the
identification by the victims of the perpetrator and the unnecessary details surrounding
the sexual misconduct were not admissible . Cf. Garrett v. Commonwealth , 48 S.W.3d
6 (Ky. 2001). However, defense counsel did not offer a proper objection to this
testimony . Thus, this error is not preserved for judicial review . RCr 9.22 .
Defense counsel did object to a later portion of the testimony as duplicative and
bolstering and the trial judge should have sustained that objection . Nevertheless, the
admission of this cumulative hearsay evidence was harmless error. Cf. White v.
Commonwealth , 5 S.W.3d 140 (Ky. 1999) .
II . Cross-examination of Doctor
Tucker contends that the trial judge erred when she refused to allow him to
question the doctor about whether the physical examination alone justified a finding of
abuse . We disagree .
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the doctor if there were any
findings that showed sexual abuse, and she replied she found no permanent injuries
during her examination . She agreed with the defense that someone who had never
been sexually abused could have identical results . Defense counsel then asked if the
results of the physical exam assist in determining one way or another if a child had
been abused, and the doctor answered that children who are abused may present a
very normal physical examination . She agreed that children who are not abused can
have normal physical exams .
Defense counsel later asked the doctor this question : "You certainly cannot tell
this jury as a fact to use in their deliberations, you cannot tell them that either as your
opinion or as a result of your exam that it's your belief that these people, or that it is a
fact that these two individuals suffered any kind of sexual abuse at anybody's hand?"
Unclear about the question and whether she could properly answer it, the doctor
explained the procedure she followed as a physician . Attempting to rephrase his
question, defense counsel then asked : "You can't or you wouldn't, you would not feel
comfortable, however you want to say it, telling this jury that these two boys, either one
of them, has suffered any form of sexual abuse based on your examination ." Again
unclear and concerned about what she was being asked to testify to, the doctor turned
to the trial judge for assistance. The Commonwealth interjected that the question had
been asked and it should be answered, then sought to approach the bench .
At the ensuing bench conference, defense counsel stated that his question was
whether these children suffered from sex abuse based on her physical examination .
When the trial judge explained that he could not ask that question because the doctor
could not give her opinion based on physical findings without considering the history,
defense counsel stated that he would withdraw the question .
Not only was this issue waived when defense counsel withdrew the question, it
was not preserved by way of avowal . Commonwealth v. Ferrell , 17 S.W.3d 520 (Ky.
2000) . It is unknown how the doctor would have answered the original question posed
by defense counsel, but it appears evident from the record that it would not have been
favorable to the defense .
Ill . Denial of Right to Refute Hearsay Testimony
Tucker asserts that the trial judge erred when she refused to permit a defense
witness to refute evidence that he had been abused by him. Defense counsel sought to
ask the cousin of the first and second victims if Tucker ever did anything improper to
him . The Commonwealth objected to the question and a bench conference followed .
Defense counsel claimed that the question was proper to rebut the testimony of the
detective that the first victim told her that Tucker had sexually abused the cousin. The
Commonwealth countered that the detective never mentioned this . The trial judge said
that they could go back and review the tape and determine whether the question was
proper. Defense counsel indicated he would call the detective to testify. The issue,
however, was apparently abandoned following the bench conference because it was
never revisited at trial.
On appeal, Tucker argues that the question was permissible to counter the
testimony of the doctor, not the detective . Not only was this issue waived by
abandoning it at trial, it is a different argument than the one presented to the trial judge.
Accordingly, it is not preserved for appellate review. Tucker will not be permitted to
feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court. See
Kennedy v. Commonwealth , 544 S .W.2d 219 (Ky. 1976).
IV . Investigative Hearsay
Tucker claims that the trial judge erred when she allowed the police detective to
present harmful investigative hearsay to the jury. We disagree .
The prosecutor asked the police detective if the first victim talked about a cousin
having pornography. Before she could respond, defense counsel objected on grounds
that the question called for hearsay. The trial judge overruled the objection, noting the
defendant had opened the door to this question . The police detective then testified that
the first victim had stated that he had knowledge of a computer disc that had
pornography; that the defendant had made the disc and that his cousin possessed it.
Previously, defense counsel had cross-examined the first victim about the
computer disc . The first victim stated that his cousin told him that Tucker made a
computer disc with pornography. Defense counsel then implied that assertion was false
by asking the witness whether he knew what perjury was and the consequences of it.
Accordingly, the testimony of the police detective was admissible as a prior consistent
statement of the first victim to rebut an implied charge of recent fabrication. KRE
801 A(a)(2) . The trial judge did not err in overruling the objection .
V. Unqualified Expert Testimony
Tucker complains that the trial judge erred when she allowed an unqualified
police detective to testify as an expert about behavior to expect from victims of sex
crimes. This witness had been a police officer for four years. When the investigation
into the allegations was conducted she was assigned as a detective with the Crimes
against Children Unit . At the time of trial, however, she was a patrol officer. This was
neither a promotion nor a demotion .
The police officer testified that it was hard for the first victim to remember details.
She explained that this was not uncommon for children who experience traumatic
injuries of this nature. The police officer continued, "We try to focus on the first time it
happened to him and the very last time it happened to him because it has been my
experience - -" Defense counsel interrupted her testimony at that point with an
objection, claiming that the witness was not qualified as an expert. The trial judge
overruled the objection.
Following that ruling, the police officer, over a second objection, explained why
they focus on the first and last incident. She indicated that the first incident is
memorable because of the trauma associated with it and the last incident is
remembered because it is fresh in their mind . The police officer then explained why the
first victim was not able to give a specific date because that is not something that
stands out in a child's mind . She suggested that the only time you can pinpoint a
specific date with a child is when the incident is associated with a holiday.
The experience this police officer had certainly could have been more fully
developed at trial. For example, it is not clear from the record how long the detective
had been with the Crimes against Children Unit or how many cases she had handled
with that unit. Nevertheless, her four years experience as a police officer and the fact
that she was assigned to the Crimes against Children Unit for part of that time, qualified
her as an expert under KRE 702. Cf. Sargent v. Commonwealth , 813 S.W.2d 801 (Ky.
1991).
Even if we were to conclude otherwise, given the limited expert testimony she
provided and the record before us, any error here would certainly be harmless . RCr
9 .24.
VI . Prior Consistent Statement
Tucker maintains that the trial judge erred by permitting evidence of a prior
consistent statement when there had been no allegation of recent fabrication or
improper influence . We disagree .
The first victim testified about the sexual misconduct of Tucker . On crossexamination, defense counsel implied that those allegations were false by asking
whether he knew what perjury was and the consequences of it. Following the testimony
of this victim, a friend of his testified and recounted an incident several years earlier
wherein the first victim revealed to him that his uncle had done something to him . This
testimony was admissible to rebut an implied charge against the first victim of recent
fabrication . KRE 801 A(a)(2) . No error occurred .
VII . Rebuttal Testimony
Tucker contends that the trial judge erred when she allowed new testimony
during the prosecutor's rebuttal case on a point that was not at issue. The defendant
testified that "he couldn't place" the diagram of an apartment drawn by the first victim,
but that it was similar to his first apartment in Lexington . Thereafter, the
Commonwealth presented a witness in rebuttal who could describe the apartment the
defendant lived in at the time of the abuse allegations by the first victim.
The trial judge is afforded a great degree of discretion in determining when
rebuttal evidence will be received . RCr 9.42 . Where there is no clear showing of
arbitrariness or an abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial judge will not be disturbed .
Pilon v. Commonwealth , 544 S.W .2d 228 (Ky. 1976) . No such showing has been made
here .
VIII . Trial Judge Bias
Tucker argues that the trial judge erred by giving an appearance of bias toward
the Commonwealth when she excused the first victim, saying "Thank you, Sweetie ."
This issue is not properly preserved for appellate review . The assertion by Tucker that
defense counsel may not have heard the remark is speculative and not very plausible.
Having reviewed the entire record, it is clear that the trial judge exhibited a very
professional and neutral demeanor throughout the trial. There was no bias by the trial
judge and certainly no palpable error.
IX. Denial of a Defense
Tucker complains that the trial judge erred when she refused to allow testimony
that a convicted sex offender lived at and had pornography at the household of the first
and second victims . His theory of the case was that the boys took events that
happened to them with this other individual and transferred them onto him.
The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine before trial seeking to exclude any
evidence that another individual may have sexually abused the victims due to the fact
that he had been convicted of a sexual offense . It alleges that such evidence was
irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant committed the acts charged . The trial
judge sustained the motion, but gave some latitude to the defense to introduce
evidence that pornographic material existed in the home of the two victims. She offered
to allow any excluded evidence to be presented by way of avowal.
The individual in question was friends with the older brother of the first and
second victims. He apparently stayed with the family for a short period of time and
slept in the bedroom of the oldest victim . He was previously convicted of a
misdemeanor sex offense. The first and second victim indicated that they had little
contact with this individual and the third victim stated he had never met him.
This issue is without merit. Tucker failed to offer any scientific, medical or legal
authority to support his theory. Moreover, the first and second victims had very little
contact with this individual and the third victim denied ever meeting him. There was
little or no nexus between any of the three victims and the other individual .
X. Cumulative Error
There is no specific error and thus no basis to claim cumulative error in this case .
Tucker received a fundamentally fair trial and was not denied either his state or federal
constitutional rights .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Marcel E . Radomile
300 West Short Street
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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