TO BE RUB JAMES G . CLEMONS V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : OCTOBER 20, 2005
AS CORRECTED : NOVEMBER 1, 2005
TO BE RUB
,*uprrwr (ffvurf of '~fi
2003-SC-001040-MR
JAMES G . CLEMONS
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT A . MILLER, JUDGE
NO . 02-CR-00069
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
AFFIRMING
The Appellant, James G . Clemons, was convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine and trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in the
first degree, both of which are felonies. He was also convicted of two misdemeanors ;
namely, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia . Clemons was
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on the manufacturing conviction and ten years
on the trafficking conviction, the sentences to run consecutively for a total of thirty
years . Two twelve-month sentences were imposed for the misdemeanor convictions
which were ordered to run concurrently with the felony sentences. Clemons was also
fined $500 .00 for each misdemeanor conviction and $1,000.00 for the felony
convictions .
Clemons appeals to this court as a matter of right . He contends that the
Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of manufacturing or
trafficking in methamphetamine. These errors are unpreserved . Although Clemons
moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, he did not
renew his motion at the close of all the evidence as is required to preserve an
insufficiency of evidence claim .' He also asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to grant his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant,
David Robinson .2
As noted, Appellant failed to preserve his insufficiency of evidence claims .
Our review of these claims will be under RCr 10 .26. We conclude that the evidence
was sufficient for the jury to convict Appellant of manufacturing and trafficking in
methamphetamine.
On August 8, 2001, Deputy Dennis "Sonny" Poteet and other members of
the Grayson County Sheriff's Department executed a search warrant at the Appellant's
residence, after Samantha Campbell had reported suspected drug activity following a
brief visit to the residence the previous evening .
At the time of the offense, KRS 218A .1432 provided that a person was
guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine if he knowingly and unlawfully manufactured
it or possessed the chemicals or equipment for its manufacture with the intent to
manufacture it. In Kotila v. Commonwealth , this court construed the language of this
statute to require possession of all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to
manufacture methamphetamine in the particular method employed . In this case the
' Baker v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 54 (1998) .
2Appellant also advances various arguments concerning the firearm enhancement
statute . However, although the jury was instructed on firearm enhancement, it rejected
the Commonwealth's argument on this point and did not convict him of using a firearm
in the commission of these offenses . Accordingly, Appellant's arguments regarding
firearm enhancement are moot.
3 114 S .W .3d 226 (Ky. 2003).
manufacturing method was the Anhydrous Ammonia method, also known as the "Nazi
Method ." At the close of its case, the Commonwealth conceded that it had not proven
that Appellant possessed all of the necessary chemicals because it offered no proof of
Anhydrous Ammonia . Thus, the jury instructions allowed a determination of guilt only
with regard to the possession of the necessary equipment, not the necessary
chemicals. Evidence of chemicals possessed was offered to prove Appellant's intent to
manufacture.
Concerning the equipment, Ms. Jennifer Winnegar, a forensic drug
chemist at the Kentucky State Police Crime Lab, testified that the only equipment
necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, a controlled substance, using the "Nazi
Method" was a glass jar or container for the Anhydrous Ammonia and Ephedrine . One
of the items retrieved from the Appellant's residence and entered into evidence was a
glass pickle jar, which Winnegar testified was sufficient equipment . Thus, our inquiry is
whether the Commonwealth presented enough additional evidence to permit a
reasonable juror to infer that Appellant intended to use the equipment (the jar) in the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
The Commonwealth presented evidence of a number of "Nazi Method"
items found inside the residence and in a vehicle parked outside the residence, both
areas where the jury could find constructive possession by Appellant . Samantha
Campbell testified that she had viewed Appellant through the window the night before
when she saw many of the items on the table in front of him . Among the items found
and admitted into evidence were coffee filters, a turkey baster, a glass jar with a coffee
filter on top, a 20 oz. Sprite bottle with a modified cap and hole in the top, liquid fire,
4 See Hargrave v. Commonwealth , 724 S .W .2d 202 (Ky. 1986) .
3
salt, a cutting agent, plastic baggies, metal and glass tubes, various baggies containing
suspected drug residue, and prescription vials. Officer Poteet also testified that there
was a substance in the residence with a strong odor of ether.
Laboratory testing revealed that some of the items contained
methamphetamine . For example, the coffee filters contained methamphetamine
residue . A twist-tie bag containing 1 .88 grams of tan solid was found to contain
methamphetamine . Two twist-tie bags containing 1 .84 grams of tan solid also tested
positive for methamphetamine . Methamphetamine was also found in two prescription
vials of brown and white solid .
Furthermore, the Commonwealth presented Samantha Campbell's
testimony that she had observed Appellant and others through the window of the
residence the night before the search and arrest . She testified that she saw "the liquid
fire (drain cleaner) and coke bottles and hoses and the white powdery substance and
stuff like that ." She also testified that she detected a smell of ether. Ms . Campbell saw
one of the individuals smoking a substance in a light bulb, which testimony revealed
was a common way of using methamphetamine . She had a brief encounter with
Appellant and left . The next morning she made the report which instigated the
issuance and execution of the search warrant by Deputy Poteet.
When this evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find Appellant
guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine.
Appellant also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
trafficking conviction . KRS 218A .1431(3) defines traffic as "to distribute, dispense, sell,
transfer, or possess with intent to distribute, dispense, or sell methamphetamine."
Trafficking in the first degree requires that a person knowingly and unlawfully traffic,
inter alia, in "a controlled substance that contains any quantity of methamphetamine,
including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers .,,5
The Commonwealth presented evidence of several small packages of
finished methamphetamine product, empty baggies which could be used for packaging
future product and what is known as a "cutting agent," which is used to dilute the
substance, increasing quantity . There was also evidence of a substantial amount of
cash ($580.00) found in Appellant's bedroom at the time of the search . Deputy Poteet
testified that, as a neighbor of Clemons, he noticed that the Clemons residence
received many short-term visitors . As an officer, Deputy Poteet testified that this type of
activity was associated with drug trafficking. Considering the testimony and evidence
presented in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to find Appellant guilty of first-degree trafficking .
Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it
refused to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant, David Robinson. Robinson was
living in Clemons' residence at the time and Clemons was not at home when the search
warrant was executed . He contends that the joint trial unfairly and unduly prejudiced
him because it associated him with his co-defendant's criminal activity.
It is well-established that the trial judge has broad discretionary powers in
matters of joinder6 and that the trial court's decision not to sever the counts "will not be
overturned absent a showing of prejudice and clear abuse of discretion ."' RCr 6.20
KRS 218A.1412(1) .
s Rearick v. Commonwealth ,
858 S .W .2d 185, 187 (Ky. 1993) ; Brown v.
Commonwealth, 458 S .W .2d 444, 447 (Ky. 1970) .
Rearick, 858 S .W .2d at 187.
permits joinder of defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
offenses .
In the instant case, the Appellant and his co-defendant were housemates .
They were charged with same crimes and both had access to the areas in which the
contraband was found . Additionally, Samantha Campbell's testimony specifically
identified the Appellant as being inside the residence the previous night during the
suspected manufacturing and use of the drugs . Thus, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its broad discretion in refusing to grant severance .
Accordingly, the Appellant's convictions and sentences are affirmed .
Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ .,
concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Mike Moulton
MOULTON & LONG, PLLC
58 Public Square
Elizabethtown, KY 42701
Jeffrey John Otis
111 Park Place
Covington, KY 41011
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
TO BE PUBLISHED
uprentr (90urf of '~Rrufurhv
2003-SC-001040-MR
JAMES G. CLEMONS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT A. MILLER, JUDGE
NO . 02-CR-00069
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
The Opinion of the Court entered October 20, 2005, is hereby corrected
on its face by substitution of the attached pages 1 and 7 in lieu of the original pages 1
and 7 of the opinion . The purpose of this Order of Correction is to correct the
addresses of Appellant's attorneys and does not affect the holding of the Opinion.
ENTERED: November 1, 2005.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.