IMP OR TANT NOTICE THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORI7'Y IN ANY OTHER
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IMPOR TANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORI7'YINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 25, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0414-MR
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TODD LOVETT
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FOUST, JUDGE
02-CR-00056
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Todd Lovett, was convicted in the Marshall Circuit Court of complicity
to manufacture methamphetamine and being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree . He was sentenced to a total of twenty years imprisonment and appeals to this
Court as a matter of right.
On March 9, 2002, Detective Russ Kegel of the Marshall County Sheriff's Office
was called to the Shamrock Motel by Deputy Johnson . While serving papers on Terry
Stubblefield, Deputy Johnson discovered items in the motel room that he believed to be
consistent with the items commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine . Detective
Kegel arrived on the scene to find Terry Stubblefield and Billy Lee in the motel room .
He also found finished methamphetamine, marijuana, ether cans, rags, and coffee
filters . Stubblefield and Lee were arrested for manufacturing methamphetamine .
On March 13, 2002, Detective Kegel received a report that an air tank was found
in a creek behind the Farm Bureau Insurance Building, near the Shamrock Motel. At
the scene, Detective Kegel discovered the air tank, which had been modified to hold
anhydrous ammonia . This tank did not have a gauge and hose that would normally be
attached to it, but rather, it had a pipefitting and valve attached . Detective Kegel also
discovered an empty ether can, empty ephedrine blister packs, and a box for an air tank
of the same model as the one found . The box had a photograph on it of an air tank with
a blue hose. Both the box and the air tank appeared to be new.
Apparently, under the mistaken belief that the UPC code could be matched to a
particular air tank, Deputy Johnson took the UPC code to Wal-Mart to see if it would
reveal any recent sales. Deputy Johnson discovered that Appellant had recently
purchased an air tank at Wal-Mart with a check that included his Kentucky I .D. number
on March 7, 2002 . In addition to the tank, Appellant's receipt also revealed that he
purchased thread tape, which can be used to seal a valve when a new valve is
attached ; Coleman fuel, which can be used in place of ether in manufacturing
methamphetamine; a plastic two-way, which can be used in a methamphetamine lab
smoker; and rawhide gloves .
Next, Detective Kegel interviewed Stubblefield and Lee . Detective Kegel testified
at trial that these interviews linked Appellant to the manufacturing of methamphetamine
at the Shamrock Motel.
Appellant was arrested on April 22, 2002 . At some point after Appellant's arrest,
Detectives Kegel and Byers went to Appellant's house, where his wife gave them
permission to look around . The detectives found a new air gauge, an air line, and a
2
blue hose in a shack next to the house . These items appeared to come from a new air
tank, although they did not find one.
Stubblefield and Lee were charged with manufacturing methamphetamine, first
degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and wanton endangerment . Pursuant to
plea agreements, these individuals pled guilty to first degree trafficking and each
received five-year sentences.
At trial, Stubblefield testified that, while he was at the Shamrock Motel, Appellant
arrived with a bag containing cold pills, lithium batteries, and a generator used in
manufacturing methamphetamine. Appellant also brought a five-gallon air tank .
Appellant wanted Stubblefield to steal anhydrous ammonia to manufacture
methamphetamine . The two men went to Royster-Clark and stole anhydrous ammonia
with two air tanks, and hid one of the tanks behind the insurance building .
Stubblefield testified that he signed an affidavit while he was in jail stating that
Appellant had nothing to do with the manufacturing at the Shamrock Motel . Stubblefield
also testified that he signed the affidavit because Appellant had threatened him .
Lee testified that he has known Appellant for about twenty-five years, and that he
had helped Appellant to manufacture methamphetamine in the past by acting as a
lookout. He testified that he ceased manufacturing methamphetamine with Appellant in
December 2001 .
I.
Appellant's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred to his substantial
detriment by allowing Stubblefield to invoke the Fifth Amendment on certain questions
during cross-examination .
During cross-examination, Stubblefield testified that he had never purchased an
air tank . He also testified that he was presently under indictment on a separate
methamphetamine related charge. Defense counsel attempted to introduce evidence
pertaining to that pending charge, and the Commonwealth objected on the ground of
relevancy . The trial court held an in camera hearing, where Stubblefield was advised of
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination . During this in camera hearing,
Appellant whispered to defense counsel, and defense counsel stated that Appellant
objected to the witness pleading the Fifth Amendment . The trial court responded by
stating that the objection might be valid if the Commonwealth called Stubblefield
knowing that he would plead the Fifth, but it was not valid in this situation where
Stubblefield was being cross-examined on a collateral matter.
After the in camera hearing, defense counsel asked Stubblefield questions
pertaining to his pending charge, to which he plead the Fifth . These questions include
whether Stubblefield was present at the place of the alleged crime, whether there was
an altered air tank present, whether Stubblefield obtained the air tank, and whether
Appellant was at the scene .
Appellant argues that he was denied his right to confrontation guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution . In particular, Appellant argues that he should have been allowed to
impeach Stubblefield's testimony regarding how he obtained the air tank in this case by
inquiring into how Stubblefield obtained an air tank in the subsequent incident.
Appellant also claims that the inquiry into Stubblefield's pending charge was relevant to
show that Stubblefield was able to manufacture methamphetamine later without any aid
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from Appellant, thereby disproving the Commonwealth's theory that Appellant was the
mastermind behind the plot.
The Commonwealth argues that Appellant did not properly preserve an objection
to Stubblefield's invocation of the Fifth Amendment . CR 46 requires "that a party, at the
time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the
action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court."
Under KRE 103(a), a party is only required to state the specific grounds for objection
when the trial judge so requests . See also Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence
Law Handbook ยง 1 .10[4][b], at 38-9 (4th ed . LexisNexis 2003) . Although the exchange
between Appellant, defense counsel, and the trial judge during the in camera hearing
was somewhat informal, it is clear from the record that Appellant did, in fact, object to
Stubblefield's pleading the Fifth.
"If the prosecution witness refuses to answer questions on cross-examination
[while exercising a Fifth Amendment privilege], the defendant's proper remedy is a
motion to strike all or part of the witness's direct testimony ." Adkins v. Commonwealth ,
96 S .W .3d 779, 789 (Ky. 2003). In the instant case, Appellant did not move to strike
Stubblefield's testimony . Accordingly, Appellant has no appropriate remedy available
on review. We note that even if Appellant had moved to strike Stubblefield's testimony,
"a witness's direct testimony generally will not be stricken when the defendant is merely
precluded from attacking that witness's credibility ." Id. at 790. As such, we deny
Appellant's request for relief as a palpable error under RCr 10.26.
Il .
Next, Appellant claims that the trial court erred to his substantial detriment by
failing to remove his handcuffs during the penalty phase of the trial .
Appellant appeared before the trial court handcuffed and in his prison clothes
throughout the penalty phase of his trial, including during his testimony before the jury .
According to defense counsel, Appellant was not allowed to change into his street
clothes . Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial and argued that the
prejudice had already been created with the jury. The trial court overruled the motion .
The Commonwealth states that the trial court offered a remedy in allowing
Appellant to change. Upon review of the record, we cannot state with certainty that the
trial judge ever offered to allow Appellant to change clothes or remove his shackles .
When a defendant appears at trial in prison clothes or in shackles, it can
prejudice the jury and impair the defendant's constitutional right to a presumption of
innocence . See e.g., Estelle v. Williams , 425 U .S . 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L .Ed .2d 126
(1976) (appearing at trial in prison clothes implicates an accused's presumption of
innocence) ; Peterson v. Commonwealth , 160 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Ky. 2005) ("The
inference of guilt created by restraining a defendant during trial `relates closely to an
accused's constructional right to be presumed innocent ."') (quoting Hill v .
Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Ky. 2004)) . Physical restraints during trial are
only appropriate under exceptional circumstances, such as good cause to believe an
accused may attempt to escape or do violence . Tunget v. Commonwealth , 303 Ky.
834, 198 S.W.2d 785 (1946) .
Here, there was no cause to believe that Appellant would be violent or attempt to
escape . Appellant's appearance at his penalty phase trial in shackles and prison
clothes was in error, but nevertheless, we find this error to be harmless. RCr 9 .24 . The
harm caused by an accused appearing at trial in prison clothes or restraints implicates
the presumption of innocence, and Appellant did not have this presumption during his
penalty phase because the jury had already found him to be guilty.'
While there was no harm in the instant case, there was simply no reason for
Appellant to have appeared at his penalty phase trial in shackles and prison clothes . It
is unclear exactly why Appellant appeared in this manner. In any case, we generally
caution courts from allowing this practice regardless of whether or not there is a
presumption of innocence .
III .
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict at the close
of the Commonwealth's case . Appellant admits that this issue is not properly
preserved, and requests review for possible palpable error. RCr. 10.26 .
Appellant argues that the evidence was qualitatively insufficient because the
testimonies of Lee and Stubblefield were inconsistent with the Commonwealth's case.
The . alleged inconsistencies relate to who bought the air tank that was found near the
scene, and whether ether or Coleman fuel was used in the manufacturing process .
While technically there was still a presumption of innocence regarding Appellant's
persistent felony offender charge, the detriment to this presumption of innocence is
negligible because the jury had already established Appellant's guilt as to the underlying
offense .
2 Appellant states that he will address the quantity of the evidence in a forthcoming
appeal from an RCr 60.02 motion filed in the Marshall Circuit Court.
7
Appellant also alleges that Stubblefield's testimony is unreliable because he had
previously signed an affidavit stating that Appellant had nothing to do with the
manufacturing of methamphetamine .
After drawing all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, "if
the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given," and the trial
court should reserve to the jury "questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony." Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S.W .2d 186, 187 (Ky . 1991). The
evidence presented at trial includes, but is not limited to, direct testimony describing
Appellant's activities related to the manufacturing of methamphetamine, and the fact
that Appellant had purchased an air tank of the exact same type that police recovered at
the scene . There was enough evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find Appellant
guilty, and the jury was free to evaluate the credibility of the Commonwealth's witnesses
and inconsistencies in testimony.
IV .
Appellant alleges the occurrences of several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. Appellant requests relief under RCr 10 .26 because these issues are not
properly preserved .
First, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth erred by introducing evidence of
Lee's and Stubblefield's guilty pleas . At trial, defense counsel initially mentioned these
guilty pleas during his opening statement. The Commonwealth elicited this information
during the direct testimonies of both Lee and Stubblefield, and the defense counsel
probed into these guilty pleas during the cross-examinations of both men . In his closing
8
argument, defense counsel argued that Lee and Stubblefield were not credible
witnesses because they only implicated Appellant to receive lesser sentences through
guilty pleas. In closing, the Commonwealth argued that Lee and Stubblefield had
already received their sentences and therefore had nothing to gain by lying at trial .
Appellant relies on Tipton v. Commonwealth , 640 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1982), which
states that it is improper to use the conviction of a co-indictee as substantive evidence
of guilt of the indictee on trial. In the instant case, the Commonwealth did not use the
plea agreements as substantive evidence against Appellant as contemplated by Ti ton .
Appellant used the plea bargains to attack the credibility of the witnesses, and in
response, the Commonwealth permissibly did the same to bolster their credibility.
Tipton , supra , at 820 (evidence of a plea agreement may be used to impeach coindictee) (citing Parido v. Commonwealth , 547 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1977)) .
Next, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth improperly commented on the
credibility of witnesses . In particular, Appellant claims that the prosecutor improperly
made an appeal to his own personal belief and opinion . Based on the record, we do not
find that the prosecutor stated personal beliefs or opinions regarding the credibility of
witnesses.
Lastly, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth engaged in misconduct by
failing to compile a bill of particulars despite Appellant's repeated requests to do so.
The record reveals that the Commonwealth fully complied with the trial court's discovery
order. Appellant argued pro se that the Commonwealth should provide a bill of
particulars stating with specificity what Appellant had done . The trial court determined
that the Commonwealth had provided Appellant with all of the evidence it would use at
9
trial, and, acting within its sound discretion, denied Appellant's motion to supplement the
bill of particulars . See James v . Commonwealth , 482 S .W .2d 92, 93 (Ky.
1972)(granting a bill of particulars is within the sound discretion of the trial court).
In sum, we find no instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
V.
Next, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by striking a certain juror for
cause . This juror was the neighbor of Appellant's father . Although he stated that he
could be fair-minded, this juror also stated that he was uncomfortable sitting on the jury,
and that it would put him in a difficult situation . Striking a juror for cause rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and we find no abuse of discretion here . Barth v.
Commonwealth, 80 S .W.3d 390, 399 (Ky. 2001).
V1 .
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling a motion to
dismiss his indictment without a hearing . In his motion, Appellant alleged that Detective
Kegal's testimony to the grand jury regarding the use of the UPC bar code was false
and misleading .
Generally, a court will not go behind an indictment to scrutinize the quality or
sufficiency of the evidence . presented to the grand jury. Jackson v. Commonwealth , 20
S.W.3d 906, 908 (Ky. 2000) ; Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 S .W .3d 585, 588 (Ky. App .
2000) . A court may only utilize its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment where a
prosecutor knowingly or intentionally presents false, misleading or perjured testimony to
the grand jury that results in actual prejudice to the defendant. Baker, supra (citing
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States , 487 U.S . 250, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed .2d 228
10
(1988)). Appellant has not demonstrated such a flagrant abuse of the grand jury
process . See Id .
The judgment and sentence of the Marshall Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Euva D . May
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D . Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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