FELIX LAZARO ALDAMA GIHON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOTTO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROHUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyremr (~ourf of
2003-SC-0820-MR
"left
i
v
FELIX LAZARO ALDAMA GIHON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
2002-CR-1563
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Felix Gihon, was convicted of one count of intentional murder and was
sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment . He appeals as a matter of right. Because the
trial court denied Gihon's motion to strike a juror who strongly indicated that she could
not consider finding a lesser-included offense, we reverse the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court.
The Crime
Gihon killed the woman he had lived with for over five years . On the night of the
murder, the victim came to their home from work, made a phone call and then left. She
told Gihon that she was going to meet a friend . Gihon hit the redial button on the
phone . A man answered . When the victim returned some four hours later, Gihon and
the victim got into an argument . It escalated . Gihon grabbed a knife and fatally stabbed
his girlfriend .
The Defense
Gihon did not deny killing his girlfriend. Defense counsel conceded Gihon's
criminal responsibility during opening statement. But he did not concede the level of
that responsibility . Gihon's sole defense was that he suffered from extreme emotional
distress at the time of the homicide . So his defense was to convince the jury to convict
him of the lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter.
The Error
During voir dire, Juror #40 approached the bench . She, the juror, explained that
she would not be particularly "unbiased" if "domestic violence" played a factor during the
defendant's trial. She said that she would not see domestic violence as an excuse for
harming or killing someone . The juror explained that she believed that people should
be in control of themselves when dealing with a domestic partner . She used herself as
an example. While she might get mad at her husband, she would never hit or kill him as
a reaction to her anger. She all but stated in technical terms that she could not consider
Gihon's EED defense and could not vote to convict him of a lesser-included offense .
In attempting to rehabilitate the juror, the prosecutor focused on the juror's ability
to consider the entire penalty range . In reply, the juror stated that she could fairly hear
all of the evidence and consider it. But she added that if the evidence included
domestic violence, then she would have feelings about that that would not help the
defendant .
The defense moved to strike Juror #40 for cause arguing that she stated that she
would be biased or slanted against the defense's theory of the case in the guilt phase.
The trial court noted that the juror stated that she would listen to all the evidence fairly
and could consider the entire penalty range . Thus, the trial court denied the motion to
strike . But the trial court failed to consider the impact of the juror's stated bias on
Gihon's defense during the guilt phase.
The sole consideration in ruling on a motion to strike for cause "is the probability
of [juror] bias or prejudice ." Pennington v. Commonwealth , Ky., 316 S .W.2d 221, 224
(1958) . Juror #40 candidly admitted that she would be biased against Gihon if his
defense in any way involved a physical reaction to an emotional domestic situation .
This bias went to the heart of Gihon's only defense which was seeking a conviction on
manslaughter first-degree based on extreme emotional disturbance in the guilt phase.
This goes beyond the probability of prejudice. It is an affirmative assertion of it. And,
the Commonwealth's attempted rehabilitation went only to whether Juror #40 could
consider the full range of penalties in the sentencing phase. It did not attempt to
address the juror's stated bias regarding the EED evidence. We, therefore, hold that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gihon's motion to strike Juror #40 for
cause. See Alexander v. Commonwealth , Ky., 862 S .W .2d 856, 864 (1993), overruled
on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 956 S .W .2d 883 (1997).
The Result
Gihon used his last peremptory challenge to remove Juror #40 from the venire .
Therefore, we presume prejudice and reversal is required . Gamble v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 68 S.W.3d 367, 374 (2002). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court and remand for a new trial .
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Johnstone, and Stumbo, JJ ., concur . Graves,
Keller, and Wintersheimer, JJ ., dissent without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
J. David Niehaus
Office of the Louisville
Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 W . Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.