COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION V. TODD A. WARD; HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; SPECIAL FUND; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDOPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : February 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0123-WC
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-1538-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NOS . 94-42764
TODD A. WARD; HON. RONALD W. MAY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; SPECIAL FUND;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals have
affirmed the decision in a reopening whereby the claimant's occupational disability from
a 1994 injury was increased from 55% to 100% . Appealing, the employer maintains
that both the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who granted the motion to reopen and the
ALJ who considered the merits and increased the award erred by failing to apply the
December 12, 1996, version of KRS 342.125(1)(d) . Other arguments are that the
increased award was not supported by substantial evidence under KRS 342.125(1)(d)
and that the ALJ erred by refusing to admit a supplemental medical report. We affirm .
On October 10, 1994, the claimant was injured while operating an end loader.
He testified that his low back, neck, and legs were affected ; that he could neither twist
nor bend his neck; and that he experienced continuous low back pain that radiated
down his left leg into his left foot. He also alleged a psychological condition due to
nervousness and depression . Although he attempted to return to work, he testified that
he was forced to quit after a few days due to pain . He maintained that he was totally
disabled .
In a decision that was rendered on April 2, 1996, and amended following a
petition for reconsideration, the ALJ awarded a 55% occupational disability due to the
neck and back injuries but determined that the psychological condition was not
disabling . The decision relied upon testimony from Drs. Vaughn and Weikel. Dr.
Vaughn reported a protruding L5-S1 disc, possible S1 radiculopathy, and bony ridging
that slightly encroached on the interior margins of the spinal canal at C4-5 and C5-6,
with disc bulging . He diagnosed a chronic lumbar sprain and prohibited lifting more
than 25 pounds, repetitive bending or twisting of the neck and back, and standing or
walking for more than six hours per day. Furthermore, he indicated that the claimant
should avoid being subjected to vibrations, jars, and jolts. In his opinion, the claimant's
conditions were work-related . Dr. Weikel offered vocational testimony that in view of the
claimant's educational level, the conditions resulted in a significant occupational loss but
did not preclude a return to light work.
On December 7, 2000, the claimant filed a motion to reopen, alleging a
worsening of his medical condition. Accompanying the motion was a report from Dr.
Adams, his family physician . The report indicated that an initial MRI revealed
degenerative changes at L5-S1 with mild central disc protrusion ; whereas, a January
28, 2000, MRI revealed a slight annular bulge at L4-5 with encroachment upon the
spinal canal . On that basis, Dr. Adams was of the opinion that the claimant's pain had
become more severe . The employer objected to the motion on the ground that the
claimant failed to offer prima facie evidence of increased disability as shown by
objective medical evidence of a worsening of impairment . KRS 342.125(1)(d) .
Nonetheless, the ALJ who considered the motion determined that the claimant made an
adequate prima facie showing under KRS 342.125 and Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek
Mining Co. , Ky., 488 S .W .2d 681 (1972), and ordered the taking of further proof.
Just as in the initial claim, the evidence at reopening was voluminous. The June
15, 2001, Benefit Review Conference memorandum indicates that the claimant's
evidence consisted of medical reports from Drs. Adams, Tibbs, and Thorndyke .
The
employer's medical evidence was as follows : deposition of Dr. Thorndyke on crossexamination, a report and deposition of Dr. Zerga, a report and deposition of Dr.
Wagner, a report and deposition of Dr. Demos, a report and deposition of Dr.
Granacher, and a deposition of Dr. Adams.
The claimant testified that his back pain was much greater at reopening than at
the time of the initial award and that it radiated from his low back, through his left leg,
and into his left foot and toes. At least twice, the leg had given way, causing him to fall
and sustain other injuries that required medical treatment . Furthermore, he began to
experience bladder problems, and his depression increased .
Dr. Adams testified that he saw the claimant monthly, that he complained of
progressively more severe back pain, and that he complained of recent bladder
problems. Based on the most recent MRI, Dr. Adams's opinion was that the back pain
had increased . He referred the claimant to Dr. Thorndyke with regard to the bladder
and urinary problems. Dr. Thorndyke's physical examination revealed a neurosensory
loss in the left leg, a diminished deep tendon reflex, and a progressive voiding
dysfunction, but he did not attribute them to the 1994 injury .
Dr. Tibbs examined the claimant and reviewed the MRI before recommending a
posterior interbody fusion at L5-S1 . In contrast, Dr. Wagner examined the claimant,
noted that the neurological examination was normal, and concluded that he was not a
surgical candidate . In Dr. Wagner's opinion, there was no objective medical evidence
upon which to base a permanent impairment rating .
Dr. Zerga examined the claimant and reviewed the results of a February, 2001,
MRI scan . Although the test revealed a small central herniated nucleus pulposus at L5S1, there was no nerve root compression or spinal canal stenosis . Comparing the
results with those of earlier scans, his opinion was that neither the scans nor EMG/NCV
testing revealed any objective findings of a change in the claimant's lumbar or cervical
spine . Furthermore, he did not think that the bladder problems were due to the work
injury. In his opinion, the claimant magnified his complaints.
Dr. Demos, a urologist, examined the claimant for the employer in May, 2001 .
The claimant complained of an inability to determine when he needed to urinate,
indicating that the problem had existed for about the past six months . He also
complained of back, leg, and neck pain since the work-related injury . Dr. Demos's
physical examination and urodynamic study revealed no sensory motor loss of bladder
function that was attributable to the injuries; however, it did reveal the lack of a
bulbocavernosus reflex . When deposed on June 13, 2001, Dr. Demos testified that the
finding could be attributable to a neurologic injury of the lower spinal cord, but he
deferred to a neurologist or neurosurgeon concerning its significance in this case. He
also stated that the finding could be attributable to either the immediate effects of a
spinal injury or to a worsening of those effects .
Dr. Granacher testified that the claimant would have a work-related psychiatric
impairment only to the extent that his bladder condition was work-related and failed to
improve .
Dr. Conte, a vocational expert, testified in both the initial claim and the reopening
proceeding . In his opinion, the claimant was no more disabled at reopening than he
had been previously.
At the Benefit Review Conference, which was held after the time for taking proof
had closed, the employer moved for leave to introduce Dr. Zerga's supplemental report
of June 13, 2001 . The report was obtained on the same day as Dr. Demos's deposition
and stated, in pertinent part, as follows :
The absence of a bulbocavernosus reflex is a common finding even in
normal individuals . If this reflex is absent from the original injury of 1994 it
would not have predisposed this patient to any progression or worsening
of his low back condition since April 2, 1996. These opinions are based
upon reasonable medical probability.
The employer's motion was denied, after which the employer petitioned for
reconsideration. Its argument was that Dr. Demos deferred to the opinion of a
neurolologist or neurosurgeon concerning the cause for the absent bulbocavernosus
reflex and that the supplemental report established that the cause was not a worsening
of the 1994 injury . Responding to the petition, the claimant maintained that Dr. Demos's
testimony was evidence of a worsening of his neurologic condition and that the
employer was attempting to impeach the testimony of its own witness with the
supplemental report . In another motion, the employer sought to introduce a
supplemental report by Dr. Granacher. Overruling both motions and the petition for
reconsideration, the ALJ noted among other things that even without counting the
testimony on cross-examination, the employer had already disregarded KRS 342 .033
by introducing the direct testimony of more than two physicians .
After reviewing the evidence at reopening, the ALJ determined that there was no
worsening of the psychological condition and that the bladder and urinary problems
were unrelated to the 1994 injury . Noting, however, that Dr. Demos's finding concerning
the lack of a bulbocavernosus reflex gave credence to the claimant's testimony and that
of Dr. Adams, the ALJ determined that the claimant had met his burden of proving a
worsening of his physical condition . Concluding that the claimant was no longer a
candidate for any work that he had previously performed or for which he could
reasonably be considered, the ALJ determined that his occupational disability was
permanent and total . Following a denial of its petition for reconsideration, the employer
appealed.
Reopening is the remedy for addressing certain changes that occur or situations
that come to light after benefits are awarded. Under KRS 342.125, a motion to reopen
is the procedural device for invoking the jurisdiction of the Department of Workers'
Claims to reopen a final award . In order to prevail, the movant must offer prima facie
evidence of one of the grounds for reopening that are listed in KRS 342.125(1) that will
establish a probable likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek
Mining Co . , supra . Only after the motion has been granted will the opponent be put to
the expense of litigating the merits of an assertion that the claimant is entitled to
additional income benefits under KRS 342 .730 . Id.
The grounds for reopening and the standards for awarding increased benefits
after a motion to reopen is granted are not necessarily consistent . In Peabody Coal Co .
v. Gossett , Ky., 819 S .W.2d 33 (1991), the 1987 amendment to KRS 342 .125(1) aligned
what, at the time of Mr. Gossett's injury, had been inconsistent standards for reopening
and awarding income benefits . Relying on the principle that statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure do not normally come within the legal conception of a
retrospective law, the Court determined that the amendment was remedial . Thus, it
governed motions to reopen that were filed on or after its effective date and was the
standard by which Gossett's motion to reopen his 1981 award should have been
decided . Since Gossett had offered prima facie evidence of increased occupational
disability, as required by the amended standard, we remanded the claim for the taking
of further proof and a decision on the merits .'
Effective December 12, 1996, the legislature amended KRS 342 .125(1) by
enacting KRS 342.125(1)(a) - (d). KRS 342 .125(1)(d) permits the reopening of a final
award upon evidence of a "[c]hange of disability as shown by objective medical
evidence of worsening or improvement of impairment due to a condition caused by the
injury since the date of the award or order." This requirement differs from the previous
standard for granting a motion to reopen where increased income benefits are sought
under KRS 342 .730 . It also differs from the standard for awarding such benefits in a
pre-December 12, 1996, claim . As we attempted to explain in our recent decision in
Woodland Hills Mining, Inc . v. McCoy, Ky., 105 S.W .3d 446 (2003), the amendment
does not govern the type of evidence necessary to establish the right to greater benefits
under KRS 342 .730 with respect to a reopened claim. It changes only a procedural
' See also Campbell v. Universal Mines, Ky., 963 S .W.2d 623 (1998) and AAA Mine
Services v. Wooten , Ky., 959 S.W.2d 440 (1998), which involved standards for
reopening under KRS 342 .125(2) [now KRS 342 .125(5)] that differed from the
applicable standards for proving an entitlement to increased benefits when the merits
were considered .
requirement, i.e., one of the grounds upon which a motion to reopen may be granted
and the taking of further proof ordered . In other words, KRS 342 .125(1)(d) addresses
the necessary prima facie showing in order to prevail on a motion to reopen that is filed
on or after December 12, 1996 . See KRS 342 .0015 . It has no effect on the substantive
proof requirements for a claim that arose before its effective date . Id . The merits of a
worker's right to receive additional income benefits at reopening are governed by the
version of KRS 342 .730 that was effective on the date of injury . See KRS 342 .125(6);
Maggard v. International Harvester Co. , Ky., 508 S .W .2d 777 (1974). Thus, reliance on
Peabody Coal Co. v. Gossett , supra, is misplaced where an appeal concerns the
decision on the merits of a reopening for additional benefits under KRS 342 .730 .
Having determined that the claimant made an adequate prima facie showing
under KRS 342 .125 and Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co . , supra , the ALJ granted
his motion to reopen and ordered the taking of additional proof. The merits of the
claimant's assertion that he was entitled to greater income benefits at reopening were
properly considered under the version of KRS 342 .730 that was effective on the date of
his injury, and he prevailed . The standard for reviewing the award of increased benefits
is whether the award was supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, was
reasonable . Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S .W .2d 641, 643 (1986).
It was not until after proof had closed that the employer moved to introduce a
supplemental report from Dr. Zerga following Dr. Demos's deposition. The
supplemental report did not dispute Dr. Demos's finding that the bulbocavernosus reflex
was absent, indicate when the reflex became absent, or dispute Dr. Demos's statement
that the loss of reflex could develop over time if a spinal injury worsened . The
supplemental report indicated only that an absent reflex was common in normal
individuals and that "if the reflex [was] absent from the original injury of 1994," it would
not have predisposed the claimant to a post-award worsening of his back condition .
Therefore, the report did not directly contradict Dr. Demos's testimony . Furthermore,
the AU relied upon Dr. Demos's testimony only to the extent of determining that it gave
credence to testimony by the claimant and Dr. Adams that the claimant's physical
condition and occupational disability had worsened since the initial award . While it
would have been within the discretion of the ALJ to reopen proof time and admit the
report, we are not persuaded that the circumstances required the ALJ to do so. See
Cornett v. Corbin Materials, Inc . , Ky., 807 S.W .2d 56 (1971).
An AU has the sole authority to judge the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of conflicting evidence . KRS 342.285. Here, the increased award was supported by
what the AU found to be the credible testimonies of the claimant and his treating
physician and by the testimony of Dr. Demos. The award was rendered under the
version of Chapter 342 that was in effect on the date of injury, and the finding of
increased occupational disability was supported by substantial evidence . Therefore, it
was properly affirmed on appeal. In view of the fact that the claimant succeeded in
prevailing on the merits, any error that might have been committed in granting his
motion to reopen and ordering the taking of further proof would be harmless. See
Stambaugh v. Ceder Creek Mining Co . , su ra. For that reason, it is unnecessary for us
to determine whether the AU failed to consider the claimant's prima facie showing
under the amended version of KRS 342 .125(1)(d).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
W . David Shearer, Jr.
Christopher Newell
The Speed Building, Ste . 312
333 Guthrie Green
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
TODD A . WARD :
Robert J . Greene
Kelsey E. Friend Law Firm
2nd Floor, Pauley Building
P.O . Box 512
Pikeville, KY 41502
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
SPECIAL FUND:
David W. Barr
Division of Special Fund
1047 U .S . 127 South, Ste. 4
Frankfort, KY 40601
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