CHARLES DANSBY V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 26, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0102-MR
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CHARLES DANSBY
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
96-CR-235, 96-CR-1507, 96-CR-2060,
AND 96-CR-2572
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Charles Dansby, pled guilty in the Jefferson Circuit Court to four
counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, KRS 218A.1412 (Class
C felony), two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, KRS 218A .500 (Class A
misdemeanor), and one count of receiving stolen property of $300.00 or more, KRS
514 .110(3) (Class D felony) . Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed a
sentence of ten years imprisonment for each trafficking count to run consecutively for a
total of forty years, and a term of one year for each of the two remaining convictions to
run concurrently with the forty-year sentence . The sentences were probated for five
years . Shortly thereafter, Appellant violated the terms of his probation, prompting the
trial court to revoke his probation and order him to serve the initial forty-year sentence .
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Appellant filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11 .42 and CR 60.02, arguing that
because KRS 533 .040(1) requires probated sentences to run concurrently, the
underlying sentences must run concurrently as well ; thus, he asserted the trial court
violated KRS 533.040(1) by requiring the four ten-year sentences to run consecutively
rather than concurrently. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected
Appellant's interpretation of KRS 533 .040(1) . Appellant's petition for discretionary
review by this Court was denied .'
Challenging his sentence again, Appellant filed a motion pursuant to CR
60 .02(e)-(f), raising the same argument he made in his RCr 11 .42 motion . He
additionally asserted that his forty-year sentence violated KRS 532 .110(1)(c), which
provides that consecutive indeterminate sentences, in aggregate, may not exceed the
maximum term authorized by KRS 532 .080 for the highest class crime for which any
sentence was imposed . Because the highest class crime in this case was a Class C
felony, the maximum aggregate sentence was a term of twenty years . KRS
532 .080(6)(b) ; Young v. Commonwealth , Ky., 968 S .W .2d 670, 675 (1998) . The trial
court overruled his motion. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the
sentence, instructing the trial court to re-sentence Appellant to terms that did not exceed
a maximum aggregate sentence of twenty years . 2 As a result, the trial court re-
' Although Appellant's sentence exceeded this Court's twenty-year jurisdictional
requirement for matter of right appeals, Ky . Const. § 110(2)(b), jurisdiction was
appropriate in the Court of Appeals because he was appealing the denial of postconviction relief, not a judgment imposing a sentence. Williams v. Venters , Ky., 550
S .W.2d 547, 548 (1977) .
2 But see Myers v. Commonwealth , Ky., 42 S .W .3d 594, 597 (2001) (defendant can
waive maximum aggregate sentence limitation contained in KRS 532 .110(1)(c)) . The
Court of Appeals opinion reversing and remanding this case was rendered on October
4, 2002, more than twenty months after Myers.
sentenced Appellant to two consecutive ten-year terms, with the remaining sentences to
run concurrently .
Appellant now appeals to this court as a matter of right, Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b),
on the ground that his sentence violates KRS 533.040(1) because the trial judge reimposed two of the originally probated ten-year terms to run consecutively, rather than
concurrently. His counsel has submitted a brief, pursuant to Anders v. California , 386
U .S . 738, 87 S .Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed .2d 493 (1967), pointing out that this is the same issue
that was raised and correctly decided by the Court of Appeals on Appellant's first appeal
and requesting permission to withdraw . She served a copy of the brief on Appellant in
July 2003 and Appellant has not provided this Court with any additional points or
authority in support of his appeal. Id . at 744, 87 S .Ct. at 1400 .
After having conducted a "full examination of all the proceedings" as required by
Anders , we agree that the appeal is frivolous . The issue now raised by Appellant was,
indeed, raised and decided by the Court of Appeals on his first appeal, and that decision
is now "the law of the case ." Williamson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 767 S .W .2d 323, 32526 (1989). Nor was the Court of Appeals' decision on the first appeal "clearly and
palpably erroneous" and substantially unjust. Gossett v. Commonwealth , Ky., 441
S .W .2d 117, 118 (1969). KRS 533.040 is titled "Calculation of periods of probation and
conditional discharge," not "Calculation of sentence ." KRS 533.040(1) states:
A period of probation or conditional discharge commences on the day it is
imposed . Multiple periods, whether imposed at the same or different
times, run concurrently.
No language in the statute makes any reference to whether the probated sentences
ordered served after revocation of probation should run concurrently or consecutively; it
only requires that periods of probation must run concurrently . Nor does legislative intent
support Appellant's interpretation . As stated in the 1974 Commentary to this provision,
subsection (1) requires periods of probation to run concurrently because "'if probation is
to work, it will generally do so within a relatively short period of time, long before the
maximum of 5 years permitted for felonies ."' KRS 533 .040, cmt. (1974) (quoting
drafters of proposed Federal Criminal Code) . In other words, a court should be able to
tell within a short time frame whether a criminal offender will rehabilitate or continue in a
life of crime, obviating the need for consecutive, i .e . , longer sentences of probation .
This rationale, however, does not apply to a case where the court orders previously
probated sentences to be served after a probation violation, because the offender, by
recidivating, has already indicated unwillingness or inability to rehabilitate without
incarceration .
The legislature has clearly addressed this issue in KRS 532 .110(1), which
provides :
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for
more than one (1) crime, including a crime for which a previous sentence
of probation or conditional discharge has been revoked, the multiple
sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall
determine at the time of sentence, except that:
(a) A definite and an indeterminate term shall run concurrently and both
sentences shall be satisfied by service of the indeterminate term;
(b) The aggregate of consecutive and determinate terms shall not exceed
one (1) year; and
(c) The aggregate of consecutive definite terms shall not exceed in
maximum length the longest extended term which would be authorized
by KRS 532 .080 . . . .
(Emphasis added .) This provision permits a trial court, within its discretion, to require
sentences for multiple crimes to be served either consecutively or concurrently after a
period of probation has been revoked .
Accordingly, the motion of Appellant's counsel to withdraw from the case is
granted and the sentences imposed by the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed .
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All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Euva D . May
Department of Public Advocacy
Assistant Public Advocate
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
Charles D . Dansby, pro se
Bell County Forestry Camp
#130736
Route 2, Box 75
Pineville, KY 40977
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Matthew D . Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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