RICHARD JONES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
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RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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APPELLANT
RICHARD JONES
V.
APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., JUDGE
CRIMINAL NOS. 01-CR-0046, 01-CR-0047, AND 01-CR-0048
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirming
A jury of the Estill Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Richard Jones, of a series of
crimes which began when a masked gunman commandeered a car in Irvine, Kentucky.
The gunman, identified by an accomplice as Appellant, acquired the vehicle after
approaching several young women as they sat in their cars, chatting at a local carwash . Jumping between the cars, the gunman pointed his pistol at the back of one
woman's head and ordered her to "get out of the f-ing car ." Driving off with the stolen
vehicle along River Road, the gunman stopped to pick up his accomplice, and the pair
headed to the outlying county, where the two men, at least one still wearing a mask,
committed their next crimes .
On Barnes Mountain, the men forced their way into the home of a long-time
resident, initially gaining entry by knocking on the door and stating, "It's me, grandma ."
Once inside, however, the intruders pushed their victim onto a bed, one man pinning
her down as the other searched the house . Finding only a purse containing some cash
and checks, the men fled in the stolen car, narrowly evading attempts by the victim's
son-in-law and grandson to create makeshift roadblocks along a mountain road . With
the authorities closing in, the men abandoned the stolen vehicle near the end of a
logging trail, setting the car ablaze before they disappeared, at least for the night, into
the wooded hillsides .
Several days later, upon questioning by the authorities, the accomplice
confessed, naming Appellant as the masked gunman and the architect of these crimes.
At the following trial, the jury, having heard this and other evidence, found Appellant
guilty of first-degree robbery for the initial car theft, second-degree robbery and burglary
for his crimes on Barnes Mountain, and second-degree arson for eventually burning the
stolen automobile . Sentences recommended by the jury range from five to twenty
years, with each sentence set to run concurrently . Appellant now appeals to this Court
as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
I. Record on Appeal
Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must first determine which portions
of the record have been properly submitted for our review. The original record
forwarded to this Court lacked four out of the five volumes of trial transcripts . Following
the submission of Appellant's brief, as well as the Commonwealth's brief, the Estill
Circuit Clerk's office transmitted the four missing volumes to this Court, along with a
letter of apology for its omission .
The Commonwealth, relying only on the partial transcripts originally received,
urges this Court to affirm Appellant's convictions, reasoning that without a complete
record of trial proceedings, Appellant cannot substantiate his claims of error. In reply,
Appellant argues that the omitted transcripts were the result of an obvious clerical error,
an error that the Commonwealth consciously disregarded in preparing its brief.
Our cases firmly establish that an appealing party shoulders the primary
responsibility of ensuring that all materials necessary for effective review are included in
the record on appeal . Oldfield v. Oldfield , Ky., 663 S.W.2d 211 (1983); Fanelli v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 423 S .W.2d 255 (1968) ; Belk-Simpson Co. v . Hill , Ky., 288 S .W.2d
369 (1956); Dept. of Transportation v. Kemper , Ky. App ., 574 S .W.2d 932 (1978) .
When court proceedings are stenographically recorded, as here, an appealing party
must specifically designate for inclusion any pertinent untranscribed material, CR
75 .01(1), make suitable arrangements for transcription, CR 75 .01(2), and then file the
designated transcripts in a timely manner with the circuit court clerk . CR 75.01(3) .
Appellant properly complied with all designation and transcription requirements,
filing the completed transcripts with the circuit clerk within the prescribed time limits.
However, on the notice of certification, the circuit clerk listed only one out of the five
volumes of trial transcripts filed in her office, and included this single binder, labeled
"Volume 4," with the original record forwarded to this Court .
Civil Rule 75 .07(2) provides that designated portions of the record "shall when
filed with the clerk be certified as part of the record on appeal ." Although an Appellant's
responsibilities do not end with filing, see CR 75.07(5) (timeliness of certification), we
believe the omitted volumes of the record here stem from a clerical error. Such errors
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may be corrected by an appellate court upon "a proper suggestion or of its own
initiative ." CR 75 .08 . Because a complete set of trial transcripts are now filed with this
Court, in an effort to avoid unnecessary delay we shall consider all of the heretofore
omitted transcripts in considering the merits of this appeal .
II . Post-Arrest Silence
Appellant complains that the prosecution's first witness improperly referred to
Appellant's post-arrest silence, necessitating a mistrial. The witness, Deputy Sheriff
James Marshall, blurted out the offending testimony during the following colloquy :
Q:
All right. All right, did you, at any time, take any statements from
the defendant, Rick Jones?
A:
Yes .
Q:
When was that?
A:
I requested a written statement, requested to speak to him . Mr.
Jones would not - would not Defense Counsel :
Objection, Your Honor.
Q:
Well, just tell us what he said, not what he wouldn't say .
A:
He said that he would rather speak to a lawyer .
Q:
Well Defense Counsel :
Objection, Your Honor.
Prosecution :
Okay.
A rather lengthy bench conference ensued, during which the prosecution conceded the
impropriety of the Deputy's testimony, yet argued that the statements were inadvertent
and should be deemed harmless . The trial judge, after initially holding his ruling in
abeyance, denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial.
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In Kentucky courts, the substantive use of a defendant's post-arrest silence
during the prosecution's case-in-chief is prohibited . Hall v. Commonwealth , Ky., 862
S.W.2d 321, 323 (1993); Green v. Commonwealth , Ky., 815 S .W.2d 398, 400 (1991) .
See also Miranda v . Arizona , 384 U .S . 436, 465 n .37, 86 S .Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966) . Here, Deputy Marshall's testimony that Appellant chose not to make a
statement, coupled with Appellant's stated preference to speak to an attorney, was
"reasonably certain to direct the jury's attention to the defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent ." Sholler v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 969 S .W.2d 706, 711 (1998). "[S]ilence
does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent as
well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted ." Wainwright v.
Greenfield , 474 U.S . 284, 295 n .13, 106 S.Ct. 634, 640, 88 L .Ed .2d 623, 632 (1986).
We nonetheless consider Deputy Marshall's single reference to Appellant's
silence harmless error. Typically, only the intentional or repeated use of such prohibited
evidence by the prosecution will result in reversal . Hall v. Commonwealth , Ky., 862
S.W.2d 321, 323 (1993) ; Romans v. Commonwealth , Ky., 547 S.W.2d 128, 130 (1977) .
In contrast, inadvertent references to a defendant's decision to remain silent often have
little impact on the overall fairness of the entire trial . Bills v. Commonwealth , Ky., 851
S .W.2d 466, 472 (1993); Wallen v. Commonwealth , Ky., 657 S.W .2d 232, 233 (1983).
In the present matter, Appellant's timely objection, combined with the fact that the
prosecution made no further mention of the matter, minimized the prejudicial effect of
Deputy Marshall's testimony . Greer v . Miller , 483 U .S. 756, 764-65, 107 S.Ct . 3102,
3108, 97 L.Ed .2d 618, 629-630 (1987) . Certainly this incident did not create the
"manifest necessity" required for a mistrial . See Bray v. Commonwealth , Ky., 68 S.W.3d
5
375, 383 (2002); Skaggs v. Commonwealth , Ky., 694 S .W.2d 672, 678 (1985) .
Furthermore, when compared to the evidence of guilt, including the accomplice's
incriminating testimony as well as the inculpatory statements allegedly made by
Appellant, we conclude that this single reference to silence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California , 386 U .S. 18, 87 S .Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed .2d 705
(1967) .
Ill . Post-Arrest Statements
Appellant claims that new evidence adduced at trial proves that sheriff's deputies
failed to "scrupulously honor" his invocation of the rights to silence and to counsel,
rendering a subsequent inculpatory statement made by Appellant inadmissible . There
seems to be no disagreement that deputies properly "Mirandized" Appellant following
his arrest, and that soon afterward Appellant declined to make a statement and then
requested to speak with an attorney . The dispute arises over whether deputies
thereafter continued to badger Appellant, or if Appellant instead voluntarily re-initiated
conversation with the deputies, before allegedly stating : "Yes. You've got me. I can't
do forty or fifty years . Let's cut a deal. I'll make you famous."
At the pre-trial suppression hearing, Deputy Marshall testified that some ten to
fifteen minutes after Appellant first invoked his rights to silence and to counsel,
Appellant indicated that he wanted to talk about the crimes . According to the deputy, he
once again read Appellant his rights, whereupon Appellant made the inculpatory
statement . Asked at the suppression hearing if he coerced Appellant into talking, the
deputy replied : "No, sir. Because I've got a different kind of law enforcement values, so
I don't - I don't pressure nobody into nothing ."
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The trial judge denied Appellant's motion to suppress, finding that the statement
was voluntarily made without any further questioning . Later at trial, however, new
evidence emerged which indicates that Deputy Marshall engaged in at least some
overreaching to obtain Appellant's statement, in this case by exaggerating the number
of witnesses who had implicated Appellant in the charged offenses . Appellant claims
this new evidence "casts doubt" on the deputy's earlier testimony at the suppression
hearing, demonstrating that Deputy Marshall persisted in an effort to wear down
Appellant's resistance following the invocation of his Miranda rights .
Undeniably, Deputy Marshall's trial testimony raises new questions regarding
whether Appellant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights was a "product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception ." Moran v. Burbine,
475 U .S. 412, 421, 106 S .Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed .2d 410 (1986), uotin Fare v.
Michael C . , 442 U.S . 707, 725, 99 S.Ct . 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed .2d 197 (1979). However,
counsel for Appellant elicited just enough "new evidence" at trial to suggest wrongdoing
by the deputy, but no more. Despite Appellant's presumptive knowledge of Deputy
Marshall's deceptive tactics, Appellant presented no evidence at the suppression
hearing .
In Watkins v. Commonwealth , Ky., 105 S .W.3d 449 (2003), we found a similar
"belated attempt" to contradict suppression hearing findings at trial "inadequate to
change the outcome of [the initial] ruling ." Id . a t 451 . Furthermore, as in Watkins ,
substantial evidence (here in the form of Deputy Marshall's detailed testimony) supports
the trial judge's findings of fact. These findings are therefore conclusive . RCr 9 .78 ;
Henson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 20 S.W.3d 466 (1999) ; Crawford v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 824 S .W.2d 847, 849 (1992) .
Defense counsel's skillful elicitation of Deputy Marshall's trial testimony, although
potentially damaging to the prosecution's case, never created more than an innuendo
that the deputy improperly compelled Appellant to waive his Fifth Amendment rights to
silence and to counsel . Cf. Crane v . Kentucky, 476 U.S . 683, 688, 106 S.Ct. 2142,
2145, 90 L.Ed .2d 636 (1986) (recognizing "the defendant's traditional prerogative to
challenge [a] confession's reliability during the course of the trial") (emphasis in original) .
By failing to more fully develop the record, Appellant cannot now claim the trial court's
ruling was clearly erroneous .
IV. Jury Instructions
Three separate indictments charged Appellant with first-degree arson, complicity
to commit robbery and complicity to commit burglary . The jury instructions, however,
omitted any reference to criminal complicity, instead allowing the jury to consider only
the offenses of first and second-degree arson, burglary and robbery . Appellant claims
the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on criminal facilitation as lesser
included offenses to all charges. We disagree .
A trial court must submit instructions to the jury on the "whole law of the case,
including any lesser included offenses which are supported by the evidence ." Gabow v .
Commonwealth, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 63, 72 (2000), quoting Houston v . Commonwealth , Ky.,
975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (1998) . However, that duty does not extend to lesser included
offenses which lack an evidentiary foundation . Gabow, supra at 72 ; Barbour v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 861, 863 (1992), overruled on other rounds,
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McGinnis v . Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W .2d 518 (1994) . Although criminal facilitation
is often considered a lesser included offence when an indictment, such as the one here,
charges an accused with criminal complicity, Houston , supra, at 930, no state of the
facts in the present case indicates that Appellant facilitated these crimes .
Criminal facilitation requires that an offender knowingly provide another with the
means or opportunity to commit a crime . KRS 506.080(1) ; Smith v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
722 S .W.2d 892 (1987) . At trial, Appellant disclaimed any direct involvement in the
charged crimes, instead asserting that he unknowingly provided others with information
or assistance that enabled them to commit these offenses . For instance, in relation to
the Barnes Mountain robbery, Appellant testified that he told his alleged accomplice
about the victim's recent receipt of money-not for the purpose of robbing her, but
instead to discuss the possibility of soliciting work from her. Similarly, Appellant also
testified that he unwittingly gave the "real" carjackers a lift through Irvine, but ordered
them out of his car immediately upon learning of their plans to commit a totally unrelated
crime. Lacking any evidence to show he knowingly assisted others in the charged
offenses, the trial court properly denied Appellant's requested facilitation instructions .
The convictions and judgment of the Estill Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Russell J. Baldani
Baldani, Rowland & Richardson
300 West Short Street
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
A.B . Chandler III
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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