RAMON PATTERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2002-SC-0491-MR
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RAMON PATTERSON
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
2000-CR-0431
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Ramon Patterson, was convicted of one count of first-degree robbery,
three counts of second-degree robbery, and being a first-degree persistent felony
offender. He was sentenced to a total of forty years' imprisonment . He appeals to this
Court as a matter of right. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm his conviction and
sentence.
Introduction
This is a very troubling case . Defense counsel had to pursue an open records
request to obtain exculpatory material in the Commonwealth's possession . The
Commonwealth destroyed or lost a key piece of evidence before trial and before
defense counsel could examine it. One of the Commonwealth's witnesses related a
statement made by Patterson that was clearly inadmissible under KRE 404(b).
Defense counsel presented each of these claims of error to the trial court . Twice the
trial court was willing to grant a mistrial but refused to find deliberate prosecutorial
misconduct, which would have barred a retrial . See Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky.
App., 709 S .W .2d 838, 840 (1986) . Both times, defense counsel elected to continue
the case . The record does not adequately explain his reasons for taking this course.
We have carefully reviewed the trial court's rulings and find no error. The trial
court rightfully allowed Patterson to elect to allow the trial to continue at his own peril.
See Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 12 S.W .3d 258, 265 (1999). (Jeopardy attaches
in a jury trial when the jury is impaneled and sworn, and, indicating that ordering a
mistrial over a defendant's objection after jeopardy attaches would bar retrial.)
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
II.
Issues
A.
Eyewitness Identifications
Patterson first argues that the photo-pack procedure used by the police in this
case was unduly suggestive and, further, that under the totality of the circumstances,
the procedure used was inherently unreliable . We disagree .
The identifications at issue here come from four of the robbery (purse-snatching)
victims : R.W ., P .K., M.B., and M .C .
R.W.
On December 14, 1999, R.W. pulled into her employer's parking lot. While
gathering her belongings from the car, a man stepped up to her car and said, "Excuse
me, ma'am ." As R.W . was turning around, the man grabbed her purse from her
shoulder . He displayed a knife and said, "This is a robbery." The man then fled the
scene .
R.W. described the man to police as being a six-foot black male weighing
between 185 and 190 pounds. She described the clothes he was wearing, as black
jeans, a black sweatshirt with a front zipper, and a baseball cap .
Once Patterson became a suspect in the case, a Detective Keeling compiled an
array of six photographs, including a photograph of Patterson, which was labeled with a
number "5." In compiling the array, Detective Keeling chose photographs of other
people who resembled Patterson, rather than photographs of persons who resembled
R.W.'s description of the person who had robbed her. Before showing R.W . the
photographs, he advised her that the array contained a photograph of the man the
police believed robbed R .W . After she picked Patterson from the array, Detective
Keeling told her that she was "a good girl," and that Patterson had been arrested for
another robbery.
P.K.
On December 12, 1999, P .K. pulled her car into a private garage . She started to
exit the car when a man pushed her back inside and said, "Shut up . This is a robbery."
The man reached over her and grabbed her purse from the passenger seat . He then
fled .
P.K. described the man as being a black male who was five-foot seven-inches
tall and possibly had some Hispanic blood in him.
Detective Keeling showed P.K. the same array of photographs that he showed to
R.W . Before showing her the photographs, he also told her that a suspect was
in the array.
robbed her.
R.W . indentified the photograph of Patterson as being the person who
M.B.
On December 18, 1999, M .B . pulled into a private garage . As she was leaving
the car, a man approached her with his hand in his pocket and said, "Your money or
your life ." M.B . handed over her purse . The man walked away, got into a car, and
drove away.
M.B . described the man as a six-foot black male with a medium build . She said
he was wearing a large jean jacket and a knit toboggan.
A Detective Bryant showed M.B . the array of photographs prepared by Detective
Keeling . M.B . identified the photograph of Patterson as being the person who robbed
her.
M .C .
On December 23, 1999, M.C. pulled into a commercial parking lot. As she was
leaving the car, a man approached her and said, "This is a robbery. Don't make it any
worse than it has to be ." He grabbed her purse and quickly walked away. M.C. hid
behind a tree and watched the man get into a red American-made car. She memorized
the license plate . (The car was registered to Patterson's girlfriend .)
M.C. described the man as being a black male with short hair, who was five-feet
nine-inches tall and weighed 180 pounds .
A Detective Alvey prepared a different array of photographs to show to M .C than
the one used by Detective Keeling . After M .C . identified Patterson, Detective Alvey
assured her that she had picked out the right person.
Argument
Patterson first argues that the photographs used in the two arrays were unduly
suggestive for a number of reasons relating to the photographs themselves, e .g ., his
photograph was more recent than some of the other photographs . We have reviewed
the photographs carefully and reject this argument. Next, Patterson argues that
Detective Keeling's statements to R.W. and P.K. that the array contained a photograph
of the police suspect made the procedure used in their cases unduly suggestive . In
support of this argument, Patterson cites Simmons v. United States , 390 U.S . 377, 88
S . Ct . 967, 19 L. Ed . 2d 1247 (1968), which indicates that alerting a witness that the
police have other evidence that one of the persons pictured in the array committed the
crime in question is a factor that may make a pretrial identification procedure
suggestive .
In the case at bar, the trial court concluded that the detectives' comments did not
make the identifications unduly suggestive because the victims most likely would
logically infer that the suspect was in the array. We agree with the trial court that these
comments did not make the pretrial identification procedure unduly suggestive . Accord
Monk v. State , 895 S .W .2d 904, 908 (Ark . 1995) ; Bundy v. State , 455 So . 2d 330 (Fla .
1984), stay granted, 475 U.S . 1041, 106 S . Ct. 89 L.Ed .2d 362, and cert. denied , 476
U .S . 1109, 106 S . Ct. 1958, 90 L. Ed . 2d 366 (1986).
Patterson next argues that Detective Keeling's statements to P.K. and M.B . and
Detective Alvey's statement to M.C. confirming that they had picked the right person,
i.e. , the police suspect, made the pretrial identification procedures unduly suggestive .
Of course, the identifications had already been made at the time the detectives made
the affirming remarks . These remarks undoubtedly bolstered the witnesses' confidence
in their identifications of Patterson from the array of photographs, and the police should
have refrained from making such statements . But in all likelihood, the information that
the victim correctly identified the defendant in the case will become known to the victim
at some point prior to trial during the preparation of the Commonwealth's case or from
contact by defense counsel . In any event, based on this record, we fail to see how
these remarks should have resulted in suppression of the identifications .
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Patterson's motion to
suppress the victims' identifications of him.
B.
Exculpatory Evidence
While in jail awaiting trial, one Dietrich Stewart allegedly told Patterson that he,
Stewart, and another person, had committed the purse snatchings for which Patterson
had been arrested . This information was eventually relayed to an investigator for the
Jefferson Public Defender's office . The investigator contacted Detective Keeling and
asked him to follow up on this information . Subsequently, Patterson filed a written
motion for the Commonwealth to produce exculpatory evidence relating to its
investigation of other purse snatchings that occurred in the Highlands area and for
which Patterson had not been charged .
The Commonwealth filed a response in which it urged the trial court to deny the
motion on grounds that the evidence was not relevant to the case. After hearing
argument on the motion, the trial court ultimately agreed with the Commonwealth and
denied Patterson's motion . Undeterred, defense counsel obtained this information
through an open records request from the Louisville Police Department.
The open records request revealed that R.W. had identified Dietrich Stewart as
closely resembling the man who had robbed her. Further, the victim of another
uncharged purse snatching also identified Dietrich Stewart as the man who had robbed
her. Armed with this information, Patterson moved the trial court to dismiss the
indictment against him or, in the alternative, to suppress the eyewitness identifications .
While the trial court denied the motion, it did grant Patterson bond relief and released
him from jail into the home incarceration program .
On appeal, Patterson argues that the trial court did not grant adequate relief.
Rather, Patterson argues that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment. We
disagree .
The evidence was exculpatory . That R.W. identified another person as closely
resembling the person who had robbed her undermined the strength of the
identification . The Commonwealth should have disclosed this evidence in discovery .
But the evidence was available to the defense, and we commend defense counsel's
ingenuity and perseverance in obtaining it. The evidence, however, was far from
conclusive proof of Patterson's innocence. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the relief it did. See Berry v. Commonwealth , Ky., 782
S .W.2d 625, 627-28 (1990) . (Trial courts have broad discretion in matters dealing with
discovery .)
C.
Destroyed Evidence
R.W. told the police that the man who stole her purse brandished a knife as a
threat . A knife was recovered at the scene. Prior to trial, defense counsel met
Detective Keeling to review the physical evidence in the case . During this meeting,
defense counsel was shown a knife, which he took to be the knife discovered at the
scene of the R.W. robbery. The knife shown to defense counsel, however, was actually
a knife taken from a set belonging to Patterson's girlfriend .
During trial, the Commonwealth announced to the trial court that the knife found
at the R.W. crime scene had been inadvertently destroyed and the Commonwealth
planned to introduce pictures of the knife instead . It was only at this point in time that
defense counsel learned that the knife Detective Keeling had shown him was not the
knife found at the crime scene . Defense counsel made an immediate and earnest
objection and moved the trial court to dismiss the indictment because neither the knife
nor the photographs of it were provided during discovery . The trial court denied the
motion, but sua sponte declared a mistrial .
Defense counsel objected to the mistrial and, instead, asked the trial court to
exclude all evidence pertaining to the knife, including the photographs and any
testimony regarding its recovery . The trial court granted this request.
The scope of the trial court's ruling came into question when, on direct
examination, the Commonwealth asked Patterson's girlfriend about the set of knives
she owned and whether any of the knives were missing . Pictures of this set of knives
were also ultimately introduced into evidence . Defense counsel argued that this
evidence was excluded by the trial court's earlier ruling . The trial court, however,
concluded that the earlier ruling only encompassed the knife recovered at the R.W .
crime scene and not the set of knives owned by Patterson's girlfriend .
On appeal, Patterson argues that the introduction of evidence concerning the
knife set and the missing knife allowed the Commonwealth to unfairly take advantage of
its own mistake in destroying the knife found at the R .W . crime scene . But there is
nothing to indicate that the destruction was done deliberately . Further, the trial court did
declare a mistrial, which would have provided complete relief to what was a blatant
discovery violation . The trial court cannot be faulted for continuing the trial after
defense counsel objected to the mistrial . All sorts of potential mischief lies in allowing
the trial court to declare and enforce a mistrial over the defendant's objections. The
most obvious being that this power would allow a trial court to "save" the
Commonwealth's case whenever it felt things were going badly for the prosecution .
Finally, the trial court's ruling allowing evidence of the knife set was entirely consistent
with its earlier ruling excluding evidence of the knife recovered at the R.W. crime scene.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing introduction of evidence of
the knife set and the missing knife .
D.
Prior Bad Acts
On direct examination, Detective Alvey testified that Patterson defended the
charges against him by declaring that robberies were not his m .o. and that he got his
money by selling drugs . Again, defense counsel vigorously objected on grounds that
this statement was not disclosed during discovery, that it was inadmissible under KRE
404(b), and that the Commonwealth failed to comply with the notice requirements of
KRE 404(c).
Initially, defense counsel asked for a mistrial, but reconsidered . Instead, defense
counsel moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds that this was just another in a long
string of discovery violations . Incredibly, the Commonwealth's Attorney argued that
Patterson's admission to selling drugs was admissible as evidence of a guilty state of
mind . Upon repeated questioning by the court, the Commonwealth's Attorney was
unable to explain how "a guilty mind" differed from the general prohibition of KRE
404(b), which states that "[e]vddence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith ." The
trial court then ruled that the statement was excluded by KRE 404(b).
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, but indicated very
strongly that it would grant a mistrial. Thereafter, the trial court attempted to clarify
whether the defense wanted to continue with the trial . Defense counsel requested that
the trial court reserve a ruling on the issue until a hearing could be held regarding
Detective Alvey's statement. The hearing apparently was never held.
We agree with the trial court that the statement was not admissible . But what
was the trial court to do besides ruling on the admissibility of the evidence and
admonishing the jury to disregard it? Defense counsel wanted to continue with the trial
and did request that the trial court admonish the jury to disregard Detective Alvey's
testimony, which the trial court did . Thus, there is simply no trial error for us to review
or rule upon.
E.
Right to Present a Defense
At trial, defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Keeling with questions
designed to show that he was biased against Patterson . Upon objection, the trial court
disallowed this line of questioning . The issue is preserved by avowal . The questions
concerned why Detective Keeling did not disclose to the defense the fact that a witness
had identified Dietrich Stewart as closely resembling the person who had robbed her
and the circumstances under which the defense obtained this information . On appeal,
Patterson argues that exclusion of this line of questioning deprived him of his
constitutional right to present a defense . We disagree .
In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U .S. 308, 315-16, 94 S . Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L . Ed. 2d
347, 353 (1974), the U .S . Supreme Court reaffirmed in no uncertain terms that the right
to cross-examine witnesses was essential to a defendant's right of confrontation under
the Sixth Amendment, which includes the right to impeach the witness. Further, the
Confrontation Clause embraces the right to cross-examine to show that the witness is
biased or prejudiced against the defendant. Caudill v. Commonwealth , Ky., 120
S.W .3d 635, 661 (2003) . But still, the trial court retains broad discretion to regulate
-10-
cross-examination . Commonwealth v. Maddox , Ky., 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1997). We
conclude that there was no abuse of discretion here .
The defense was able to impeach the reliability of R.W .'s identification of
Patterson with her statement that she had previously determined that Dietrich Stewart
closely resembled the person who had robbed her. Why Detective Keeling failed to
disclose this statement had little or no relevance to show that he was personally biased
against Patterson . It might reveal professional bias that he was certain that Patterson
was the guilty party, but did not show that he had a motive to lie or fabricate evidence .
Further, the fact that the defense obtained the statement through an open records
request had no relevance to the credibility of Detective Keeling's testimony. Therefore,
we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding this evidence .
F.
Failure to Severe the Indictment
Finally, Patterson argues that the trial court erred in allowing the four robberies to
be tried together . We disagree .
"A trial court has broad discretion with respect to joinder and a decision in that
regard will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice and clear abuse of
discretion." Jackson v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 20 S .W .3d 906, 908 (2000). In denying
Patterson's motion to sever the robbery charges, the trial court concluded that the
modus operandi in the four cases, while not identical, was sufficiently similar to allow
joinder of the offenses under RCr 6 .18, which permits joinder of two or more offenses in
the same indictment if the offenses are of the same or similar character or are based on
the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan . We agree and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Patterson's motion to sever the counts in the indictment.
III.
Conclusion
As noted above, this is a difficult case and we are greatly troubled by the actions
of the Commonwealth. On appeal, Patterson alleges numerous instances of trial error,
most of which relate in some way to the Commonwealth's questionable conduct in this
case. We have reviewed the record carefully for trial court error and have found none.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T. Goyette
Chief Public Defender
Frank W . Heft, Jr.
Elizabeth B . McMahon
Assistant District Defenders
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Anitria M. Alo
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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