KURT ROBERT SMITH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHER OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 23, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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,Suprant (gaurf of
2002-SC-0293-MR
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KURT ROBERT SMITH
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
CASE NO . 01-CR-00693
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Following a jury trial in the Fayette Circuit Court, Appellant, Kurt Robert Smith,
was convicted of wanton murder for the death of his infant son, Blake Smith . Appellant
was sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment . He appeals to this Court as a
matter of right. Ky . Const. ยง 110(2)(b). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On March 21, 2001, Blake Smith, the victim herein, was transported to the
University of Kentucky Medical Center for medical attention . On March 23, 2001, the
six-week-old victim was pronounced dead . Results from a preliminary autopsy
indicated that death resulted from blunt force trauma to the victim's head .
Because Appellant was a juvenile at the time of the victim's death, the
proceedings against him began in the Fayette District Court. Pursuant to KRS 640 .010,
Appellant was transferred to the Fayette Circuit Court as a youthful offender . In July of
2001, the Fayette County grand jury returned an indictment charging Appellant with
murder . During the course of the trial, Appellant admitted he caused the victim's death .
He testified that due to exhaustion and frustration with the child's crying, he lost control
and shook the victim until the victim's head was flopping back and forth . Appellant
further testified that he then dropped the victim to the floor.
The jury received instructions on intentional murder, wanton murder, first-degree
manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide . The jury returned
a verdict of guilty on the charge of wanton murder, and recommended a life sentence .
The trial court adopted the recommendation and sentenced Appellant accordingly . This
appeal followed as a matter of right.
Appellant advances six assignments of error in this appeal. We shall address
each in turn .
I.
For his first assignment of error, Appellant alleges that the evidence was not
sufficient to prove him guilty of wanton murder . While conceding his conduct was
criminal, Appellant contends that such conduct did not manifest extreme indifference to
human life . We disagree .
A person is guilty of wanton murder when, "under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another person."
KRS 507.020(1)(b) .
A person acts wantonly if he or she "is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance
exists ." KRS 501 .020(3). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard
thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation ." Id .
This Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991),
provides the applicable standard of review . "On appellate review, the test of a directed
verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Id . at 187 ;
see also, Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky ., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983) . Following a careful
examination of the record on appeal, the evidence shows that the jury's verdict was not
unreasonable .
Medical evidence presented at trial revealed that the victim's injuries included a
skull fracture, bleeding inside the skull and around the spinal column, and bruising on
the back and buttocks . Testimony was given that the victim's injuries were consistent
with shaken baby syndrome. During his testimony, Appellant admitted that he shook
the victim and subsequently dropped the victim to the floor. On cross-examination,
Appellant stated that he was cognizant that his actions could cause serious injury and
further conceded that he disregarded such.
The evidence presented here indicates that a rational juror could believe that
Appellant wantonly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another
and thereby caused the victim's death under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life .
We thus hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it denied
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict .
Appellant claims error in the trial court's instruction to the jury on first-degree
manslaughter. Specifically, he complains that the concept of extreme emotional
disturbance (EED) was not included within the instruction . However, this issue was not
preserved for appellate review.
RCr 9 .54(2) provides :
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an offered
instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection before the court
instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which the party objects
and the ground or grounds of his objection .
"Failure to comply with RCr 9 .54(2) has been consistently held to prohibit review of
alleged error in instructions because of the failure to properly preserve the claimed
error." Commonwealth v. Duke , Ky., 750 S .W.2d 432, 433 (1988) . Appellant concedes
that he did not object to the jury instructions, but, nevertheless, requests this Court
review this issue as palpable error under RCr 10 .26.
RCr 10 .26 provides that an alleged error improperly preserved for appellate
review may be revisited upon a demonstration that it resulted in manifest
injustice . Palpable error affects the substantial rights of a party and, under
Partin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S .W.2d 219, 224 (1996), relief will only
be granted if the reviewing court concludes "that a substantial possibility
exists that the result would have been different" absent the error.
Butcher v . Commonwealth , Ky., 96 S .W.3d 3, 11 (2002) . Having examined the
instructions, we find no error. Baze v. Commonwealth , Ky., 965 S .W .2d 817, 823
(1997) .
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth gave notice that it intended to introduce
evidence that the victim suffered a bruise on his nose while in Appellant's care and
regarding incidents where Appellant would yell in the victim's face when he cried . At a
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pre-trial hearing, Appellant objected by arguing that the evidence should be excluded as
prior bad acts under KRE 404(b) . Appellant further argued that the evidence was
unduly prejudicial . The trial court determined that the evidence of Appellant yelling at
the victim was admissible as evidence of wantonness. The trial judge reserved ruling
on the evidence of the bruise until trial, but ultimately allowed that evidence to be
admitted as evidence of absence of mistake or accident .
Appellant alleges that the trial court committed error by permitting the
Commonwealth to introduce the above evidence . He contends that it is not relevant to
any of the factors set forth in KRE 404(b) . Also, he contends that even if the above
evidence is deemed relevant, its probative value cannot outweigh its prejudicial effect.
We disagree .
KRE 404(b) provides :
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith . It may, however, be admissible :
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident . . .
"The trial court has discretion to admit evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or bad acts if it
is `relevant, probative and the potential for prejudice does not outweigh the probative
value of such evidence ."' Brown v. Commonwealth , Ky., 983 S.W.2d 513, 516 (1999)
(quoting Parker v. Commonwealth , Ky., 952 S .W.2d 209, 213 (1997)). Absent an abuse
of discretion, this Court will not reverse a trial court's ruling concerning the admission of
evidence . Commonwealth v. King , Ky., 950 S .W.2d 807, 809 (1997) . Specifically when
considering a case of child abuse, this Court has held that "the probative link between
evidence of prior bad acts and a particular defendant does not have to be established
by direct evidence ." Parker v. Commonwealth , Ky., 952 S .W.2d 209, 213 (1997) . The
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evidence complained of more than meets that standard and demonstrates "the animus
of [Appellant] towards the child and to show the absence of accident or mistake ." Id . at
214 .
The evidence at issue here was probative and relevant to show the absence of
mistake or accident . Moreover, it is our view that none of the evidence - neither the
evidence of the bruise, nor the evidence of the yelling - was unduly prejudicial to
Appellant's defense . We cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to allow such evidence to be admitted . Accordingly, we find no reversible error.
IV.
During the cross-examination of Appellant, the Commonwealth asked about
letters sent to the district court by members of Appellant's family on his behalf .
Appellant contends that this line of questioning could be construed to mean that
Appellant was perpetrating a fraud on the court by asserting his right to remain silent at
the same time the members of his family prayed for leniency . We note that no
objection was raised during the cross-examination . Therefore, it is not properly
preserved for our review. However, Appellant seeks review pursuant to RCr 10 .26.
Appellant's claim does not rise to the level of palpable error because it first
ignores the fact that once the accused takes the stand, he is subject to crossexamination for all matters pertaining to the prosecution, including state of mind which
"may be inferred from actions preceding and following the charged offense ." Lawson v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 53 SW.3d 534, 549 (2001) (quoting Parker v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 952 S .W .2d 209, 212 (1997)) . There was no manifest injustice arising from this line
of questioning, thus no error.
V.
Appellant claims that it was erroneous for the trial court to admit into evidence a
photograph depicting injuries suffered by the victim . He asserts that the jury could not
have been significantly aided by the photograph and further argues that what little
probative value the photograph may have is clearly outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
We cannot agree .
An otherwise admissible photograph does not become inadmissible merely
because it is gruesome and the crime is heinous . Butler v. Commonwealth , Ky., 560
S .W.2d 814, 816 (1978) . A photograph that is probative of the nature of the injuries
inflicted will not be excluded unless it is so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value. Adkins v . Commonwealth , Ky., 96 S .W.3d
779, 794 (2003) ; KRE 403.
The photograph at issue here, which displays injuries inflicted upon the victim's
back and buttocks, while distressing, is simply not inflammatory, as contended by
Appellant . It displayed the location and severity of the victim's bruising and was clearly
admissible for that very purpose . Hodge v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 17 S .W.3d 824 (2000) .
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the
photograph to be admitted as evidence . Commonwealth v. English , Ky., 993 S .W.2d
941, 945 (1999) .
VI.
At trial, following the Commonwealth's closing argument, Appellant's defense
counsel claimed that the Commonwealth failed to correctly state the law in defining
intentional acts . After a bench conference, and pursuant to defense counsel's
suggestion, the trial judge admonished the jury by reminding its members that the
arguments of the attorneys at trial were just that - arguments . He further reminded the
jury members that one must refer to a particular instruction and verify that all of the
elements listed therein are satisfied before a defendant can be found guilty.
Appellant now asserts that the Commonwealth's closing argument stated a
reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the instructions, and argues that the
error is not that the Commonwealth misquoted the instructions ; rather, the instructions
misstated the law. Appellant seeks review under RCr 10 .26.
Just as we noted previously in this opinion, instructional error must be preserved
for appellate review. (See Part II of this opinion, supra) . Appellant's trial objection in no
way brought this issue to the trial court's attention . Appellant sought an admonition
when the original issue arose . He received it and is entitled to no other relief.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Timothy G . Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Michael Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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