GEORGE MILLION, WARDEN V. DONALD RAYMER
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RENDERED : JUNE 17, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixprnttr 49ourf of
A
2002-SC-0205-DG
GEORGE MILLION, WARDEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-1831
MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CI-00136
V.
APPELLEE
DONALD RAYMER
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Reversinq
In November 1998, Appellee, Donald Raymer, an inmate at the Kentucky State
Penitentiary (KSP), was placed in administrative segregation pending an investigation
into whether he had introduced contraband, namely marijuana, into the institution .
Ultimately, Raymer was charged with two violations of Corrections Policy and
Procedure (CCP): possession or promoting of dangerous contraband and developing a
relationship with a correctional officer . Raymer was subsequently transferred to the
Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex (EKCC) .
On January 12, 1999, Raymer appeared before the prison disciplinary committee
at EKCC and pled guilty to having had a relationship with a correctional officer, but
denied the contraband offense . Following the initial hearing, the committee found
Raymer guilty of the contraband charge and penalized him with the loss of 180 days of
accumulated good time, 180 days of telephone restriction, and 90 days in disciplinary
segregation . Raymer successfully appealed to the EKCC Warden /Appellant herein,
George Million, who reversed the committee's decision and ordered a new hearing .
Following a second hearing before the committee on March 22, 1999, Raymer was
again found guilty of the contraband charge but his penalty was reduced to 54 days in
segregation, which he had already served .
Kentucky's CPP 15 .6 requires that appeals of disciplinary proceedings be made
to the warden in writing within 15 days of the committee's decision . In his effort to
appeal from the second committee hearing, Raymer filed an open records request form
on March 31, 1999, seeking a copy of the second hearing video tape . The record
reflects that on April 2, 1999, Corrections Employee and Legal Aide Supervisor, Kathy
Litteral, noted on Raymer's request form that the video equipment malfunctioned during
the second hearing and, as a result, there was no tape of the proceeding . It is unclear,
however, exactly when Raymer became aware of this information .
On April 15, 1999, Warden Million affirmed Raymer's conviction, noting that the
15-day deadline for filing the appeal had passed . Nonetheless, Raymer filed an appeal
on April 16, 1999. A notation at the bottom of the document indicates that the belated
appeal was filed at the direction of Ms. Litteral . Raymer alleges in his brief that Ms.
Litteral told his legal aide to "ignore the notice denying the appeal," and that Raymer's
belated appeal would receive "full and proper consideration ." While the Department of
Corrections does not contest Raymer's version of the events, it does note that nothing
on the belated appeal indicates that it was ever received by the appropriate authority .
Raymer alleges that he made several inquiries in the following months to Ms.
Litteral regarding the status of his appeal . On June 1, 2000, Raymer filed a petition for
declaratory judgment in the Morgan Circuit Court claiming that his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated during
the prison disciplinary hearings, and seeking an expungement of the disciplinary report .
On July 7, 2000, the Morgan Circuit Court granted the Department of Corrections'
motion to dismiss Raymer's petition as being time barred by the one-year statute of
limitations set forth in KRS 413 .140(1) (a).
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the circuit court's decision, finding that
Raymer's petition "asserted a claim specifically arising under the policies and
procedures adopted by the Department of Corrections as authorized by the Legislature
at KRS 196 .030(1) and KRS 197.020(1) . Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Raymer's petition was timely filed under KRS 413 .120(2), which allows five years for
commencing "[a]n action based upon a liability created by statute, when no other time is
fixed by the statute creating the liability ."
This Court thereafter granted the Department of Corrections' motion for
discretionary review . At issue in this case is the applicable statute of limitations for a
civil declaratory judgment action alleging violation of an inmate's constitutional rights in
a prison disciplinary proceeding .'
Appellant argues that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, the five-year
limitations period under KRS 413.120(2) is inapplicable to Raymer's claim because: (1)
It should be noted that in 2002, the General Assembly amended KRS 413.140,
Actions to be brought within one year, to include, "An action arising out of a detention
facility disciplinary proceeding, whether based on state or federal law." KRS
413.140(k) .
KRS 196.0302, KRS 197 .0203 , and CPP 15 .64 are not statutes that create liability, and
(2) Raymer's petition only asserted violations of his 14 th Amendment due process rights .
As such, Raymer's petition alleged the type of constitutional torts governed by the oneyear statute of limitations found in KRS 413 .140(a) .
Raymer responds that the five-year statute of limitations applies to prison
disciplinary proceedings because the constitutionally-required procedural protections
arise due to rights conferred upon the inmate under Kentucky Law. Wolff v. McDonnell ,
418 U .S. 539, 94 S .Ct. 2963, 49 L.Ed .2d 935 (1994) ; Black v. Parke, 4 F.3d 442 (6th Cir.
1993). Essentially, Raymer contends that, although the state is under no duty to
provide these rights or entitlements, once the state creates them it is required to provide
procedural due process before denying the right or entitlement . Wolff, supra . Raymer
argues that the state-created right at issue in this case finds its origin in the Kentucky
Constitution § 254. KRS 196.030(1) (a) and KRS 197 .020(2), enacted to comply with
the constitutional mandate, delegate rule-making power to the Kentucky Department of
2 KRS 196 .030, Functions of the Department of Corrections, provides, in pertinent part
that, "(1) The department shall, unless otherwise provided by law, exercise all functions
of the state in relation to : (a) management of penal, reform, and correctional institutions
[.l
3 KRS 197.020, Regulations to be made by Department of Corrections, provides, in
pertinent part: (1)The Department of Corrections shall: (a) Formulate and prescribe all
necessary regulations and bylaws for the government and discipline of the penitentiary,
the rules for the government and official conduct of all officials connected with the
penitentiary and for the government of the prisoners in their deportment and conduct[ .]
4 CPP 15 .6 is entitled Adjustment Procedures and Programs . Its stated purpose is "To
establish disciplinary procedures for handling violations of institutional and Corrections
rules by inmates . It also provides guidance for the Adjustment Committee and
empowers the Adjustment Committee and others designated by the Warden to perform
certain functions which shall be essential to the good order and discipline of the
institution and to advance the rehabilitative progress of inmates .
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Corrections . Raymer cites to this Court's decision in Mahoney v. Carter , Ky ., 938
S.W .2d 575 (1997), for the proposition that prison officials may create constitutionallyprotected liberty interests through official policies and procedures . Therefore, Raymer
maintains that to hold that properly adopted prison regulations do not create a cause of
action or liability would be contrary to Wolff, supra, which makes clear that officials
cannot create a liberty interest and then provide procedural protections beyond the
review of the courts . 418 U .S. at 558 .
"A petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to KRS 418.040 has become the
vehicle, whenever Habeas Corpus proceedings are inappropriate, whereby inmates
may seek review of their disputes with the Corrections Department." Smith v. O'Dea,
Ky., 939 S .W.2d 353, 355 (1997) . See also Polsgrove v. Kentucky Bureau of
Corrections , Ky., 559 S .W.2d 736 (1977) and Graham v. O'Dea , Ky. App., 876 S .W.2d
621 (1994).
KRS 418 .040 does not set out a standard statute of limitations for all
declaratory judgment actions, and indeed, this Court has never specifically addressed
the issue as it pertains to inmate litigation. We conclude, however, that the underlying
theory of law asserted in the petition determines what statute of limitations should apply.
Raymer's petition for declaratory judgment alleged the following :
1 . Petitioner's 14 th Amendment due process rights were violated when he
was convicted despite the fact that . . . there was no evidence linking
said contraband to the petitioner.
2. Petitioner's 14th Amendment due process rights were violated when he
was convicted based on information obtained from confidential sources
absent any determination of the reliability of said informants .
3 . Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the adjustment
committee failed to adequately state their findings on which they based
their determination of guilt.
4. Petitioner's due process rights were violated by his accuser's failure to
execute an adequate chain of custody that documented the handling
and testing of the alleged contraband .
5. Petitioner's due process rights were violated by Respondent's failure to
provide a transcript of the adjustment hearing proceedings .
6 . Petitioner's due process rights were violated when Warden Million
failed to respond to his belated appeal of the adjustment committee
verdict.
7 . Dismissal and expungement of the category 6.4 dangerous contraband
charge is the appropriate remedy in this cause of action, rather than
remand for a hearing .
Raymer argues that despite invoking the Fourteenth Amendment throughout his
petition, and specifically requesting "a Declaration that his 14t" Amendment due process
rights were violated," his action is actually premised solely upon state law, namely KRS
196.030(1) (a), KRS 197.020(1), and CPP 15 .6. Yet, Raymer made no mention of state
statutory or administrative law in the petition . The Court of Appeals based liability on
state law and thus, ruled that Raymer's petition was timely filed under KRS 413 .120(2),
which allows five years for commencing "[a]n action based upon a liability created by
statute, when no other time is fixed by the statute creating the liability ."
In doing so, the Court of Appeals relied on Clifton v. Midway College , Ky., 702
S.W.2d 835 (1986), which involved a civil rights claim of employment discrimination, a
statutorily created cause of action under KRS Chapter 344. This Court recognized that
KRS 344 .450 specifically creates a private right of action against violators and liability
on their part. Accordingly, we held that such an action under Chapter 344 was
governed by the five-year statute of limitations in KRS 413.120(2), since it was based
"upon a liability created by statute."
Raymer's petition is firmly grounded in the 14t" Amendment to the U .S.
Constitution, not KRS 196.030(1) (a) or KRS 197.020(1) . Raymer's claims are
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analogous to federal constitutional claims made under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 . In fact, all of
the cases cited in the petition are § 1983 decisions . It is well-established that state
personal injury statutes of limitations govern timing for federal constitutional claims .
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U .S. 261, 105 S .Ct. 1938, 85 L .Ed .2d 254 (1985) . In Kentucky,
such claims are subject to our one-year limitations period under KRS 413 .140 for
personal-injury actions. Brown v . Wiggington , Ky., 981 F .2d 913 (6th Cir. 1992) ; Board
of Trustees of University of Kentucky v. Hayse , Ky., 782 S.W.2d 609 (1989).
We are of the opinion that application of the one-year statute of limitations period
under KRS 413 .140 for constitutional claims such as those made herein is consistent
with federal law governing essentially the same types of claims. 42 U .S.C. §1983.
Raymer's claims were time-barred as of April 15, 2000, one-year from the date of
Warden Million's affirmance of the conviction . As Raymer did not file his petition for
declaratory judgment until June 1, 2000, the trial court properly dismissed the matter.
Inasmuch as we have concluded that Raymer's petition did not allege violations
of state statutory or administrative law, we perceive no necessity and therefore decline
to address the nature and degree of state-created liberty interests afforded an inmate
under the Corrections Policies and Procedures. We do note, however, that contrary to
Raymer's assertion, our holding herein does not run afoul of Wolff, supra . Procedural
due process protections afforded inmates are not beyond the review of the courts .
Rather, an inmate claiming a violation of those due process protections simply has an
obligation to make his grievance known within the allowable statute of limitations .
Raymer failed to do so and thus, is precluded from pursuing further redress .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the Morgan
Circuit Court dismissing Raymer's petition is reinstated.
Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, and Wintersheimer, J.J ., concur.
Stumbo, J, dissents in a separate opinion in which Lambert, C .J., joins .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Rebecca Baylous
Department of Corrections
Office of General Counsel
2439 Lawrenceburg Road
P .O. Box 2400
Frankfort, KY 40602-2400
John T. Damron
Corrections Cabinet
Office of General Counsel
2439 Lawrenceburg Road
P .O . Box 2400
Frankfort, KY 40602-2400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Allison Connelly
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Kentucky
College of Law
209 Law Building
Lexington, KY 40506-0048
RENDERED : JUNE 17, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Suprme Courf of ~Kmfurkg
2002-SC-0205-DG
GEORGE MILLION, WARDEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-1831
MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CI-00136
V.
APPELLEE
DONALD RAYMER
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE STUMBO
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the Court of
Appeals decision that Appellee's Petition For Declaratory Judgment was timely filed in
the Morgan Circuit Court should be affirmed, as Appellee's cause of action accrued as
"[a]n action upon a liability created by statute ." KRS 413 .120(2) .
Appellee Raymer petitioned the Morgan Circuit Court for a judicial declaration
that his due process rights were violated by the Department of Corrections' (DOC)
handling of his prison disciplinary hearing and asked that his prison disciplinary
conviction be reversed and expunged from his record in its entirety. KRS 196.030(1)(a)
grants to the DOC the authority to "exercise all functions of the state in relation to . . .
[m]anagement of penal, reform, and correctional institutions ." Likewise, KRS
197.020(1)(a) mandates that the DOC shall "[f]ormulate and prescribe all necessary
regulations and bylaws for the government and discipline of the penitentiary . . . ." In
turn, the DOC has implemented CCP 15 .6, which establishes certain procedures for
governing disciplinary violations by inmates . CCP 15 .6 makes clear that "[a]n inmate's
due process rights shall be fully protected ." CCP 15 .6 confers upon inmates, among
other things, the right to a hearing, the right to the assistance of legal aide, and the right
to an appeal of any adverse decision . Accordingly, any rights created by the regulations
and policies of the DOC promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to it by KRS
196 .030, KRS 197.020, and Section 254 of the Kentucky Constitution, also impose
upon the DOC the corresponding liability of ensuring that those rights comply with
procedural due process requirements . See Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U .S . 539, 556-557,
94 S . Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed .2d 935 (1974) . These procedural requirements (and
resulting constitutionally protected liberty interest) exist only because they arose from
certain rights created by state statutes and DOC regulations . See Mahoney v. Carter ,
Ky., 938 S .W.2d 575, 576 (1997) (observing that "prison officials may create liberty
interests through official promulgations, policy statements, or regulations") . As such,
Raymer's cause of action was properly brought as "[a]n action upon a liability created by
statute."
The majority opinion concludes that since the underlying theory of law asserted
throughout Raymer's pro se petition was grounded in federal constitutional law, it is
analogous to a claim made under 42 U .S .C. Section 1983, and therefore the one-year
statute of limitations applies . Presumably then, had Raymer more artfully pled the same
claim as a violation of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky statutory law, his action
would still be viable pursuant to KRS 413.120. This Court has many times held that
when a prisoner elects to proceed pro se, he is not subject to the same standard of
pleading as is legal counsel ; and that rules are to be "construed liberally in his favor."
Case v. Commonwealth , Ky., 467 S.W.2d 367, 368 (1971) . See also Commonwealth v.
Miller , Ky ., 416 S .W.2d 358, 360 (1967) . Raymer should not be precluded from judicial
relief on this basis alone .
The legislature's subsequent amendment of KRS 413.140 to include within the
purview of the one-year statute of limitations "[a]n action arising out of a detention
facility disciplinary proceeding, whether based upon state or federal law," is not
indicative of the original legislative intent . Indeed, "there is no presumption from the
amendment that such is what the statute meant originally. On the contrary, the
presumption is that the legislature, by the amendment, intended to change the law."
Whitley County Bd. of Educ. v . Meadors , Ky., 444 S.W.2d 890, 891 (1969) .
Accordingly, we can presume that the legislature intended to effect a change in the law
when it added actions "arising out of a detention facility disciplinary proceeding" to those
items already specifically enumerated in KRS 413 .140, thereby subjecting such claims
to a one-year statute of limitations .
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision
reversing the Morgan Circuit Court's order that dismissed Raymer's cause of action as
time barred .
Lambert, C .J ., joins this dissent .
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