COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. DAVID BUCHANON
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AMENDED : JANUARY 12, 2004
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
~sUyrrmr C~Vurf of
2001-SC-1056-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-1750
BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT NO . 99-CR-00109
V.
DAVID BUCHANON
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE STUMBO
AFFIRMING
David Buchanon was arrested and entered a conditional plea of guilty to firstdegree possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence, possession of
marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia after being stopped at a roadblock
operated by the Butler County Sheriff's Department at the intersection of Kentucky
Highways 70 and 1117/369 . Buchanon moved to suppress the evidence seized from
his vehicle based on his claim that the police roadblock was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The trial court subsequently denied Buchanon's motion to suppress ;
however, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the
case in order to allow Buchanon to withdraw his guilty plea . The Court of Appeals found
that the roadblock was constitutionally impermissible under City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond , 531 U .S . 32, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed . 2d 333 (2000), and United States v.
Huquenin , 154 F.3d 547 (1998). We accepted discretionary review and hereby affirm
the opinion of the Court of Appeals .
On September 5, 1999, the Butler County Sheriffs Department set up and
maintained a roadblock that stopped every car in both directions of Highway 70 west in
Butler County. David Buchanon was driving to work in Muhlenburg County at
approximately 6 :30 p .m . when he approached the roadblock . The sheriffs department
had placed a "spotter" several hundred yards before the roadblock who radioed ahead if
a vehicle looked suspicious . As Buchanon's vehicle approached, the spotter alerted
deputies at the roadblock that there was a lot of abnormal movement coming from
inside the vehicle. When Buchanon reached the roadblock Deputy Steve Morris
approached the vehicle and asked to see Buchanon's license and registration . Deputy
Morris testified that there was a strong odor of cologne emanating from the vehicle, that
Buchanon seemed "real nervous," and that his face was red and his eyes were
bloodshot . Deputy Morris testified that he believed Buchanon to be under the influence
of drugs . Buchanon was asked to exit the vehicle and was given two field sobriety
tests, which although appearing unstable, he ultimately passed . Deputy Morris then
asked Buchanon for permission to search his vehicle but was refused . At this time,
Deputy Morris summoned the dog trained to detect narcotics to the vehicle to conduct
an exterior "sniff." The dog subsequently alerted to the presence of narcotics inside
Buchanon's vehicle . The vehicle was then searched and the evidence that resulted in
the above charges recovered .
The Commonwealth appeals the Court of Appeals' ruling that the roadblock
operated by the Butler County Sheriff's Department was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment pursuant to Edmond and Huquenin, supra . Edmond is the United States
2
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the constitutionality of suspicionless
seizures occurring at highway checkpoints . In Edmond , the Supreme Court held an
Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program to be in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment because its primary purpose was "to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing . . . ." 531 U .S. at 42. To allow checkpoint programs that target such a
general interest in crime control would leave law enforcement authorities with the ability
to construct roadblocks for nearly any conceivable purpose, thus rendering the Fourth
Amendment's protections virtually non-existent in this arena . Id . In Edmond, the parties
conceded that the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoints was the interdiction
of illegal narcotics ; however, the government asserted that the program was justified by
its secondary purposes of detecting drunken drivers and verifying licenses and
registrations . Id . at 46 . The Court responded that "[i]f this were the case, however, law
enforcement authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose
so long as they also included a license or sobriety check ." Id . The Court indicated that
it would now be necessary for courts to examine the evidence to determine whether the
actual primary purpose of the checkpoint is lawful, regardless of the government's
ostensible or secondary purposes. Id . The Court, in a footnote, specifically reserved
the question of whether a checkpoint with the primary purpose of checking licenses and
registrations or driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics
would pass constitutional muster' . Id . at 47 n .2 .
It is well established that a highway stop of motorists at a government-operated
checkpoint effectuates a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Michigan Dept. of
' Although, the very presence of footnote two seems "divorced from the rest of the opinion," in that the
language of the opinion itself seems to indicate that if the primary purpose is lawful, the checkpoint is
constitutional . See United States v. Moreno-Vargas , 315 F.3d 489, 490 (5th Cir . 2002); United States v.
Davis , 270 F.3d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
3
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U .S . 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L. Ed . 2d 412, 420
(1990) ; United States v . Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S . 543, 556, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1116, 1128 (1976) . In order to pass constitutional muster, the seizure must be
deemed reasonable, which requires "a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and
the severity of the interference with individual liberty ." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 5051, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979) . The Fourth Amendment
requires that generally, in order to be reasonable, all searches and seizures must be
accompanied by an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing . Chandler v . Miller , 520
U .S. 305, 308, 117 S . Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed . 2d 513 (1997) . The United States Supreme
Court has recognized certain situations, however, where individualized suspicion is not
required in order for the brief seizure of motorists to be reasonable .
In Martinez-Fuerte , supra , the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
fixed Border Patrol checkpoint with the primary purpose of intercepting illegal aliens.
The Court focused on the significant government interest in patrolling the U.S . border
and determined that it outweighed the minimal intrusion upon motorists briefly detained
at the checkpoints . Id. at 561 .
In Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S . 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed . 2d 660 (1979),
the Supreme Court held that random spot checks of motorists to determine if they held
valid driver's licenses and registrations were invalid under the Fourth Amendment
without some individualized suspicion of wrongdoing . Id . at 663. The Court found that
the intrusion upon lawful motorists was too great to justify a policy of randomly stopping
vehicles to check compliance with licensure and registration laws . The stops were
likened to the roving-patrol stops by Border Patrol agents held to be unconstitutional in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U .S. 873, 95 S . Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed . 2d 607 (1975) .
The Court warned against the "grave danger" inherent in this type of "standard less" and
"unconstrained" discretion of law enforcement officers . Prouse , supra, at 662-663 .
However, the Court intimated that a roadblock-type stop that checks all oncoming traffic
for licenses and registrations would be a sufficient constraint on the discretion of police
officials, thereby suggesting that this type of procedure would survive Fourth
Amendment scrutiny . Id . at 663.
In Sitz , supra, the Supreme Court held that the Michigan State Police's
checkpoint program, designed to remove drunken drivers from the roadways, was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment . 496 U.S . at 455. The Court in Sitz stated that
in order to determine the reasonableness of a highway checkpoint stop, courts must
perform the balancing test enunciated in Brown , supra . Id. at 450. The Court ultimately
determined that the state's interest in eradicating drunk driving was sufficiently
advanced by the sobriety checkpoint program, and that this interest far outweighed the
intrusion upon motorists who were only briefly stopped at the checkpoints . Id . at 455 .
The Supreme Court's decision in Edmond , supra, reiterated that the
constitutionality of such checkpoint programs of the type approved in Sitz and MartinezFuerte , "still depends on a balancing of the competing interests at stake and the
effectiveness of the program ." 531 U .S . at 47. However, the Court added that it would
now be necessary for courts to conduct a purpose inquiry at the programmatic level in
order to determine if the program is justified by a lawful primary purpose . Id, at 46-48.
The Edmond Court determined that a primary purpose of general crime control, i .e .
"interdicting illegal narcotics," did not justify a checkpoint program that stopped
motorists without some indicia of individualized suspicion . Id . at 47 .
Kentucky case law on the issue is sparse. Our Court of Appeals has adopted the
reasoning of Prouse and Sitz and held that inherent in all constitutional checkpoints is
constrained discretion of officers at the scene, and that the checkpoint be established
pursuant to some sort of systematic plan . See Commonwealth v. Bothman , Ky . App.,
941 S.W.2d 479 (1996) ; Steinbeck v. Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 862 S.W.2d 912
(1993) ; Kinslow v. Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 660 S .W .2d 677 (1983) .
In the case at bar, the record reveals that signs posted as vehicles from one
direction 2 neared the roadblock read, "DUI-DRUG CHECK AHEAD," "K-9 AT WORK,"
and "PREPARE TO STOP," although Buchanon himself would not have seen the signs
prior to being stopped . Deputy Morris, the supervising officer at the scene, testified that
the purpose of the roadblock was to "detect any violation of the law," including driving
under the influence and possession of narcotics . Deputy Scott McIntosh testified that
the purpose of the roadblock was "to make sure everyone was safe and sober."
However, the record reveals that only Deputy Morris was trained in DUI detection in
Kentucky (Deputy McIntosh was certified only in Tennessee), while the other officers at
the scene did not have any DUI training. Deputy Morris testified that although he had a
portable breathalyzer test (PBT) device at the roadblock, he did not administer the
breath test to Buchanon because he did not smell any alcohol . There was also
testimony presented at trial that the Butler County Sheriff's Department usually
conducted such roadblocks in the afternoon and with a dog trained to detect narcotics
present.
There was no written plan detailing the Butler County Sheriff's Department's
policies and procedures to be followed when conducting vehicle checkpoints . Deputies
2 Deputy Scott McIntosh testified that the sheriffs department only had enough signs to place on one side
of the road .
6
Morris and McIntosh stated that the sheriff's department did follow certain procedures in
the administration of all of its roadblocks, such as stopping every vehicle in both
directions -- first asking for the driver's license and registration, and then proceeding
with more intrusive questions only if the officer smells alcohol or marijuana . Deputy
McIntosh testified that the sheriff's department's training taught deputies to let motorists
proceed if they produce a valid license and registration and if everything otherwise
"checks out."
The Court of Appeals relied in part on the Sixth Circuit case of Huquenin , supra ,
which dealt with a "ruse" roadblock that was established at the end of an exit ramp and
was designed to catch those drivers who exited the highway after having seen signs
posted that there was a "Drug - DUI Enforcement" checkpoint further on down the
highway . When motorists took the exit, which was not frequently used because no
services were offered there, they were stopped by police and asked why they had
exited the highway. There was a drug dog present at the checkpoint, but no
breathalyzer device. Also, there was no checkpoint on the highway, as the signs had
indicated . The Sixth Circuit found that the checkpoint's primary purpose was to detect
narcotics and was therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment . The court went on to
hold that even if its primary purpose had been to detect drunk drivers, under the Brown
balancing test, the severe degree of subjective and objective intrusion upon motorists
far outweighed the government's interest in removing intoxicated drivers from the road .
Id. at 563 .
We do not find the facts in Huquenin to be as strikingly similar to the present
case as did the Court of Appeals; however, its analysis is proper. As later stated in
Edmond , courts are required to determine the primary purpose of the vehicle
checkpoint . If, in fact, the court finds that the purpose is one that has previously been
held by the Supreme Court to be in violation of the Constitution, then there is no need to
perform the balancing test enumerated in Brown . If, however, the primary purpose of
the checkpoint were determined by the court to be valid, then it would be necessary to
apply the balancing test to the facts of each case .
We conclude that the primary purpose of the roadblock in the case sub judice
was to detect narcotics or "any violation of the law." Though admittedly, the
circumstances here present a much more difficult case than as in Hu uq enin , where
motorists were tricked and police had unfettered discretion, or as in Edmond , where the
admitted primary purpose of the checkpoint was interdicting illegal narcotics . The
Edmond Court noted the difficulty inherent in determining the primary purpose of a
particular roadblock. 531 U .S . at 46-47. Indeed, we find this case to be particularly
difficult . Ultimately, however, we must err on the side of caution when dealing with the
most fundamental of those rights granted to our citizens to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures .
The presence of the drug dog at a roadblock held in the mid-afternoon operated
by only one officer trained to detect drunk drivers, coupled with the testimony of Deputy
Morris that the purpose of the roadblock was "to detect any violation of the law,"
indicates that the primary purpose of the roadblock was general crime control, or more
specifically, the interdiction of illegal narcotics . The United States Supreme Court has
proscribed this purpose in Edmond and we are bound by that decision .
We note that most law enforcement officials have not established official
guidelines governing vehicle checkpoints . Although we are reluctant to mandate a set
list of criteria for officials to follow, we can take this opportunity to suggest several non-
exclusive factors courts may consider in determining the reasonableness of a particular
roadblock. Cf. Las Cruces v . Betancourt, 735 P . 2d 1161 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) .
First, it is important that decisions regarding the location, time, and procedures
governing a particular roadblock should be determined by those law enforcement
officials in a supervisory position, rather than by the officers who are out in the field .
Any lower ranking officer who wishes to establish a roadblock should seek permission
from supervisory officials . Locations should be chosen so as not to affect the public's
safety and should bear some reasonable relation to the conduct law enforcement is
trying to curtail .
Second, the law enforcement officials who work the roadblock should comply
with the procedures established by their superior officers so that each motorist is dealt
with in exactly the same manner. Officers in the field should not have unfettered
discretion in deciding which vehicles to stop or how each stop is handled .
Third, the nature of the roadblock should be readily apparent to approaching
motorists . At least some of the law enforcement officers present at the scene should be
in uniform and patrol cars should be marked in some manner. Signs warning of a
checkpoint ahead are also advisable .
Fourth, the length of a stop is an important factor in determining the intrusiveness
of the roadblock. Motorists should not be detained any longer than necessary in order
to perform a cursory examination of the vehicle to look for signs of intoxication or check
for license and registration . If during the initial stop, an officer has a reasonable
suspicion that the motorist has violated the law, the motorist should be asked to pull to
the side so that other motorists can proceed.
We reiterate that the above list of factors is not exhaustive . Also, a mere
violation of one factor does not automatically result in a violation of constitutional
proportions . The guidelines are to be applied on a case-by-case basis in order to
determine the reasonableness of each roadblock .
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the roadblock set up by the Butler
County Sheriffs Department was unconstitutional under Edmond , supra, and therefore
any evidence seized pursuant to the search of Buchanon's vehicle should be
suppressed . We affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion that remanded this case back to
the Butler Circuit Court in order to allow Buchanon to withdraw his guilty plea.
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper and Johnstone, JJ ., concur. Graves, J ., dissents by
separate opinion, with Keller and Wintersheimer, JJ ., joining that dissent .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive, Suite 200
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph Kirwan
Coffman & Kirwan
P .O . Box 1359
917 College Street
Bowling Green, KY 42102
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
,$ix~x~tt~efaa~trf of ~t~~~
2001-SC-1056-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-1750
BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT NO. 99-CR-00109
v.
DAVID BUCHANON
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Respectfully, I dissent because this was a reasonable roadblock for a legitimate
public interest, highway safety.
The Court of Appeals panel erred by impermissibly invading the fact-finding
province of the circuit court and by construing too narrowly City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U .S. 32, 121 S.Ct . 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), wherein the United
States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment had been violated because the
city therein had conceded the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoints was
narcotics detection . However, the Court expressly declined to address the
constitutionality of multi-purpose roadblocks in the 6-3 decision . "[W]e need not decide
whether the State may establish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose
of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting
narcotics ." Id. at 47, 121 S .Ct. at 457, n .2 .
By comparison to the narcotics checkpoints considered in Edmond , supra, this
case concerns a "routine roadblock . . . safety check" established by the Butler County
Sheriffs office at the intersection of KY 70 and KY 1117/369 . As was the custom of that
office, the "roadblock/safety check" was operated so as to stop all traffic traveling in
both directions beginning at mid-afternoon on September 5, 1999, for the purpose of
"checking for proper vehicle registration, DUI, drugs, and other violations ." Officers on
the scene were accompanied by a "K-9" unit for the stated purposes of providing
protection, drug detection, as needed, as well as any necessary tracking of persons
attempting flight on foot. Signage warned approaching drivers of a "DUI-DRUG CHECK
AHEAD ."
The Court of Appeals panel further erred in embracing the logic enunciated by
the 2-1 majority in United States v. Huguenin , 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998), disparaging
"mixed-motive checkpoints ." Although Buchanon points out that this Court is bound by
the Sixth Circuit, this case presents different circumstances from the roadblock ruse
repeatedly referred to by the Sixth Circuit majority as a "trap" engendering "fear and
surprise ." Id. a t 561 .
Because it is permissible to establish a valid sobriety check point that has a
secondary or collateral purpose of drug interdiction, I would reverse the Court of
Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the Butler Circuit Court.
Keller, and Wintersheimer, J .J ., join this dissenting opinion .
,$uyrrmr (~vurf of ~irufurhV
2001-SC-1056-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-1750
BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT NO. 99-CR-00109
V.
DAVID BUCHANON
APPELLEE
ORDER AMENDING OPINION
On the Court's own motion, page one of the opinion rendered on December 18,
2003, in the above-styled case is hereby modified by substituting a new page one,
attached hereto, in lieu of page one of the opinion as originally rendered . Said
modification is made to correct a typographical error in the caption, changing the
spelling of "Bultler" to "Butler" and does not affect the holding of the opinion as originally
rendered .
ENTERED : January 12, 2004 .
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