ROBERT C . BLAKEMAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 21, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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ROBERT C. BLAKEMAN
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL F . ISAACS, JUDGE
1999-CR-0038
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Blakeman
of second-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of alcohol and as a first-degree persistent felony offender . He was
sentenced to a total of forty years in prison .
The questions presented are whether it was error not to direct a verdict on the
first-degree wanton endangerment charge ; whether it was error to admit evidence of
other bad acts and whether it was error not to grant a mistrial for the failure of the
prosecution to comply with a discovery order regarding the blood test evidence .
Blakeman first entered a plea of not guilty, but decided to enter into a plea
agreement for each of the four counts in exchange for a recommendation by the
Commonwealth for a concurrent sentence of ten years. In accepting the guilty plea, the
trial judge conducted an extensive colloquy and made findings that the plea was
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily . At his scheduled sentencing hearing,
Blakeman withdrew his guilty plea, asserting that he had been misinformed about
parole eligibility. The trial judge then confirmed that the defendant understood that if he
withdrew the guilty plea he would be facing forty years if convicted at trial. The original
guilty plea was entered in November 1999, the plea bargain occurred on February 8,
2000, the sentencing hearing on April 11, 2000, and the ultimate trial in November
2000.
On October 6, 1999, a serious traffic accident occurred at approximately 1 a.m .
in Paris, Kentucky. Larry Tipton, a night foreman and head of security at a private
company, overheard the traffic accident report on his police radio. Tipton, who had
served for twelve years as a sergeant on the Paris Police Department, testified that he
was aware of the seriousness of the traffic problem and volunteered to assist the police
with traffic control . He was at the intersection directing traffic for approximately 40
minutes when Paris police officer Frakes joined him. Both Tipton and Officer Frakes
had parked their cars with their emergency lights on so as to block traffic. The pair
directed oncoming traffic for about the next 30 minutes without incident.
At approximately 2 :15 a.m ., Officer Perry and the mobile command center of the
Paris police department arrived . The command center was a very large truck similar to
an ambulance which stood over ten feet tall and was equipped with emergency gear.
The command center was parked in between and slightly in front of the other cars . All
the vehicles had emergency lights on. Within moments, Tipton heard another car
coming up the road and told the officers that he would direct one last car and then turn
the entire matter over to them . He walked to the intersection with a flashlight to flag the
oncoming car. Tipton testified that he could not at first see the car, but he could only
hear it. When he finally saw it, the car was not speeding, but was not slowing down.
Tipton stated that he yelled, "He ain't going to stop!" He then "took off running for the
ditch" on the side of the road . Tipton said if he didn't take off running, he felt "sure he
[the driver] would have hit him." When he got up off of the ground, he heard the crash
and saw that the car had rammed into the parked command center. He never saw or
heard the car try to stop .
After the crash, Officer Frakes found Officer Perry lying in the command center
and called for help. He then went to the other vehicle where the driver was still gunning
the engine . Officer Frakes verified this was not a situation where the vehicle's
accelerator was stuck; it was intermittent - the driver was still pumping the gas. The
police officer opened the door of the car and turned off the ignition. As he did, he
discovered several beer cans on the floor boards and detected the odor of alcohol on
the driver. Officer Frakes indicated that the driver had slurred speech and glassy eyes .
When the driver was taken out of the car, he was somewhat belligerent . Both Officer
Frakes and Tipton testified that based on their experience, they believed that the driver
was under the influence of alcohol. The evidence ultimately revealed that Blakeman
was the driver.
Shortly thereafter, Kentucky state police trooper Kirkland responded to the scene
and began his investigation of the crash site . He concluded that Blakeman was driving
between 40 - 50 m.p.h. when he rammed into the command center . The trooper found
no skid marks in the road . He went to hospital and obtained a voluntary blood sample
from Blakeman, who was being very belligerent . The sample was drawn about two and
a half hours after the crash and showed a blood alcohol level of .17.
At trial, Blakeman testified in his own defense and stated that he had no
recollection of the crash and no recollection of being at the hospital. He also testified
that he did not remember seeing Tipton or the lights on the top of the vehicles in the
roadway . Upon being questioned by his own counsel, Blakeman admitted that he was
a convicted felon and had a prior DUI conviction . He explained that the DUI was from 9
years earlier and that he lost control of his car and hit a fence .
Upon cross-examination, Blakeman admitted that he had been drinking whiskey
that night . He also conceded that his lack of memory about the incident may have been
caused by alcohol . The jury found the defendant guilty on all charges. This appeal
followed .
I . Directed Verdict on First-degree Wanton Endangerment
Blakeman argues that it was error to deny his motion for a directed verdict on the
first-degree wanton endangerment charge. He asserts that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that his conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value
of human life or created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury as
required by KRS 508 .060. He maintains that KRS 508 .070, second-degree wanton
endangerment, requires only "substantial danger of physical injury" without any
reference to death or serious physical injury. He believes his conduct did not express
extreme indifference to the value of Tipton's life because there was no conscious lack
of concern that death might ensue .
The trial judge overruled the motion for directed verdict and Blakeman did not
renew his motion at the close of all the evidence, thus the claim is not properly
preserved for appellate review. In order to preserve an issue relating to the sufficiency
of the evidence, the defendant must renew his motion for a directed verdict at the close
of all evidence . Baker v . Commonwealth , Ky., 973 S .W.2d 54 (1988). Here, while
Blakeman did move for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution's case, he did
not renew his motion at the close of all the evidence .
In any event, taking the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, assuming it to be true, and drawing all fair and reasonable inferences
in favor of the Commonwealth, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt.
Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S .W .2d 186 (1991). Appellate review is governed
by the standard stated in Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky ., 660 S.W .2d 3 (1983) . Here,
the evidence established that Blakeman was driving a vehicle between 40 and 50
m .p .h . in a highly intoxicated state . There was evidence of a blood alcohol level of .17
more than two hours after the incident. Immediately after the crash, Blakeman was still
pumping the gas and had several beer cans in the car. He smelled of alcohol, had
slurred speech and glassy eyes. Blakeman failed to observe three emergency vehicles,
each with lights flashing and failed to notice Tipton attempting to flag him to stop. It is a
reasonable inference that an individual who is struck by a vehicle traveling at a rate of
speed between 40 - 50 m.p .h . is very likely to suffer serious physical injury or death. In
this case, Officer Perry was actually struck by the same vehicle and suffered serious
physical injury . There was sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict
of acquittal on wanton endangerment first .
II . Prior Bad Acts
Blakeman contends that evidence of other prior bad acts was improperly
admitted during the trial in violation of KRE 404(b). He claims that the state trooper
made improper statements during his testimony and that the prosecution made
improper remarks during the penalty phase closing arguments .
While explaining that Blakeman was belligerent at the hospital, the trooper
stated, "I know Mr. Blakeman just from the counties that I work . I've had prior dealings
with Mr. Blakeman." He later said, "I believe . . . I happen to live in the same county that
Mr . Blakeman lives in, and so I know him pretty well ."
Blakeman also refers to comments by the Commonwealth's Attorney in the
sentencing phase that "One of these convictions involved the use or possession of
morphine . The cold check he's talking about was an $18,000 cold check. And, now
he's climbing back into the car and doesn't care . There was a domestic dispute with his
girlfriend so he took to the highway with a .17." The Commonwealth introduced the final
judgment in support of the possession charge and the indictment and final judgment in
support of the bad check charge .
Blakeman made no objection to any of the statements when made at trial . He
concedes that neither allegation is preserved for appellate review, but seeks relief on
the basis of palpable error pursuant to RCr 10 .26. In order to permit review on the
basis of palpable error it must be established that there was an error and that such
error was obvious, affected the substantial rights of the defendant and has caused a
manifest injustice. See Brock v. Commonwealth , Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24 (1997); United
States v. Olano , 507 U .S . 725, 113 S .Ct . 1770, 123 L .Ed .2d 508 (1993).
The statements by the trooper do not clearly impute the commission of any
unconnected crimes to the defendant; nor do they tend to show any specific prior bad
acts . The two statements were vague references to the officer's familiarity with
Blakeman, and as such do not constitute a violation of KRE 404(b) . Under no
circumstances do they rise to the level of palpable error. There is no indication that this
testimony affected the verdict in any way. Cf. Pace v. Commonwealth , Ky., 82 S .W .3d
894 (2002).
There was no error in the penalty phase closing argument by the
Commonwealth . In Maxie v. Commonwealth , Ky., 82 S .W .3d 860 (2002), the court
recognized that KRS 532.055(2)(x)(2) permits the Commonwealth to introduce
evidence of the nature of prior offenses during the penalty phase . Here, the evidence
was nothing more than a general description of the prior offenses and did not exceed
the scope of the evidence held admissible in Robinson v . Commonwealth , Ky., 926
S.W .2d 853 (1996). Moreover, it was the defense who introduced these facts during
Blakeman's closing arguments . The Commonwealth was simply rebutting the
arguments that his prior convictions did not support a long sentence.
III. Discovery -Blood Alcohol
Blakeman argues that the trial judge erred by not granting a mistrial because of
the failure of the Commonwealth to comply with a discovery order by virtue of providing
the defense with the blood test results only four days before trial in violation of RCr
7.24. Blakeman claims that this issue is preserved by the pretrial motion for discovery
and a motion to suppress the blood alcohol test based on the alleged late compliance
with the discovery order.
On the morning of trial, a hearing was held on the motion to exclude the blood
alcohol test. Defense counsel claimed that two discovery motions had been filed
without a response and that the test results were only received within the last four days.
The Commonwealth responded that it had produced the report the same day it was
received and that there was no discovery deadline . It contended that Blakeman had
known for sometime that the prosecution intended to introduce evidence of his blood
alcohol and that the discovery had been interrupted by his initial guilty plea as well as
subsequent procedural activities . The trial judge overruled the motion to exclude the
evidence .
The prosecution presented testimony about the blood alcohol test results .
Blakeman did not object to the introduction of such evidence .
A review of the record indicates that there was no motion for a mistrial, only a
motion to exclude evidence . Nor does the record contain a discovery order. Further,
Blakeman never sought a continuance and did not identify what, if anything, would have
been done differently had the report been received earlier. It is within the discretion of
the trial judge to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed
as well as the option of granting a continuance or the prohibition of the introduction of
evidence not previously disclosed . See Neal v. Commonwealth , Ky., 95 S.W .3d 843
(2003); Berry v. Commonwealth , Ky., 782 S .W .2d 625 (1990); RCr 7.24(9) . Our review
of the record does not disclose an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in refusing to
exclude the test result .
Blakeman received a fundamentally fair trial and there was no violation of either
the state or federal constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
P.O . Box 12947
498 Georgetown
St .
Lexington, KY 40508
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Carlton S . Shier
Assistant Attorney General
Michael Harried
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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