CHARLES BARNETT V. LAURA P . WILEY
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CHARLES BARNETT
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-2034-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 2000-D-0010
V.
LAURA P. WILEY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE JOHNSTONE
REVERSING AND REMANDING
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether Appellant, Charles Barnett, and
Appellee, Laura Wiley, were an "unmarried couple" within the meaning of KRS 403.720,
so that Wiley could obtain a Domestic Violence Order ("DVO") against Barnett . We
hold that they were not an "unmarried couple," as defined in KRS 403.720(3) and,
therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals .
On February 21, 2000, Wiley petitioned the Franklin Circuit Court to enter a DVO
against Barnett. In the petition, she alleged that Barnett approached her car, banged
on the window, threatened to kill her, and followed her in his vehicle in a reckless
manner after she drove away. At the hearing on the DVO motion, Wiley testified that
she was not related to Barnett, had no children in common with him, and had never
lived with him . Nonetheless, the trial court granted her petition for a protective order.
Barnett moved to have the petition dismissed on grounds that Wiley did not have
standing to seek a DVO against him, because they were not an "unmarried couple" as
the term is defined by KRS 403.720(3). The trial court summarily denied the motion .
Barnett then filed a motion to reconsider . The trial court again denied the motion, but
this time included conclusions of law. In the order, the trial court reasoned that its
expansive definition of an "unmarried couple" was consistent with the assuredly vital
public policy of protecting and preventing domestic violence .
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's
reasoning and affirmed . In his dissent, Judge Buckingham concluded that the plain
language of the statute could not be stretched to construe a dating relationship as
failing within the definition of an "unmarried couple ." We agree with Judge Buckingham
and, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals' decision .
KRS 403.725 states that "[a]ny family member or member of an unmarried
couple" may file a petition for a protective order under the domestic violence statutes .
"Member of an unmarried couple" is defined as including "each member of an
unmarried couple which allegedly has a child in common, any children of that couple, or
a member of an unmarried couple who are living together or have formerly lived
together ." KRS 403.720(3). There are no Kentucky cases that address the issue of
what the term "living together" means in the context of domestic violence statutes. But
this does not mean we are without guidance.
In their definitive treatise on Kentucky domestic relations law, Justice Keller and
Professor Graham have this to say about the phrase :
Legislatures have generally expanded the definition of
protected parties in response to wider diversity in family
structure. The Kentucky statute does not define "living
together ." Courts give substance to this language, and in
doing so they should focus on the purpose of the statute
rather than technicalities . The point of domestic violence
legislation is to protect victims from harm caused by the
persons whose intimate physical relationship to the victim
increases the danger of harm, either because the parties live
in physical proximity or because the relationship is one
whose intimacy may disable the victim from seeking
protection .
Louise E . Graham and James E . Keller, 15 Kentucky Practice : Domestic Relations
Law, § 5 .1 at 107 (2d ed . West 1997) .
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the domestic violence
statutes should be construed liberally in favor of protecting victims from domestic
violence and preventing future acts of domestic violence . See KRS 500 .030 ("All
provisions of this code shall be liberally construed according to the fair import of their
terms, to promote justice, and to effect the objects of the law."). But the construction
cannot be unreasonable . See Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson County,
Ky ., 873 S.W .2d 575, 577 (1994) ("We are not at liberty to add or subtract from the
legislative enactment nor discover meaning not reasonably ascertainable from the
language used."). The phrase "living together" implies some sort of cohabitation . This
is consistent with the definition of "cohabitation," which means the "fact or state of living
together, especially as partners in life, usually with the suggestion of sexual relations ."
Blacks Law Dictionary (7th ed . 1999) .
A number of courts have addressed the "issue of defining and interpreting the
term 'cohabitation' as it applies to persons charged with committing a crime of violence
pursuant to domestic violence statutes ." Elizabeth Trainor, Cohabitation for the
Purposes of Domestic Violence Statutes , 71 A.L.R. 5th 285, § 2(a) (West Group 2002).
As there is no Kentucky case law on what constitutes proof of "cohabitation" or "living
together," we turn to these cases for guidance. See Brown v. Commonwealth , Ky.
App., 40 S .W.3d 873, 876 (1999) .
In State v. Kellogg , 542 N .W .2d 514 (Iowa 1996), Kellogg was charged with
domestic abuse assault under the Iowa penal code . The applicable statutes defined
the crime in terms of assault involving domestic abuse. Id . at 516 . In turn, "domestic
abuse" was defined in terms of "an assault between family or household members who
resided together at the time of the assault ." Id . And, finally, "family or household
members" were defined as "spouses, persons cohabitating, parents or other persons
related by consanguinity or affinity ." Id . The trial court instructed the jury that
it
cohabitating means dwelling together or living in the same place ." Id . At issue on
appeal was whether this instruction was correct . On review, the Kelloqq court
undertook to determine the meaning of "cohabitating" as it was used in the statute to
decide this issue.
Relying on dictionary definitions of the term, as well as Iowa case law interpreting
it within the context of divorce law, the Kellogg court held that the trial court's instruction
was too broad :
As instructed by the court that "cohabiting" means "dwelling
or living together in the same place," a jury finding that
persons were mere roommates or lived in the same
apartment building would be sufficient to support a
conviction . We do not find any statutory evidence that the
legislature intended this breadth of application from its
enactment of the Domestic Abuse Act.
Kellogg , 542 N .W .2d at 518 . In reversing the trial court, the Kellogg court provided
some direction for the trial court on retrial :
While proof of a sexual relationship between the
parties is not required to establish cohabitation, it is
nevertheless a factor for jury consideration . Two California
cases are instructive on this point. In People v. Ballard , 203
Cal . App . 3d 311, 249 Cal . Rptr. 806 (1988), and People v.
Holifield , 205 Cal. App. 3d 993, 252 Cal . Rptr. 729, 731
(1988), the California Court of Appeals examined a domestic
abuse statute similar to Iowa's in the face of a constitutional
challenge by the defendant that the provisions were void for
vagueness in that they failed to set out a precise definition of
cohabitation . In Ballard , the court upheld a trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury that cohabitation required a finding
of sexual relationship . Ballard then noted the purpose of the
statute was to widen the protections previously granted by
the "wife beating" statute to protect the large numbers of
couples who live as husband and wife without the formal
aspect of marriage .
In Holifield , the California court further clarified this
interpretation and explained the relationship at issue need
not rise to the level of a de facto marriage . In doing so the
court noted the particular difficulty involved in determining
whether a relationship is equivalent to a marriage .
A police officer, district attorney, court and jury
will have far less trouble determining whether a
significant live-together relationship exists
than determining whether the relationship is
quasi-marital, particularly when there exists
such uncertainty over which rights, duties and
obligations of marriage are ordinary in our
society .
The court then approved the following indicia for the
jury to consider (nonexclusively) in determining whether a
couple was cohabiting :
1 . Sexual relations between the parties while
sharing the same living quarters .
2 . Sharing of income or expenses.
3 . Joint use or ownership of property.
4. Whether the parties hold themselves out as
husband and wife .
5. The continuity of the relationship .
6 . The length of the relationship .
These six indicia, being nonexclusive, accord with our
prior interpretations of the term cohabitation and are also
consistent with common understanding of the term cohabit
and the intent of the legislature in enacting chapter 236 and
its amendments . We adopt them as appropriate
considerations for making a factual determination as to
whether a couple is cohabiting under the umbrella of chapter
236 .
Kellogg , 542 N .W.2d at 518 (internal spot cites omitted) .
Likewise, we believe that the six factors discussed in Kellog+
cLare relevant in
determining whether two people are "living together" within the meaning of KRS
403 .720. But under the plain language of the statute, there must be, at a minimum,
proof that the petitioner seeking a DVO shares or has shared living quarters with the
respondent before a finding can be made that the two are an "unmarried couple" under
KRS 403.725 . Because there is no proof in the record that Barnett and Wiley ever
shared living quarters, either permanently or on a part-time or temporary basis, we hold
that the trial court erred in issuing a DVO against Charles Barnett .
Therefore, we reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand this case
to the Franklin Family Court with instructions to vacate the DVO order against Barnett .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Rodney McDaniel
236 West Main Street
P. O. Box 1788
Frankfort, KY 40602-1788
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Rick Eugene Sparks
Assistant Franklin County Attorney
P. O . Box 73
Frankfort, KY 40602
COUNSEL FOR KENTUCKY DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE:
Lisa Ann Beran
Kentucky Domestic Violence Association
P. O . Box 356
Frankfort, KY 40602
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