EWELL COCHRAN V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2001-SC-0738-MR
EWELL COCHRAN
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APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
2000-CR-0076
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE JOHNSTONE
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Ewell Cochran, was convicted of three counts of first-degree burglary,
one count of second-degree burglary, and ten counts of third-degree burglary . He was
sentenced to a total of fifty years' imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of
right. Ky . Const. § 110(2)(b) . On appeal, he argues that his conviction for seconddegree burglary must be reversed because the house of a recently deceased owner
and sole resident is not a "dwelling" within the meaning of the burglary statutes .
Further, he argues that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed to
excuse a juror for cause. Finally, he argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing because the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior conviction that was
over thirty years old . For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the
Rowan Circuit Court .
1.
Dwelling
Cochran argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on second-degree
burglary in connection with the break-in and theft of items from one Junior Caskey's
trailer home. Caskey had died one week prior to the break-in and, therefore, Cochran
argues that the trailer was not a "dwelling" within the meaning of the burglary statutes .
We disagree .
"A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when, with the intent to
commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling ." KRS
511 .030(1) (emphasis added) . "Dwelling" is defined as "a building which is usually
occupied by a person lodging therein ." KRS 511 .010(2). Under this definition, a
building does not have to be occupied at the time of the crime charged to constitute a
"dwelling." See Haynes v. Commonwealth , Ky., 657 S.W .2d 948, 952 (1983) ; 13 Am.
Jur. 2d Burglary § 8 (online edition updated May 2003) . "In cases where an occupant is
temporarily absent, a dwelling retains its character as such if the building was adapted
for occupancy at the time of the wrongful entry, the occupant intended to return, and, on
the date of the entry, a person could have occupied the building overnight ." People v.
Barney , 294 A.D.2d 811, 812, 742 N .Y.S.2d 451, 453 (N .Y.A.D. 4 Dept. 2002)
(construing a New York statute that defines "dwelling" identical to Kentucky's statutory
definition of the same term), affd , 742 N .Y.S .2d 451 (N .Y. 2003).
Under Cochran's argument, Caskey's death created a permanent absence from
the trailer, which precluded a finding that Caskey intended to return to the trailer. But,
the term "occupant" is broader in meaning than "owner" or "resident." For example, in
Haynes, we held that, despite the death of the owner of a house, the house that the
appellant wrongfully entered was still a "dwelling" based on its occasional occupancy by
the owner's son and evidence that the house was not empty and had not been
abandoned at the time of the unlawful entry. Haynes, 657 S.W .2d at 952. Therefore,
whether a building is a "dwelling" turns on its capacity, at the time of unlawful entry, of
being occupied overnight and the intent of lawful or authorized persons to use it as
such .
The record shows that Caskey's trailer was still furnished, had utility service, and
had not been abandoned . While there was no evidence that anyone actually occupied
the trailer after Caskey's death, cases from other jurisdictions hold that-in cases of a
temporary vacancy created by the death of a building's sole resident-a building does
not lose "dwelling" status when the building (1) has been used as a residence in the
"immediate past," (2) is capable of occupancy at the time of unlawful entry, and (3) has
not been abandoned . Barney, 294 A .D.2d at 813 ; State v. Edwards , 589 N .W .2d 807,
811 (Minn . Ct . App . 1999). This rule is consistent with the purpose of the burglary
statutes to "encompass all unlawful intrusions which are accompanied by alarm and
danger to occupants ." Litton v. Commonwealth , Ky., 597 S .W .2d 616, 617 (1980)
(quoting the 1971 commentary to the penal code) .
The time immediately following a person's death is often hectic and chaotic for
the deceased's family, friends, and loved ones . It is a time of gathering, which often
means travel for many of those coming together to remember and to share their grief
and sorrow. Use of the deceased's home as a place of temporary residence in these
circumstances is common and is to be expected . It should not be discounted by
miscreants who would seek to take advantage of the misfortune of others . Due to the
emotional stress underlying the necessity of such temporary occupancy, the need is
great to offer strong protection against the "alarm and danger" inherent in unlawful entry
into a dwelling . Thus, given the potential for occupancy and the sensitivities of the
potential occupants, it is reasonable to construe "dwelling" to include buildings that
have been occupied in the immediate past by a recently deceased resident . Therefore,
we hold that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on second-degree burglary .
11 .
Failure to Excuse a Juror for Cause
Cochran argues that an unidentified juror (Juror X) should have been excused
for cause based on her relationship with the Commonwealth's Attorney . We disagree .
According to the record, Juror X volunteered during voirdire that the
Commonwealth's Attorney had "represented [her] in a case in front of the Grand Jury."
A discussion at the bench disclosed that Juror X was a crime victim and that the
Commonwealth's Attorney office "worked extensively on the presentation of the case ."
Juror X, however, worked primarily with the Commonwealth's Attorney victim advocate,
rather than with the Commonwealth's Attorney himself. Moreover, Juror X and the
Commonwealth's Attorney only spoke with each other a couple of times in connection
with the case . Finally, Juror X stated affirmatively that she could put aside her past
dealings with the Commonwealth's Attorney and that she could be fair and impartial.
Some relationships between a potential juror and an attorney, party, victim, or
witness are so close that the implied bias from the relationship "transgresses the
concept of a fair and impartial jury." Sholler v. Commonwealth , Ky., 969 S .W .2d 706,
709 (1998). The relationship here is not one of them . Thus, we examine the trial
court's decision for abuse of discretion or clear error. Id. at 708. A careful review of the
record reveals neither an abuse of discretion, nor a clear error by the trial court in
denying the motion to excuse Juror X for cause .
111111.
Admission of the 31-Year-Old Conviction
Finally, Cochran argues that the trial court erred in admitting a conviction from
1970 in the penalty phase . Again, we disagree .
We begin by noting that this error is not preserved and is subject to the palpable
error rule of RCr 10 .26 .
Cochran starts with a concession that there are no time restrictions on the age
of convictions that can be introduced in the penalty phase under the so-called truth-insentencing statute, KRS 532.055 . See McKinnon v. Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 892
S.W .2d 615, 616 (1995). Cochran, however, argues that an outer limit was implied in
Grenke v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 796 S .W.2d 858 (1990) . Presumably, Cochran's
argument is that the relevancy of a conviction lessens with time and makes exclusion of
the evidence of the conviction more likely under KRE 403. Indeed, this is confirmed by
McKinnon:
Trial judges are vested with reasonable discretion in determining whether
to admit evidence of prior convictions during the sentencing phase.
Grenke makes it clear that there is no "bright line" rule to be applied by
the trial court during this balancing test. Having reviewed the arguments
and evidence before us, we are unable to conclude that the trial judge's
ruling was clearly erroneous or that he abused his discretion in this
instance .
McKinnon , 892 S .W .2d at 616.
In this case, the trial court was not given an opportunity to exercise its discretion
to determine whether the conviction should have been excluded under KRE 403. Even
if the conviction-which was for armed robbery-should have been excluded, the
inclusion of it in the penalty phase did not rise to the level of palpable error.
Additionally, Cochran argues that introduction of the conviction resulted in
palpable error because it included a recitation of defense counsel's motion for a
continuance . He argues that this information went beyond evidence of the general
nature of the crime and was reversible error under Robinson v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
926 S .W .2d 853, 855 (1996). Even if the information went beyond what is allowed by
Robinson , the information itself concerned the substance of the anticipated and
exculpatory testimony of a defense witness . Thus, the information is not particularly
prejudicial and certainly not unduly so. If the information regarding the motion for a
continuance was admitted in error, the error was not palpable .
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Rowan Circuit Court is
affirmed .
Lambert, CJ ; Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur. Cooper, J ., concurs in
part and dissents in part by separate opinion, with Keller and Stumbo, JJ., joining that
separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
N . Susan Roncarti
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
supreme
~ourf of ~rufurhV
2001-SC-0738-MR
EWELL COCHRAN
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
2000-CR-0076
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
I concur in the affirmance of all of Appellant's convictions except his conviction of
burglary in the second degree under Count 15 of the indictment. That charge dealt with
the burglary of the former dwelling of Junior Caskey, deceased .
An additional (third) element which distinguishes third-degree
burglary, a Class D felony, from second-degree burglary, a Class C felony,
is the nature of the property in or upon which the offense occurred . If the
property is a "building," the offense is third-degree burglary, KRS
511 .040(1) ; if it is a "dwelling," the offense is second-degree burglary,
KRS 511 .030(1) . The definitions of "building" and "dwelling" are similar,
but not identical . A "building" is defined, inter alia, as "any structure . . .
[w]here any person lives," KRS 511 .010(1)(a); whereas, a "dwelling" is
defined as "a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging
therein ." KRS 511 .010(2). Thus, every dwelling is a building, but every
building is not a dwelling . Since the burglary of a building is a Class D
felony, KRS 511 .040(2), and the burglary of a dwelling is a Class C felony,
KRS 511 .030(2), the legislature obviously considered the distinction to be
significant and the burglary of a dwelling to be more grievous than the
burglary of a mere building.
Colwell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S .W.3d 721, 725 -26 (2000). Obviously, the
legislature did not classify the burglary of a dwelling as a more serious offense than the
burglary of a building because of its structure or contents . Rather, the higher
classification reflects the greater danger inherent in the burglary of a building "usually
occupied by a person lodging therein," i .e . , that the person usually lodging therein might
be killed or injured while defending against the depredation .
The evidence was undisputed that Junior Caskey died an accidental death
approximately one week prior to Appellant's unlawful entry into his residence . Despite
the majority opinion's gratuitous judicial notice that bereaved out-of-town relatives
sometimes gather at their decedent's former residence while attending the decedent's
funeral, no evidence was introduced in this case that Junior Caskey had any out-of-town
relatives, that his funeral was still pending, that anyone had even entered the residence
or used it for any purpose between the date of his death and the date of the burglary, or
that anyone intended to use it as a residence . No member of Caskey's family or anyone
else connected with him testified at Appellant's trial . Detective Anderson testified that
he learned of the burglary from an anonymous tip . Kevin Easterling, Appellant's
accomplice in all of the burglaries, testified for the Commonwealth that he and Appellant
targeted Caskey's former residence precisely because they knew he was deceased and
because they had heard a rumor that Caskey had hidden $250,000 .00 in the residence
before his death . (The burglary failed to produce the rumored cache.)
There are no Kentucky cases directly on point. In Haynes v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 657 S .W.2d 948 (1983), the owner of the burgled residence was deceased but the
owner's son had continued to reside in the residence on an intermittent basis . In a
related case, however, we held in Bray v. Commonwealth , Ky., 68 S.W.3d 375 (2002), a
defendant convicted of arson in the first degree, KRS 513.020, was entitled to an
instruction on arson in the second degree, KRS 513.030, as a lesser included offense
on evidence that the persons whose bodies were found in the burned residence were
already deceased when the fire was set. Id . at 385 . See also State v. Ward , 379
S .E.2d 251, 253-54 (N.C. Ct. App . 1989) (arsoned mobile home was not a dwelling
since owner-occupant had died two days before the fire was set).
The majority opinion primarily relies on State v. Edwards , 589 N.W .2d 807 (Minn .
Ct. App . 1999), and People v. Barney , 742 N .Y.S .2d 451 (N .Y. App. Div. 2002) . Though
I disagree with results reached in those cases, each is factually distinguishable from the
case sub iudice. In Edwards , the occupant had been murdered and her body remained
hidden in a closet during the five days the defendants used her residence as a "crack
house ." The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the residence retained its character
as a "dwelling" because it had been used as a residence in the "immediate past" and
had not been abandoned. 589 N .W .2d at 811 . In Barnev , the lodger had been dead
two days but the utilities were still connected and there was food in the refrigerator,
evidence that the residence was at least ready for habitation at the time of the burglary.
No such evidence was introduced in this case. More importantly, there was no
evidence that the defendant in Barnev was aware that the owner-occupant of the
residence was deceased so that his mens rea was no less than if the former resident
had still been alive. Interestingly, the majority relies on the following test adopted in
Barnev :
In cases where an occupant is temporarily absent, a dwelling retains its
character as such if the building was adapted for occupancy at the time of
the wrongful entry, the occupant intended to return , and, on the date of the
entry, a person could have occupied the building overnight .
Id . at 453 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) . Obviously, Junior Caskey's absence
was not temporary and he could not have intended to return . Although there was
evidence that his furniture had not been removed, no witness testified that the utilities
were still connected or that the building was otherwise habitable .
In People v. Ramos, 60 Cal.Rptr. 2d 523 (Cal . Ct. App. 1997), the owneroccupant of the burgled residence had died of natural causes prior to the burglary and
his dead body was found still in his bed by the burglar during the course of the burglary .
The California Court of Appeal succinctly held that "a dead body is not using a house for
a 'dwelling' and there is no way to say that a dead man is going to return or that he has
an 'intent' of any kind ." Id . at 524. In People v. Hider, 351 N .W.2d 905 (Mich . Ct . App .
1984), the owner had died the day before the burglary . Michigan's burglary statute
defined an "occupied dwelling house" as a building "habitually used as a place of
abode ." Holding that the building was not a "dwelling house," the Court stated:
Mrs. Clark's house was not an "occupied dwelling house" at the time of the
crime . Mrs. Clark's absence can hardly be considered temporary and
there was no evidence that anyone had shared her home and intended to
either remain in it or to return to it after a temporary absence.
Id. at 908 . The same holds true in the case sub iudice.
Though Appellant could properly have been convicted of third-degree burglary
under Count 15 of the indictment, he was improperly convicted of second-degree
burglary . Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it affirms that
conviction.
Keller, and Stumbo, JJ ., join this opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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