TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC. VS. ARNOLD (BRENT), ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 12, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2011-CA-000556-WC
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING,
KENTUCKY, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-08-00674
BRENT ARNOLD;
HON. RICHARD M. JOINER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
and WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER, AND MOORE, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded Brent Arnold
temporary total disability benefits (TTD) from May 10, 2007, to May 8, 2009, and
assigned Arnold a 6% permanent disability rating based on a finding of a
cumulative work trauma injury Arnold sustained to his right shoulder during the
course of his employment with appellee, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. Following the ALJ’s award, Toyota petitioned the ALJ to reconsider the
period of TTD specified in the award, arguing:
[T]he evidence was clear, as acknowledged in the
Opinion, that [Arnold] did not leave work on May 10,
2007 as a result of his shoulder condition, and the record
is devoid of any medical proof which states he was
unable to work due to his shoulder at that time. In order
to qualify for temporary total disability benefits, not only
must [Arnold’s] condition be such that he is not at
maximum medical improvement, it must prevent him
from a return to employment. KRS [Kentucky Revised
Statutes] 342.001(11)(a).
There is simply no evidence to support the proposition
that [Arnold’s] shoulder condition was keeping him from
work at the time temporary total disability benefits were
initially awarded under the opinion. [Arnold] left Toyota
on May 10, 2007, stating in his request for leave that he
had to care for his pregnant wife, and then filed another
request for leave due to extreme stress. He applied for
and received short term disability as a result of these nonwork related conditions. No physician took him off of
work due to any shoulder abnormalities at that time.
Awarding temporary total disability benefits to [Arnold]
because he left work to care for his pregnant wife is a
patent error on the face of the opinion.
If temporary total disability benefits are awarded for the
shoulder, the benefits should start from the date of
surgery, as there is no other medical record which
indicates the Plaintiff was unable to work because of his
shoulder at any earlier period. That surgical date was
November 12, 2008. The Opinion should be amended to
reflect onset of temporary total disability from that date
through May 8, 2009.
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In essence, Toyota argued that Arnold had left work on May 10, 2007,
when he applied for family medical leave to care for his wife and children, not due
to his medical condition. The ALJ declined to amend the part of his order relating
to Arnold’s entitlement to TTD and denied Toyota’s petition. Toyota offered the
same argument on appeal before the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board
affirmed, holding that substantial evidence of record—and particularly Arnold’s
own testimony—properly supported the ALJ’s award of TTD. The particulars of
the ALJ’s order and the Board’s opinion will be discussed in our analysis.
Toyota now appeals to this Court, arguing that the ALJ’s findings
relating to Arnold’s award of TTD are inadequate as a matter of law, and that in
affirming it, the Board engaged in unauthorized fact-finding. Because we agree
with Toyota on both of these points, we reverse the ALJ’s determination regarding
Arnold’s entitlement to TTD and remand this matter for the ALJ to reconsider and
support his determination with adequate findings of fact.
As noted, among the several matters presented in this case, the ALJ
was required to determine whether the condition of Arnold’s shoulder temporarily
and totally disabled Arnold and, if so, for how long. “Temporary total disability”
is statutorily defined as “the condition of an employee who has not reached
maximum medical improvement from an injury and has not reached a level of
improvement that would permit a return to employment[.]” KRS 342.0011(11)(a).
Thus, in order to be entitled to temporary total disability benefits, Arnold was
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required to prove that for a definite period of time his shoulder 1) had not reached
maximum medical improvement; and 2) had not improved enough to allow Arnold
to return to work. Magellan Behavioral Health v. Helms, 140 S.W.3d 579, 581
(Ky. App. 2004). “The second prong of KRS 342.0011(11)(a) operates to deny
eligibility to TTD to individuals who, though not at maximum medical
improvement, have improved enough following an injury that they can return to
work despite not yet being fully recovered.” Id. And, this second prong is the
focus of Toyota’s appeal. Toyota contends that the ALJ made no adequate
findings demonstrating that Arnold’s shoulder injury prevented him from returning
to work between the date he stopped working, May 10, 2007, and the date of his
shoulder surgery, November 12, 2008.
Per KRS 342.275, an ALJ must support his “award, order, or decision
. . . with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and any other matters
pertinent to the question at issue.” If an ALJ’s order fails to make the statutorily
mandated findings of fact, the ALJ’s order contains a patent error. Eaton Axle
Corp. v. Nally, 688 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Ky. 1985). Whether an appellate body
reviews this type of patent error, however, depends entirely upon whether the
complaining party has requested additional findings and clarification from the ALJ
through a petition for reconsideration, per KRS 342.281. In the absence of a
petition for reconsideration, inadequate, incomplete, or even inaccurate findings of
fact on the part of the ALJ will not justify reversal on appeal. Eaton Axle Corp.,
688 S.W.2d at 338. Instead, appellate review of the ALJ’s findings will be limited
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to a determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record that
supports the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion. Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276, 279
(Ky. App. 1979).
Conversely, if a party does file a petition for reconsideration asking
the ALJ to remedy inadequate, incomplete, or inaccurate findings of fact regarding
an essential issue and the ALJ summarily denies that petition, an appellate body
will review whether the ALJ made adequate findings of fact. See, e.g., Shields v.
Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company, 634 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. App. 1982).
And, where the appellate body determines that the ALJ’s findings on an essential
issue are inadequate, the appellate body will reverse and remand for additional
findings regardless of whether the record contained substantial evidence that could
have otherwise supported the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion. Id.; see also Cook v.
Paducah Recapping Serv., 694 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1985).
Entitlement to TTD is a question of fact. Halls Hardwood Floor Co.
v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Ky. App. 2000) (citing W.L. Harper
Construction Company, Inc. v. Baker, 858 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ky. App. 1993)).
Toyota properly raised the issue of whether the ALJ made adequate findings of fact
regarding Arnold’s entitlement to TTD by filing a petition for reconsideration. The
ALJ summarily denied Toyota’s petition. As such, the adequacy of the ALJ’s
factual findings regarding TTD is squarely presented for our review. If the ALJ’s
findings were inadequate, we need not address whether the record contained
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s ultimate decision.
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That said, the question of whether a finding of fact is adequate or
sufficient depends upon the case. Passmore v. Lowes Home Center, 2008 WL
5274855 (Ky. 2008)(2008-SC-000224-WC), at *2.1 However, Kentucky
precedent has consistently held that a finding of fact must be, at minimum,
sufficient to apprise the parties of the basis for the ALJ’s decision and to permit a
meaningful appellate review. See Big Sandy Community Action Program v.
Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1973); Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Yates, 743
S.W.2d 47 (Ky. App. 1988); Shields, 634 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. App. 1982). Our courts
will reverse an ALJ’s finding on an issue involving “highly controverted
evidence,” where “the lower decisions were insufficiently clear for the reviewing
body to determine what weight, if any, the fact-finder had given to particular
evidence.” Carnes v. Parton Bros. Contracting, Inc., 171 S.W.3d 60, 67, n. 19
(Ky. App. 2005).
In Shields, for example, an ALJ found that a claimant suffered from
pneumoconiosis. The ALJ’s finding on that issue stated only
[t]hat on or about March 30, 1979, the plaintiff became
totally and permanently disabled as a result of the
occupational disease of coal worker’s pneumoconiosis
and/or silicosis arising out of and in the course of his
employment as a coal miner. The claimant is 62 years
old, with a 7th grade educational level, and has been
exposed to the hazards of the disease for about 39 years
as a coal miner.
1
We find Passmore to be persuasive authority in this case and proper to cite as it fulfills the
criteria of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.28(4).
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This Court observed that Kentucky precedent requires “that an administrative
agency must make findings of basic evidentiary facts, as opposed to a simple
statement which reaches a conclusion and quotes the words of a statute[.]” Id. at
443. In remanding this issue for additional findings, this Court stated that
[t]he question whether claimant was suffering from
pneumoconiosis was sharply disputed by the physicians
who testified in the case; and inasmuch as a finding of
the existence of pneumoconiosis requires some expertise,
all parties should have the benefit of knowing the factual
basis for such a determination.
Id. at 444.
Here, the ALJ’s order states only the following with regard to
Arnold’s entitlement to TTD:
What is the appropriate period of Temporary Total
Disability? Temporary total disability is defined in the
Act as “the condition of an employee who has not
reached maximum medical improvement from an injury
and has not reached a level of improvement that would
permit a return to employment.” KRS 342.0011(11)(a).
Here again, I accept the determination of Dr. [Timothy]
Prince that maximum medical improvement of the
shoulder condition was achieved by May 8, 2009. I
conclude that during the time from the date he stopped
work, May 10, 2007, until the date of May 8, 2009, Brent
Arnold had not reached maximum medical improvement
and had not reached a level of improvement that would
permit a return to employment. Where an employee has
not reached maximum medical improvement [MMI] and
faces restrictions that preclude the employee from
returning to his customary work or work that the
employee was performing at the time of injury, it is
permissible to find a temporary total disability for the
duration of those conditions. Central Kentucky Steel v.
Wise, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 657 (2000).
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In sum, this portion of the ALJ’s order concludes that Arnold reached
MMI on May 8, 2009. The record contains Dr. Prince’s determination to this
effect; the ALJ cites to Dr. Prince’s determination for factual support; and no party
argues that it was improper for the ALJ to do so. The ALJ’s order also concludes
that Arnold’s shoulder prevented him from working as of May 10, 2007. But, the
ALJ’s order is insufficiently clear for this Court to determine what weight, if any,
the ALJ gave to any particular evidence as a factual basis for this determination.
Dr. Prince offered no opinion that Arnold’s shoulder caused Arnold to be
temporarily and totally disabled as of May 10, 2007, and the ALJ merely supports
this latter determination by quoting KRS 342.0011(11)(a). Most strikingly, this
determination actually appears to conflict with the very order upon which it is
written. On page 9 of that order, the ALJ summarized the evidence of record,
stating:
When Mr. Arnold first left his job[,] there was no
indication from the medical records provided that he was
not working because of neck or shoulder problems. The
primary diagnosis was depression, stress, and anxiety.
In its own review, the Board decided that the ALJ’s conclusion that
Arnold’s shoulder prevented him from returning to work as of May 10, 2007, was
adequate. In its affirming opinion, the Board reasoned:
With regard to the period of TTD, the ALJ clearly
indicated his belief Arnold had not reached MMI and had
not reached a level of improvement that would permit a
return to employment from May 10, 2007, until he
reached MMI on May 8, 2009, following recovery from
surgery. The ALJ noted that, where an employee has not
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reached MMI and faces restriction precluding the
employee from returning to his customary work or work
the employee was performing at the time of the injury, it
is permissible to find temporary total disability for the
duration of those conditions. The ALJ apparently
accepted Arnold’s testimony [that] the problem arose
with the switch to the assembly job in April 2007 and
progressively worsened until May, at which time, Arnold
ceased working. The claimant’s own testimony may
constitute substantial evidence regarding his ability to
labor and his retained physical capacity. Carte v. Loretto
Motherhouse Infirmary, 19 S.W.3d 122 (Ky. App. 2000).
The ALJ may give weight to a claimant’s own testimony
regarding his retained physical capacity and occupational
disability. Hush v. Abrams, 584 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1979).
Arnold’s testimony further indicates the stress and
depression he was having at the time he went off work
was a result of not being able to keep up with the pace on
the assembly line as a result of his shoulder condition.
The ALJ could reasonably conclude restrictions assessed
by Dr. [Kaveh] Sajadi limiting Arnold to no
lifting/pushing, and pulling more than two pounds with
the right arm were reasonable restrictions from the time
of injury until Arnold recovered from the surgery.
Further, the ALJ could reasonably conclude Arnold was
precluded from performing repetitive work with his right
upper extremity for the duration of the period based on
the restriction of avoiding repetitive work with the right
upper extremity assessed by Dr. [Warren] Bilkey.
For the duration of the period in question, Arnold was
receiving treatment for conditions related to the work
injury. There is no indication Arnold’s condition
continued to worsen after he ceased working. The ALJ
could reasonably conclude Arnold was a surgical
candidate during the entirety of the period and, without
undergoing the surgery, was unable to perform the
repetitive activities of his job. Arnold testified his work
on the assembly line involved 500 to 600 automobiles per
shift. Again, we note Dr. [Ray] Wechman took Arnold
off work on May 15, 2007, as a result of stress and
depression, which Arnold testified was a result of his
inability to keep pace with his work. Thus, even though
Arnold may not have asserted a claim for permanent
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income benefits as a result of his stress and depression,
the ALJ could reasonably find Arnold initially left work
on May 15, 2007, as a result of a condition related to his
work. There being substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ’s award of the period of TTD, we are
without authority to disturb the award.
(Emphasis added.)
The issue presented in this matter, however, is the adequacy of the
findings that the ALJ actually made regarding whether Arnold’s shoulder rendered
Arnold unable to return to work as of May 10, 2007. The issue is not whether
substantial evidence of record, or any reasonable inferences that might have been
drawn from it, could have supported the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion on that issue.
There is no indication that the ALJ chose to assign any weight, in the context of
this issue, to Arnold’s testimony or any evidence relating to Drs. Sajadi, Bilkey, or
Wechman. In that light, the Board’s myriad insights regarding what the ALJ might
reasonably have concluded from that evidence are inconsistent with the Board’s
function; taken as a whole, they amount to additional, unauthorized fact-finding.
This, in spite of the fact that the Board itself acknowledged in its own opinion,
shortly before making these findings, that
[t]he Board as an appellate tribunal may not usurp the
ALJ’s role as fact-finder by superimposing its own
appraisals as to the weight and credibility or noting
reasonable inferences that otherwise could have been
drawn from the evidence. Whittaker v. Rowland, 998
S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1999).
(Emphasis added.)
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Moreover, the Board’s opinion ignores that this evidence, along with
other evidence of record, “would also have permitted other reasonable inferences”
as to why Arnold stopped working on May 10, 2007. Passmore, 2008 WL
5274855, at *2. With regard to Arnold’s testimony allowing for a “reasonable
inference” that his shoulder caused him to be temporarily and totally disabled
beginning on that date, even the ALJ’s order notes, to the contrary, that when
Arnold saw Dr. Wechman on May 23, 2007, Arnold stated:
The last day I worked was 5/15, when I left after two
hours.[2] I have not worked since. I have not seen an
EAP. I spoke with CIGNA’s representative yesterday
finally. I feel better when I am sleeping, a bit better. If I
am sitting on the back porch not thinking about anything,
I feel a little better. I feel at times like I’ve lost control of
everything. I’ve never cared for this type of work that I
am doing. I put up with it for ten years so I don’t know
why it is bothering me now.
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, the record contains two applications for medical
leave that Arnold filed with Toyota, where Arnold explained that he did not work
on May 10, 2007, because he “[h]ad to care for [his] wife and children, due to [his]
wife being sick from a migraine [h]eadache and not able to take medication due to
pregnancy,” and that he did not expect to return to work until May 16, 2007, due to
his own symptoms of “[e]xtreme stress [and] depression per doctor diagnosis.”
The Board also emphasizes that “Dr. Wechman took Arnold off work
on May 15, 2007,” but Dr. Wechman did so due to “stress and depression.” When
Dr. Wechman evaluated Arnold’s physical condition at that time, his report noted
2
Although Arnold worked for two hours on May 15, 2007, the parties agree that Arnold
effectively stopped working on May 10, 2007.
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no abnormalities with Arnold’s head or neck, and, as it relates to Arnold’s
shoulder, noted only that Arnold had “good muscular coordination and strength
bilaterally.”
The Board’s opinion also emphasizes that “The ALJ could reasonably
conclude restrictions assessed by Dr. Sajadi limiting Arnold to no lifting/pushing,
and pulling more than two pounds with the right arm were reasonable restrictions
from the time of injury until Arnold recovered from the surgery.” However, Dr.
Sajadi did not actually evaluate Arnold until October 2, 2007, which is
approximately five months after Arnold stopped working. And, while Dr. Sajadi
did assign restrictions relating to Arnold’s right shoulder, he assigned those
restrictions for a condition of Arnold’s shoulder which Dr. Sajadi believed was not
work related. Dr. Sajadi stated as much in a February 29, 2008 report.
Finally, the Board’s opinion states that “the ALJ could reasonably
conclude Arnold was precluded from performing repetitive work with his right
upper extremity for the duration of the period based on the restriction of avoiding
repetitive work with the right upper extremity assessed by Dr. Bilkey.” Dr. Bilkey
did opine that “the onset of Mr. Arnold’s pain problems is due to repetitive work
activities that occur [sic] during the time period from 5/27/06 through 5/27/08.”
However, Dr. Bilkey did not evaluate Arnold until September 16, 2008, and he
arrived at his restrictions by resorting to and incorporating the restrictions assigned
by Dr. Sajadi. As noted, contrary to Dr. Bilkey’s opinion, Dr. Sajadi assigned
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those restrictions for what he believed was a non-work-related injury to Arnold’s
shoulder.
In short, the issue of whether Arnold’s shoulder injury prevented
Arnold from returning to work between May 10, 2007, and the date of his surgery,
November 12, 2008, was sharply disputed. And, to paraphrase Passmore, 2008
WL 5274855, at *3, Toyota was entitled to be certain that the ALJ considered and
understood all of the relevant evidence when the ALJ found that Arnold’s shoulder
injury prevented Arnold from returning to work as of May 10, 2007. The ALJ has
failed to make clear when summarizing the evidence what, if anything,
demonstrated that Arnold was unable to work beginning May 10, 2007, due to his
shoulder, and even the ALJ’s own order appears to contradict that notion. It is
impossible under the circumstances to determine whether the ALJ’s finding of
TTD was the product of reasonable inferences based upon a consideration and
accurate understanding of all of the evidence. As such, the decision of the Board is
reversed, and this claim is remanded to the ALJ to reconsider and make additional
findings regarding this issue.
CLAYTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KELLER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KELLER, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent because I
believe the majority's opinion alters the responsibility placed on the ALJ. As noted
by the majority, an ALJ is required to "support his 'award, order, or decision . . .
with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and any other matters
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pertinent to the question at issue.'" KRS 342.275. However, as the Supreme Court
of Kentucky held in Big Sandy Community Action Program v. Chaffins, 502
S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1973), "KRS 342.275 requires nothing more than an award,
findings of fact, and rulings of law. It is not incumbent upon the [ALJ] to provide
for the record a discussion and analysis of either the evidence or the law." Id. at
531.
An ALJ must make two factual findings before awarding TTD
benefits. First, an ALJ must find that the claimant "has not reached maximum
medical improvement from an injury." Next, an ALJ must find that the claimant
"has not reached a level of improvement that would permit a return to
employment." KRS 342.0011(11)(a). The ALJ herein made those findings of fact.
That is all he was required to do. While I agree with Toyota, the majority, and by
inference, the Board, that it would have been better had the ALJ specifically
pointed to the evidence that supported these findings of fact, he was not required to
do so.
The majority cites to Shields v. Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining
Company, 634 S.W. 2d 440 (Ky. App. 1982); Cook v. Paducah Recapping Serv.,
694 S.W. 2d 684 (Ky. 1985); Carnes v. Parton Bros. Contracting, Inc., 171
S.W.3d 60 (Ky. App. 2005); and Passmore v. Lowes Home Center, 2008 WL
5274855 (Ky. 2008)(2008-SC-000224-WC), for the proposition that the ALJ's
findings of fact were inadequate. However, I do not find these cases to be
dispositive.
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In Shields, the Board found that Shields gave due and timely notice of
his claim and that he was totally and permanently disabled as a result of coal
workers' pneumoconiosis. This Court's opinion does not state whether the Board
undertook to summarize the evidence and noted that at least a portion of the
evidence was faulty. Furthermore, this Court noted that a finding of the existence
of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and whether Shields gave due and timely notice
are conclusions of law.
Herein, the ALJ undertook a lengthy and detailed summary of the
evidence before making findings of fact regarding Arnold's ability to perform work
and the date he reached maximum medical improvement. The ALJ then reached
the conclusion of law that Arnold was entitled to TTD benefits for the period of
time specified. Pursuant to Big Sandy, that is all he was required to do.
In Cook, the question on appeal was whether the Board was required
to find whether Cook had any occupational disability before it could make an
award based on functional impairment. That issue no longer exists in cases
involving permanent partial disability. Furthermore, as in Shields, the Supreme
Court noted that the Board's factual summary of one medical witness was faulty.
Toyota does not argue that the ALJ misstated or incorrectly summarized the facts,
it argues that the ALJ reached the incorrect conclusion from the facts.
Furthermore, the majority does not point to any factual misstatements or errors by
the ALJ; therefore, I do not believe that Cook is dispositive.
In Passmore, the Supreme Court stated that
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[t]he ALJ failed to make clear when summarizing the
evidence whether he was aware that the claimant had
applied for social security disability benefits as of the
hearing; whether he considered and understood all of Dr.
El-Kalliny's testimony regarding the lifting restriction;
and whether he considered and understood all of the
claimant's testimony regarding his ability to perform
work with a sit/stand option. It is impossible under the
circumstances to determine whether the finding of partial
disability was the product of reasonable inferences based
upon a consideration and accurate understanding of all of
the evidence.
Passmore, 2008 WL 5274855, at *3.
As in Cook and Shields, the issue was whether the ALJ's findings of
fact were based on a correct understanding of the record, not whether they were
adequate. Therefore, like Cook and Shields, I am not convinced that Passmore is
dispositive.
I sympathize with Toyota's and the majority's frustration with the
ALJ's opinion. I believe that, in the best of all possible worlds, the ALJs would
specifically connect their summary of the evidence and their findings of fact.
However, I do not believe that is the current status of the law, and the ALJ herein
did all that was required of him.
Finally, I take issue with the majority's statement that the Board
engaged in "unauthorized fact-finding." The Board did recite evidence in the
record that supports the ALJ's award of TTD benefits. However, it did so to point
out that the ALJ's award was supported by evidence of substance, which, as noted
by the majority, is the Board's function. See Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276,
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279 (Ky. App. 1979). Because there is evidence of substance to support the ALJ's
award of TTD benefits, reversing and remanding will likely result in the ALJ
issuing a new opinion that better makes the transition from his summary of facts to
his findings of fact. Given that a different ultimate outcome is unlikely and in the
interest of judicial economy, as well as for the foregoing reasons, I would affirm
the Board.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth J. Dietz
Florence, Kentucky
Stephanie N. Wolfinbarger
Louisville, Kentucky
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