WRIGHT (RANDY), ET AL. VS. CROSS (DAVID), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002262-MR
RANDY WRIGHT;
AND RICKY WRIGHT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CLINTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00254
DAVID CROSS; EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF LEXIE
TOMPKINS, DECEASED; AND
MICHAEL WRIGHT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER AND WINE, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Randy and Ricky Wright appeal from the Clinton Circuit
Court judgment holding Michael Wright to be an heir of Roger Wright, and thus
1
Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
entitled to inherit under the terms of the last will and testament of Lexie Tompkins,
now deceased. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Lexie Tompkins died testate on October 30, 2004. David Cross was
appointed Executor of her estate by the Clinton District Court. After several
specific bequests, the remainder of Tompkins’ estate was to be devised, per stirpes,
to ten named nephews and nieces, unless any nephew or niece predeceased her,
then any interest conveyed to that nephew or niece was to pass to her issue.
Roger Wright, a nephew named in Tompkins’ last will and testament,
predeceased Tompkins. Roger was survived by two biological sons, Randy and
Ricky Wright, who each claimed a share of Tompkins’ bequest to Roger. Michael
Wright, who purported to be Roger’s adopted son, also claimed a share of the
bequest.
In the probate action regarding Tompkins’ estate (No. 04-P-00062), Cross
filed documents to recognize Michael as the adopted heir of Roger and beneficiary
under Tompkins’ will. Randy and Ricky Wright filed this underlying action
seeking a declaratory judgment that Michael was not adopted under the laws of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, and therefore not included among Roger Wright’s
issue and not a beneficiary under Tompkins’ will.
A hearing was held on September 4, 2009. Josiah Hutton, who was
Michael’s attorney-in-fact, testified that he had gone to Taipei, Taiwan and
obtained two documents which proved Roger adopted Michael in Taiwan. The
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documents were translated into English and certified as accurate translations by the
Taipei Translation and Globalization Center.
Ming Adamson, Michael’s mother, testified that she and Roger married
while Roger was stationed with the Air Force in Taiwan. Ming testified during this
time Roger adopted Michael and the three shared a household. Additionally,
Roger’s brother, Billy Wright, testified that Roger stated he adopted Michael while
stationed in Taiwan and married to Ming, and that in a probate action for another
relative, Billy recognized Michael as an heir of Roger. Following the hearing, the
trial court held the evidence supported a finding that Michael was the adopted son
of Roger, and therefore entitled to inherit under the terms of the last will and
testament of Tompkins. This appeal followed.
Randy and Ricky first argue the trial court erred by allowing Michael to
introduce the two Taiwanese documents regarding the adoption because they were
not properly authenticated. We disagree.
Under KRE2 901, a proponent of evidence is required to meet a slight
burden, which requires only a prima facie showing of authenticity. Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Ky. 2004) (citing United States v. Reilly, 33
F.3d 1396, 1404 (3rd Cir. 1994) (interpreting FRE3 901(a) which is worded
identically to KRE 901(a)). The burden may be met by introducing circumstantial
evidence “permitting an inference that the document is what it is represented to
be.” Thrasher v. Durham, 313 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Ky. 2010) (citing Johnson, 134
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Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
3
Federal Rules of Evidence.
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S.W.3d at 567). Our review of a trial court’s ruling on authenticity of evidence is
for an abuse of discretion. Thrasher, 313 S.W.3d at 549 (citing Johnson, 134
S.W.3d at 567).
KRE 901(a) states, “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” In addition, KRE
901(b)(4) provides that authentication or identification may be proven by a
document’s “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances.”
In this case, Hutton testified he obtained the foreign adoption records from
the Taipei District Court in Taipei, Taiwan. Translation of the documents was
approved and certified as correct English translations by the Taipei Translation and
Globalization Center. The adoption registration was signed by Roger Wright,
Michael’s mother, Ming, the Director General of the Household Registration
Office and subsequently notarized by a member of the Notary Public Office in
Taipei. Hutton further testified he was informed by Taipei officials that these
documents constituted the record of Roger’s adoption of Michael.
Although the trial court’s ruling focused on whether the documents were
self-authenticating under KRE 902(3), we find the unique and distinctive
characteristics of the documents, as well as Hutton’s testimony regarding the
process under which he obtained the documents sufficiently proves their
authenticity under KRE 901. McCloud v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 780, 786
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n.19 (Ky. 2009) (Appellate courts may sustain the trial court for any reason
supported by the record.). Accordingly, we find the trial court’s ruling as to the
authenticity of the documents to be within its discretion.
Next, Randy and Ricky argue the trial court erred by concluding that the
evidence proved Roger adopted Michael. We disagree.
A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky.App. 2005) (citations
omitted). Such findings are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial
evidence. Id. (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence “that a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moore v.
Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).
Currently, Kentucky “recognize[s] a decree, judgment, or final order of
adoption issued by a court or other governmental authority with appropriate
jurisdiction in a foreign country when the child to be adopted has been approved
for United States citizenship, or as otherwise provided by federal law.” KRS
199.585. However, Michael claims to have been adopted in 1967, before the
enactment of KRS 199.585.4
In Moore v. Smith, 14 S.W.2d 1072 (Ky. 1929), the court held, “[i]f the
adoption was legal in Colorado, it is legal [in Kentucky.]” Id. at 1075; See Pyle v.
Fischer, 128 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1939) (an adoption in one state will be
recognized in another); See also Edmands v. Tice, 324 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Ky. 1958)
4
The trial court held KRS 199.585 does not have retroactive effect, and that ruling is not
challenged on appeal.
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(Kentucky adopted the rule that any rights acquired by adoption and recognized in
one state will be given effect in another statute so long as those rights are not
inconsistent with the laws and policies of such state.). Extending this rationale to
the case at bar, if the evidence supports a finding that Roger’s adoption of Michael
was legal in Taiwan, the adoption will be recognized under Kentucky law so long
as doing so would not be inconsistent with our laws and policies.
Here, Hutton testified that he obtained two documents from the Taipei
District Court that he was told are the adoption records for Roger’s adoption of
Michael. The first document states that Roger agreed to adopt Michael, and that
Michael’s mother consented to the adoption. In addition, the document states that
Roger agreed to assume the duty of caring, teaching, and nourishing Michael. The
document was signed by Roger and Michael’s mother, as well as the Director
General of the Household Registration Office in Taipei, and was notarized. The
second document identifies Roger as the adopted parent of Michael, and references
the first document as the adoption registration. This second document, Hutton
testified, exists for purposes of allowing Taipei officials to maintain records on
individuals by the household in which they reside, because Taiwan did not issue
documents similar to birth certificates.
In addition to the two documents and testimony of Hutton, Ming Adamson
testified that Roger adopted Michael. Billy Wright testified that Roger referred to
Michael as his adopted son, and as administrator of an estate of another relative,
Billy recognized Michael as an heir of Roger. The Taiwanese adoption
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documents, Hutton’s testimony relating to the documents, and the circumstantial
evidence provided by Ming and Billy, constitute substantial evidence to support
the trial court’s conclusion that Roger adopted Michael in Taiwan, and thus the
adoption is recognized and given effect in Kentucky.
The judgment of the Clinton Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Luther C. Conner, Jr.
Albany, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MICHAEL
WRIGHT:
Gordon T. Germain
Monticello, Kentucky
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