BROUGHTON (JOSH), ET AL. VS. RUSSELL (TOMMY)
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001753-MR
JOSH BROUGHTON, MICHAEL ADCOCK
AND KIMBERLY WHITLEY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-01004
TOMMY RUSSELL
APPELLEE
OPINION
DISMISSING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Josh Broughton, Michael Adcock and Kimberly
Whitley (Appellants) appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss Tommy Russell’s
negligence action. Appellants argue: (1) they are entitled to qualified immunity
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
from suit; and (2) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After reviewing
the record and briefs, we have determined that this appeal is interlocutory and,
therefore, must be dismissed.
At all times pertinent to this case, Russell was a state inmate at the
Frankfort Career Development Center. Whitley was the warden of the facility.
Adcock was a supervisor at the facility and Broughton was an employee who had
immediate training and supervisory control of Russell. Russell participated in a
work release program at the National Guard Boone Center Headquarters in
Frankfort, Kentucky, on August 18, 2008. Adcock instructed Broughton to have a
tree cut down and to have Russell assist him. Broughton in turn told Russell to cut
down the tree. When felled, the tree landed on Russell’s left leg. The resulting
injury ultimately required amputation of that limb below the knee. Russell filed an
action against Appellants in their individual capacities alleging that their
negligence caused his injuries.
Appellants filed a motion to dismiss Russell’s action. For purposes of
the motion, they accepted the facts as stated in the complaint as true. They argued
they were immune from suit based on a theory of qualified immunity. The trial
court found “the inquiry goes beyond a mere question of law and involves facts at
hand, namely, whether Defendants acted in good faith[.]” With that factual issue
unresolved by the pleadings, the trial court then ordered the case to proceed with
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limited discovery on the issue of qualified immunity. The trial court’s opinion and
order recited Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.02 finality language.
This appeal followed.
Appellants first argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
However, the trial court did not adjudicate the issue of qualified immunity one way
or the other. It merely denied the motion to dismiss and ordered that limited
discovery be taken on the issue.
Where an order is by its very nature interlocutory, the recital of CR
54.02 finality language does not make it appealable. Hook v. Hook, 563 S.W.2d
716, 717 (Ky. 1978). In most instances an order denying dismissal of an action is
interlocutory and non-appealable. Gooden v. Gresham, 6 Ky. Op. 560, 1873 WL
11234 (Ky. Mar. 13, 1873); see also Parton v. Robinson, 574 S.W.2d 679 (Ky.
App. 1978). In order to be immediately appealable, a qualified immunity issue
must not involve a genuine factual dispute, but must be “a purely legal one.”
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 132 L.Ed.2d 238
(1995). In Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held that “good faith” is at times a fact-dependent issue in the
context of qualified immunity. “Ultimately, however, once the material facts are
resolved, whether a particular defendant is protected by official immunity is a
question of law. . . . ” Id. The Supreme Court noted “the trial court here properly
waited on the necessary limited discovery before making its final ruling on the
question.” Id. at fn 4.
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The trial court did not make a final ruling on the issue of qualified
immunity nor did it dispose of any claims. It merely reserved its ruling following
limited discovery. Under the authority cited above, we conclude that the trial
court’s order was interlocutory. Therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.
Appellants also argue the trial court lacks jurisdiction over Russell’s
claims because exclusive jurisdiction rests with the Board of Claims. However,
this argument is premised on a request that this Court overrule Yanero v. Davis, 65
S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001). As an intermediate appellate court, this Court is bound by
established precedents of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Rules of the Supreme
Court (SCR) 1.030(8)(a). The Court of Appeals cannot overrule the established
precedent set by the Supreme Court or its predecessor court. Special Fund v.
Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1986).
Accordingly, Appeal No. 2009-CA-001753-MR is dismissed as being
taken from an interlocutory order.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Sheila P. Hiestand
Louisville, Kentucky
James M. Herrick
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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