DIALS (BRENDA KAY), ET AL. VS. DAVIS (MILTON)
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 17, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001457-MR
BRENDA KAY DIALS AND
LUCILLE DIALS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MARTIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL SPARKS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-00138
MILTON DAVIS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND COMBS, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a decision of the Martin Circuit
Court finding in favor of the appellee, Martin Davis. The appellants, Brenda Kay
and Lucille Dials, argued that they owned the property to which Davis claimed title
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
under the theory of adverse possession. We agree with the decision of the trial
court that they did not.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Lucille was married to Clay Dials (now deceased). In August of
1972, the two purchased approximately three acres of property from Jess Coleman
upon which was located a cinder block house. Davis owned adjoining property
and the Dials used a driveway passing through his property to gain access to their
home. Davis had acquired 90 percent of his property from Hobart Evans in
February of 1971. The remaining 10 percent Davis acquired in April of 1996.
In 1974/1975, Lucille traded the property with her sister who
occupied the property for a couple of years. Sometime during 1974, Lucille hired
Rufus Reed Survey to perform a survey of her property. While the deed to
Lucille’s property contained a description of three acres “more or less,” the Reed
survey showed ten and a half acres. Thereafter, the house located on the three or
more acres was rented until the structure was destroyed by fire around 1978/1979.
Davis testified at trial that Brenda Kay came onto his property and planted a
vegetable garden during the time she lived on the property. He filed a lawsuit in
May of 1974 as a result of her actions but the lawsuit was subsequently dismissed
without prejudice due to lack of prosecution in July of 1977.
Between 1985 and 1986, Lucille’s son moved a mobile home onto the
approximate three acres and began to occupy it for the next two years at which
time it, too, was destroyed by fire. In 1989, Lucille and her son began construction
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on a house on the property. Lucille’s son originally moved into the new home and
Lucille moved in several years later.
In 1993, Brenda Kay came onto the property the appellants claimed
title to it under adverse possession and Davis then brought suit in Martin Circuit
Court. The appellants contended that they were the owners through adverse
possession of the additional 7.5 acres set forth in the Reed survey.
The appellants hired Justice Land Surveying to survey the property
and this survey set forth 2.77 acres as belonging to the appellants. Davis had
Bocook Engineering perform a survey upon the property which indicated 1.93
acres was that of the appellants.
After a hearing, the trial court concluded that:
1.
The [appellants] have failed to establish actual
possession of the claimed property. They admitted that
they did not fence the boundaries of the property and any
use of the property was merely intermittent cultivation of
the property for a garden and pasturing a horse for a brief
period of time, both of small portions of the property
claimed.
The [appellants], at the hearing, alleged that the
Rufus Reed Survey established a well defined boundary
to which they were claiming. Under the doctrine of color
of title, actual possession of one part of a tract of
property held under a deed that is valid on its face and
extends to the entire tract described in the deed [sic].
However, the Rufus Reed Survey is not the type of
instrument by which color of title can be established
because it does not convey any property to the
[appellants].
***
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2. The [appellants] have failed to establish that they
held the property claimed by adverse possession
continuously for a period of fifteen (15) years. The
house located on the property conveyed to the
[appellants] by deed burned during 1978 or 1979. It was
not until 1985 when a mobile home was located in the
same general location as the house. The mobile home
burned two (2) months later according to the testimony of
[Davis], or two (2) years later according to the
[appellants]. A second house was constructed on the
purchase property which was not inhabited until 1990.
This lawsuit was filed during 1993, which interrupted
any possession of the disputed property.
3. The [appellants’] use of the property claimed by
adverse possession was not exclusive. [Davis] testified
that he had cut roads, removed and sold topsoil and cut
timber on a regular basis from the property claimed by
the [appellants].
Based upon the above conclusions of law, the trial court entered a judgment
accepting the Justice Land Survey as the accurate reflection of the extent and
boundaries of the property owned by Lucille and Brenda Kay Dials. The
appellants now appeal that judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01, “[f]indings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” In
appeals of property title issues, the appropriate standard is whether the trial court
was clearly erroneous or abused its discretion. Church and Mullins Corp. v.
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Bethlehem Minerals Co., 887 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ky. 1992), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1110, 115 S.Ct. 1962, 131 L.Ed.2d 853 (1995). With this standard in mind, we
turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in finding there was no adverse
possession of the property.
DISCUSSION
In determining whether title through adverse possession is appropriate we
must examine whether the following elements are met:
the possession must be shown to be actual, open and
notorious, exclusive, and continuous for a period of
fifteen years. Tartar v. Tucker, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 150,
152 (1955); Creech v. Miniard, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 432,
436 (1965); KRS 413.010. “The ‘open and notorious'
element requires that the possessor openly evince a
purpose to hold dominion over the property with such
hostility that will give the non-possessory owner notice
of the adverse claim.” Appalachian Regional
Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Ky., 824
S.W.2d 878, 880 (1992) (citing Sweeten v. Sartin, Ky.,
256 S.W.2d 524, 526 (1953)). Mere intentions or verbal
expressions of a claim to property is [sic] not sufficient
absent physical acts appearing on the land evidencing a
purpose to hold the property hostile to the rights of and
giving notice to the title holder. See Gatliff Coal Co. v.
Lawson, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 375, 377 (1952); Warfield
Natural Gas Co. v. Ward, 286 Ky. 73, 149 S.W.2d 705
(1940); D.B. Frampton & Co. v. Saulsberry, Ky., 268
S.W.2d 25 (1954). Absent proof that the possessor made
physical improvements to the property, such as fences or
buildings, there must be proof of substantial, and not
sporadic, activity by the possessor. (Citations omitted.).
Phillips v. Akers, 103 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Ky. App. 2002). See also Heinrichs v.
Polking, 185 Ky. 433, 215 S.W. 179 (Ky. App. 1919); Johnson v. Kirk, 648
S.W.2d 878 (Ky. App. 1983).
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As set forth above, the trial court found that there had been no actual,
continuous or exclusive possession of the property to which there was made an
adverse claim. We agree with the trial court.
The “actual possession” requirement of adverse possession claims means
that the claimant must physically possess or occupy the land. Stephens v. Kidd,
298 Ky. 38, 181 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1944). The appellants assert that pursuant to the
holding in Appalachian Regional Healthcare, 824 S.W.2d 878, their possession
may be constructive if the claim is under color of title. They argue that theirs was
due to the Rufus Reed survey. The trial court found, and we agree, that a survey
does not purport to convey property and is not sufficient to establish actual
possession. The deed under which the appellants claimed title set forth that the
property was approximately three acres. A survey which claimed ten acres would
not suffice to give color of title to the property owners for the remaining seven
acres.
Continuity in possession is also required when making a claim under
adverse possession. This requires that the occupier of the premises remain
continuously and uninterruptedly for the fifteen-year statutory period. Frazier v.
Banks, 294 Ky. 61, 170 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. App. 1943). In the present case,
testimony from all parties indicated that there had been two instances where the
dwellings on the property had been burned and uninhabitable. As a result, there
were periods of years when the appellants were not occupying the premises. Thus,
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we agree with the trial court that the appellants failed to prove this prong of the
adverse possession standard as well.
Finally, the trial court found that there was no exclusive possession of the
property for the fifteen-year statutory period. Davis’s testimony was that he had
performed various tasks on the property which indicated he was the owner of the
property. He testified that he had cut roads on the property, removed and sold
topsoil from the property and cut timber from the property on a regular basis. All
these acts interfered with any exclusive claim to the property made by the
appellants and their claim under adverse possession would fail as a result. Thus,
we affirm the decision of the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul D. Deaton
Paintsville, Kentucky
Don A. Bailey
Louisa, Kentucky
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