HARMON (MICHAEL A.), ET AL. VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, JUSTICE CABINET
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RENDERED: AUGUST 29, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: SEPTEMBER 26, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002459-MR
MICHAEL A. HARMON
AND EDDIE PHILLIPS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-01029
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
JUSTICE CABINET, DEPARTMENT
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Two teachers (Appellants) brought this action originally against
the Hardin County Board of Education, the Kentucky Educational Collaborative
for State Agency Children (KECSAC), and the Commonwealth of Kentucky
Justice Cabinet, Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), challenging a reduction in
their compensation as violative of, inter alia, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
158.135(6), 158.060(3) and 505 Kentucky Administrative Regulation (KAR)
1:080. The Hardin Circuit Court dismissed all claims on motions for summary
judgment of KECSAC and the Board, and allegedly acting, sua sponte, as to the
DJJ, thereby dismissing the entire complaint. Having settled with KECSAC and
the Board, the Appellants bring this appeal claiming that it was error for the Hardin
Circuit Court to dismiss their claims against the DJJ. Because we conclude that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the Appellants’ claims against the DJJ, we
affirm the Hardin Circuit Court’s disposition of the case.
FACTS
The Appellants, Michael A. Harmon and Eddie Phillips, were teachers
employed by the Hardin County Board of Education. In July of 2001, the DJJ
contracted with the Board of Education to educate youth in the care and custody of
the Department. In their capacity as employees of the Hardin County School
System, the Appellants were assigned to the Extended Summer Services (ESS)
program to teach summer classes at the Lincoln Village Youth Development
Center and the Hardin County Day Treatment Center, two facilities operated by the
DJJ in Hardin County.
Until and for many years prior to July of 2001, the Appellants were
employed by the Board of Education on the basis of an annual 230-day work
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schedule derived from a 185-day “standard” school year, plus 45 days of work in
the ESS program. During the course of a 230-day annual work schedule, they
were paid an equal daily rate of pay in accordance with the Board of Education’s
salary schedule. In a letter dated May 7, 2001, the Board informed the Appellants
that the 230-day work schedule would be discontinued in favor of a 185-day work
schedule. The letter further indicated that rather than being assigned to the ESS
program, the Appellants would be eligible to apply for ESS positions which would
now have their own pay schedule. In conjunction with the schedule change, the
ESS program was reduced from 6 to 5 hour daily periods of instruction, resulting
in an overall reduction in the Appellants’ summer take-home pay and retirement
benefits. Under the new plan, however, presumptively to counteract the effects of
the ESS program’s period of instruction reduction, the base salary for the new 185day standard schedule was increased by 4%.
The Appellants brought suit against the Board, KECSAC, and the DJJ
claiming that the new 185-day schedule and the reduced hours ESS program
resulted in both a reduction of annual compensation and of future retirement
benefits, and therefore constituted violations of, KRS 158.135(6), 158.060(3) and
505 KAR 1:080.1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
The original action also charged the defendants with violating KRS 161.760(1), 157.350(3) and
505 KAR 1:080 §2(3)(e). On appeal, the DJJ’s alleged statutory violations are limited by the
Appellant to KRS 158.135(6), 158.060(3) and 505 KAR 1:080.
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At the trial court level, in response to motions for summary judgment
by the Board and KECSAC, the circuit court dismissed all the claims against each
of the defendants, including the claims against the DJJ. Having since settled with
the Board of Education and KECSAC, the Appellants now appeal the dismissal of
their claims against the DJJ claiming that because they were third-party
beneficiaries to the contractual agreement between the Hardin Board of Education
and the DJJ, they are entitled to damages for losses realized stemming from the
DJJ’s alleged violations of KRS 158.135(6), 158.060(3) and 505 KAR 1:080.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion
for summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were
no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Steelvest v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476, 480-82 (Ky. 1991). Because summary judgment involves only legal
questions and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate
court need not defer to the trial court's decision and will review the issue de novo.
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996).
ANALYSIS
The Appellants contend that the trial court improperly dismissed their
claims against the DJJ alleging that the trial court was without authority to dismiss
the claim since there was no motion for summary judgment by the Department
pending at the time of dismissal. Thus, the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal was
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improper. The Appellants further contend that judgment should have been entered
on the merits of the claims against the Department for violating KRS 158.135(6),
158.060(3), and 505 KAR 1:080, when it agreed to abide by the terms of the new
schedule instituted by the Board of Education. Setting aside whether the
Department’s actions constituted a violation of the cited statutory law, we perceive
an overarching problem with the Appellants’ fundamental claim. In our view, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity shelters the DJJ from any liability to the Appellant
for its actions in carrying out its governmental duties of educating youth in its care
and custody.
Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a concept from old English common law “that
precludes the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given its
consent or otherwise waived its immunity.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517
(Ky. 2001). The rationale for this concept is grounded in the separation of powers
doctrine that courts “should not be called upon to pass judgment on policy
decisions made by members of coordinate branches of government . . . , because
such actions furnish an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social,
political, or economic policy.” Id. at 519. In Kentucky, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has been adopted by section 231 of the Constitution of Kentucky which
provides for immunity from suits “brought against the Commonwealth.” KY.
CONST. § 231.
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Although the defense of sovereign immunity usually arises from tort
claims, it is well settled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to actions
in both tort and contract, thus making the Commonwealth immune from suits for
breach of contract. University of Louisville v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. App.
1978); see also Foley Construction v. Ward, 375 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1964). In
addition to breach of contract and tort claims, our Supreme Court has held that
section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution and the doctrine of sovereign immunity
also foreclose against the state or one of its agencies “claims of violation of
statutes.” Ammerman v. Board of Educ., of Nicholas County, 30 S.W.3d 793 (Ky.
2000).
In the case of Ammerman v. Board of Educ., of Nicholas County,
teachers brought an action against the Board of Education of Nicholas County
alleging breach of contract, various tort claims, violation of statutes protecting
teachers, and sexual harassment in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The
Court made a factual finding that the school board’s response to the teachers’
claims of sexual harassment was wholly inadequate. Despite the finding that
sexual harassment indeed occurred and that the School Board’s response was
woefully insufficient, the Court held that the Board of Education of Nicholas
County was protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity from claims of
tort, breach of contract and non-civil rights statutory violations in connection with
allegations of sexual harassment. Ammerman, at 797.
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Here, the Appellants’ claims are for damages for losses realized as a
result of the Department’s alleged violations of 505 KAR 1:080; KRS 158.060(3);
and KRS 158.135(6).
As a division of the Commonwealth of Kentucky Justice Cabinet, an
extension of the executive branch of government, the DJJ is a state agency. As
such, the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies and, without an express waiver of
sovereign immunity, protects the Commonwealth from liability without regard to
whether the new 185-day schedule and adherence to it by the Department
constituted a statutory violation. Thus, the Appellants’ claims are barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The Trial Court Acting Sua Sponte
The Appellants argue that the trial court was without authority to
dismiss their claims against the DJJ, sua sponte, given that the Department had
made no motion for summary judgment when the decision was made. On either of
alternative grounds, we hold that the circuit court’s actions were not improper.
Although clearly discouraged, a trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s
claims against the defendant, sua sponte, is permissible where there is no undue
prejudice to the plaintiff. Fourroux v. City of Shepherdsville, 148 S.W.3d 303 (Ky.
App. 2004). Whether the trial court’s actions resulted in undue prejudice against
the plaintiff turns on whether the following minimal procedures of due process are
met:
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(1) allow service of the complaint upon the defendant; (2)
notify all parties of its intent to dismiss the complaint; (3) give
the plaintiff a chance to either amend his complaint or respond
to the reasons stated by the [trial] court in its notice of intended
sua sponte dismissal; (4) give the defendant a chance to respond
or file an answer or motions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed,
state its reasons for the dismissal.
Storer Communications of Jefferson County, Inc. v. Oldham County Board of
Education, 850 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky.App. 1993) citing Gall v. Scroggy, 725
S.W.2d 867 (Ky.App. 1987).
In Storer Communications, the plaintiff filed suit alleging that a gross
receipts utility tax violated its constitutional rights. The trial court, without a
motion for dismissal or summary judgment by any party, without briefs or
arguments on the issues, entered an order granting its judgment for the defendant
on the merits. On appeal, holding that none of the procedures outlined in Gall v.
Scroggy, had been complied with, this court found that the trial court’s sua sponte
dismissal violated the plaintiff’s due process rights.
We believe the case, sub judice, is distinguishable from Storer
Communications. Here, there was a complaint and an amended complaint which,
in turn, elicited responses from the three original defendants. Subsequently, the
DJJ filed a motion to dismiss, and the Board and KECSAC filed motions for
summary judgment, to which the court granted the Appellants an opportunity to
respond and argue. The trial court subsequently granted partial summary
judgment, dismissing three of the claims, leaving the remaining claims for further
adjudication after more briefing and argument, thus giving the Appellants further
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opportunity to respond to the pending motions for dismissal and summary
judgment. This also served as notice to the Appellants that without providing more
than they had to that point, the motions for summary judgment were likely to be
granted. Five months after the order granting partial summary judgment, and after
even more responses and replies to the motions, the trial court entered summary
judgment on the remainder of the claims and dismissed the entirety of the
complaint.
In both the partial summary judgment and the summary judgment, the
court engaged in detailed, well-thought-out legal analysis, considering both sides
of each of the issues in turn, and drawing logical conclusions. It is apparent that
the trial court concluded that since the claims against the Board had been
dismissed, those same claims, to the extent they related to the DJJ, were also
dismissed. After all, the judgment of the trial court was that the Board’s decision
to modify the school schedule did not constitute a statutory violation. Logically,
then, the Department’s adherence to the Board’s decision could not constitute a
statutory violation either. Therefore, it was proper to assume that since the claims
against the Board were dismissed, consequently the claims against the Department
were also dismissed, sub silencio, and so the trial court properly dismissed the
complaint in its entirety. We find that the Appellants’ due process rights were not
violated, nor were the Appellants unduly prejudiced, by the trial court’s decision.
We therefore uphold the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of the Appellants’
claims against the DJJ.
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In the alternative, upon further examination of the record, there is
evidence that the court’s granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint
may not have been sua sponte after all. The Kentucky Supreme Court held in,
Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. 1995), that Court rules “contemplate a
relationship between a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motion for
summary judgment, and contemplate that a motion for judgment on pleadings may
be treated as motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 338.
In Hoke, the plaintiff alleged negligence against the defendant for
injuries sustained during a tennis match. Following depositions and
interrogatories, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
Jefferson Circuit Court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s action with prejudice. The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not act improperly in treating the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as a motion for summary judgment,
when three months elapsed between defendant's motion and filing of trial court's
memorandum and order, both parties filed memoranda arguing evidence during
that period, and plaintiff did not seek to present additional evidence. Id.
Here, the original case was dismissed on December 2, 2001, after
which the trial court allowed the Appellants to file an amended complaint. On
January 7, 2002, the DJJ filed its second motion to dismiss (the first having been
filed under the original complaint), to which the Appellants responded. On
January 24, 2002, the Appellants filed a memorandum in response to the
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Department’s motion to dismiss. On February 7, 2002, the DJJ filed a reply to the
Appellants’ response memorandum. The trial judge never ruled on the
Department’s motion to dismiss. On November 14, 2005, the court adjudged that
the motions for summary judgment were granted and that the Appellants’
complaints were dismissed with prejudice. This ruling effectively treated the
Department’s pending motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. We,
like the Supreme Court in Hoke, “regard it as of little moment that the trial court
failed to clearly distinguish between motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and motions for summary judgment.” Hoke, 914 S.W.2d at 338. During the
course of the three-and-a-half years between the time the motion to dismiss was
filed and the motions for summary judgment were granted, the Appellants were
given ample time and opportunity to prove to the court that they had presented a
case which revealed the existence of disputed material facts. Much of that time
was dedicated to motions, exchanges, and discovery between the Board and the
Appellants as the Appellants’ fundamental claim was against the Board, and as
examined supra, without a claim against the Board, there could be no claim against
the DJJ. Therefore, by dismissing the entirety of the complaint, the trial court
properly converted the Department’s motion for dismissal into a motion for
summary judgment. Consequently, we uphold the trial court’s disposition of this
matter whether it constituted a sua sponte dismissal of the Appellants’ claims, or
whether the trial court merely converted the Department’s motions to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment. The result is the same.
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Sovereign Immunity and Equitable Relief
In response to the question of sovereign immunity, the Appellants
claim that their seeking equitable relief to compel the DJJ to conform with
statutory law is beyond the reach of sovereign immunity. Although the Appellants
cite authority that offers examples in which claims of equitable relief have been
made by teachers against their employing school district and supervisory officials,
they provide no authority for an equitable relief exception to the bar of sovereign
immunity which provides protection against claims of statutory violation by the
state or its agencies. Moreover, we do not believe that there exists authority to
contradict the holding, in Ammerman, supra, that claims of non-civil rights
statutory violations against the state and its agencies are barred by sovereign
immunity.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, AND THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCUR
IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
John Frith Stewart
Crestwood, Kentucky
William H. Fogle
Assistant General Counsel
Frankfort, Kentucky
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