UNITED PARCEL SERVICE v. CAROLYN MARTIN; HON. MARCEL SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000873-WC
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-05-95658
CAROLYN MARTIN;
HON. MARCEL SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: United Parcel Service (UPS) appeals from the Opinion of the
Workers' Compensation Board (the Board) affirming the Administrative Law Judge's
(ALJ) decision awarding Carolyn Martin (Martin) medical expense benefits. UPS argues
on appeal that Martin did not file her claim within the applicable statutory period; that the
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
medical opinion on which the ALJ relied was not stated within the realm of reasonable
medical probability; and that an award of future medical expense benefits is not proper
when there has been no finding of a permanent impairment rating or permanent disability.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTS
Martin filed an Application for Resolution of Injury Claim on March 10,
2005, alleging work-related repetitive injuries to her wrists from July 18, 2002, through
January 6, 2005. The parties stipulated that Martin received temporary total disability
benefits from October 20, 2002, through February 16, 2003.
In support of her claim, Martin filed medical records from Dr. Geoffrey
Durham-Smith, who performed right carpal tunnel surgery on November 14, 2002, and
left carpal tunnel surgery on December 24, 2002. In a report dated May 26, 2005, Dr.
Durham-Smith listed diagnoses of median and ulnar nerve compression "most probably
secondary to tendinitis in the wrists . . . with some residual intermittent tendinitis." He
stated that Martin had reached maximum medical improvement, had no impairment
rating, and should avoid "prolonged repetitive keying tasks." Dr. Durham-Smith did not
directly address whether Martin's conditions were related to her work at UPS.
Martin also filed medical records from Dr. Kenneth Beilman. In pertinent
part, Dr. Beilman's records reflect as follows: January 4, 2005, office note states as
follows: (1) on April 29, 2003, Dr. Bielman stated that Martin had "[t]endinitis of hands,
likely related to repetitive keying at work"; (2) on July 22, 2003, Dr. Beilman "[a]dvised
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patient to look for another job where she does not have to do so much repetitive motions
with her wrists"; (3) on September 16, 2003, Dr. Beilman noted that Martin had "some
residual symptoms made worse by repetitive injuries that the patient is fully aware of";
(4) on November 9, 2004, Dr. Beilman noted that Martin was "[s]till wearing the wrist
splints because of the data entry she has to do"; and (5) on January 4, 2005, Dr. Beilman
stated that Martin's "[o]ngoing symptoms [are] secondary to the nature of her job."
UPS filed the report of Dr. Michael Moskul. Dr. Moskul's examination
revealed bilateral loss of strength, pain behaviors with range of motion testing,
tenderness, and negative Tinel's and Phalen's tests. Following his examination and
review of Martin's medical records, Dr. Moskul made diagnoses of idiopathic pain of the
bilateral upper extremities with no evidence that Martin had ever suffered from carpal
tunnel syndrome. Dr. Moskul stated that he could not determine the rationale for
performing surgery; however, he had not reviewed Dr. Durham-Smith's records. Finally,
Dr. Moskul stated that Martin's complaints were not related to "her vocational exposure,"
that she did not require any further treatment, that she had no impairment, and that she
had no restrictions.
With regard to its statute of limitations defense, UPS filed correspondence
from the then-Department of Workers' Claims (the DWC) stating that temporary total
disability benefits had been terminated on February 16, 2003. Furthermore, the letter
advised Martin that "within two years after the last voluntary payment of income
benefits" (emphasis in original) she had to file an Application for Resolution of Claim or
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any claim she had would be barred. Martin filed a check stub from the workers'
compensation carrier dated March 21, 2003, representing payment of temporary total
disability benefits from August 22, 2002, through October 29, 2002.
Martin testified that she worked primarily entering data into computers. On
July 18, 2002, Martin's pain was such that she could not continue working. Following a
course of conservative care, Martin underwent right wrist surgery in November of 2002
and left wrist surgery in December of 2002. Martin was off work from August 22, 2002,
through February 17, 2003, during which time she received short-term disability and
temporary total disability benefits. Martin went off work again on January 28, 2005,
because of pain in her hands. At that time, Martin's hand surgeon advised her that she
could not return to work doing data entry. United Parcel Service (UPS) did not pay
Martin any income benefits following the alleged January 28, 2005, injury.
With this factual background in mind, we will address the issues raised by
UPS in turn.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A reviewing court must give great deference to the
conclusions of the fact-finder on factual questions if
supported by substantial evidence and the opposite result is
not compelled. When considering questions of law, or mixed
questions of law and fact, the reviewing court has greater
latitude to determine whether the findings below were
sustained by evidence of probative value.
Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Ky. 1991). The issues
raised by UPS are questions of law and/or mixed questions of law and fact; therefore, we
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will undertake a de novo review. See A & A Mechanical, Inc. v. Thermal Equipment
Sales, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ky.App. 1999).
ANALYSIS
A. Statute of Limitations
KRS 342.185(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a claimant is required to
file a claim within two years of the date of the accident or, if voluntary income benefits
are paid, "within two (2) years following the suspension of [those] payments." It is
undisputed that UPS notified the DWC that it terminated temporary disability benefit
payments as of February 16, 2003. It is also undisputed that, after notifying the DWC,
UPS sent a temporary total disability check for past due benefits to Martin on March 21,
2003. Finally, it is undisputed that Martin did not file her claim until March 10, 2005,
more than two years after UPS notified the DWC that it had terminated benefits but less
than two years after UPS made its last payment. Therefore, the question before us is,
what constitutes "suspension" of temporary total disability benefits, the carrier's notice to
the DWC that it has terminated benefits or the date the last payment is actually made?
UPS argues that the date of "suspension" is the date Martin's entitlement to
temporary total disability ended, not the date the check was issued. In this case, Martin's
temporary total disability ended on or about February 16, 2003. As noted by the Board,
the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed this issue in Transcraft Corp. v. Lovely, 2004SC-0145-WC, 2005 WL 119746 (Ky.). In Lovely, Transcraft's workers' compensation
carrier notified the DWC that it had terminated payment of TTD benefits, and the DWC
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sent a letter to Lovely notifying him of his statutory filing period. Sometime later, the
carrier sent an additional TTD benefit check to Lovely, explaining that it had previously
paid at the incorrect rate and that the additional TTD check represented payment
designed to cure that deficiency. The carrier then notified the DWC of this additional
payment and the DWC sent a letter to Lovely notifying him of his statutory filing period,
using the date benefits were terminated rather than the date of the last benefit check.
Lovely filed his claim within two years of the date of the last check, but not within two
years of the date benefits were terminated.
The ALJ found that Lovely timely filed his claim because it was filed
within two years of the date of the last TTD payment. The Board, this Court, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the ALJ. In affirming, the Supreme Court noted that "[a]
pertinent definition of the term 'suspend' is found in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
1174 (1975). That is, 'to stop payment or fail to meet obligations.'" Considering that
definition, the Supreme Court concluded that:
KRS 342.185(1) runs the period of limitations for a period of
two years after the employer stops paying voluntary income
benefits, i.e. for two years after it makes the final payment.
This construction is consistent with both the purpose of the
provision and its plain language.
We discern no reason to disagree with the Supreme Court's holding in Lovely; therefore,
since Martin filed her claim within two years of the date of the last TTD payment, we
affirm the ALJ's finding that Martin timely filed her claim.
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B. Sufficiency of Medical Evidence
UPS argues that Martin did not submit any medical evidence to support her
contention that her condition is work related and that the evidence Martin did offer is not
expressed within the realm of reasonable medical probability. We will address whether
Martin offered any evidence of causation first.
“The claimant in a workman's compensation case has the burden of proof
and the risk of persuading the board in his favor.” Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276,
279 (Ky.App. 1979). In order to meet his burden, a claimant must produce evidence that
has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable persons.
Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. 1970).
As noted above, Dr. Bielman states in his medical records, a number of
times, that Martin's condition is related to her work activity. Therefore, UPS's argument
that Martin did not put forth any medical evidence of causation is without merit.
Furthermore, Dr. Bielman's statement on January 4, 2005, that Martin's "[o]ngoing
symptoms [are] secondary to the nature of her job;" his September 16, 2003, statement
that Martin's residual symptoms were "made worse by repetitive injuries;" and his April
29, 2003, statement that Martin had "[t]endinitis of hands, likely related to repetitive
keying at work" constitute evidence of substance sufficient to support Martin's claim.
As to whether Martin's proof fails because none of the medical opinions are
expressed within the realm of reasonable medical probability, we note that
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"medical-opinion evidence [must] be founded on probability and not on mere possibility
or speculation." However, "the realities of the problem of semantics must be taken into
account." While "speculative viewpoints must be rejected . . . substance should prevail
over form, and the expert's testimony should be examined in its total meaning, rather than
word-by-word." Young v. L. A. Davidson, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ky. 1971).
Taking the preceding into account, and looking at the totality of Dr.
Beilman's records, we hold that Dr. Beilman's opinions regarding causation were stated
with sufficient certainty to pass muster. Therefore, we affirm the findings of the ALJ and
the Board in that regard.
C. Future Medical Expenses
Despite her finding that Martin had no permanent impairment rating and
thus no permanent disability, the ALJ awarded Martin ongoing medical expense benefits.
UPS argues that such an award, absent a finding of a permanent impairment rating or of
permanent disability is contrary to the plain meaning of KRS Chapter 342. As noted by
the Board, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held otherwise in FEI Installation, Inc. v.
Williams, 214 S.W.3d 313 (Ky. 2007). As the Supreme Court stated in Williams:
Mindful of the relationship between impairment and disability
under the 1996 Act, we conclude that disability exists for the
purposes of KRS 342.020(1) for so long as a work-related
injury causes impairment, regardless of whether the
impairment rises to a level that it warrants a permanent
impairment rating, permanent disability rating, or permanent
income benefits.
Williams, at 318-319.
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Martin suffered a work-related injury that required surgery. She continues
to be symptomatic following that surgery and medical evidence presented to the ALJ
indicates that additional medical treatment will be required. Therefore, the ALJ's award
of ongoing medical expenses is supported by the evidence and the Supreme Court's
holding in Williams. Thus, we discern no error in the ALJ's opinion awarding Martin
ongoing medical expenses nor in the opinion of the Board affirming the ALJ.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the ALJ's findings that Martin
timely filed her claim; that Martin's condition is related to her work for UPS; and that
Martin is entitled to ongoing medical expense benefits are supported by both the evidence
and the law. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
H. Douglas Jones
Kenneth J. Dietz
Florence, Kentucky
Sean P. Lohman
Louisville, Kentucky
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