MELISSA HEMBREE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 16, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002413-MR
MELISSA HEMBREE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KATHLEEN VOOR MONTANO, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-003150
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; LAMBERT, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Melissa Hembree appeals from a jury verdict and judgment of
the Jefferson Circuit Court finding her guilty of complicity to manufacture
methamphetamine and sentencing her to eleven-years' imprisonment. After our review,
we affirm.
On May 27, 2004, officers with the Louisville Metro Police Department
executed a search warrant on the residence of Clayton Nagle as part of a
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Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
methamphetamine investigation. Upon arriving at the residence at approximately 10:22
p.m., they forced entry through the front door and proceeded into the living room. They
observed Hembree removing Sudafed pills from their packs and placing them into a
bowl. Sudafed contains pseudoephedrine, an ingredient known to be used in making
methamphetamine. Multiple packs of the pills were on a coffee table in front of her and
on a couch next to her; it appeared that several hundred pills had been placed into the
bowl. The officers apprehended Nagle as he attempted to flee through a back door. He
was arrested along with his girlfriend, Shirley Shmigel, and Hembree. Hembree's
husband, Jerry Hembree, arrived at the residence some time later and was also arrested.
The police found numerous items used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine in the residence, including iodine, “HEET,” liquid fire, coffee filters,
pipes, glass jars, funnels, lithium batteries, lye, Coleman fuel, approximately 1400
Sudafed pills, a glass flask with red phosphorous residue, and a cigar box full of
matchbook strike plates. The police also located a suitcase that contained equipment for
a mobile methamphetamine lab, baggies containing methamphetamine, liquid residue
from “pill washes,” a .22-caliber handgun, three sets of digital scales, and a drug ledger.
Many of these items were found in the kitchen, which was directly adjacent to the living
room. Others were found in bedrooms, on the rear deck of the house, and in a shed in the
backyard.
On November 9, 2004, the Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted Hembree
on charges of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine pursuant to Kentucky
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Revised Statutes (KRS) 502.020 and 218A.1432; complicity to traffic in a controlled
substance, first-degree, pursuant to KRS 502.020 and 218A.1412; and unlawful
possession of a methamphetamine precursor pursuant to KRS 218A.1437. Hembree's
case was tried before a Jefferson County jury in June 2006. The jury found Hembree
guilty of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine and recommended that she serve a
sentence of eleven -years' imprisonment. Hembree's post-trial motions were denied. On
October 6, 2006, in accordance with the jury's verdict, the court entered an order finding
Hembree guilty of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine. The court sentenced
Hembree pursuant to the jury's recommendation but withheld imposition of the sentence
and granted her conditional probation for a period of five years. This appeal followed.
Hembree first argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a
directed verdict because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her
conviction for complicity to manufacture methamphetamine. Our standard of review as
to a denial of a motion for directed verdict was set forth by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991):
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given.
For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight
to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
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unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Id. at 187.
In order to obtain a complicity conviction pursuant to KRS 502.020(1), the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant intended to promote or to facilitate the
underlying charged offense. Harper v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Ky. 2001).
In this case, the underlying offense was the possession of two or more chemicals or items
of equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine with the intent that they be
used for that purpose. See KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). The Commonwealth also has the
burden of proving that another person committed the charged offense and that the
defendant participated in that offense. Harper, 43 S.W.3d at 265; see also Parks v.
Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 327 (Ky. 2006); Robert G. Lawson & William H.
Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 3-3(d)(2), at 117 (1998).
Hembree does not dispute that the underlying charged offense was
committed by another person. Instead, she contends that the Commonwealth failed to
prove complicity on her part because it failed to establish that she possessed two or more
chemicals or items of equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Hembree admits that she was in possession of Sudafed pills, which are a critical
component in the manufacture of methamphetamine. However, she argues that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that she was in possession of any other items used for this
purpose. In response, the Commonwealth contends that Hembree had “constructive
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possession” of a number of other items contained in the house that are used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
Constructive possession exists when a person does not have
actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and
intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control of
an object, either directly or through others.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Ky. 2002), quoting United States v.
Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1995). “To prove constructive possession, the
Commonwealth must present evidence which establishes that the contraband was subject
to the defendant's dominion and control.” Pate v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593, 59899 (Ky. 2004), quoting Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky. 2000).
Hembree argues that the Commonwealth did not establish that she had
constructive possession over any other items used to manufacture methamphetamine or
that she had the intention to promote or facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine.
However, she admits that she cleaned Nagle's home and did laundry there two to three
times per week; she had access to the kitchen, laundry room, and living room and to all
the items contained located in those areas. She also acknowledges that many of items
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine – Mason jars, aluminum foil, lithium
batteries, coffee filters, plastic baggies, and funnels – were found in the kitchen, which is
directly adjacent to the living room in which she was found with the Sudafed tablets.
Since constructive possession is established when items are subject to a person's
dominion and control, we cannot say that it was “clearly unreasonable” for the jury to
have found that Hembree had constructive possession of these items. The Benham test,
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which requires us to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, reinforces this conclusion. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
While Hembree testified at trial that she had no intention to assist in the
manufacture of methamphetamine, she also admitted that she suspected that the Sudafed
pills in her possession were going to be used for that purpose. She cooperated with Nagle
and complied with his request to remove them from their packs and place them in a bowl.
She testified that she believed that Nagle was helping one of his friends make
methamphetamine and acknowledged that possession of that much Sudafed was illegal.
In light of her testimony, coupled with the the “clearly unreasonable” standard governing
our review of the denial of a motion for directed verdict, we conclude that the court did
not err in submitting Hembree's charges to a jury. “Intent can be inferred from the
actions of an accused and the surrounding circumstances. The jury has wide latitude in
inferring intent from the evidence.” Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862
(Ky. 1988).
Hembree last argues that the trial court erred by submitting an instruction to
the jury that failed to include “intent” as a necessary element for a finding that she was
guilty of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine. “Alleged errors regarding jury
instructions are considered questions of law that we examine under a de novo standard of
review.” Hamilton v. CSX Transp., Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Ky.App. 2006).
Hembree particularly challenges the following instruction:
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 – MANUFACTURING
METHAMPHETAMINE – COMPLICITY
You will find the Defendant, MELISSA DIANE
HEMBREE, guilty under this Instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the following:
That in Jefferson County, Kentucky, on or about the
27th day of May, 2004, MELISSA DIANE HEMBREE, acting
alone or in complicity with another, possessed the chemicals
or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine with
intent to manufacture it.
According to Hembree, this instruction is deficient “for its failure to specifically include
her mental state – her intent to manufacture methamphetamine;” therefore, she contends
that the trial court's judgment must be reversed because she was substantially prejudiced
by the instruction. We disagree.
The instruction indisputably advises that the jury could find Hembree guilty
only if it found that she, “acting alone or in complicity with another, possessed the
chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine with intent to
manufacture it.” (Emphasis added). Hembree also fails to point out that the definitional
provision of the jury instructions expanded upon complicity as follows:
... that a person is guilty of an offense committed by another
person when, with the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits,
commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other person
to commit the offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid
such person in planning or committing the offense.
(Emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that such an instruction is
in harmony with KRS 502.020 and satisfies the intent requirement for a complicity
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charge. Crawley v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Ky. 2003). We conclude that
the trial court did not err in denying Hembree's claim of error.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Cicely J. Lambert
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public
Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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