JOSHUA BOYLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: OCTOBER 26, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000761-DG
JOSHUA BOYLE
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-XX-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Joshua Boyle appeals his conditional guilty plea to driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUI) charge. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm his
conviction.
Background
On August 25, 2005, at 12:41 a.m., in Stanford, Lincoln County, Kentucky,
a peace officer pulled Boyle over because the officer suspected that the single orange
road construction barrel in the bed of Boyle's truck was stolen government property.
When the officer approached Boyle, he smelled alcohol. After Boyle failed several
sobriety tests, the officer arrested Boyle for DUI. Boyle confessed his guilt to the DUI
charge, but nevertheless asserts that the traffic stop leading to his arrest and conviction
violated his constitutional rights.
Legal Standards
The law is well settled that an investigatory traffic stop is constitutionally
justified if and only if the facts and totality of circumstances surrounding the stop indicate
the existence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in
unlawful activity. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Ky. 1998).
The reasonable and articulable suspicion standard is a significantly lower standard than
the probable-cause standard. Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Ky. 1999).
Also, the subjective motivation of the investigating peace officer is immaterial as to
whether the facts and circumstances surrounding a traffic stop are indicative of an
objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of crime. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806,
813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
Analysis
The uncontroverted, material facts surrounding the investigatory stop in this
case are that Boyle drove his unmarked pick-up truck after midnight with a single orange,
road-construction barrel in its bed. Because we know “as a matter of ordinary human
experience” that the increasingly ubiquitous orange, road-construction barrel is ordinarily
transported during daylight hours, in bunches, and by marked construction or government
-2-
vehicles, we find that, at the time of the investigatory stop leading to Boyle's arrest and
guilty plea, there was indeed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Boyle was in
possession of a stolen barrel. See, U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84
L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (requiring use of “common sense and ordinary human experience” to
adjudicate investigatory traffic stops). Thus, even though the barrel was later shown to
have been borrowed, not stolen, the arresting officer's investigatory stop was not
unconstitutional or improper. Indeed, but for Boyle's palpable intoxication, the stop
would have been momentary and therefore not a significant violation of Boyle's privacy
interests when compared to the Commonwealth's significant interest in investigating
possible criminal activity.
Conclusion
Because the foregoing analysis reveals that the undisputed facts support the
lower court's legal conclusion that the traffic stop in this case was constitutional, we hold
as a matter of law that the court below correctly overruled Boyle's motion to suppress.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002) (stating standard
of review). Accordingly, we affirm Boyle's DUI conviction, which he entered on his
conditional plea of guilty.
MOORE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
NICKELL, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
NICKELL, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I must dissent. I believe
-3-
the majority is erroneous in affirming the trial court's finding that the traffic stop was
legal.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. On August 25, 2005, Boyle was
driving his pickup truck on Main Street at 12:41 a.m. in Stanford, Lincoln County,
Kentucky. Boyle was carrying an orange construction barrel in the bed of the truck. The
barrel had been given to Boyle by his employer1 for use in his landscaping business.
Absent this knowledge, Trooper Jeffrey Goins of the Kentucky State Police pulled Boyle
over to investigate whether the construction barrel might have been stolen. Upon
approaching Boyle's truck, Trooper Goins smelled alcohol. Boyle failed several sobriety
tests and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).2 Subsequent to
his arrest, Boyle submitted to a test of his blood alcohol level.
On October 13, 2005, Boyle filed a motion to suppress the results of the
field sobriety tests claiming the results were obtained following an illegal stop of his
vehicle. The Lincoln District Court denied Boyle's motion on October 27, 2005.
Thereafter, on December 22, 2005, Boyle entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09, to DUI, first offense, preserving his
right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. On March 9, 2006, the Lincoln
Circuit Court issued its opinion which affirmed the district court's order. This Court
granted discretionary review of this case on June 14, 2006.
1
Boyle was employed by Inter-County Electric on a road crew.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189A.010.
-4-
The only issue for our review is whether the traffic stop was legal. Boyle
contends it was not, arguing there is nothing criminal about transporting an orange barrel
in the bed of a truck. The Commonwealth, however, argues that hauling an orange
construction barrel in a privately-owned pickup truck after midnight gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that the barrel was stolen. It is well-settled that if a police officer
has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is about
to occur, a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Baltimore v. Commonwealth,
119 S.W.3d 532, 538 (Ky.App. 2003), we set forth a two-part analysis for evaluating the
legitimacy of an investigatory stop. “First, whether there [was] a proper basis for the stop
based on the police officer’s awareness of specific and articulable facts giving rise to
reasonable suspicion. Second, whether the degree of intrusion was reasonably related in
scope to the justification for the stop” [footnotes omitted].
The standard for our review is set forth in Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Pursuant to the direction provided in
Ornelas, the determination of a lower court regarding a suppression motion based on an
alleged illegal search is subject to a two-pronged analysis. First, historical facts should
be reviewed for clear error, and the facts are deemed to be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. Second, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause
are mixed questions of law and fact and are therefore subject to de novo review.
Furthermore, we are bound to give “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
-5-
resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id., 517 U.S. at 699. As the facts
herein are not in issue and are supported by substantial evidence, they are deemed to be
conclusive. On this issue, I agree with the majority. However, I disagree with the
majority's summary determination regarding the propriety of the trial court's ruling as to
the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion of criminal activity to effectuate the traffic
stop at issue.
Boyle argues that Trooper Goins was acting on a hunch and his suspicions
were unreasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. I agree. The requirement
under Terry, supra, that a police officer have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
criminal activity has occurred or is imminent prior to effectuating a brief detention for
investigative purposes demands more that a mere hunch, guess, general assumption, or
intuitive feeling. The suspicion must have a reasonable and legitimate basis.
During the suppression hearing, Trooper Goins stated only one reason for
stopping Boyle’s vehicle: Boyle was carrying an orange construction barrel in the bed of
his pickup truck. Boyle was operating his vehicle in a legal manner, and was not
speeding or swerving. On cross-examination, Trooper Goins testified that his decision to
stop Boyle was not based on any tip, call, or complaint that a construction barrel had been
stolen, nor had he issued citations to anyone for stealing a construction barrel in the
preceding 12 months. The basis of the stop was a general assumption that sometimes
construction barrels are stolen.
-6-
The majority asserts, without any support from the record, “we know 'as a
matter of ordinary human experience'” that orange construction barrels are “ordinarily
transported during daylight hours, in bunches, and by marked construction or government
vehicles . . . .” Therefore, the majority reasons Boyle's mere possession of an orange
construction barrel in the truck bed of his personal vehicle after midnight provides a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the barrel was stolen, and thus a proper basis for
a traffic stop.
However, in my understanding of “ordinary human experience” such
construction barrels are readily available for purchase and use by not only government
agencies and business operations but also by private individuals.3 The majority fails to
note there is no legal proscription against private ownership or possession of a
construction barrel, nor does the majority take into account the increasing amount of
public and private construction work which occurs during the nighttime hours so as to not
disturb traffic flow during the day. I believe the precedent the majority sets today takes a
huge step down the wrong path. The slippery slope of the majority's reasoning might just
as easily be applied to other items of legally owned or possessed property being hauled
about in one's privately owned vehicle. The majority's result in this case clearly ignores
established principles of law.
3
In fact, suppliers of orange construction barrels and other traffic control devices can be easily
found in the phone directory or on the Internet. Furthermore, these suppliers do not limit sales of
their products solely to government or businesses entities.
-7-
In weighing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of
Boyle’s vehicle, I believe the stop was illegal and the district court should have
suppressed the evidence obtained as a result. In no way can it be established based on the
facts of this case that Trooper Goins had a specific, reasonable, and articulable suspicion
to stop Boyle’s vehicle. I believe the stop in this case was impermissible and the
evidence obtained as a result should have been suppressed. For these reasons, I would
reverse the Lincoln Circuit Court's judgment and remand to the Lincoln District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this dissent.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jonathan R. Baker
Robert R. Baker
Stanford, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
John E. Hackley
Special Assistant Attorney General
Stanford, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.