GLENN FRANKLIN DEAN, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
DECEMBER 15, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002380-MR
GLENN FRANKLIN DEAN, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN WHITE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-00011
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GUIDUGLI, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
In July 1990, a Christian County jury
convicted Glenn Dean, Jr., of two counts of first-degree rape
and related offenses stemming from Dean’s and a codefendant’s
violent attack upon a sixteen-year-old girl.
to ninety years’ imprisonment.
Dean was sentenced
In Dean v. Commonwealth, 884
S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1992), our Supreme Court upheld Dean’s
conviction and sentence.
In September 2005, Dean moved for
relief from his 1990 conviction pursuant to CR 60.02.
The
Christian Circuit Court denied that motion on October 13, 2005
and Dean has appealed.
Dean contends that he was not accorded a
mandatory competency hearing prior to his 1990 trial and that
the circuit court erred by ruling that because Dean could have
raised this issue during his direct appeal he is precluded from
raising it now.
Although our reasoning differs somewhat from
that of the trial court, we agree that Dean’s current motion is
untimely, and in any event Dean’s underlying claim is meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Prior to Dean’s trial his counsel moved for a
psychiatric evaluation on the ground that “[t]here is a
substantial reason to believe that defendant is not entirely
aware of the consequences of the charges against him, or
possibly [will] not be able to communicate adequately with his
counsel.”
The trial court granted the motion, and Dean was
eventually evaluated by both a KCPC psychologist and a
psychologist retained by the defense.
The report of the state
psychologist appears in the record, and Dean’s psychologist
testified during the penalty phase of the trial.
Both found
that Dean was of low average intelligence and had trouble
reading, but neither found any disabling mental defects or
psychiatric conditions.
Dean had no trouble communicating with
either of them, gave what they deemed valid responses to their
several tests, and displayed a detailed recollection of the
crime and the surrounding events.
-2-
The state psychologist
concluded that “Mr. Dean is clearly competent to stand trial.”
Confronted with the state’s evaluation and what apparently was a
similar evaluation by the psychologist he had retained, defense
counsel waived a competency hearing and stipulated to Dean’s
competence.
The matter then went forward to trial.
Relying on Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406
(Ky. 2001), and Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473 (Ky.
1999), Dean correctly observes that once a criminal defendant’s
competence is brought into doubt, “the trial court must hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine the question.”
Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d at 486.
Mills v.
Nevertheless, our Supreme
Court has held that the appellate standard of review in a case
where the trial court has failed to conduct a competency hearing
is, “[w]hether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial
court judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is
being reviewed, should have experienced doubt with respect to
competency to stand trial.”
Id. at 486 (quoting Williams v.
Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Where there
is no continuing reason for doubt, the failure to hold a hearing
is at most a harmless error.
Id.
Here, assuming that counsel’s
motion for an exam initially raised a meaningful doubt about
Dean’s competence, neither Dean’s demeanor, counsel’s subsequent
representations, nor either expert’s examination provided any
reason for continuing to doubt Dean’s competence.
-3-
The trial
court’s failure to hold a competency hearing, therefore, was a
harmless error, not the plain error Dean alleges, and thus even
on the merits Dean’s CR 60.02 motion was properly denied.
The motion was also untimely.
Although the failure to
raise competency issues on direct appeal generally does not
preclude collateral review, because the defendant’s alleged
incompetence may well invalidate his apparent waiver,
Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361 (2nd Cir. 1983), the
availability of collateral review is not limitless.
Generally,
of course, the vehicle for collateral review of a criminal
conviction in Kentucky is RCr 11.42, which imposes a three-year
limitations period for collateral relief.
The extraordinary
remedy provided by CR 60.02 is not available where the issue
could have been raised in an RCr 11.42 proceeding.
Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005).
Bowling v.
Here, Dean’s
competency claim could have been raised under RCr 11.42 and was
thus subject to that rule’s limitations period.
The error Dean
alleges—the lack of a hearing—was apparent on the face of the
record, and he has offered no reason why the limitations period
should be tolled for nearly ten years.
Dean’s reference to RCr
10.26, the substantial error rule, is unavailing.
That rule
expands the scope of review somewhat, by permitting review of
plain errors unpreserved in the original proceeding, but it does
not expand the time for review.
Even plain error review must be
-4-
sought in a timely manner, which, for the purposes of this case,
means within the three-year limitations period.
Dean’s motion
was untimely, and for that reason, too, it was properly denied.
Accordingly, we affirm the October 13, 2005, order of the
Christian Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Glenn Franklin Dean, Jr., pro
se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.