GARY DEAN VAUGHN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002259-MR
GARY DEAN VAUGHN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00201
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE; MILLER,2
SPECIAL JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE:
Gary Dean Vaughn appeals from an
order of the Laurel Circuit Court denying his motion for a new
trial under CR3 61.02.
Because Vaughn was procedurally precluded
from seeking relief in the manner he chose, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
The crimes committed by Vaughn occurred on July 17,
2003.
On May 12, 2004, a Laurel County jury found Vaughn guilty
of the offenses of first-degree assault, first-degree robbery,
first-degree arson, and of being a first-degree persistent
felony offender (PFO I).
The court subsequently sentenced
Vaughn to life in prison on each of the three principal counts,
with the sentences to run concurrently.
The Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in an opinion
that became final on July 7, 2005.4
On July 21, 2005, Vaughn filed a motion to vacate his
conviction and sentence pursuant to RCr5 11.42.
The trial court
denied the motion in an order it entered on September 14, 2005.
Vaughn did not appeal from that order.
On September 26, 2005, Vaughn filed a motion for a new
trial pursuant to CR 61.02.
In his motion, he argued that
palpable error occurred in the underlying action.
Prior to the
court’s ruling on this motion, Vaughn filed a motion to vacate
his conviction and sentence pursuant to CR 60.02.
On October
19, 2005, the court entered an order denying Vaughn’s motion for
a new trial under CR 61.02.
Vaughn’s CR 60.02 motion was
pending at that time.
4
See 2004-SC-462-MR.
5
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-2-
In addressing Vaughn’s CR 61.02 motion, the court
concluded that CR 61.02 was synonymous with RCr 10.26.
The
court further found that there was no palpable error affecting
Vaughn’s substantial rights and warranting a new trial.
This
appeal by Vaughn followed.
On appeal, Vaughn raises several arguments.
include:
These
that the indictment was insufficient to charge him
with PFO, that the PFO sentencing was conducted improperly, that
the indictment was insufficient because it omitted reference to
some essential elements of several offenses, and that his
convictions of both robbery and assault constituted double
jeopardy.
Regardless of the merits of any of these arguments,
we must affirm the trial court’s order denying Vaughn’s motion
for the reasons set forth below.
First, CR 61.02 and RCr 10.26 are not mechanisms for
obtaining post-conviction relief.
Rather, those rules allow
palpable error that was insufficiently raised or preserved to
serve as grounds for relief in a motion for a new trial filed
pursuant to RCr 10.06 or in a direct appeal.
Since Vaughn’s
time for filing an RCr 10.06 motion for a new trial had passed
long before he filed this motion, his motion for a new trial was
untimely and could have been denied by the trial court for this
reason alone.
-3-
Second, Vaughn’s attempt to obtain relief in this
fashion was not allowed by the rules governing post-conviction
relief.
In Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky.
1983), the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that “(t)he structure
provided for attacking the final judgment of a trial court in
criminal cases is not haphazard and overlapping, but is
organized and complete.
That structure is set out in the rules
related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR
60.02.”
As Vaughn has utilized post-conviction attacks on his
conviction by direct appeal, RCr 11.42, and CR 60.02, his
belated attempt to obtain a new trial in the manner he employed
was improper.
Finally, we note that even if the trial court and this
court had treated Vaughn’s motion as one under CR 60.02, he
would not have been entitled to relief because the grounds
asserted were grounds that could have been raised in his direct
appeal or in his RCr 11.42 motion.
raising them in this manner.
Thus, he is precluded from
See Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
The order of the Laurel Circuit Court is affirmed.6
ALL CONCUR.
6
We have not addressed the basis of the trial court’s order denying Vaughn’s
motion. However, we “may affirm the trial court for any reason sustainable
from the record.” See Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d
928, 930 (Ky.App. 1991).
-4-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary Vaughn, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
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