HENRY WAKE HUFFMAN v. DELORES WOODS BAKER
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 6, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002031-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-002109-MR
HENRY WAKE HUFFMAN
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00396
DELORES WOODS BAKER
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY, JUDGE; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
This case involves an appeal of a jury
verdict in litigation alleging legal malpractice.
On June 14,
2005, the Carter Circuit Court entered an order awarding Henry
Wake Huffman $17,000.00 in damages and $5,553.33 in costs and
interest against attorney Delores Woods Baker.
1
On Baker’s
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
motion, the award of $5,553.33 in costs and interest was
subsequently reversed by the court by order of September 1,
2005.
It is from this latter order that Huffman, acting pro se,
now appeals.
Baker has filed a cross-appeal.
Huffman’s malpractice claim against Baker arose from a
title search that she performed for him in connection with his
purchase of a Carter County farm comprised of approximately 185
acres.
His family had owned the farm for nearly three hundred
years, and Huffman wanted to acquire the property so that it
would remain in his family.
As far as Huffman knew at that
time, a four-fifths’ interest in the land belonged to his uncle,
Wake.
The remaining one-fifth interest belonged to another
uncle, Chris, who was deceased.
Wake had told Huffman that he
was willing to sell him his share of the property.
Huffman, a
contractor by occupation, had employed Baker on various legal
matters over a period of about fifteen years.
He asked her to
perform a title search on the property in order to determine
what had happened to Chris’s one-fifth interest.
In July 1998, Baker presented Huffman with a letter in
which she stated: “It is my opinion that Wake Huffman has good
and marketable title to the subject property.”
She explained to
Huffman that Chris’s heirs had deeded away their interests in
the property to Wake before Chris’s death.
By operation of the
after-acquired-title doctrine, Baker believed that their
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interests in the property were wholly extinguished and they did
not inherit any share in the property after Chris’s death.
Relying on the letter, Huffman believed Wake to be the
sole owner of the property.
He made an agreement with Wake to
acquire the property; the agreed consideration was the balance
owed by Wake on a promissory note that was being held by
Citizens National Bank (now known as Citizens Bank of Grayson).
The balance on the note was approximately $19,000.00, which
Huffman paid in full.
(The land was later appraised and valued
at $98,000.00).
Huffman was then sued by a number of his cousins, all
heirs of Chris, who claimed fractional ownership of the farm
(Carter Circuit Court Civil Action 99-CI-00224).
Baker
represented Huffman and moved to dismiss the suit on the basis
of the after-acquired-title doctrine.
The circuit court denied
the motion on November 24, 1999, holding as follows:
The Defendants’ assertion that the claims of
the Plaintiffs are barred by the After
Acquired Title Doctrine are misplaced and in
error. That doctrine is not applicable to
the facts of the case[.]
Baker withdrew her representation in the case on
February 7, 2000; she recommended to Huffman that he find
another attorney.
After some difficulty in finding another
lawyer willing to take the case, Huffman hired Robert Miller,
who proceeded to defend the case on a theory of adverse
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possession.
The case was ultimately resolved through mediation.
Huffman paid the plaintiffs sums totalling $15,375.00.
exchange, he received quit-claim deeds to the farm.
In
The case
was dismissed as settled on September 24, 2001.
On December 18, 2001, Huffman filed a legal
malpractice action against Baker.
jury on June 28, 2005.
The case was tried before a
Huffman presented no expert testimony on
the subject of Baker’s alleged negligence.
By a vote of nine to
three, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Huffman and
awarded him damages of $17,000.00.
The final judgment of the
court added to this amount the sum of $5,553.33 for costs and
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum to run from May 23,
2001.
Although the significance of the date from which interest
was computed was not explained in the order, Baker has noted
that it was the date on which Huffman paid his cousins the
amounts as agreed upon in the settlement.
On July 25, 2005, Baker filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict; she also sought the alternate
relief that the court grant a new trial or that it alter or
amend its judgment.
On September 1, 2005, the Carter Circuit
Court denied the motion except with respect to the amount of
$5,553.33 in costs and interest.
deleting that amount.
It amended the judgment by
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
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The issues on direct appeal are whether the circuit
court erred:
in allowing the case to be heard by a jury, in not
granting Huffman’s motion for summary judgment, in improperly
instructing the jury regarding damages, and in deleting the
costs and interest amount from the final judgment.
The issue on
cross-appeal is whether the circuit court erred in denying
Baker’s motion for a directed verdict.
Baker argues that she
was entitled to a directed verdict because Huffman failed to
present any expert testimony to support a finding that she acted
negligently.
At the opening of the trial, Huffman’s counsel made an
unsuccessful motion to dismiss the jury by contending that
malpractice was not a jury issue and that the case ought to be
decided in a bench trial.
Huffman argues on appeal that the
denial of the motion was error since marketability of title is a
question of law.
Therefore, it was not appropriate for
resolution by a jury.
In denying the motion, the court held
that at issue was the alleged negligence of Baker -- not the
marketability of Huffman’s title.
It held that the alleged
negligence in the performance of duty is a jury question.
agree.
As it would be in negligence cases
generally, the question of whether the
conduct of the attorney meets the standard
of care test is one for the trier of the
facts to determine.
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We
Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. App. 1979)
(citations omitted).
Thus, the court did not err in overruling
the motion and in allowing a jury to hear the case.
We shall next address Baker’s argument on crossappeal.
She contends that expert testimony was required at
trial to prove that she was negligent and that the court erred
in failing to grant her motions for a directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
A plaintiff in a legal malpractice case bears the
burden of proving three elements:
1) that there was an employment relationship
with the defendant/attorney;
2) that the attorney neglected his duty to
exercise the ordinary care of a reasonably
competent attorney acting in the same or
similar circumstances; and
(3) that the attorney’s negligence was the
proximate cause of damage to the client.
Marrs v. Kelly, 95 S.W.3d 856, 860 (Ky. 2003)(citations
omitted).
Baker’s argument is directed at the sufficiency of the
evidence presented to prove the second element of failure to
exercise the duty of ordinary care.
Expert testimony is
required in legal malpractice cases unless “the negligence is so
apparent that a layperson with general knowledge would have no
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difficulty recognizing it[.]”
Stephens v. Denison, 150 S.W.3d
80, 82 (Ky. App. 2004).
In this case, Baker gave Huffman her opinion that the
interests of Chris’s heirs in the property had been extinguished
under the after-acquired-title doctrine, a theory that Baker
herself has described in her cross-appeal as “esoteric.”
No
expert testimony was presented to explain or to establish how
this advice constituted a breach of her duty to exercise the
ordinary care of a reasonably competent attorney acting in the
same or similar circumstances.
The only expert testimony
presented was provided by Charles Holbrook, who testified on
behalf of the defense.
Holbrook is an attorney who has been
practicing law since 1970 with a concentration of sixty to
eighty percent of his time in the areas of real estate and title
work.
Holbrook testified that Baker was not acting unreasonably
or negligently in relying on the doctrine of after-acquired
title; that he had relied on the doctrine in the past; and that
it is a sound principle in Kentucky law.
The evidence offered at trial to support a finding
that Baker had acted negligently consisted of the following:
(1) that the court entered the order of
November 24, 1999, in the initial action (99-CI00224), denying Baker’s motion to dismiss on the
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grounds that the doctrine of after acquired title
was not applicable to the case;
(2) that Baker withdrew her representation
after the trial court denied her motion to
dismiss;
(3) that Huffman testified that he had a
great deal of difficulty finding an attorney to
take his case after Baker withdrew her
representation.
He also testified that the
numerous other attorneys whom he consulted told
him that the doctrine of after-acquired title did
not apply to his case.
Defense counsel’s
objection to these comments as hearsay was
sustained, but the jury did hear the testimony
and was not admonished;
(4) that Huffman’s second attorney, Robert
Miller, who succeeded Baker, proceeded on a
theory of adverse possession (not the afteracquired property doctrine) before the case
finally went to mediation; and
(5) that rather than advancing to trial, the
underlying case was resolved through mediation
with Huffman paying the plaintiffs $15,375.00.
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This evidence was not substantively sufficient to
support a finding that Baker’s title opinion amounted to a
breach of her professional duty to Huffman.
However, Huffman
contends that the order of November 24, 1999, denying Baker’s
motion to dismiss, became “the law of the case” as a whole and
that it was, therefore, sufficient to sustain a finding of
negligence per se.
He relies on Hogan v. Long, 922 S.W.2d 368,
370 (Ky. 1995)(citations omitted), which contains the following
language:
a final decision, whether right or wrong, is
the law of the case and is conclusive of the
questions therein resolved and is binding
upon the parties, the trial court, and the
Court of Appeals.
As the language of Hogan makes clear, however, only a
final decision has this binding effect.
An interlocutory order
does not constitute “the law of the case.”
See Cartmell v.
Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of City of
Maysville, 419 S.W.2d 719, 721-22 (Ky. 1967).
If any adverse
interlocutory ruling (such as this order denying a motion to
dismiss) were deemed to constitute sufficient evidence of
negligence per se, no attorney could escape liability for
malpractice.
Winning and losing theories of cases are
propounded constantly without raising the spectre of
malpractice.
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Furthermore, even if the Carter Circuit Court were
correct and the theory of after-acquired title did not apply to
the circumstances of this case, a mistaken theory of law subject
to the test of a trial cannot be assumed automatically to amount
to malpractice.
Expert testimony was required to show that
Baker’s reliance on the doctrine constituted a breach of her
professional duty to Huffman.
In arguing his motion for a bench
trial, Huffman’s own trial counsel admitted that the matter was
“too complicated and confusing to address to the jury.”
Determining whether Baker’s reliance on the theory constituted
negligence was indeed a matter beyond the ken of a layperson
without the assistance of expert testimony.
We hold that the
absence of expert testimony was fatal to a finding of negligence
and that the court erred in failing to direct a verdict on this
issue.
Accordingly, we reverse on this issue as asserted in
Baker’s cross-appeal.
Huffman has argued on appeal that the court should
have granted his motion for summary judgment.
We disagree.
Since it was based on Huffman’s mistaken belief that the order
of November 24, 1999, was irrefutable proof of Baker’s
negligence, it was based on an erroneous premise.
The court did
not err in declining to enter summary judgment on this issue.
Having determined that the court erred as a matter of
law in failing to direct a verdict because of the necessity for
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expert testimony, we need not discuss the issue of damages and
the alleged error as to the jury instructions on damages.
The order of the Carter Circuit Court is reversed.
remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Henry Wake Huffman
Grayson, Kentucky
Robert L. Caummisar
Grayson, Kentucky
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