LESLIE CLINE v. LEECO, INC; BOONE MOUNTAIN SERVICES, INC., HON. A THOMAS DAVIS, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: May 5, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001996-WC
LESLIE CLINE
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NOS. WC-04-94923 & WC-04-01321
LEECO, INC; BOONE MOUNTAIN
SERVICES, INC., HON. A THOMAS
DAVIS, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
The single question in this appeal is
whether the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge
compelled a finding of compensability on appellant’s claim for
benefits stemming from a back injury sustained in the course of
his employment with appellee Leeco, Inc. and cumulative trauma
allegedly incurred while working for appellee Boone Mountain
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Services, Inc., as well as on his claim for a related
psychiatric condition.
Because a review of the evidence
convinces us that the Workers’ Compensation Board has not
“overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or committed an
error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice,”2 we affirm its decision.
After awarding permanent partial benefits for a knee
injury sustained while working for Leeco, the ALJ dismissed the
back injury component of the claim on the basis that appellant
had a pre-existing, active condition prior to his December 2002
injury at Leeco, and that he had failed to demonstrate any
increase in his functional impairment due to his employment with
Boone Mountain.
The ALJ also concluded that appellant’s
psychological condition was not work-related.
In a thorough and
well-reasoned opinion, the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed
the decision of the ALJ.
Appellant now advances in this appeal
the same arguments he pressed before the Board:
1) whether the
ALJ erred in finding he had a preexisting active disability; 2)
whether he was entitled to an application of the multipliers
provided in KRS 342.730(1)(c); 3) whether the ALJ misstated the
law concerning cumulative trauma; and 4) whether the ALJ erred
in dismissing his psychiatric claim.
Because we are convinced
that we can add little, if anything, to the Board’s well2
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992).
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reasoned analysis of these issues, we affirm its decision and
adopt the following portions of its opinion as our own:
Cline, born May 9, 1955, has a twelfth
grade education. He has earned both
electrician’s and foreman’s papers for
underground coal mining. Cline filed claims
for injuries to his low back and right knee
occurring in two separate incidents while
working as an electrician for Leeco. He
also filed a claim against Boone Mountain
for cumulative trauma to his low back.
Cline worked as a mechanic and electrician
for Leeco from November 1, 2002 through June
14, 2003. He was employed by H & D Mining
Co. through Boone Mountain from June 15,
2003 through December 15, 2003.
Cline’s medical history is significant.
He sustained multiple work-related injuries
to his back in 1976, 1987, and 1989. He
sustained an injury to his neck and back on
October 15, 1990. Cline testified that
following each of these injuries he was off
work for a minimal period of time, if at
all, and returned to his job without
difficulty. Significantly, Cline underwent
an MRI scan of his lumbar spine on June 25,
2002, prior to his first work injury with
Leeco on December 26, 2002. The MRI was
interpreted by Dr. Mahender Pampati as
follows:
There is evidence of disc
herniation at the level of L4-5
and L3-4 levels. Grade 12-2
spondylolisthesis of L5 over S1.
There is also suggestion of
moderate degenerative changes of
the lumbar spine at the level of
L4-5 and L5-S1. Please note,
there is a slightly lateralization
of the disc herniation at the
level of L3-4 and L4-5 towards the
right. Correlate clinically.
-3-
On July 8, 2002, Cline received the
following assessment of his condition by Dr.
Jaya Pampati:
1. Degenerative arthritis of the
lumbar spine with symptoms
suggestive of spinal stenosis and
lumbosacral radiculopathy.
2. Due to history of diffuse
arthralgias, fatigue, associated
with recent shortness of breath
and questionable history of
Raynaud phenomena, connective
tissue disease is a consideration.
Cline testified he was prying up on a
slate bar trying to remove a piece of belt
structure when his feet slipped, causing him
to twist his back. He testified that as he
fell his chin hit the belt structure, which
bent him backwards, and he landed face down
in the mud. Cline continued to work
following the incident and sought medical
attention on January 28, 2003, with reported
symptoms of stiffness and low back pain
resulting from the injury.
Cline sustained a second work injury on
June 9, 2003, when he slipped and fell
twisting his right knee. Cline’s knee
injury is not at issue on appeal.3
Cline claims a cumulative trauma injury
against Boone Mountain premised on
approximately twenty-seven years of working
in and around coal mines. He listed
December 15, 2003, his last date of working
for Boone Mountain, as the date his
cumulative trauma became manifest.
Cline testified both by deposition and
at the hearing. He explained his change of
employment from Leeco to Boone Mountain.
According to Cline, he could no longer
perform the heavy labor required of an
electrician in low coal at Leeco. At Boone
Mountain he hoped to be a superintendent,
3
The appeal referenced is that from the Administrative Law Judge to the
Workers’ Compensation Board.
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thinking the work would be easier on his
back. As it turned out, Cline ended up
working as an electrician for Boone
Mountain, in addition to his supervisory
duties. He testified the work turned out to
be too much for him and he stopped working
in December 2003. At his hearing, Cline
testified he is in a lot of pain and also
suffers from high blood pressure. He
testified his back is a lot more problematic
than his knee and he could work if his
condition was limited to the knee. Cline
stated that when he first quit his job, he
was given job offers and he told them all he
was not able to work. He further testified
that none of his previous back injuries
prevented him from working.
*
*
*
The ALJ reviewed the lay and medical
testimony in the record in considerable
detail. He framed the issue as whether
Cline’s injury was an exacerbation of a
preexisting active condition or a new
injury, possibly a reawakening of a dormant
condition. The ALJ relied on the evidence
that Cline had an active painful back
condition prior to the December 2002 injury
and his condition necessitated an MRI of his
lumbar spine in June 2002. The ALJ was
persuaded by Dr. Wagner’s opinion that Cline
had a 7% whole person impairment due to
spondylolisthesis, a developmental defect
which preexisted his employment in coal
mines; Dr. Graulich’s assessment a 7%
impairment due to the spondylolisthesis
unrelated to work injuries; and Dr.
Goldman’s finding of no work-related
impairment. The ALJ further relied on
evidence that Cline did not miss any work
following the work injury and he returned to
his regular duties until he sustained a knee
injury. The ALJ therefore dismissed Cline’s
claim based on the December 2002 injury.
Concerning the cumulative trauma claim
against Boone Mountain, the ALJ was
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persuaded by Dr. Templin’s opinion that
Cline’s back problems were documented prior
to his hire date with Boone Mountain. Dr.
Templin agreed that subsequent back studies
did not show any evidence of new injury, and
Cline’s functional impairment rating was not
increased in any way by his employment with
Boone Mountain. The ALJ determined Cline
suffered a series of ‘maxi-traumas’ to his
back and not mini-traumas.
Concerning Cline’s psychiatric
condition, the ALJ stated:
The ALJ determines that the
Plaintiff’s psychological
condition is primarily a non-workrelated impairment. . . .
Mr. Cline has psychological
problems related to his whole life
situation. Not just employment
related problems. Dr. Shraberg’s
report outlines the extraneous
psychological stressors.
At the hearing Mr. Cline
certainly did not have the
appearance, demeanor,
articulateness or the actions of
someone with a present 43 GAF
score as put forth by Dr. Allen.
The ALJ determined Cline had a 4%
impairment rating due to his knee injury and
awarded benefits based thereon.
*
*
*
On appeal, Cline argues 1) there was
no preexisting active disability; 2) he is
entitled to application of the three
multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c);
3) he sustained a cumulative trauma injury;
and, 4) his psychiatric condition is
compensable.
Since Cline, the party with the burden
of proof, was unsuccessful on the issue of
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work causation, the issue on appeal is
whether the evidence on which he relies is
so compelling as to require the result he
seeks as a matter of law. Snawder v. Stice,
Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979), Wolf Creek
Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App.
1984). The ALJ, as fact finder, has the
sole authority to determine the weight,
credibility, substance, and inferences to be
drawn from the evidence. Paramount Foods,
Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky.
1985). Furthermore, the ALJ has the
absolute right to believe part of the
evidence and disbelieve other parts, whether
it comes from the same witness or the same
party’s total proof. Caudill v. Maloney's
Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1977).
It is not enough to show that there is some
evidence which would support a contrary
conclusion. McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp.,
514 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1974). So long as the
ALJ’s opinion is supported by any evidence
of substance, ordinarily we may not reverse.
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641 (Ky.
1986).
Cline first argues the ALJ erred in
determining his prior back problems were
preexisting and active. He submits his
conditions were not active enough to prevent
him from earning $65,000 to $75,000 per
year. He likens his situation to that of
the claimant in McNutt Construction/First
General Services v. Scott, 40 S.W.3d 854,
859 (Ky. 2001), and argues his fall at work
on December 26, 2002 constitutes an injury
as defined by law.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Roberts
Brothers Coal v. Robinson, 113 S.W.3d 181
(Ky. 2003), addressed the issue of active
disability pursuant to the 1996 Workers’
Compensation Act. In terms of permanent
partial occupational disability awards, the
court explained that impairment and
disability are not synonymous. Whether a
claimant has a preexisting ‘impairment’
requiring an exclusion from a permanent
partial disability award must be determined
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in accordance with the American Medical
Association, Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment (‘Guides’). Any
measurable impairment existing prior to a
work-related injury to the same body part is
non-compensable, regardless of whether the
impairment is vocationally limiting. If
there is a measurable preexisting
impairment, it cannot be viewed as being
proximately caused by the subsequent injury.
Here, there was considerable evidence
that Cline sustained numerous injuries to
his back prior to commencing employment with
Leeco. In fact, an MRI performed in June
2002 revealed degenerative changes with
herniated discs. Both Dr. Wagner and Dr.
Graulich assessed a 7% impairment rating due
to spondylolisthesis, a preexisting
condition unrelated to Cline’s work
injuries. Further, Dr. Goldman indicated
there was no work-related impairment. It is
true that an injury which arouses a
preexisting, dormant, non-disabling
condition remains compensable. McNutt,
supra. Here, however, there was substantial
evidence to suggest Cline’s impairment
preexisted his latest injuries at Leeco and
Boone Mountain. Cline next argues the ALJ
erred with regard to the application of the
multipliers pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c).
Cline contends the ALJ erred in determining
he could return to his usual work and his
findings are not in conformity with the
supreme court’s holding in Fawbush v. Gwinn,
103 S.W.3d 5 (Ky. 2003). He also cites
Adkins v. Pike County Board of Education,
141 S.W.3d 387, 390 (Ky. App. 2004) as
authority for the proposition that ‘in
determining whether a claimant could
continue to earn an equal or greater wage
the ALJ must consider a broad range of
factors, only one of which is the ability to
perform the current job.’ He requests
remand for further findings.
Cline was awarded benefits only for his
knee injury. To be entitled to the three
multiplier, the lack of the ‘physical
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capacity to return to the type of work that
the employee performed at the time of
injury’ must be ‘due to’ that injury.
(Emphasis added.) KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. In
other words, the injury must be the reason
why Cline can’t return to the type of work
he was performing at the time of injury.
Since the ALJ dismissed Cline’s low back
injury claim, it cannot form the basis for
an award of enhanced benefits. Cline would
only have been entitled to the three
multiplier if the knee injury prevented him
from returning to his pre-injury work. The
Form 107 of Dr. Kibler indicates Cline
retained no restrictions on his ability to
work due to that injury. This evidence, as
well as Cline’s own testimony addressing his
ability to work if his knee only was
involved, constitutes substantial evidence
upon which the ALJ could rely.
Cline next argues the ALJ misstated the
law with regard to cumulative trauma in
dismissing his claim against Boone Mountain.
In essence, Cline argues the fact that he
had preexisting arthritis should not
preclude a finding of compensability when an
injury arouses that preexisting arthritis
into active impairment sooner than otherwise
would have been the case. Cline contends
the ALJ’s determination that he did not
sustain an increase in functional impairment
rating due [to] his employment with Boone
Mountain is not in conformity with the law.
He also argues the ALJ rendered a medical
conclusion when he determined Cline suffered
a series of ‘maxi-traumas’ as opposed the
mini-traumas.
As set out in the discussion of active
disability, the ALJ determined Cline’s back
condition was active and in existence prior
to his injury with Leeco. As previously
discussed, Drs. Wagner and Graulich both
assessed a 7% impairment for Cline’s
spondylolisthesis which was in existence
prior to his employment with Leeco or Boone
Mountain. In fact, Dr. Templin, Cline’s
examining physician, acknowledged the
-9-
diagnosis of chronic low back pain syndrome
predated Cline’s hire date with Boone
Mountain. Dr. Templin’s testimony further
established Cline’s functional impairment
rating had not increased in any way by his
employment with Boone Mountain. Dr.
Graulich was of the opinion that no
cumulative trauma injury resulted from
Cline’s last employment. All of this
evidence is substantial in nature,
precluding the Board’s intervention on
appeal. KRS 342.285(2). Special Fund v.
Francis, supra.
Lastly, Cline takes issue with the
ALJ’s dismissal of his psychiatric claim,
arguing ‘The substantial contributing factor
has always been the law of Kentucky. Deutsch
v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141 (1980). The
work related events need not be the sole
cause of psychological impairment.’
(Emphasis original.)
Cline takes issue with the ALJ’s
conclusions: 1) ‘Mr. Cline has psychological
problems related to his whole life
situation. Not just employment related
physical problems. Dr. Shraberg’s report
outlines the extraneous psychological
stressors[,]’ and 2) his ‘psychological
condition is primarily a non-work-related
impairment.’ In the absence of a petition
for reconsideration, the only issue is
whether the ALJ’s dismissal of Cline’s
psychiatric claim is supported by
substantial evidence. Hall’s Hardwood Floor
Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327 (Ky. App.
2000); Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally, 688 S.W.2d
334 (Ky. 1985).
Dr. Shraberg concluded Cline had
recovered from an adjustment disorder
following his December 2002 work accident
and the residual anxiety and depression were
associated with aging and a cardiac
condition. Dr. Shraberg determined Cline had
a 0% work-related psychiatric impairment.
Absent a showing that the ALJ’s finding was
so unreasonable under the evidence that it
must be rejected as a matter of law, this
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Board is required to affirm. Ira A. Watson
Department Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48
(Ky. 2000).
Accordingly, the opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board is in all respects affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
James D. Holliday
Hazard, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BOONE
MOUNTAIN SERVICES, INC:
W. Barry Lewis
Hazard, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LEECO,
INC.:
Jeffrey D. Damron
Pikeville, Kentucky
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