EARL BEGLEY v. BENNY DALE COLEMAN; TERESA COLEMAN; JOYCE ANN MURPHY; JAMES L. MURPHY; GAYLE LOU GROT; ROBERT A. GROT; CARLO B. COLEMAN; AND DONALD W. PACE
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 15, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001831-MR
EARL BEGLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00856
v.
BENNY DALE COLEMAN; TERESA
COLEMAN; JOYCE ANN MURPHY;
JAMES L. MURPHY; GAYLE LOU GROT;
ROBERT A. GROT; CARLO B. COLEMAN;
AND DONALD W. PACE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GUIDUGLI AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
In 1974, Earl Begley approached his neighbor,
Mrs. Arthur Pace, seeking permission to construct a driveway
across her property to his own property.
Pace agreed contingent
upon Begley demolishing and removing three houses owned by Pace,
as well as his cutting down a large tree on her property.
performing the work, Begley subsequently constructed the
After
driveway which included a bridge over a small stream.
For the
next 29 years, Begley maintained and used the driveway without
incident.
On June 23, 2003, Begley lost his home in a
foreclosure sale.
Prior to the date of the sale, Benny Dale
Coleman, the present owner of the property formerly owned by the
Paces, instructed his attorney to send a letter to the attorney
for National City Bank stating that the driveway which traversed
the Coleman property was not included in any sale of the Begley
property.
The note further instructed that any buyer of the
Begley property wishing to use the driveway would have to seek
express permission from the Colemans.
In turn, a representative
of National City Bank faxed a note to the Harlan Circuit Court
Master Commissioner requesting that the Commissioner announce at
the sale that use of the driveway was solely by permission of
the Colemans, which had been withdrawn.
The property was ultimately sold to National City
Bank, who later assigned its winning bid to Federal Home Loan
Mortgage.
On October 18, 2004, Begley entered into a rent-to-
own agreement with CMB Property Ventures, LLC, pursuant to which
he contracted to repurchase the property.
On December 1, 2004, Begley filed an action in the
Harlan Circuit Court seeking a declaration that he was the owner
of an easement by prescription over the driveway traversing the
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Coleman’s property.
Begley also moved for a restraining order
prohibiting the Colemans from blocking his use of the driveway.
On February 4, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on Begley’s
motion.
The trial court denied Begley’s motion in an order
entered on March 24, 2005.
In its Findings of Fact and Order,
the court specifically found:
3.
That the Plaintiff, Mr. Earl Begley
testified that he had received
permission from the prior owners of the
property, that being Arthur Pace who
was the grandfather of Benny Dale
Coleman, to use the driveway going
across the Defendant’s property;
4.
That after further testimony the
Plaintiff testified that he had bought
the right to cross the Defendant’s
property by doing work for Mrs. Arthur
Pace;
5.
That there was no written document of
(sic) conveyance produced by the
Plaintiffs and in fact the Plaintiff
testified that there was no written
document regarding this easement; that
this lack of a writing fails to satisfy
the Statu[t]e of Frauds; and
6.
That the Plaintiff’s wife for more than
twenty (20) years, Thelma Cochran, who
is now his ex-wife testified that the
Plaintiff used the driveway across the
Coleman property by permission from
Mrs. Arthur Pace; and Ms. Cochran,
further, testified that should Mrs.
Arthur Pace have told the Plaintiff to
stop using the driveway across the
Coleman property, then they would have
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done so pursuant to the request of Mrs.
Pace.
The court further held that Begley “failed to establish that
this is a prescriptive easement as he has failed to prove that
they have had open, notorious, forcible, exclusive and hostile
use of this driveway across the [Colemans’] property for a
period of at least fifteen (15) years.”
Following the court’s decision to deny Begley’s
request for a restraining order, each of the parties briefed the
issue raised by Begley’s lawsuit before submitting it for a
final decision.
On July 28, 2005, the court entered a judgment
dismissing Begley’s complaint.
After first incorporating the
factual findings from the March 24 order denying Begley’s motion
for a restraining order, the court noted that because no
additional evidence had been presented, the question before it
was purely a legal one.
Based on the record before it, the
court held “[t]hat the facts, when juxtaposed with the law in
this case, show that the proof, at best, submitted by the
Plaintiff is inconsistent and does not show by a preponderance
of the evidence that an easement by grant or prescription ever
existed – at most there was a permission of use only”.
Begley
has appealed the judgment to this Court, and because we find no
error in it, we affirm.
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Begley’s first argument is that the circuit court
erred by substituting its judgment for that of a jury.
Our
standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is
well-settled.
The standard of review on appeal when a
trial court grants a motion for summary
judgment is “whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” . . . The trial court must
view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and
summary judgment should be granted only if
it appears impossible that the nonmoving
party will be able to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in his favor. .
. . The moving party bears the initial
burden of showing that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and then the burden
shifts to the party opposing summary
judgment to present “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
. . . The trial court “must examine the
evidence, not to decide any issue of fact,
but to discover if a real issue exists.” .
. . While the Court in Steelvest[, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476, 480 (Ky. 1991),] used the word
“impossible” in describing the strict
standard for summary judgment, the Supreme
Court later stated that the word was “used
in the practical sense, not in an absolute
sense.” . . . Because summary judgment
involves only legal questions and the
existence of any disputed material issues of
fact, an appellate court need not defer to
the trial court’s decision and will review
the issue de novo. . . .
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Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001)
(citations omitted).
Begley first argues that the language used by the
trial court in its judgment is evidence that the court usurped
the role of a jury by weighing the parties’ opposing evidence
rather than merely determining whether Begley had offered any
evidence upon which a trier of fact could render judgment in his
favor.
Specifically, the trial court stated in its Judgment:
That the facts, when juxtaposed with the law
in this case, show that the proof, at best,
submitted by the Plaintiff is inconsistent
and does not show by a preponderance of the
evidence that an easement by grant or
prescription ever existed – at most there
was a permission of use only . . . .
While at first glance Begley’s concern is understandable given
the trial court’s particular choice of language, we do not
believe that the decision is in error.
Our review of the record
reveals no evidence that supports Begley’s claim for a
prescriptive easement, and thus entry of the judgment against
him was appropriate.
It is undisputed that Begley’s use of the subject
driveway began as a result of his receiving permission from the
Paces.
Begley’s own testimony indicates that he both sought the
Paces’ permission and performed various tasks to receive it.
Further, the testimony of Begley’s former wife of more than 20
years reveals that, at least during their years together, the
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Begleys knew that they would have had to relinquish their use of
the driveway had the Paces revoked their permission.
This Court has previously held that a prescriptive
right to use a passway cannot be acquired no matter how long the
use continues if it originated as a permissive use by the owner
of the servient estate.
2001).
Cole v. Gilvin, 59 S.W.3d 468 (Ky. App.
See also Jackey v. Burkhead, 341 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1960)
(where use of way is permissive, no prescriptive right to it is
acquired, although it may have been used for 15 years or more);
Tapley v. Lee, 205 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. 1947) (right to a passway
cannot be acquired following grant of permissive use given to
dominant landowner by servient landowner, however long such use
might continue).
Rather, when the use begins with permission,
in order for it to be transformed into a prescriptive title the
claiming party must prove that at some point subsequent to the
grant of permission he made a distinct and positive assertion of
a claim of right against the servient estate owner.
Newberry v.
Hardin, 161 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. 1942).
Begley contends that he offered proof of such an
assertion of right through his long-standing use of the
driveway.
He further argues that the trial court erred by not
accepting his continued use as evidence sufficient to establish
a prima facie case of a prescriptive easement.
Contrary to
Begley’s argument, however, mere length of use of a passway is
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insufficient proof of a “distinct and positive assertion” of a
claim of title.
As discussed above, if a right of use is
acquired by permission, it remains permissive for as long as the
use continues.
See Jackey, supra; Tapley, supra; Cole; supra.
Barring some other “distinct and positive assertion” of an
adverse claim of right, when use of a passway begins as a
permissive right, long-standing use alone simply can not alter
the character of its use so as to give rise to a prescriptive
claim of right.
McCoy v. Hoffman, 295 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1956);
Lambert v. Huntsman, 209 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1948); Richardson v.
Horn, 137 S.W.2d 394 (Ky. 1940).
Thus, we agree with the trial court that the only
evidence offered by Begley – his three decade use of the
driveway – was insufficient to sustain his claim for a
prescriptive easement.
Aside from his period of use, the record
is devoid of any evidence that demonstrates an actual, open,
notorious, forcible, exclusive, and hostile claim of right made
by Begley in favor of such an easement.
Cole, supra.
Because
of this, his right of use that originated as a permissive one
never changed its character.
Accordingly, the trial court
correctly determined that Begley failed in his duty to present
“at least some affirmative evidence” demonstrating that there is
a question of material fact warranting trial.
Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
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We are aware that our Supreme Court has, on occasion,
denied the owner of a servient estate the power to withdraw
previously given consent concerning the use of a passway.
See,
e.g., Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976); Akers v.
Moore, 309 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1958); McCoy v. Hoffman, 295 S.W.2d
560 (Ky. 1956).
In these decisions, an “easement by estoppel”
was recognized when the owner of the dominant estate, in
reliance upon permission to use a passway, had expended
considerable funds and efforts to effect improvements on the
passway or the dominant estate, or both.
Moreover, in addition
to the substantial improvements, the owner of the dominant
estate also had demonstrated that he would be without any
practical means of ingress and egress had the servient estate
owner not been estopped from withdrawing permission.
We find neither of these prerequisites in this case.
While it is true that Begley constructed a small wooden bridge
on the servient estate over a creek or ditch, we do not believe
that this improvement is so substantial as to warrant estopping
the Colemans from withdrawing their permission regarding
Begley’s use of the driveway.
Further, while the disputed
driveway may be a more convenient means for Begley to access his
property, he admits that it is not the only means of access
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available to him.
Under these circumstances, there is simply no
basis for finding an easement by estoppel.1
Because we agree with the trial court that Begley’s
right to use the driveway in question was at all times
permissive and never rose to the level of a prescriptive
easement or an easement by estoppel, we need not address his
arguments concerning the loss of that alleged easement through
the foreclosure of his property.
The July 28, 2005, judgment of
the Boyd Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Russell D. Alred
Harlan, Kentucky
Otis Doan, Jr.
Doan Law Office
Harlan, Kentucky
1
Even if we were to find that, prior to the foreclosure of Begley’s property,
the Colemans were estopped from denying Begley permission to use the
driveway, the ultimate result herein would be the same. When National City
Bank foreclosed on the Begley property and later purchased it at auction, it
acquiesced in the Colemans’ desire to withdraw permission for use of the
driveway. Thus, even though Begley later repurchased his property, his right
to use the driveway had been extinguished through National City Bank’s
agreement with the Colemans.
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