SIDNEY COAL COMPANY, INC. v. NORMAN CHARLES; HONORABLE MARCEL SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD and NORMAN CHARLES v. SIDNEY COAL COMPANY, INC.; HONORABLE MARCEL SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 25, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001750-WC
SIDNEY COAL COMPANY, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-01-78170
v.
NORMAN CHARLES; HONORABLE
MARCEL SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD
AND:
NO. 2005-CA-002228-WC
NORMAN CHARLES
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-01-78170
SIDNEY COAL COMPANY, INC.;
HONORABLE MARCEL SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING APPEAL IN PART;
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
This appeal and cross-appeal stem from
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board reversing the
Administrative Law Judge’s order directing the claimant Norman
Charles to reimburse the employer Sidney Coal for temporary
total disability benefits paid and affirming the denial of
Charles’s claim for future medical benefits.
We affirm the
Board’s decision as to reimbursement but conclude that the
recent opinion of this Court in Combs v. Kentucky River Health
District2 requires reversal on the denial of future medical
benefits.
The claimant Norman Charles suffered two separate
injuries to his shoulder in the course of his employment as a
scoop operator with appellant Sydney Coal Company on August 9
and August 10, 2001.
After seeking medical treatment, he was
off work for two weeks and then returned to light-duty work
until he was laid off on February 23, 2002.
Charles testified
at the hearing on his claim that he was paid temporary
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
____S.W.3d ____ (rendered February 10, 2006).
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disability benefits after he was laid off because he was still
under a doctor’s care.
He also admitted working during the time
he was receiving TTD benefits as a computer customer service
representative, as an employee of a company repossessing fourwheelers, and as an employee of a used car lot, washing,
detailing and fueling automobiles.
Charles underwent two surgical procedures on his
shoulder.
The first was performed by Dr. Steven Shockey on
January 31, 2002, and the second by Dr. Ben Kibler in July 2003.
He testified at the hearing that although he was still working
for the car lot, he was having significant difficulties with his
shoulder.
After reviewing the lay and medical evidence in the
record, the ALJ concluded that Charles suffered no permanent
disability as a result of the shoulder injuries.
In reaching
that determination, the ALJ relied upon the opinion of Dr.
Timothy Wagner who evaluated Charles on May 8, 2003, and again
on May 6, 2004.
Dr. Wagner’s impression after the second
evaluation was that Charles had reached maximum medical
improvement and that he could continue his job with the auto
dealership.
He assessed a 0% impairment rating and placed no
restrictions on Charles’s work activities and was of the opinion
that Charles retained the physical capacity to return to his
former job.
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Although the ALJ dismissed Charles’s claim for
permanent partial disability benefits, she was nevertheless
convinced that he was entitled to an award of temporary total
disability benefits.
However, because Charles had returned to
work for a different employer while continuing to receive TTD
benefits, the ALJ concluded that Sidney Coal had made a
voluntary overpayment and ordered Charles to reimburse the
employer a total of $30,744.06, representing payments of $530.07
per week for the period from September 23, 2002, through October
31, 2003.
She made a specific finding, however, that there was
insufficient evidence of wrongdoing on Charles’s part to invoke
the provisions of KRS 342.335 regarding false or fraudulent
claims or the penalty provisions of KRS 342.990.
On petition
for reconsideration, the ALJ clarified the periods for which
Sidney was entitled to reimbursement of TTD benefits and denied
Charles’s request for an award of reasonable and necessary
future medical benefits.
On appeal, the Board reversed the order requiring
Charles to reimburse Sidney stating that no statutory provision
requires an employee receiving temporary income benefits to give
notice of return to work as is the case with an award of
permanent income benefits under KRS 342.730(7).
The Board set
out the following rationale for its reversal of the ALJ’s
decision as to reimbursement:
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Furthermore, KRS 342.990(11) states that in
addition to the penalties provided in this
section, the commissioner and any
administrative law judge or court of
jurisdiction may order restitution of a
benefit secured through conduct proscribed
by this chapter.
Here, the ALJ specifically determined
Charles did not commit any conduct which
rose to the level to invoke the penalties of
KRS 342.990. In other words, the ALJ made
the express finding that Charles did not
engage in any conduct that was proscribed by
the statute. Outside of KRS 342.990, there
exists no authorization under the Kentucky
Workers’ Compensation Act for recouping
overpayment of income benefits mistakenly
made when there are no past due benefits
awarded. That is not to say we cannot
perceive a situation where an employer,
under extraordinary circumstances not
present here, might also be entitled to a
credit against future benefits.
We recognize the payment to Charles may be
deemed a windfall. However, as the court
indicated in Stratemeyer, supra, a balance
must be struck between the interests of the
employer against the interest of an injured
worker. In situations such as the instant
claim, we believe the supreme court has
determined the interest of the injured
worker outweighs the employer’s right to
recover overpayment of TTD benefits
voluntarily made. Here we have a maximum
wage earner who was truly injured and
underwent two shoulder surgeries. He
attempted and did return to little more than
minimum wage work. The ALJ specifically
determined Charles’s actions did not rise to
the level to invoke the penalties of KRS
342.990. Pursuant to the supreme court’s
decision in Stratemeyer, supra, without an
award of past due permanent partial
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disability benefits, there is simply no
authority justifying an order of repayment
of overpaid TTD. For the above reasons, we
agree with Charles that the ALJ erred in
ordering reimbursement of overpaid TTD
benefits.
Sidney argues in its direct appeal that the Board erred in
reversing the reimbursement decision of the ALJ, citing the
definition of “temporary total disability” contained in KRS
342.0011(11)(a) and stating that there is no statutory
prohibition against the type of reimbursement ordered in this
case.
We find this argument unpersuasive.
In Double L Construction, Inc. v. Mitchell,3 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the question of whether an
injured worker is entitled to TTD benefits when he continues to
work at a concurrent part-time job.
The claimant in that case
sustained an injury in the course of his usual job as a
carpenter requiring him to be off work from that job for a
period of seven months.
During this seven-month period,
however, the claimant continued to work a concurrent part-time
janitorial job.
Although the facts of the instant case differ
slightly from Mitchell in that we are dealing with a return to
minimal work after a lay-off, we are convinced that the analysis
with respect to entitlement to TTD benefits is equally
applicable here.
3
182 S.W.3d 509 (Ky. 2005).
-6-
In concluding that Mitchell was entitled to TTD
benefits despite the fact that he continued to work a concurrent
part-time job, the Court reasoned that a claimant is entitled to
TTD benefits if the work-related injury resulted in a temporary
inability to perform the job in which the injury occurred.
The
fact that the claimant continued to work a concurrent job during
the period of disability was not a disqualifying factor.
Relying on Central Kentucky Steel v. Wise,4 the Court noted that
while permanent disability awards require a complete inability
to perform any type of work,5 temporary total disability awards
require only that the claimant is unable to perform the job in
which the injury occurred.6
Especially pertinent to Norman
Charles’s situation, the Mitchell court made clear that workers
should not be penalized for attempting to perform what work they
are able to do.
The Court found no basis for relieving the
injury employer from liability for TTD benefits simply because
the worker is still able to work a concurrent job.7
Because we are convinced that the analysis supporting
the Board’s reversal of the reimbursement order falls neatly
within the Mitchell rationale, we find its holding to be
4
19 S.W.3d 657 (Ky. 2000).
5
KRS 342.0011(11)(b) and (c); KRS 342.730(1)(a) and (b).
6
Mitchell, 182 S.W.3d at 514.
7
Id.
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dispositive of Sidney’s appeal.
Like the Board, we are
convinced that Charles’s ability to return to lighter minimumwage work did not disqualify him from entitlement to TTD
benefits from his primary employment.
Thus, there was no basis
for requiring him to reimburse Sidney for those payments.
Next, we turn to Charles’s argument that he was
entitled to an award of reasonable and necessary medical
payments.
Entitlement to future medical benefits in the absence
of an award of permanent disability benefits was recently
addressed by this Court in Combs v. Kentucky River District
Health Department.8
In reversing the denial of future medical
benefits to Ms. Combs under circumstances similar to those in
Norman Charles’s claim, this Court set forth the following
rationale:
As noted by the Board and the ALJ below, the
issue of whether an injured worker is
entitled to future medical benefits when the
subject injury does not merit an award of
permanent disability income benefits was
first addressed by this state's highest
court in Cavin v. Lake Construction Co., 451
S.W.2d 159 (Ky.1970). In Cavin, the
claimant was injured when he tripped and
fell into a ditch while carrying an 80-pound
jackhammer on his shoulder. The Workmen's
Compensation Board rejected Cavin's claim
for disability income benefits, finding that
the injury produced no occupational
disability, but nevertheless awarded him
further medical benefits pursuant to KRS
342.020. The former Court of Appeals (now
8
Supra.
-8-
the Kentucky Supreme Court) affirmed this
decision, holding: “We do not believe it is
necessarily inconsistent for the board to
award payment of medical expenses without
finding some extent of disability. It is
not impossible for a non-disabling injury to
require medical attention.” Id. at 161-62.
Despite the Board's belief that the
conclusion in Cavin that future medical
benefits may still be awarded in the absence
of a finding of disability is mere dicta and
“conflicts with the plain language of KRS
342.020, which confines an award for medical
expenses to those expenses which ‘may
reasonably be required at the time of injury
and thereafter during disability’” (italics
in original), this proposition has been
repeatedly recognized and followed by our
courts-even given the sweeping legislative
changes of the workers' compensation system
in 1996. See Alcan Foil Products, a
Division of Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Huff, 2
S.W.3d 96, 99 (Ky. 1999) (“Although a
finding of occupational disability is
required for an award of income benefits,
the onset of occupational disability has no
bearing on determining the date from which
the period of limitations begins to run or
on determining an injured worker's
entitlement to medical benefits.”); Mountain
Clay, Inc. v. Frazier, 988 S.W.2d 503, 505
(Ky.App.1998) (“It has consistently been
held that an ALJ may award medical expenses
even if he finds no disability because it is
possible for a non-disabling injury to
require medical care.”). Moreover, the
particular portion of KRS 342.020 noted
above that was cited by the Board as being
in conflict with Cavin was in effect well
before that decision was rendered, and our
predecessor court presumably was aware of it
when the case was decided. While the Board
may disagree with this precedent, it is
still bound to follow it. See Western
Baptist Hospital, supra. We also note that
none of the cases cited to by the Board in
support of its decision deals with the
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specific issue of whether future medical
benefits can ever be awarded in the absence
of a finding of permanent disability or
addresses Cavin in any way. Accordingly,
until our Supreme Court decides to
explicitly overturn its decision in Cavin,
we will continue to abide by the principles
set forth in that case. Therefore, we must
reverse the Board on this issue.
Because we find this analysis applicable to Charles’s claim for
future medicals, we reverse the Board’s decision on that issue.
Finally, as the Board pointed out in its opinion,
there is ample evidence to support a conclusion that Charles may
well be in need of future medical intervention despite having
produced insufficient evidence to merit an award of permanent
occupational disability benefits:
In addition to Dr. Wagner’s report there is
other evidence in the record indicating
Charles might need continuing prescription
medication. Dr. King, Charles’s family
physician, in a report dated April 22, 2004,
listed current medications as: 1) Neurontin
800 mg PO t.i.d.; 2) Motrin 800 mg PO
t.i.d.; 3) Zanaflex 4 mg PO b.i.d.; and 4)
Lortab 7.5 PO b.i.d., #60 per month. Dr.
King indicated he asked Charles to continue
his current medications along with heat,
home exercises and restrictions. Dr. Nadar,
Charles’s IME physician, indicated “he’ll
continue to need ongoing symptomatic
treatment from time to time with analgesics
and anti-inflammatory medications.” Dr.
Kibler, in a note dated September 23, 2003,
indicated Charles needed to work on scapular
control “and return to see me on an as
needed basis.”
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On this state of the record, we are convinced that Charles was
entitled to an award of reasonable and necessary future medical
benefits.
Accordingly, we affirm the Board in Appeal No. 2005CA-001750; in Appeal No. 2005-CA-002228, the opinion of the
Board is reversed and the case remanded for entry of a decision
in conformity with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. Stuart Bennett
Lexington, Kentucky
Miller Kent Carter
Pikeville, Kentucky
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