BLUEGRASS COOPERAGE v. MIKE JOHNSON AND HONORABLE LAWRENCE F. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
APRIL 14, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001622-WC
BLUEGRASS COOPERAGE
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
PETITION AND CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NOS. 1998-WC-85673 AND 2003-WC-01462
MIKE JOHNSON
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AND
HONORABLE LAWRENCE F. SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
Bluegrass Cooperage petitions for review of an
opinion of the Worker’s Compensation Board that reversed an
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision to dismiss Mike
Johnson’s claim for benefits for a cumulative trauma injury to
his right elbow.
In addition, Johnson has filed a cross-
petition from the portion of the Board’s decision which affirmed
the ALJ’s decision to dismiss Johnson’s claim for benefits for a
cumulative trauma injury to his left elbow.
We affirm the
Board’s opinion in all respects.
The record of this case is lengthy and complex.
For
purposes of resolving these petitions for review, however, we
need only to consider the following basic facts.
In May 2001,
Johnson filed a claim for benefits for alleged cumulative trauma
injuries to both elbows; and, in July 2003, Johnson filed
another, separate claim for benefits for a cumulative trauma
injury to his left elbow.
Each injury allegedly occurred as a
result of Johnson’s employment as a cooper with Bluegrass
Cooperage.
Each side marshaled evidence, after which the ALJ
found that Johnson “was made aware that he had bilateral workrelated elbow injuries on December 18, 1997.”
So the ALJ
dismissed Johnson’s claims as having been brought outside of
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.185’s two-year statute of
limitations.
Johnson appealed the ALJ’s dismissal of his claims to
the Board.
In a well-written opinion by Board Member Young, the
Board found that they were “unable to locate support in the
record for a finding that Johnson’s right elbow problems began
in December of 1997 or that Johnson was made aware of a right
elbow injury in December of 1997.”
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The Board then noted that
much of the medical evidence supported a finding that Johnson’s
right elbow injury was first medically documented in February
1998.
But because the Board lacked authority to make factual
findings, such as Johnson’s injury onset date, it vacated the
ALJ’s decision as to the right elbow and remanded the claim for
additional findings consistent with the evidence.
That portion
of the Board’s opinion is the subject of Bluegrass Cooperage’s
petition for review.
As to Johnson’s alleged left elbow cumulative trauma
injury, the Board found that there was evidence in the record
supporting the ALJ’s decision that that injury’s onset date was
December 18, 1997.
So the Board affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of
Johnson’s 2003 claim for benefits due to the expiration of the
statute of limitations.
And that portion of the Board’s opinion
is the subject of Johnson’s cross-petition.
It is well-established that this Court’s function in
workers’ compensation cases “is to correct the Board only where
the . . . Court perceives the Board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an
error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.”1
1
Furthermore, Johnson, as the claimant, has the
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-688 (Ky.
1992).
-3-
burden of proof and must prove every element of his claim.2
Because the ALJ’s decision was not in Johnson’s favor, the issue
on appeal is “whether the evidence was so overwhelming, upon
consideration of the entire record, as to have compelled a
finding in [Johnson’s] favor.”3
In order to be compelling,
evidence must be “so overwhelming that no reasonable person
would fail to be persuaded by it . . . .”4
It must also be noted that the ALJ acts as the sole
finder of fact in workers’ compensation cases, meaning that the
ALJ alone “has the authority to determine the quality,
character[,] . . . substance[,]”5 and weight of the evidence
presented, as well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom.6
Thus, the ALJ “may reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether
it comes from the same witness or the same adversary party’s
total proof.”7
In our limited function as a reviewing court, we
may not “substitute [our] judgment” for that of the ALJ, nor can
2
Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Ky. 2000).
3
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App. 1984).
4
Magic Coal Co., 19 S.W.3d at 96.
5
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985).
6
Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico., Inc., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331
(Ky. 1997).
7
Magic Coal Co., 19 S.W.3d at 96.
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we render our own findings or direct the conclusions the ALJ
shall make.8
In its petition for review, Bluegrass Cooperage
repeatedly argues that the evidence supports a finding that
Johnson’s right elbow injury onset date was in September 1996.9
This argument is unavailing, however, because, as stated
previously, we are unable to make factual findings.
So even if
we believed Bluegrass Cooperage’s contention, we cannot find
that Johnson’s injury onset date was September 1996 (or any
other date).
The only question properly before us is whether
any evidence exists to support the ALJ’s conclusion that
Johnson’s right elbow injury’s onset date was December 18, 1997.
Notably, Bluegrass Cooperage’s petition does not contain a
citation to anything in the record supporting that onset date,
nor have we independently located anything to support that onset
date.
Thus, the Board correctly concluded that the ALJ erred
when he found that Johnson’s right elbow injury became manifest
on December 18, 1997.
Furthermore, as the ALJ is the only
entity with the authority to make findings of fact, the Board
8
Wolf Creek Collieries, 673 S.W.2d at 736.
9
In repetitive injury cases, the injury “becomes manifest for the
purpose of notice and limitations with the worker's knowledge of the
harmful change and the fact that it is caused by the work.”
Brummitt v. Southeastern Kentucky Rehabilitation Industries,
156 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Ky. 2005).
-5-
properly remanded this issue to the ALJ with instructions to
find a new onset date for Johnson’s right elbow injury.
Finally, we agree with Bluegrass Cooperage that on
remand, the ALJ may well find that the correct injury onset date
for Johnson’s right elbow trauma was February 1998.
If the ALJ
does find February 1998 as the onset date, Johnson’s 2001 claim
for benefits will likely again be dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds.
But we must reject Bluegrass Cooperage’s
harmless error argument because it is premised on the ALJ
finding that Johnson’s right elbow injury onset date is February
1998, a finding that the ALJ has yet to make.
Finally, lest
this opinion be misconstrued, we are not requiring the ALJ to
pick any specific injury onset date.
On remand, the ALJ is free
to choose whatever onset date is supported by the evidence.
Turning to the cross-petition, the ALJ and the Board
both found that Johnson’s 2003 claim for a left elbow injury was
merely a new recitation of his 2001 claim.
The ALJ found that
Johnson “was made aware that he had bilateral work-related elbow
injuries on December 18, 1997.”
(Emphasis added).
The ALJ then
concluded that “the evidence [is] insufficient to show the
plaintiff’s elbow problems referred to in this [2003] claim are
any different from the elbow problems referred to in” the
2001 claim.
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The Board noted that the evidence was conflicting on
whether the 2001 claim and 2003 claim referenced the same left
elbow injury but affirmed because the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence.
According to the ALJ and the
Board, since the 2003 claim was traceable to the same onset date
as the 2001 claim, it was untimely filed.
In his cross-petition, Johnson contends that his
2003 left elbow claim references a new injury and was not merely
a differently worded rehash of his previous claim.
Therefore,
Johnson contends that his 2003 claim had a different onset date
than his 2001 claim.
As noted by the Board, Dr. Thomas Lehmann’s office
notes for December 18, 1997, contain a finding that Johnson
suffered from “left medial epicondylitis.”10
Johnson argues to
us, as he did before the ALJ and the Board, that his 2003 claim
represents a claim for recurrent medial epicondylitis, which he
contends is a different injury than that referenced in his
2001 claim or in Dr. Lehmann’s December 1997 notes.
Indeed,
Johnson’s contention finds some supporting evidence in the
record.
10
But the fact that there is conflicting evidence is not
Epicondylitis is “inflammation of an epicondyle or of tissues
adjoining the humeral epicondyle[,]” and an epicondyle is “an
eminence upon a bone, above its condyle.” DORLAND’S POCKET MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 247 (23rd ed. 1982).
-7-
enough to require reversal on appeal.11
Although reasonable
minds could differ as to whether the 2003 claim represents a
different injury than that alleged in the 2001 claim, it is
undisputed that Dr. Lehmann mentioned a medial epicondylitis
injury to Johnson’s left elbow in his December 1998 notes.
The
ALJ could permissibly conclude, therefore, that the injury
referenced in Dr. Lehmann’s December 1998 notes is the same
injury alleged in Johnson’s 2003 claim.
Thus, the ALJ could
have reasonably found that the onset date for Johnson’s 2003
claim is December 1998, meaning that Johnson’s 2003 claim was
untimely.
Therefore, as the ALJ’s and Board’s decisions are
supported by substantial evidence, we must affirm.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
Worker’s Compensation Board is affirmed in all respects; and
this matter is remanded to the ALJ for additional findings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT AND CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE AND CROSSAPPELLANT MIKE JOHNSON:
M. Christopher Davis
Louisville, Kentucky
Wayne C. Daub
Louisville, Kentucky
11
Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1999) (“[a]lthough a
party may note evidence which would have supported a conclusion
contrary to the ALJ's decision, such evidence is not an adequate
basis for reversal on appeal.”).
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