JASON GOLDSMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 28, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001540-MR
JASON GOLDSMITH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00269
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND HENRY, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Jason Goldsmith appeals from an order of
the Bullitt Circuit Court that denied his motion to withdraw his
plea of guilty to first-degree wanton endangerment and
misdemeanor trafficking involved in marijuana charges.
He
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
motion.
As we disagree, we affirm the trial court.
Goldsmith was charged with first-degree wanton
endangerment, trafficking in marijuana (less than eight ounces),
and driving on a suspended or revoked operator’s license.
Goldsmith held a .9 mm handgun to the head of a fourteen-yearold boy in an attempt to coerce information from the boy
concerning the theft of several thousand dollars worth of
illegal drugs from his car.
notified.
He fled the scene after police were
When he was apprehended, he possessed the handgun,
two bags of marijuana, and $5,423.00 in cash.
A grand jury
returned an indictment against him on November 10, 2004; he
entered his plea of guilty on March 3, 2005.
for April 27, 2005.
Sentencing was set
Goldsmith was allowed to remain free on
bond despite objection by the Commonwealth.
Several diverse incidents occurred between the time of
his plea and his sentencing.
accident.
bedroom.
Goldsmith was involved in a car
He was allegedly observed to have a shotgun in his
Believing that Goldsmith was suicidal, his father
obtained a seventy-two-hour mental health commitment for him.
After he failed to appear for his sentencing, a bench warrant
was issued for his arrest.
Goldsmith obtained new counsel, who
filed motions to substitute as counsel and to withdraw
Goldsmith’s guilty plea.
The trial court granted the motion for
substitution and scheduled a hearing on the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea.
At the hearing on June 13, 2005, Goldsmith called his
father as his sole witness.
His father testified that he was
unaware that Goldsmith had intended to enter a guilty plea until
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after it occurred.
With regard to the accident, he testified
that Goldsmith had been drinking prior to wrecking the car.
He
also reported that he had seen Goldsmith with a shotgun in his
bedroom.
His father described Goldsmith as “edgy” prior to his
sentencing date.
He was unable to testify that Goldsmith had
actually attempted suicide or that he had ever spoken about
killing himself.
The trial court entered an order denying the motion to
withdraw the plea.
It sentenced him on July 13, 2005 to serve
two years on the wanton endangerment charge according to the
terms of his plea agreement.
He received a concurrent twelve-
month sentence on the trafficking charge.
This appeal followed.
Goldsmith argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea
prior to sentencing.
RCr1 8.10, which governs the withdrawal of
guilty pleas, provides as follows:
At any time before judgment the court may
permit the plea of guilty or guilty but
mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty substituted.
If the court rejects the plea agreement, the
court shall, on the record, inform the
parties of this fact, advise the defendant
personally in open court or, on a showing of
good cause, in camera, that the court is not
bound by the plea agreement, afford the
defendant the opportunity to then withdraw
the plea, and advise the defendant that if
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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the defendant persists in that guilty plea
the disposition of the case may be less
favorable to the defendant than that
contemplated by the plea agreement.
The court can defer accepting or rejecting
the plea agreement until there has been an
opportunity to consider the presentence
report.
Kentucky holds that “permission to withdraw a guilty
plea and substitute a plea of not guilty is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court.”
507 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Ky. 1974).
Anderson v. Commonwealth,
At the time of his plea,
Goldsmith was twenty-six years of age.
He had graduated from
high school and had been employed at various jobs.
He reported
no previous treatment for mental illness nor any impairment due
to substances.
The trial court conducted a thorough colloquy
prior to accepting his guilty plea.
Each of his constitutional
rights was explained to him, and he stated that he understood
them and wished to waive them by pleading guilty.
He confirmed
that he had conferred with his counsel and that he was satisfied
with the representation he received.
Goldsmith informed the
trial court that he was voluntarily pleading guilty to the
charges against him.
After discussing the elements of the plea with
Goldsmith, the court asked his lawyer whether they had discussed
the facts of the case, the nature of the charges and available
defenses, and Goldsmith’s rights.
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His lawyer answered in the
affirmative.
The trial court then accepted his guilty plea, and
Goldsmith received the exact sentence recommended by the
Commonwealth.
Thus, there was no mandatory right under RCr 8.10
entitling him to withdraw his plea.
Goldsmith now contends that the voluntariness of his
plea is at issue because of his allegedly precarious mental
state prior to his first scheduled sentencing date.
disagree.
We
At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea,
Goldsmith’s new attorney conceded that the trial court’s
colloquy complied with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969),
acknowledging that there was no evidence of a problem with his
mental state until the day before he was scheduled for
sentencing.
Absent some evidence that Goldsmith did not
understand his rights, the Commonwealth contended that the court
had the discretion rather than an obligation to permit his plea
to be withdrawn.
In denying Goldsmith’s motion to withdraw his plea,
the court found that it was knowing and voluntary.
In addition,
the court concluded that the hospital records submitted by
Goldsmith failed to establish that he suffered from mental
illness as he claimed.
We cannot conclude the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Goldsmith’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
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We affirm the judgment of the Bullitt Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Fred R. Radolovich
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kevin Ricky Branscum
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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