KEVIN McGREGOR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001444-MR
KEVIN McGREGOR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-002507
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JOHNSON AND WINE, JUDGES; MILLER,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Kevin McGregor appeals from an order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to CR2 60.02.
For the reasons stated
below, we affirm.
1
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
In October 1998, McGregor was indicted by the
Jefferson Circuit Court on charges of second-degree possession
of a forged instrument and second-degree persistent felony
offender.
On March 29, 1999, McGregor, in connection with a
guilty plea, was sentenced to an enhanced sentence of five-years
imprisonment and was placed on probation for a five-year period
(Case No. 98-CR-002507).
In 2003, McGregor committed additional felonies and
was sentenced to ten-years imprisonment (Case 2003-CR-000070)
while still on probation.
Final sentencing in that case
occurred on January 22, 2004.
On February 10, 2004, the
Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke McGregor’s probation in
the 1998 case.3
On March 30, 2004, the Jefferson Circuit Court
entered an order revoking the appellant’s original probation and
imposing the five-year sentence that was placed upon him by the
judgment entered March 29, 1999.
On April 5, 2004, McGregor filed a pro se motion to
alter, amend or vacate judgment, claiming that the five-year
probated sentence could not be imposed upon him because the
court’s order was entered on March 30, 2004, which was one day
beyond the five-year period of the original imposition of
sentence on March 29, 1999.
The circuit court denied the motion
3
Prior to this time and subsequent to the 1998 judgment McGregor committed
various other crimes and there had been various other motions to revoke his
probation; however those events are not relevant to this appeal.
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by order entered April 13, 2004.
McGregor appealed the circuit
court’s decision to this Court but the appeal was dismissed by
order entered August 11, 2004; his motion to file a belated
appeal was also denied.
On May 24, 2005, McGregor filed a pro se motion
pursuant to CR 60.02 again arguing that the trial court erred by
revoking his probation one day beyond the expiration of his
probationary period.
The motion argued in the alternative that
his sentence in the 1998 case should be ordered to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed in his 2003 case.
By
order entered on May 27, 2005, the circuit court denied the
motion.
This appeal followed.
Before us, McGregor abandons his late-revocation
argument and argues only that the trial court erred by failing
to run his 2003 sentence concurrently with his 1998 conviction.
The Commonwealth raises several procedural and preservation
arguments, with which we generally agree.
However, we will
address the issue raised by McGregor upon the merits.
In support of his argument, McGregor contends that the
2003 judgment did not specify whether his 2003 sentence would
run concurrently with his 1998 sentence and cites us to KRS
532.110(2), which provides as follows:
If the court does not specify the manner in
which a sentence imposed by it is to run,
the sentence shall run concurrently with any
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other sentence which the defendant must
serve unless the sentence is required by
subsection (3) of this section or KRS
533.060 to run consecutively. (Emphasis
added).
However, KRS 533.060(2) states as follows:
When a person has been convicted of a felony
and is committed to a correctional detention
facility and released on parole or has been
released by the court on probation, shock
probation, or conditional discharge, and is
convicted or enters a plea of guilty to a
felony committed while on parole, probation,
shock probation, or conditional discharge,
the person shall not be eligible for
probation, shock probation, or conditional
discharge and the period of confinement for
that felony shall not run concurrently with
any other sentence. (Emphasis added).
KRS 533.060(2) is clear and unambiguous – if a
defendant commits a felony while on probation for a prior
felony, the sentence on the second felony may not be run
consecutively with the sentence on the first felony.
that the sentences must be run consecutively.
It follows
Hence, by
operation of law, the sentence in the 2003 case must be run
consecutively with the sentence in the 1998 case.
The Circuit Court accordingly did not err by denying
McGregor’s motion for post-conviction relief.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kevin McGregor, pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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